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This thesis compares the French and British Chernobyl debates in the period between 
1986 and 2006 and investigates the transnational debate on the health effects of this 
accident. While the exchange of actors and arguments has resulted in a rather congruent 
debate at the transnational level, the internal country debates on Chernobyl have remained 
very much bound by the national framework. This becomes particularly obvious in the 
comparison of the French and British Chernobyl debates, where multiple factors, specific 
to the national context, have shaped the different trajectories of the debates. In France, 
from the outset, Chernobyl was framed as a French debate, and placed into the context of 
the nucléocratie. In Britain, such an interpretative framework did not exist for the civil 
nuclear programme, since the predominant criticism against the nuclear enterprise had 
always been directed against the military complex and more focused on aspects of 
international relations than on the national nuclear energy complex. In Britain, therefore, 
Chernobyl was considered from a global perspective, whereas in France the focus was 
placed on the accident's impact at home. However, with the end of the Cold War and the 
British government’s decision in the mid-1990s to no longer finance new nuclear power 
plants, anti-nuclear positions as such lost their impetus. Thus, few people in Britain were 
interested transforming the debate on the health impact of Chernobyl into a proxy war in 
the fight over the legitimacy of the civil nuclear enterprise, as was happening in France. 
Leaving this discursive and commemorative gap to the solidarity movement, in Britain, 
Chernobyl did not become an anti-nuclear lieu de mémoire as it did in France, but instead 
became associated primarily with charity activities for disabled or unprivileged children 
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After the 1986 nuclear disaster in Chernobyl, the name itself was commonly used to mean 'the
worst accident ever to have occurred in the civil use of nuclear energy.' Chernobyl has held this rank
ever since, that is, until 11 March 2011, when an earthquake and the resulting tsunami partially
destroyed the Japanese nuclear power plant at Fukushima. Classified a category 7 on the
International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES), the meltdown of the core at Chernobyl
was, at the same time, considered the worst accident that could possibly take place in a nuclear
power plant. Technically, the actual meltdown is over. In this regard, Chernobyl is considered an
event of the past, an event to which a 'start' and an 'end' were attributed by technical evaluations that
followed the evolution of the incident. However, its consequences are far from over. As with war,
the scars of a nuclear catastrophe run deep; the aftermath is engraved in the environment, in the
people's bodies and in their memories. Signing a peace treaty does not bring an end to suffering;
burying a destroyed reactor core under hundreds of thousands of tons of concrete does not mean
that the evacuees can come home and simply forget what happened. 
Comparing the Chernobyl disaster to a war scene is not just an outgrowth of a creative
thinking process that was too strongly conditioned by my research on this topic. Many Ukrainian
and Belorussian accounts narrate and interpret the struggle endured and carried out by the
firefighters and rescue workers as a battle against an enemy: the burning reactor. The victims,
destruction, and displacements this burning reactor provoked have been paralleled to those caused
by World War II. The asymmetry of such an equation may seem obvious when remembering the
millions killed in the battlefields and murdered in the concentration camps of World War II, and
such a comparison might even seem inappropriate. But these narrations of Chernobyl do indeed
exist, as does the metaphor of the 'nuclear holocaust'. The description also exists, however, of
Chernobyl as a moderately serious industrial accident that resulted in a handful of deaths and
increased the probability that lethal cancers would break out in the exposed population, in other
words a minor health impact when compared to the annual number of deaths from road accidents or
from smoking cigarettes. 
Hence, what does this term 'worst accident ever to have occurred in the civil use of nuclear
energy' actually mean? For some, Chernobyl is proof that this technology must be abandoned, better
sooner rather than later. Yet, for others, Chernobyl is proof that this technology is the best mankind
has invented to date. How is it possible that the same event can be interpreted in such different
ways? It is precisely this question that I am concerned with in this book. One could argue: 'What is
surprising about the fact that a person in Belarus, who lost not only a loved one but also his or her
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home and whose place of birth was deleted from the map, puts the event in a different light than a
technocratic engineer in Vienna whose task is to calculate the probability that exactly the same
accident will happen in a different nuclear power plant?' Actually, there is nothing at all surprising
about the fact that these two people give a different meaning to 'Chernobyl'. Indeed, such an
observation would barely be enough to build a whole argument for a PhD thesis upon. But what if
these divergent interpretations are found in societies that are considered to be detached from the
event, geographically as well as politically? What if even amongst different groups within these
societies completely different narratives and interpretations of the causes and consequences of the
accident are found? Would this constitute valid grounds for investigating the origin of these
different narratives and interpretations, and for looking for explanations that can shed light on why
these different narratives and interpretations are constructed the way they are? I do. Therefore, it is
the aim of this book to elucidate the processes that led to the formation of these competing 'truths'
regarding Chernobyl that are circulating in the public discourse.
As the previous paragraphs have hinted, my approach to such concepts as 'constructions',
'interpretations', and 'narratives' is discourse analytical. It is not my aim to add 'my own truth' to the
many that circulate about Chernobyl. What is more, I am not in a position to judge which 'truth' is
more valid than another. Undoubtedly, many criteria could be applied to justify such a judgement:
for instance, the scientific or political authority of the person or institution to deliver a given
statement, or the number of people or institutions that quote this statement. But to judge these
competing 'truths' in such a manner would be to hover along the surface of this discourse rather than
investigating the discourse as such. Therefore, I am not asking: 'Is this statement valid?' But rather, I
am asking: 'Why was a certain narrative disseminated in a precise moment by a given person or
institution and what is the meaning or significance of this narrative?'
In the following paragraphs, I will further elaborate what this approach actually means for
the way I conducted my research, what I consider to be my frame of reference, and the contribution
of my research.
1.1 Why a comparison between France and Britain?
Accounts of Chernobyl are so numerous that it would be nearly impossible to write a global
Diskursgeschichte ('discourse history') of the accident. Most of the time, the quantity of sources
available in any single European country produces enough viable material to generate several years
worth of research. When I started my PhD project, I envisaged a three-country comparison between
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France, Great Britain, and Italy. For my master's thesis, I had already worked intensively on the
French debate regarding the impact of Chernobyl, so for this case study, my foundation was quite
solid.1 My intention was to take this case study as a point of departure and to compare the French
debate with those of the other two countries. Shortly after I began work on the British material,
however, I was forced to acknowledge that I would not be able to treat the three countries in the
same depth. The material I had researched during my first trip to London in 2011 already unveiled a
wealth of interesting aspects, although at this point, I could only observe but not yet explain many
of them. At the same time, my observations on the British Chernobyl debate called into question
some of my hypotheses on the French debate that I had thus far to some degree taken for granted.
Therefore, I decided to focus my research on the comparison between France and Britain and, in
addition, to look for transnational links in the respective Chernobyl debates. I considered it far more
important to research the British debate in depth, to rethink the assumptions I had made regarding
the French debate, and to enquire about transnational arguments and actors than to add another case
study to my work.
Initially, in choosing France, Great Britain, and Italy for my research project I had focused
primarily on two aspects: the impact the Chernobyl disaster had had on the nuclear politics of each
country and the growing entanglement of the French nuclear sector with the British and Italian
energy sectors from the year 2000 onwards. My research on the British case, however, strengthened
one aspect that I had not previously believed to be of importance: that the country in itself was a
nuclear power. Once I directed my attention toward this distinguishing characteristic, I began to
discover ever more parallels to the French debate – and this despite the fact that the debates had
been processed in entirely different ways. By studying these parallels more carefully, my work
brought me ever closer to the sphere of Science, Technology and Society (STS) Studies, a field of
research I had, heretofore, barely touched upon. But before I proceed to describe the
methodological details further (see section 1.3), I would like to briefly discuss the aforementioned
parallels between the French and the British case – parallels that render a comparison of their
respective Chernobyl debates especially sapid.2
1 My master's thesis, which serves here as the basis for my arguments on the French case, was published in 2011: 
Karena Kalmbach, Tschernobyl und Frankreich. Die Debatte um die Auswirkungen des Reaktorunfalls im Kontext 
der französischen Atompolitik und Elitenkultur (Frankfurt a. M.: Peter Lang Verlag, Zivilisationen und Geschichte 7,
2011.)
2 When I presented my research at various colloquia and conferences, I was frequently asked why I had not chosen to 
carry out a French-German comparison. Certainly, such a perspective can be solidly justified given that the French 
and German Chernobyl debates are so closely interwoven. Indeed, the protective measures put in place in West 
Germany during the days immediately following the accident had served as an argument in order to call into 
question the absence of such measures in France and thus sparked the affaire Tchernobyl. At the same time, nuclear 
advocates in France referred to these German counter-measures as proof of the devastating output of an exaggerated 
Atomangst. Therefore, it makes good sense indeed to carry out a French-German comparison to research Western 
European Chernobyl debates – or to research Western European anti-nuclear protest as Dorothy Nelkin and Michael 
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France and Great Britain share a common history that since the 20th century has been  marked
in many ways by the fact that they are the only nuclear powers in Western Europe. This factor –
which is attributed the role of the tertium comparationis in this comparison – not only shaped each
countries' history of technology of the military use of the atom. The decision to build nuclear
weapons, at the same time, strongly shaped developments in civil nuclear engineering of the two
nations. As the offspring of its military application, the civil use of nuclear energy was similarly
governed by classified policies and surrounded in secrecy. Furthermore, nuclear power plants were
never simply power plants, in France or in Britain. The inauguration of the first plants went hand in
hand with intensive demonstrations of national pride; pride that they had been able to master this
technology, that these genius engineers were citizens of the nation. This shared status as nuclear
powers was not only reflected in the specific role that was attributed early on to the civil use of
nuclear energy, it meant at the same time that they were confronted with criticism from parts of
their respective societies that had called this technology into question. Although the focus of this
criticism differed between the two countries – in France it was directed toward the civil use of
nuclear energy, and in Britain toward the military use – important environmental and anti-nuclear
movements sprang up in both and contributed to shaping the respective national discourse on
nuclear technology. In both countries, public and political support of the civil use of nuclear energy
has oscillated over time. The respective developments of each country did not begin at the same
time or progress at the same rates, nor were they identical in how they evolved, but over the last few
years, strong political support for a nuclear renaissance has been verified in both countries. 
With so many similarities between them, one might expect that the direct reactions to the
disaster in 1986 and ensuing debates on its impact would also be similar. Yet, this is only true for
one of the two aspects. The direct reactions in 1986, particularly from official sources like members
of the government or radiation protection agencies, were similar. However, the debates regarding
the impact of Chernobyl that would unfold in the years to come could hardly have proceeded more
differently. Having been hit by comparable levels of radioactive fallout,3 the citizens of both
Pollak have to a great extent already done. However, comparative European history has at times been far too limited 
to the French-German perspective. In addition, intensive research on the German Chernobyl debate has already been
undertaken. Moreover, I think it is problematic to permanently and continuously place French and German positions
on the nuclear question in opposition to each other. In France, German anti-nuclear convictions are often perceived 
as a kind of messianic mission, as an open confrontation and criticism of French policies. At the same time, 
Germans tend to consider themselves to be in a better moral position when it comes to nuclear questions, 
particularly since the idea that anti-nuclear activism and environmentalism is a German invention is so widespread. 
If there is a particular lacuna in nuclear debates, it is the lack of willingness of opposing sides to communicate. My 
intention with this work is not to contribute to this non-communication or lack thereof. On the contrary, I hope that 
my will open new opportunities for discussion. Therefore, to leave the 'beaten path' of the French-German 
comparison has the potential to unveil interesting new insights. For me, comparative history not only means to look 
for similarities, differences, and connections between cases. It means to try to better understand each single case by 
looking at a specific aspect through different lenses. 
3 For an early estimate of the levels and intensity of the radioactive fallout in both countries, see for example: 
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countries were assured that there would be no repercussions on their health. Official statements
released at the time went on to specify that the accident had occurred too far away for there to be
any effects: even had a minimal quantity of airborne radionuclides reached the country the
associated risk levels would be marginal. Furthermore, according to these official statements, the
accident did not constitute grounds for calling into question the safety of the national nuclear
programme insofar as the accident was a combination of elements: the Soviet (hence inferior)
technology, the faulty design of the reactor, and the human errors of the plant workers. These
statements, how they were communicated, and how the public and certain groups and individuals
reacted towards them, will be analysed in depth in the following chapters. What interests us here is
that although France and the UK started from a similar point of departure in 1986, their debates on
the impact of Chernobyl developed in very different ways. In France, Chernobyl was assigned the
role of a lieu de mémoire4 ('site of memory', i.e. a symbolic element of the memorial heritage of a
community) and became a common reference point not only in nuclear energy debates but also in
wider arguments on public policy. In Britain, on the other hand, Chernobyl was to all effects almost
forgotten.
How is it possible that Chernobyl, between France and Britain, was allocated to two
diametrically opposed positions in the collective memory? What were the influencing factors that
enabled the memory of Chernobyl to be 'kept alive' in France, and which factors in Britain buried
National Radiological Protection Board, A Preliminary Assessment of the Radiological Impact of the Chernobyl 
Reactor Accident on the Population of the European Community (Luxembourg: Commission of the European 
Communities, 1987): Appendix, Figure 7 Average Adult Effective Dose to 50 y within the EC. In this map, French 
and British citizens are indicated to have received a similar effective dose: 10-50 µSv in the greater part of the 
country and 80-300 µSv in the more affected regions, more specifically in the south-east (France) and the north-west
(Britain). Initial maps like this were the product of the extrapolation of individual measuring points (N.B. the 
number of measuring points varied widely from one country to another). These estimates were revised and refined in
the years immediately following 1986. Later maps were the result of a compendium of different kinds of data 
derived for example from measurements of radionuclides in soil and grass samples, or in the rainfall or sometimes 
even nationwide comprehensive measurements of caesium. The most complete atlas of the whole of Europe was 
published by the European Commission in 1996. A free downloadable version is available: Atlas on the caesium 
deposition across Europe after the Chernobyl accident (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities, 1998), http://rem.jrc.ec.europa.eu/RemWeb/pastprojects/atlasfiles/TEXT/ENGLISH.PDF 
(last accessed: 15 June 2013).
4 Since Pierre Nora's classic work on the sites of memory of France, his concept has on various occasions been 
removed from its original conceptual frame of nation building and applied to the most different contextual settings 
in which a collective memory contributes to the self-conception of a specific group. In this book, I also refer to the 
broader meaning of the term when I speak of Chernobyl as a lieu de mémoire. Thus, I am not implying that 
Chernobyl holds a certain place in the self-conception of a nation (although this might indeed be the case, for 
example, in Belarus) but rather I mean that the memory of the event contributes to the identity of a group of people. 
Recently, the concept of lieu de mémoire was adopted by environmental historians and resulted in the creation of the
anthology Ökologische Erinnerungsorte ('ecological sites of memory') and led to the publication of a special edition 
of the journal Global Environment. For the conceptual framework, see: Frank Uekötter, “Wege zu einer 
ökologischen Erinnerungskultur.” In Ökologische Erinnerungsorte, ed. by Frank Uekötter (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck 
& Ruprecht, 2014): 7-26; id., “Environment and Memory: Some Introductory Remarks,” Global Environment 11 
(2013): 5-15. It is interesting to note that there is no article on Chernobyl included in the comprehensive book 
project Europäische Erinnerungsorte ('European sites of memory'), which was published in 3 separate volumes in 
2011-12 by the Oldenbourg Verlag.
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the memory of Chernobyl? Who were the stakeholders in this process? And what are the
overarching frames of these developments, which are so essential to our understanding of the
respective symbolic meaning of the two national Chernobyl debates? These questions stand at the
core of this book and the attempt to answer them was the aim of my research. I am afraid, however,
that not all of these questions will be answered to the fullest satisfaction of the readers. At times, in
the course of this book, I will have to raise even more questions rather than give answers. But as
this work was an endeavour into generally un-researched terrain, I am sure that raising new
questions will also contribute to a better understanding of the contested 'truths' that surround
Chernobyl. 
Until recently, the influence the collective memory of Chernobyl had on Western European
societies and the construction of this historical event was practically overlooked. Historians had
limited themselves to the idea that a history of Chernobyl existed only in those countries that were
the most (directly) affected by the radioactive fallout, i.e. Belarus, Ukraine, and the Russian
Federation. Some attention was turned toward West Germany, where the timing of the accident
occurred at the peak of the anti-nuclear movement and therefore news of the former was very
strongly received. However, even if the governments and radiation protection agencies of several
countries were quick to state that their countries had not been touched by any considerable
radioactive fallout – whether this is indeed true or not is a question that does not concern us here –
Western European countries experienced an intense debate over the impact Chernobyl would have.
Chernobyl has thus become a global historical event and its discursive impact cannot be locally
equated with just its physical impact. 
Due to the novelty of my topic, I could not base my work on solid pre-existing research of
Western European Chernobyl debates. Instead, I had to draw on the literature and knowledge from
many different fields. In the following section, I will give a brief summary of what areas of research
were important for my own work, and at the same time offer the reader insight into the
miscellaneousness of the different approaches to Chernobyl.
1.2 The state of the art in Chernobyl research and connected works
The Chernobyl accident has only recently become a topic of historical research. Unlike political
scientists and sociologists, who have investigated this field from the outset (i.e. directly from 1986
on), historians are at the cusp of the discovery that they, too, can contribute to this field of research.
Their role will not be limited to an order to 'find out what really happened on 26 April 1986', once
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the archives are opened. What historians can primarily contribute to the research on Chernobyl now
is their critical approach to sources, i.e. by asking how a certain narrative developed and not just
taking it for granted, or by investigating the impact this narrative had on the collective memory of a
society, and not by simply analysing the outcome in terms of 'learning abilities' and 'risk awareness'
(two fields many social science Chernobyl-studies have focused on). 'Historicizing Chernobyl' does
not mean that this event must be banished to the past, denying that its fallout continues to have an
impact even today and might continue to do so even for a long time yet to come. 'Historicizing
Chernobyl' means, rather – and here I follow the approach of the Begriffsgeschichte ('history of
concepts') – that Chernobyl is not a fixed entity, a clearly contoured 'thing' that has an absolute
meaning. On the contrary, I treat Chernobyl as something the meaning of which changes and
mutates over time, and I am interested in why these changes occur, in which context they occur, and
who are the promoters behind them. 
The following paragraphs give an overview of the disciplines and sub-disciplines that have
addressed the question of Chernobyl. At the same time, this account on the state of the art of
research also informs the reader of the publications and authors that lie outside the truly
interdisciplinary field of Chernobyl research that have been important for my own project.
1.2.1 History and Anthropology of Eastern Europe
Within social sciences and the humanities, the field of history and anthropology of Eastern Europe
is surely the one that has addressed Chernobyl more than any other. Historians and anthropologists
are not the only ones who have conducted research in this field. Political scientists and sociologists
have as well. What they all have in common is a shared interest in the way in which Chernobyl
transformed and impacted the societies geographically closest to the plant: the peoples of Ukraine,
Belarus and the Russian Federation. From this field of research, it is certainly Adriana Petryna's
work that, internationally, has received the most attention. Her book, Life Exposed: Biological
Citizenship after Chernobyl,5 in which she sheds light on the societal impact of the compensation
system that was implemented for the parts of the Ukrainian population that were exposed, has
clearly obtained the status of a reference work for Chernobyl research. Recently, a research group
based at the Centre for Contemporary History in Potsdam (ZZF), headed by Melanie Arndt and
funded by the Volkswagen Stiftung has made important contributions to this field. Six scholars
conducted research on Politics and Society after Chernobyl in Belarus, Ukraine, Russia, Lithuania
5 Adriana Petryna, Life Exposed: Biological Citizens after Chernobyl (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).
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and Germany in individual projects, the focus of which lay on the question: 'how the subject of
Chernobyl became a line of conflict and how it was instrumentalized by the dynamics of various
movements'.6 The anthology “Anthropologischer Schock” nach Tschernobyl? Politik und
Gesellschaft nach der Katastrophe assembles the papers presented in an international conference
organized by this group in 2011.7
There are far too many important works in this field of research than is possible to discuss
here in detail. Thus, my reference to Petryna's book, the ZZF research group and the conference
publication should be considered only as examples of a flourishing scientific field. Moreover, this
section is not intended to be a literature review but rather is intended to give an idea of the diversity
that exists in the approaches to the Chernobyl topic. Before moving on to another field that is
concerned with research on this nuclear accident, the footnote below lists further references of
interest.8 
1.2.2 History of Technology, History of Science, Environmental History
The decision to combine the historical sub-disciplines of the History of Technology, the History of
Science, and Environmental History into one single paragraph requires some explanation. Although
at times, there is an overlap in the topics they study, these sub-disciplines most certainly do not
constitute a coherent field of study and frequently do not even share the same methodological
approaches. Moreover, with regard to their relevance for research on Chernobyl, very few scholarly
works from these disciplines explicitly investigate this particular accident. There is, however, a
6 This is a quote from the project's website www.after-chernobyl.de (last accessed: 15 June 2013). The entire research 
project consisted of Melanie Arndt's Post-Doc-project and five doctoral dissertations by Evgenija Ivanova, Tatjana 
Kasperski, Anastasija Leuchina, Andrej Stepanov, and Aleksandr Dalhouski respectively. For a description of the 
individual projects, see: http://www.zzf-pdm.de/site/661/default.aspx (last accessed: 15 June 2013). 
7 Melanie Arndt (ed.), “Anthropologischer Schock” nach Tschernobyl? Politik und Gesellschaft nach der Katastrophe
(Wien / Köln / Weimar: Böhlau, 2014, forthcoming).
8 For publications from the field of history and anthropology of Eastern Europe concerned with Chernobyl, see for 
example: Melanie Arndt (ed.), “Memories, Commemorations, and Representations of Chernobyl” in Anthropology 
of East Europe Review, 30, 1 (2012); Olga Kuchinskaya, “Twice Invisible: Formal Representations of Radiation 
Danger,” in Social Studies of Science 43, 1 (2012): 78-96; Tatiana Kasperski, La politique de la mémoire d’une 
catastrophe nucléaire: les usages de l’accident de Tchernobyl en Biélorussie (1986–2008) (Sciences Po Paris: PhD 
dissertation, 2012); Sarah Drue Phillips, “Chernobyl’s Sixth Sense: The Symbolism of an Ever-Present Awareness,” 
in Anthropology and Humanism, 29, 2 (2004): 159–85; Astrid Sahm, Transformation im Schatten von Tschernobyl. 
Umwelt- und Energiepolitik im gesellschaftlichen Wandel von Belarus und Ukraine (Münster: LIT Verlag, 1999); id.,
“Und der dritte Weltkrieg heißt Tschernobyl...” In Erinnerungen gegen den Krieg, ed. by F. Dorn et al. (Minsk: 
Journalistenfonds des Journalistenverbandes von Belarus, 1995): 202-227; Melanie Arndt, “Von der Todeszone zum 
Strahlen-Mekka? Die Erinnerung an die Katastrophe von Tschernobyl in Belarus, der Ukraine und Russland,” in 
Zeitgeschichte-online, April 2006; Astrid Sahm, Manfred Sapper, Volker Weichsel (eds), “Tschernobyl: Vermächtnis
und Verpflichtung,” special issue of Osteuropa, 56, 4 (2006); David Marples, Chernobyl and Nuclear Power in the 
USSR (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1987); id., The Social Impact of the Chernobyl Disaster (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1988).
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broad literature from these three historical sub-disciplines that is concerned with various aspects of
nuclear technology. One might go so far as to say that 'Nuclear History' as it is represented today in
conferences, book projects, and research groups is mainly grounded in that point in which theses
three historical sub-disciplines intersect: Research on the development of nuclear technology in a
particular country,9 on regulatory regimes,10 on specific projects,11 or on particular scientists12
encounters, here, publications on particular accidents,13 as well as studies concerned with the
societal and environmental impact of this technical enterprise.14 This variety of scholarly
approaches and scientific backgrounds is clearly reflected in the different departmental affiliations
of the members of the Nuclear International Research Group (NIRG). 
This heterogeneous body of scholarly work on Nuclear History widened my perspective and
led me to reflect upon Chernobyl not as single isolated event but as part of a bigger picture of
nuclear techno-politics and their environmental impact. For my case studies on France and Britain,
the works by Gabrielle Hecht15 and Brian Wynne16 were of utmost importance. Their works are
telling examples of the way in which disciplinary boundaries blur when it comes to Nuclear
History: Hecht's work on the post-war French nuclear programme and Wynne's work on the
conflicts implicit in the British post-Chernobyl sheep farm restriction are classics in STS and, at the
same time, serve as primary references for research in the nuclear history of both countries.
9 For classical works on the history of specific national nuclear programmes, see for example: Joachim Radkau, 
Aufstieg und Krise der deutschen Atomwirtschaft 1945-1975. Verdrängte Alternativen und der Ursprung der 
nuklearen Kontroverse (Reinbek: Rowohlt 1983); Margaret Gowing, assisted by Lorna Arnold, Independence and 
Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945–1952 (London: Macmillan, 1974); Robert Anderson, Nucleus and 
Nation: Scientists, International Networks, and Power in India (Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 2010); 
Paul R. Josephson, Red Atom. Russia's Nuclear Power Program from Stalin to Today (Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 2005).
10 See for example: Cyrille Foasso, L'Histoire de la sûreté de l'énergie nucléaire civile en France, 1945- 2000 
(Université Lumière Lyon II: dissertation, 2003); Soraya Boudia, “Global regulation: Controlling and Accepting 
Radioactivity Risks,” in History and Technology 23, 4 (2007): 389-406.
11 See for example: Susan M. Lindee, Suffering Made Real: American Science and the Survivors at Hiroshima 
(Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 1994).
12 See for example: Cathryn Carson, Heisenberg in the Atomic Age. Science in the Public Sphere (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010); Andrew Brown, Keeper of the Nuclear Conscience. The Life and Work of 
Joseph Rotblat (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Christoph Laucht, Elemental Germans: Klaus Fuchs, 
Rudolf Peierls and the Making of British Nuclear Culture 1939-59 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
13 See for example: Samuel Walker, Three Mile Island. A Nuclear Crisis in Historical Perspective (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2004); Lorna Arnold, Windscale 1957: Anatomy of a Nuclear Accident (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 1995).
14 See for example: Kate Brown, Plutopia. Nuclear Families, Atomic Cities, and the Great Soviet and American 
Plutonium Disasters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Jacob Darwin Hamblin, Poison in the Well. 
Radioactive Waste in the Oceans at the Dawn of the Nuclear Age (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 
2008); Laura Harkewicz, The Ghost of the Bomb: The Bravo Medical Program, Scientific Uncertainty, and the 
Legacy of U.S. Cold War Science, 1954—2005 (PhD Dissertation University of California San Diego, 2010). 
15 Gabrielle Hecht, The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War II (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1998); id., “Nuclear Ontologies,” in Constellations, 13, 3 (2006): 320–331.
16 Brian Wynne, “Misunderstood Misunderstanding: Social Identities and Public Uptake of Science,” in Public 
Understanding of Science 1 (1992): 281-304; id., “Sheepfarming after Chernobyl. A Case Study in Communicating 
Scientific Information,“ in Environment 31, 2 (1989): 10-39; id., Rationality and Ritual. Participation and 
Exclusion in Nuclear Decision-making (Abingdon: Earthscan, 2011).
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1.2.3 Social and Cultural History of the Nuclear Age
A classic example of approaching the nuclear complex from a social and cultural history perspective
is the book Nuclear Fear by Spencer Weart. In this book, Weart traces the origins of the pervasive
nuclear imagery that continues to accompany our conceptualization of nuclear power today.17 A
broad range of scholarly publications shed light on the cultural implications of this new technology,
particularly with regard to the atomic bomb and its crucial role in Cold War deterrence strategies.18
The notion of 'cultural implications' has two meanings in this regard: the first studies the
implications that the nuclear complex had on specific cultural media such as film or newspapers.19
The second incorporates the endeavours that were undertaken to merge individual case studies with
the aim of outlining the specificities of a particular national nuclear culture, as was recently carried
out for the case of Britain.20
However, research in the field of Social and Cultural History of the Nuclear Age is not
interested exclusively in the cultural 'output' of nuclear discourses. At the same time, it considers the
'input' side of the process and investigates the role of scientists and techno-political regimes in the
construction of these nuclear discourses. Gabrielle Hecht's work on the French post-war nuclear
enterprise is a classic example of this approach.21 In this regard, certain nuclear scientific
communities, networks, or individual scientists have come to be a well-researched topic.22
Undoubtedly, one central aspect of nuclear history that social historians in particular have
been concerned with is the field of anti-nuclear movements. These movements are mostly
considered in connection to the history of the environmental movement or the peace movement in a
17 Spencer R. Weart, Nuclear Fear. A History of Images (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988).
18 For another classical study in this regard, see: Paul S. Boyer, By the Bombs Early Light. American Thought and 
Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age (New York: Pantheon, 1985). Reflections on the nuclear legacy of the Cold 
War can be found in: Bernd Greiner (ed), Erbe des Kalten Krieges (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2013). The 
majority of the literature dealing with the nuclear complex in relation to the Cold War comes from the field of 
International History. For such works, see for example: Beatrice Heuser, Nuclear Mentalities? Strategies and Belief-
systems in Britain, France and the FRG (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998); Leopoldo Nuti, La sfida 
nucleare. La politica estera italiana e le armi atomiche, 1945-1991 (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2007); David Holloway, 
Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).
19 For the latest publication in this field, see: Dick van Lente (ed.), The Nuclear Age in Popular Media. A 
Transnational History, 1945-1965 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
20 Jonathan Hogg and Christoph Laucht (ed.), “British Nuclear Culture,” The British Journal for the History of 
Science, 45, 4 (2012). For France, a similar sort of endeavour was undertaken. However, it did not only address the 
nuclear culture but the ecological culture of the entire nation. See: Michael Bess, The Light-Green Society. Ecology 
and Technological Modernity in France, 1960-2000 (Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 2003); id., “Ecology 
and Artifice: Shifting Perceptions of Nature and High Technology in Postwar France,” in Technology and Culture 
36, 4 (1995): 830-862.
21 Hecht, The Radiance of France.
22 I previously referred to this body of research in relation to the History of Science, see footnote 12.
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specific country or region, or to a particular protest event.23 The transnational and European
perspectives have also gained importance in recent years.24 With regard to Britain, the works of Karl
Ditt25 on nature protection and of Holger Nehring26 on the anti-nuclear weapons movement are of
central importance for gaining an understanding of the historical discursive context within which
debates on the civil use of nuclear energy have been located. At the same time, Sezin Topçu's
investigation into the history of the contestation of nuclear energy in France is crucial for
understanding the French discursive context.27 
Anti-nuclear movements are not a topic of interest only for historians, however. Rather, it is a
field that has long been dominated by political scientists and sociologists. The same is true for
research on power dynamics – such as decision making processes or elite formation – within the
nuclear complex.
1.2.4 Sociology and Political Science: Anti-nuclear movements, nuclear politics, STS, and risk
As mentioned in the previous paragraph describing the historical perspective on anti-nuclear
movements, these last have also been studied from the sociology and political science perspectives.
Studies on the movements in specific countries28 and the use of comparative approaches have
23 See for example: Tom Wellock, Critical Masses: Opposition to Nuclear Power in California, 1958-78 (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1998); Gilles Simon, Plogoff. L'apprentissage de la mobilisation sociale (Rennes: 
Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2010); Jens Ivo Engels, Naturpolitik in der Bundesrepublik. Ideenwelt und 
politische Verhaltensstile in Naturschutz- und Umweltbewegung 1950-1980 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2006).
24 For the latest publications in this field, see: Jan-Henrik Meyer, “Challenging the Atomic Community: The European 
Environmental Bureau and the Europeanization of Anti-Nuclear Protest.” In Societal Actors in European 
Integration. Polity-Building and Policy-Making 1958–1992, ed. by W. Kaiser and J.-H. Meyer (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 2013): 197–220; id., “Un faux départ? Les acteurs français dans la politique environnementale européenne
des années 1970.” In Une protection de l'environnement à la française, XIXe-XXe siècles, ed. by J.-F. Mouhot and 
C.-F. Mathis (Seyssel: éditions Champ Vallon, 2013): 120–30. 
25 Karl Ditt, “Vom Natur- zum Umweltschutz? England 1949 bis 1990.” In Natur und Umweltschutz nach 1945. 
Konzepte, Konflikte, Kompetenzen, ed. by F.-J. Brüggemeier and J. I. Engels (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2005): 
38-61. For his comparative work, see for example: id., “Die Anfänge der Naturschutzgesetzgebung in Deutschland 
und England 1935/49.” In Naturschutz und Nationalsozialismus, ed. by J. Radkau and F. Uekötter (Frankfurt am 
Main: Campus, 2003): 107-144; id., “Naturschutz und Tourismus in England und in der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland 1949-1980. Gesetzgebung, Organisation, Probleme,” in Archiv für Sozialgeschichte 43, (2003): 241-
274.
26 Holger Nehring, “Cold War, Apocalypse, and Peaceful Atoms. Interpretations of Nuclear Energy in British and West
German Anti-Nuclear Weapons Movements,” in Historical Social Research 29, 3 (2004): 150-170.
27 Sezin Topçu, L’agir contestataire à l’épreuve de l’atome. Critique et gouvernement de la critique dans l’histoire de 
l’énergie nucléaire en France, 1968-2008 (École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales: PhD dissertation, 2010); 
recently published as book: Sezin Topçu, La France nucléaire. L'art de gouverner une technologie contestée (Paris: 
Éditions du Seuil, 2013). See also her articles: id., “Les physiciens dans le mouvement antinucléaire: entre science, 
expertise et politique,” in Cahiers d'histoire. Revue d'histoire critique 102, 2 (2007): 89-109; id., “Confronting 
Nuclear Risks: Counter-Expertise as Politics Within the French Nuclear Energy Debate,” in Nature and Culture 3, 2 
(2008): 225-245. 
28 The work of Alain Touraine is of central importance for gaining an understanding of anti-nuclear activism in France:
Alain Touraine, La prophétie anti-nucléaire (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1980); id., “Réactions anti-nucléaires ou 
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resulted in a broad range of social science literature on this topic.29 The same is true for studies on
nuclear politics, policies and polities. Here as well, a considerable variety of comparative studies
and national case studies have been carried out. Furthermore, among the researchers who have
conducted research in this area are those who are particularly concerned with the direct impact of
Chernobyl on nuclear politics, policies and polities, like Angela Liberatore.30 
In addition, political scientists often include in their conclusions explicit policy advice based
on their research findings.31 Consequently, their work is generally a good reflection of the current
political debates about the future of the civil use of nuclear energy.32 
Yet, another group of social scientists concerned with nuclear questions are the STS scholars.
Their research focuses on the power dynamics within the nuclear complex, among which are the
decision-making processes, elite formation, and the production of scientific knowledge. These
studies often deal with specific problematic issues, such as accidents or the radioactive
contamination of workers, downwinders, and the environment, or radioactive waste.33 Connecting
my work on Chernobyl to the field of STS – especially through the work of Brian Wynne and
mouvement anti-nucléaire,” in Sociologie et Société, 13, 1 (1981): 117-145. A comprehensive study on the anti-
nuclear movements of Britain does not exist, although an essential part of this topic is covered in Ian Welsh, 
Mobilising Modernity. The nuclear moment (London: Routledge, 2000). On the other hand, the British 
environmental movement has been studied in detail, mainly by Christopher Rootes. For a comprehensive summary 
of his work on England, see his conference paper “Environmental Protests, Local Campaigns and the 
Environmental Movement in England”, available online: http://www.kent.ac.uk/sspssr/staff/academic/rootes/ecpr-
lisbon.pdf (last accessed: 15 November 2013).
29 See for example: Wolfgang Rüdig, Anti-nuclear Movements: A World Survey of Opposition to Nuclear Energy 
(Harlow: Longman, 1990); Emmanuel Rivat, La transnationalisation de la cause antinucléaire en Europe. Une 
approche comparée de la France et des Pays-Bas, 1970-2010 (Sciences Po Bordeaux: PhD dissertation, 2013); 
Dorothy Nelkin and Michael Pollak, The Atom Besieged: Antinuclear Movements in France and Germany 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1982); Tony Chafer, “Politics and the perception of risk: A study of the anti-nuclear 
movements in Britain and France,” in West European Politics 8, 1 (1985): 5-23; Christian Joppke, Mobilizing 
against Nuclear Energy: a Comparison of Germany and the United States (Berkeley, University of California Press, 
1993); Hanspeter Kriesi, Ruud Koopmans, Jan Willem Duyvendak, Marco G. Giugni, New Social Movements in 
Western Europe. A Comparative Analysis (chapter 6: The Political Construction of Nuclear Energy Issues) 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995); Dieter Rucht, “The Impact of Anti-Nuclear Power Movements 
in International Comparison.” In Resistance to New Technology. Nuclear Power, Information Technology, and 
Biotechnology, ed. by Martin Bauer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995): 277-289.
30 Angela Liberatore, The Mangement of Uncertainty. Learning from Chernobyl (Amsterdam: Gordon and Breach 
Publishers, 1999).
31 See for example: Lutz Mez, Lars Gerhold, Gerhard de Haan, Atomkraft als Risiko. Analysen und Konsequenzen 
nach Tschernobyl (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Verlag, 2010); or publications by the Sussex Energy Group, such 
as the working paper by Jim Watson and Alister Scott, “New Nuclear Power in the UK: A Strategy for Energy 
Security?,” available online: http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Users/prpp4/Supergen_Nuclear_and_Security.pdf (last 
accessed: 15 November 2013).
32 The extensive research undertaken by political scientists on the issue of proliferation is not considered in this 
account.
33 See for example: Joseph P. Masco, The Nuclear Borderlands: The Manhattan Project in Post-Cold War New Mexico
(Princeton University Press, 2006); Gabrielle Hecht, Being Nuclear: Africans and the Global Uranium Trade 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012); Richard Hindmarsh (ed.), Nuclear Disaster at Fukushima Daiichi: Social, 
Political and Environmental Issues (New York: Routledge, 2013); Sonja Schmid, “When Safe Enough is not Good 
Enough,” in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist 67, 2 (2011): 19-29; Paul Jobin, “Qui est protégé par la 
radioprotection?,” in Ebisu 47 (2012): 121-131; Yannick Barthe, Le pouvoir d'indécision. La mise en politique des 
déchets nucléaires (Paris: Economica, 2006).
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Gabrielle Hecht on the British and French nuclear complex34 – was a precious step in the evolution
of my research the moment that many issues I had identified as central to the different trajectories
of national Chernobyl debates also lie at the heart of many research questions of STS scholars.35 
However, STS studies of the nuclear complex are not the only STS studies that can improve
one's understanding of the issues at stake in the Chernobyl debate. Research on other 'big
technologies', too – like electricity networks,36 bio-(chemical-) and life sciences37 or GMOs38 –
sheds light on the interface between society and technology and on issues and constellations that
often parallel those of the nuclear complex. In addition, the work carried out in STS on social
constructions and the role of experts, counter-experts and laypersons has produced results that have
been of paramount importance to this study, too.39 
Amongst sociologists, research on and the theorization of risk has been a major interest for a
long time. Considered an incarnation of a risky technology, the nuclear complex has prominently
served as an illustrative example of the arguments made by researcher, wherein Ulrich Beck's Risk
Society40 and Charles Perrow's Normal Accidents,41 as the most prominent examples, sit at the
forefront.42 Chernobyl has been associated with Beck's work in particular; not only because Risk
34 I already referred to the work of these authors in relation to the History of Science and Technology, see footnotes 15 
and 16.
35 Atsushi Akera's summary of traditional STS approaches illustrates well the overlap with the perspective I have taken
on the Chernobyl debates: 'Those in STS would focus on expert authority, political protest, public debates, and the 
projected images surrounding a controversial technology.' (Atsushi Akera, Synopsis of the Sessions and Papers on 
the 2011 Fukushima / East Japan Disaster, 4S/EASST Annual Meeting, Copenhagen Business School 17-20 October 
2012, posted on fukushima-forum@googlegroups.com; last accessed: 15 November 2013).
36 See for example: Jean-Baptiste Fressoz, “The Gas Lighting Controversy: Technological Risk, Expertise, and 
Regulation in Ninteenth-Century Paris and London,” in Journal of Urban History 33, 5 (2007): 729-755.
37 See for example: Sheila Jasanoff, Designs on Nature. Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States 
(Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005); Soraya Boudia and Natalie Jas, Powerless Science? Science and 
Politics in a Toxic World (New York: Berghahn Books, 2014).
38 For a French-British comparison in this field, see: Pierre-Benoit Joly and Claire Marris, “La participation contre la 
mobilisation? Une analyse comparée du débat sur les OGM en France et au Royaume-Uni,” in Revue internationale 
de politique comparée 10, 2 (2003): 195-206.
39 For research on nuclear expertise in France, see the work of Sezin Topçu (footnote 26) and Soraya Boudia, “Sur les 
dynamiques de constitution des systèmes d'expertise scientifique: le cas des rayonnements ionisants,” in Genèses 70,
1 (2008): 26-44. In recent years, experts and elites have become prominent topics not only for sociological but also 
for historical research. A particularly interesting study among the broad literature available is: Lee Clarke and Caron 
Chess, “Elites and Panic. More to Fear than Fear Itself,” in Social Forces 87, 2 (2008): 993-1014. For general 
considerations on the role of experts in society, see Harry Collins and Robert Evans, Rethinking Expertise (Chicago 
IL: University of Chicago Press, 2007) and the many reactions to this book.
40 Ulrich Beck, Risikogesellschaft (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986).
41 Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents. Living with High-Risk Technologies (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1984).
42 For more important sociological works on risk, see for example: Niklas Luhmann, Risk: A Sociological Theory 
(Berlin / New York: de Gruyter, 1993); Wolfgang Bonß, Vom Risiko. Ungewißheit und Unsicherheit in der Moderne 
(Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 1995); William R. Freudenberg, “Perceived Risk, Real Risk: Social Science and the 
Art of Probabilistic Risk Assessment,” in Science 242 (1988): 44-49; Paul Slovic, “Perception of Risk,” in Science 
236 (1987): 280-285; Soraya Boudia and Natalie Jas, “Risk and 'Risk Society' in Historical Perspective” special 
issue of History and Technology 23, 4 (2007). Wolfgang Bonß even identified the very foundation of risk sociology 
in the debates on nuclear technology: Bonß, Vom Risiko, p. 9: 'So gibt es Risikoanalysen in einer institutionell 
wahrnehmbaren Form erst seit dem Ende der sechziger Jahre, wobei ihr Ausgangspunkt in den Kontroversen um die
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Society came out the month immediately following the accident but also because Beck's later
article, in which he directly connected his theory to the event, provided a term that has been used
ever since as kind of 'name affix' to Chernobyl: anthropological shock.43 
Public perception of the nuclear risks is another field that has been researched intensively by
sociologists.44 Among scholars in this field, some have studied how this perception can be
influenced, for example, through tailored risk communication.45 Others – specifically with regard to
Chernobyl: Christoph Hohenemser and Ortwin Renn46 – are interested in how certain events,
primarily accidents, influence this public perception of risk. What has proved problematic about the
studies on the public perception of the nuclear risks is that some researchers take a very normative
stance when investigating people's so-called 'overreactions' or 'irrational behaviours' and fail to
reflect upon the basis of their judgements and the 'scientific facts' they rely on.47 Risk perception,
however, is not the only focus of the research carried out by sociologists and political scientists on
the public debates over nuclear technology. The different frames as well as the individual arguments
used in these debates have been investigated as well.48 The field of media studies is, of course,
Atomtechnologie lag.' As to the specific social implications of nuclear technology, social philosophy has also been 
concerned with this topic, see for example: Günther Anders, Endzeit und Zeitenende. Gedanken über die atomare 
Situation (München: C. H. Beck, 1972); id., Die atomare Drohung. Radikale Überlegungen (München: C. H. Beck, 
1981); Jean-Pierre Dupuy, Pour un catastrophisme éclairé: quand l'impossible est certain (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 
2002).
43 Ulrich Beck, “The Anthropological Shock: Chernobyl and the Contours of the Risk Society,” in Berkeley Journal of 
Sociology. A Critical Review 32 (1987): 153-165. Like Ulrich Beck, Wolfgang Bonß in his book Vom Risiko strongly
referred to Chernobyl in order to underpin and exemplify his arguments. According to him, Chernobyl illustrated the
devastating consequences that were possible in the event of a failure of tightly inter-linked high-technologies ('eng 
gekoppelte riskante Hochtechnologien'). Bonß integrated his reflections on the discursive reactions toward 
Chernobyl in his theorization of coping with risks and uncertainties in modernized modernity. In this book, I will 
further refer to his reflections in later footnotes.
44 See for a classic work: Joop van der Pligt, Nuclear energy and the public (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992). For a study 
that deals specifically with the case of France, see for example: Yves Bouvier, “Risques perçus et risques industriels.
Le nucléaire en France.” In Risques et prises de risques dans les sociétés industrielles, ed. by Denis Varaschin 
(Bruxelles: Peter Lang, 2007): 139-150. 
45 See for example the works of Baruch Fischhoff, “The Nuclear Energy Industry's Communication Problem,” in 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist (2009): http://thebulletin.org/nuclear-energy-industrys-communication-problem (last 
accessed: 15 November 2013); id., “Risk Perception and Communication Unplugged: Twenty Years of Process,” in 
Risk Analysis 15, 2 (1995): 137-145. 
46 Christoph Hohenemser and Ortwin Renn, “Chernobyl's Other Legacy. Shifting Public Perceptions of Nuclear Risk,” 
in Environment 30, 3 (1988): 5-11, 40-45; Ortwin Renn, “Public Responses to the Chernobyl Accident,” in Journal 
of Environmental Psychology, 10 (1990): 151-167.
47 See for example: Pamela Abbott, Claire Wallace, Matthias Beck, “Chernobyl: Living with Risk and Uncertainty,” in 
Health, Risk & Society 8, 2 (2006): 105–121. This study clearly shows how much a given judgement on the 
'adequate' behaviour of people placed in a risky or uncertain situation is directly linked to the individual researcher's 
risk perception. In the case of Chernobyl, this is linked to the stance the researcher has taken with regard to the 
health impact of the accident.
48 The most important works carried out on Britain are: Karen Bickerstaff et al., “Reframing Nuclear Power in the UK 
Energy Debate. Nuclear Power, Climate Change and Radioactive Waste,” in Public Understanding of Science 17 
(2008): 145-69; Tuula Teräväinen, Markku Lehtonen, Mari Martiskainen, “Climate change, energy security, and risk
– debating nuclear new build in Finland, France and the UK,” in Energy Policy 39 (2011): 3434-3442; Ian Welsh, 
“The NIMBY Syndrome: Its Significance in the History of the Nuclear Debate in Britain,” in British Journal for the
History of Science 26, 1 (1993): 15-32.
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closely connected to these types of studies. 
1.2.5 Media Studies
Often, Chernobyl has been labelled a media event. This classification is evident in a broad range of
research from the field of media studies that address this accident. It goes without saying that the
interest media science scholars have turned toward the nuclear complex does not exclusively regard
Chernobyl. The classic work that studies the interconnection of media discourse and public opinion
on nuclear power is the research carried out by William A. Gamson and Andre Modigliani in which
they investigated changing public opinions on nuclear power in the US in relation to media
reporting on this issue from 1945 to the late 1980s.49 Since the publication of this seminal study,
media studies scholars have gone on to research, for instance, media agendas in particular
countries50 or the representation of critical voices in media coverage.51 There are also specific
studies that directly examine the media reporting on Chernobyl, such as Katrin Jordan's PhD project
on French and German media reporting on the accident from 1986 to 1990.52 Investigations of
media reporting and comparisons of media discourses in various countries were amongst the earliest
approaches used by social scientists to study Chernobyl in the immediate aftermath of the
accident.53 Many chose the same initial approach to investigate the impact of the Fukushima
accident following 11 March 2011; however, special interest is now dedicated to the new social
media platforms.
In addition to studies on news reporting, researchers in the field of media studies have also
paid attention to the visualization and artistic narration of Chernobyl.54 In recent years, a growing
body of academic work that is concerned with the question of how people experience and visualize
49 William A. Gamson and Andre Modigliani, “Media Discourse and Public Opinion on Nuclear Power: A 
Constructionist Approach,” in The American Journal of Sociology 95, 1 (1989): 1-37.
50 Philippe Blanchard, Les médias et l’agenda de l’électronucléaire en France, 1970-2000 (Université Paris-Dauphine:
PhD dissertation, 2010).
51 Felicity Mellor, “Left Unsaid: The Marginalisation of Scientist-Critics in Media Coverage of Controversial 
Technologies.” In Sciences and its Publics, ed. by A.R. Bell, S. R. Davies, F. Mellor (Newcastle: Cambridge 
Scholars Publications, 2008): 157-178.
52 Katrin Jordan, Tschernobyl und die Medien. Die Tschernobyl-Debatte in der bundesdeutschen und französischen 
Medienöffentlichkeit in der zweiten Hälfte der 1980er Jahre (Humboldt Universität Berlin: PhD dissertation, 
forthcoming).
53 See for example: Commission of the European Communities, An Analysis of the Print Media in Europe Following 
the Chernobyl Accident (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1987).
54 See for example: Daniel Bürkner, “Eine vollkommen neue Realität: Transgression des Wahrnehmbaren in den 
Bildern Tschernobyls.” In Maßlose Bilder: Visuelle Ästhetik der Transgression, ed. by I. Reichle, S. Siegel, A. 
Spelten (München: Wilhelm Fink, 2009): 189-206; Andrea Zink, “Approaching the Void. Chernobyl in Text and 
Image,” in Anthropology of East Europe Review 30, 1 (2012): 100-112. 
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their visit to the forbidden zone has sprung up; these visits have become possible as a result of the
increased marketing of the Chernobyl plant as a touristic sight.55
1.2.6  Miscellaneous: National contexts and Disaster Studies
Writing about Chernobyl debates in France and Britain would certainly not be possible without first
acquiring background knowledge of the respective national histories and political systems of the
two countries as well as knowledge of specific aspects that have shaped the trajectories of their
respective Chernobyl debates. For example, the French Chernobyl debate cannot be understood
without considering the societal role of the Grandes Écoles and Grand Corps.56 The same is true in
Britain where research in the Chernobyl debate requires knowledge of the British system of
planning control and charity sector. 
But it is not only national histories as well as specific political cultures in which Chernobyl
debates need to be located. If we approach the subject more from the perspective of the impact and
type of event, it is possible to connect Chernobyl to various other disasters, either in the national
contexts – e.g. the affaire du sang contaminé in France, or the Windscale Fire in Britain – or in a
global context. With regard to this last, the comparison between Chernobyl and Fukushima has
become a prominent topic of academic research.57 The emerging field of Disaster Studies58 and the
efforts in recent years to create a specific research field for Disaster STS59 have provided a
considerable amount of input, which has impacted how Chernobyl is studied and perceived and how
it is compared to other disasters. This study contributes to this field of research in the way in which
it places emphasis on the duration of the aftermath of disasters and on the important role that
narratives and memory play in contributing to how a disaster is understood and to its meaning for a
55 For an analysis of tourists' photos of Chernobyl, see: Jeff Goatcher and Viv Brunsden, “Chernobyl and the Sublime 
Tourist,” in Tourist Studies 11, 2 (2011): 115-137. For reflections of the role of Chernobyl as a touristic site, see: 
Philip R. Stone, “Dark Tourism, Heterotopias and Post-Apocalyptic Places: The Case of Chernobyl.” In Dark 
Tourism and Place Identity, ed. by L. White and E. Frew (Melbourne: Routledge, 2013).
56 Important reference works for this field are: Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron, Les Héritiers – Les 
étudiants et la culture (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1964); Marie Christine Kessler, Les grands corps de l’État (Paris: 
Presses de la fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1986); Philippe Simonnot, Les nucléocrates (Grenoble: 
Presses universitaires de Grenoble, 1978).
57 See for example the book project: Thomas Bohn, Thomas Feldhoff, Lisette Gebhardt, Arndt Graf (eds.), The impact 
of disaster: social and cultural approaches to Fukushima and Chernobyl (forthcoming).
58 As a kind of foundation for this field, see: Havidan Rodriguez, Enrico L. Quarantelli, Russell Dynes (eds.), 
Handbook of Disaster Research (New York: Springer, 2006).
59 See in this regard for instance the workshops 'Historical and Contemporary Studies of Disasters' at the SHOT 
Conference 2012 in Copenhagen and the 'STS Forum on the 2011 Fukushima / East Japan Disaster' in Berkeley in 
2013. For more information on these events, see: http://fukushimaforum.wordpress.com/ (last accessed: 15 
November 2013).
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given society. In fact, by its very nature the resolution of a disaster does not correspond to the
concise moment in which the emergency measures are wrapped up and terminated. And if the truth
be told, disasters as such do not come to an end. A political process is needed to negotiate a new




Within the natural sciences, the variety of disciplines that contribute to the research on Chernobyl is
manifold. Nuclear physics, meteorology, geology, biology, and nuclear medicine all focus on
different aspects of this nuclear accident. Research projects have ranged anywhere from the analysis
of the physical reactions in the reactor and the movements of the airborne radionuclides to the
conditions of deposition of radionuclides in different geological settings and the uptake of
radionuclides in plants. Of course, research has intensively dealt with the health effects of
Chernobyl radiation on the human body. 
When discussing the research produced on Chernobyl within the fields of history and
anthropology of Eastern Europe (paragraph 1.2.1), I claimed that the volume of published work was
far too large to be discussed in detail. This statement applies even more so to the body of literature
from the natural sciences. A simple list of journal articles containing the word 'Chernobyl' in the
title would fill an entire book. However, there is an additional reason for why I have chosen to
refrain from giving a detailed account of the state of the art in Chernobyl research within the natural
sciences: I mostly used these publications as primary sources for my research. I enquired into what
presumptions certain studies were based upon, by whom they were financed, or quoted. In this
regard, I paid particular attention to publications by French and British public research agencies that
had or were looking into the impact of the fallout in their respective countries, and also to reports by
international (governmental and non-governmental) organizations that had or did provide
evaluations of the accident.60 I applied the same approach to popular scientific accounts on
60 The most important reports by international (governmental and non-governmental) organizations on the health 
impact of Chernobyl are: WHO, Health Effects of the Chernobyl Accident and Special Health Care Programmes, 
Report of the UN Chernobyl Forum Expert Group “Health” (Geneva: WHO, 2006); UNSCEAR, Sources and 
Effects on Ionizing Radiation. UNSCEAR 2000 Report to the General Assembly with Scientific Annexes. Annex J: 
Exposures and effects of the Chernobyl accident. (New York: United Nations, 2000); UNDP and UNICEF, The 
human consequences of the Chernobyl Nuclear Accident – A Strategy for Recovery (New York: United Nations, 
2002); The International Chernobyl Project, An Overview. Assessment of Radiological Consequences and 
Evaluation of Protective Measures. Report by an International Advisory Committee (Wien: IAEA, 1991); The 
Chernobyl Forum, Chernobyl’s Legacy: Health, Environmental and Socio-Economic Impacts and Recommendations
to the Governments of Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine (Wien: IAEA 2006); Ian Fairlie and David 
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Chernobyl by asking in which editing house they had been published, into which languages they
had been translated and who had made reference to them. 
The sheer volume of reports, numbers and data available on Chernobyl has resulted in a large
variety of different 'truths' that circulate about Chernobyl among natural scientists. The aim of this
book is to investigate the reception of these different 'truths' in public discourse, and not to add
another opinion to the intense debate about which of these 'truths' is to the most credible. Before
explaining in more detail the methodology of this approach, I will finish this paragraph with a
reflection on the state of the art of Chernobyl research. 
1.2.8 An attempt at a synthesis 
The separation of research areas as introduced above is, of course, open for debate. Many of the
cited works and scholars, in fact, easily conform to more than one of the categories listed. For
instance, Gamson's and Modigliani's famous article is as well placed in the category 'Sociology and
Political Science' as it is in 'Media Studies'. As occurs so often, attempts to strictly classify scholarly
works from the humanities and social sciences into a specific sub-discipline reveals the somewhat
artificially drawn demarcation lines between sub-disciplines rather than providing clarification.
Therefore, this account on the state of the art of Chernobyl research and connected works is not
meant to be a classification or systematization of these publications. Rather, it is intended to shed
light on the wide range of research that must be considered and consulted when approaching the
topic of Chernobyl. Clustering these works under the labels of different disciplines was a way to
exemplify the wide variety of academic fields involved in research on Chernobyl. In addition, this
clustering shows that a coherent established and well-defined field of 'Chernobyl research' does not
exist. As in the case of 'nuclear studies', we are confronted with a wide range of approaches that,
when assessed from a perspective external to the nuclear topic, seem to barely be connected at all.
Having introduced all of these different academic categories and scholarly approaches, it is
now time to situate my own project within this matrix. Were I to have to choose one single category,
I would try to squeeze the project into the 'Social and Cultural History of the Nuclear Age', but not
Summer, The Other Report on Chernobyl (TORCH) (Berlin/Brussels/Kiev: The Greens and EFA in the European 
Parliament, 2006); Greenpeace, The Chernobyl Catastrophe: Consequences on Human Health (Amsterdam: 
Greenpeace, 2006); German Affiliate of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) / 
Gesellschaft für Strahlenschutz, Health effects of Chernobyl. 25 years after the reactor catastrophe (Berlin: 
IPPNW / Gesellschaft für Strahlenschutz, April 2011). For a partial analysis of some of these reports from a science 
studies perspective, see: Susanne Bauer, Karena Kalmbach, Tatiana Kasperki, “From Pripyat to Paris, from 
Grassroots Memories to Globalized Knowledge Production: Local and Transnational Scales of Chernobyl.” In 
Nuclear Portraits, ed. by Laurel MacDowell (Toronto: Toronto University Press, forthcoming).
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before having changed the label so that it read 'Nuclear History with a strong recourse to STS
approaches'. This self-categorization results from the way in which I conducted my research.
Therefore, the following paragraphs will be dedicated to the methodological approach of my work.
1.3 The methodological approach of my research
Having shed light on the variety of scholarly approaches to Chernobyl in the previous section, I will
now address the question of how I actually proceeded myself. The following paragraphs will
explain how I approached my topic, what sources I used, how I categorized this material, and which
questions informed my process. 
1.3.1  Chernobyl in the public discourse: Actors and sources
When I began to work on Chernobyl in 2006, I was particularly interested in the way in which the
20th anniversary of the accident had been used to underpin political arguments in the field of energy
policies. In consequence to my close adherence to the Geschichtspolitik61 approach, I considered the
commemorative activities undertaken by the various actors of the Chernobyl debate as a means with
which these actors instrumentalized the accident as a political argument and to have discursively
constructed a specific narrative of the historical event that corroborated the actors' claims and in so
doing reinforced their interests and aims. When, in a second phase, I traced the French Chernobyl
debate and its evolution over the time period from 1986 to 2006, I maintained this focus on the
accident's anniversary. My actions, however, were dictated by a practical reason: Accounts on
Chernobyl were not published on random dates, but appeared on the occasion of the accident's
anniversary on 26 April. As time passed it was possible to see a corresponding decrease in the
levels of interest, as was evident in the drop in the news coverage and publications dedicated to the
accident. In April 1987, Chernobyl could still be identified as a theme, but in the years to follow it
lost its news value. At the 5th anniversary of the event, interest was piqued once more, and again on
the 10th and 20th, which served as occasions to once more discuss Chernobyl. Needless to say, the
intermediate anniversaries did not evoke much debate. Therefore, my search for material was
primarily directed toward the years 1986/87 (i.e. for the interpretations directly surrounding the
61 Geschichtspolitik, in my use of the term, means the discursive usage of historical events, persons etc. as political 
arguments.
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occurrence of the event), and the years 1996 and 2006; in doing, I was able to cover a broad span of
time and to look for any changes and continuities in the narratives. Since this approach has proved
very fruitful in my previous work on the French case study, I applied it to my work on Britain. 
In practice, the adoption of this research strategy dictated that I search for all manner of
material that contained a narrative of Chernobyl and that was present in the public discourse in
1986/87 or the accident's 10th or 20th anniversary. There were two important implications of this
approach. Firstly, I did not consult any institutional archives. I was not interested in internal
discussions within the concerned governmental agencies or anti-nuclear groups; this would have
been a different project. The main criteria that I used in judging whether a source was to be included
in my research was its public availability. To give a concrete example: An internal paper of the
French radiation protection agency Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire (IRSN) that
discussed the format and content of the agency's online dossier on Chernobyl for the 20th
anniversary would not have met this criteria and hence would not have been included in my
research. However, the very product of such a discussion, i.e. the online dossier published by the
IRSN in 2006, was exactly the type of source I was looking for. It might be that not all people
working for an institution like the IRSN agreed with the narrative that was presented in this dossier.
But, again, this was not relevant to my research topic. What I was interested in were the narratives
that the actors of the Chernobyl debate made available to the public. Thus, in the event that a person
employed by the IRSN disagreed enough with the narrative presented in this dossier to have
published a counter statement, I, of course, would have considered this publication as a source.
(N.B. The example I have just described – apart from the IRSN online dossier as such – is just a
fictitious construct used to illustrate my approach.) While this example clarifies how I identified my
sources, it also alludes to who I considered to be actors. Actors – as I have used the term and
applied it to my project – are individuals, groups, or institutions that actively take part in the
Chernobyl debate in the way in which they communicate their points of view to the public. The fact
that the ways in which they communicate their statements can vary brings us to the second
important implication of my research focus: the variety of sources. Any given actor's statement can
be communicated in manifold ways: through a book, a newspaper article, a leaflet, a website, a film,
a documentary, a song, a photo, an art installation, a speech, etc. I tried to include as many of these
different kinds of sources as possible. Often, a source consisted of a combination of text and visual
elements: books and leaflets are frequently illustrated with graphs, photographs, or art works; a CD
has an illustrated cover and an explanatory booklet. When analysing a source, I always considered
these different elements and asked how they interacted together. 
The locations from where I was able to gather most of my material were the French and the
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British National Libraries: the Bibliothèque nationale de France (BNF) in Paris and the British
Library (BL) in London. Thanks to the legal deposit rules in place in both France and Britain that
oblige an editor to hand a copy of every publication that is printed in the country over to the
national library,62 I was in a lucky – and for an historian quite abnormal – situation, of not having to
spend most of the time available to me consulting archival finding aids. Instead, I was able to
directly access my material in the libraries and reinvest the time I saved in the search process in the
consultation of a greater variety of material. Here again, I was able to benefit from the favourable
situation of conducting my research in the BNF and the BL: In addition to their enormous book
collections, both libraries have extensive collections of grey literature and government publications.
They also boast a plenitude of audio-visual material that has been rendered searchable through the
use of key words. Moreover, the building of the BNF (site François Mitterrand) incorporates the
Institut national de l'audiovisuel (INA), where I was able to research French TV-reports on
Chernobyl. With regard to newspaper reporting, I was able to benefit from the various databases
offered by the BL. These databases were not only enabled to search specific newspapers using a key
word, they were also designed – for most of the titles after the mid-1990s onward – to carry out
cross-searches for the different newspapers. For the French case, I was able to consult the press
clipping collection of Sciences Po Paris, which contains several files with French newspaper
reports on Chernobyl and is still updated today. Although my research did not comprehend a media
content analysis, it was important for me to look into British and French news reporting – for 1986
as well as for the three quinquennial anniversaries – in order to see how the topic was received in
the media.63 In particular, it was interesting to see what level of importance was attributed to
Chernobyl in comparison to other topics and which aspects of the topic were taken up. Before
concluding this description of my sources, I must add that the Fondation EDF, members of
Chernobyl solidarity groups and individual activists were so kind as to provide me with additional
'grey literature'. Again, this was not 'internal material' but material that had been published but had
not made its way into a library. 
After having collected the research material, the next step consisted of arranging the sources
62 Undoubtedly, the legal deposit rule only means that all printed publications should be filed with the national library, 
which is not always the case. Therefore, for every source I consulted, I always checked the references and 
bibliography in order to find out whether there were perhaps other publications in circulation that were perceived in 
the debate but had not found their way into the library. Again, to my luck and due to the fact that I was dealing with 
quite a contemporary timespan, it happened only rarely that a source I wished to consult was not part of the 
collection of the BNF or the BL.
63 In this study, I do not treat the media as an actor in and of itself. Rather, I look at the actions of individual journalists
and the ways in which statements by the various actors have been reflected in media reporting. Undeniably, the 
media is quite capable of playing the role of an actor in public debate, in particular with regard to agenda setting. 
But as I investigate media reporting particularly in relation to the events of 1986 and the quinquennial anniversaries,
the topic was basically implicit in the event and the dates themselves, and thus the aspect of agenda setting is not of 
foremost importance in this context.
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and of addressing the following question: Who said what at what point in time? Naturally, the
identification of the actors of the debate resolved the first element of the question, i.e. the who, and
mapping the discursive field responded to the second element, i.e. the what. Determining the point
in time, and hence the third element of the question, implied putting the debate into context. The
following paragraphs address what this all meant in practice and what methodologies informed this
approach.
1.3.2 Who? What? When? In other words, the applied methodology
An investigation of the actors involved in the Chernobyl debate meant that two distinct activities
had to simultaneously be carried out: identifying the actors and researching how they are
interlinked. Therefore, I focused on personal and institutional interconnections as well as on
argumentative networks, and I tried to determine who was informed and influenced by whom.
However, the actors and their networks were not the only thing that intrigued me: I also wanted to
understand the reasons that motivated their actions. While analysing the sources, I examined the
ways in which the various actors used Chernobyl as an argument. Each author's arguments referred
to different topic fields. For instance, a certain way in which Chernobyl was interpreted would
produce an argument in favour or against a certain nuclear policy in the relevant national context; it
either served to justify humanitarian action in an Eastern European country; or it was used as a
statement against the political opponent in the Cold War legacy of East-West-appreciations. These
few examples are but an illustration of the breadth of the Chernobyl discourse and demonstrate the
variety of aspects embraced in this discourse. At the same time, these examples also reveal the
political dimension that underpinned every interpretation and argument surrounding Chernobyl.64
64 I do not consider the political sphere to be a clearly delimited field, but rather something that is being constantly 
challenged. The process of negotiating what topics should by determined through political decision-making is part 
of the political sphere. Given this consideration, I follow the approach of New Political History which focuses on 
the shifting lines between that which is deemed 'political' and that which is deemed 'un-political' over time, see: Ute 
Frevert, “Neue Politikgeschichte: Konzepte und Herausforderungen.” In Neue Politikgeschichte. Perspektiven einer 
historischen Politikforschung, ed. by U. Frevert and H.-G. Haupt (Frankfurt/New York: Campus 2005). Wolfgang 
Bonß in particular has pointed to the changing boundaries of the political sphere within the context of dealing with 
risks and uncertainties in modernized modernity. According to Bonß, through the approach of risk communication, 
the very concepts of risk and harm undergo a process of (re)politicization. See: Bonß, Vom Risiko, p. 247: 'Aber faßt 
man ihn [den Begriff des Risikokommunikation] nicht zu eng, so verweist er auf Strategien im Umgang mit 
Unsicherheit, die im Kern auf eine kommunikative Verflüssigung der Grenzziehungen zwischen „sicheren“ und 
„unsicheren“ Aktivitäten hinauslaufen. Eine solche kommunikative Verflüssigung, die eine (Re-)Politisierung 
sowohl des Risiko- als auch des Schadenskonzepts bedeutet, unterscheidet sich von den ersten beiden Optionen [für 
den Umgang mit den Unsicherheiten der modernisierten Moderne, welche sind 1. Kalkulation und Inkaufnahme von
(Rest-)Risiken und 2. Prävention und Schadensvermeidung] sowohl in ihrer Zielrichtung als auch im Verfahren. 
Während die Anhänger der Inkaufnahme am Dispositiv von vermeidbaren und unvermeidbaren Schäden festhalten 
und die Verfechter der Prävention darauf abzielen, die unvermeidbaren in vermeidbare Schäden umzudefinieren, 
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Regardless of whether an actor self-identified as non-political, the consequences of the actions
perpetuated by the actor were (inevitably) political, for their statements on Chernobyl
simultaneously acted as statements in the related debates that were woven into the Chernobyl
discourse. To clarify this point, I will discuss the example of humanitarian aid provided to Eastern
Europe, which might seem to be the least political statement of the examples given above: An
action such as the decision to distribute humanitarian aid follows certain presumptions regarding the
health impact of the Chernobyl fallout. Were the fallout beyond the restricted zone not to be
considered dangerous, there would be no reason to organize recreational visits to Western Europe
for children from Belarus. Conversely, were somebody to see the need to bring these children on
recreational holidays to Western Europe, the existence of an underlying statement on the
hazardousness of low-level radiation to the human body would then be implied. Such an action,
indeed, might have many other implications – I will deal with them in depth in the sections on the
Chernobyl solidarity movement – but for now, I wish to focus on the existence of a political sphere
the presence of which is implied in the use of Chernobyl as argument.
Every account on Chernobyl provides a certain 'image' of the accident and contains a certain
interpretation of what happened, what is happening still and what will happen in the future. An
account of the events can be expressed in many different ways: via a picture, a text, music – in as
many different ways as are different the sources I spoke of above. It can be presented as an anti-
nuclear manifesto, as an official report on health consequences published by an international
organization, or as a photography book. No matter how 'objective' or 'subjective' it claims itself to
be to its audience, it aims to make a certain statement about Chernobyl. I refer to the way in which
these statements differ and contest as the Chernobyl debate, i.e. the Chernobyl debate is the variety
of and relation between statements, interpretations and narratives on Chernobyl that have circulated
in public discourse over time. What turns this variety into a debate is the setting; in other words,
although each statement claims to truly represent the 'reality' surrounding Chernobyl, most conflict
with the rest insofar as they are all based upon different 'facts'. The reason why we find such diverse
'facts' on Chernobyl in the scientific literature is mainly due to the unsolved controversy on health
effects of low-level radiation. The existence of these multiple 'facts' inevitably leads to the situation
wherein actors can pick the 'facts' that most closely conform to their convictions and then
interweave them into their own unique narrative; they, therefore, construct their own separate and
distinct 'truth' about Chernobyl. This implies that actors claim that any narrative that differs from
their own 'truth' is 'untrue' or even call it out as a 'lie' inasmuch as the 'facts' upon which the
konzentriert sich die Risikokommunikation auf die Frage, wie handhabbare, zu verantwortende und damit 
akzeptable Risiken und Schadensfälle diskursiv bestimmt und konsensuell abgesichert werden können.'
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competing 'truth' is based are considered to be false. 
Yet, this way to explain the emergence of the Chernobyl debate should not give the
impression that scientists constitute a system that is external to this debate. On the contrary, some
play a prominent part as actors themselves. But as wrong as it would be to not consider them as
actors, it would likewise be a mistake to declare that every single article that has ever been
published by a natural scientist is an active part of the Chernobyl debate. The important line needs
to be drawn between works that emerge as a result of a certain Chernobyl-related conviction and are
undertaken with the aim of proving a certain statement that regards Chernobyl and those works that
are not primarily related to the Chernobyl debate, i.e. those works that have not been undertaken to
demonstrate the veracity or other of a certain statement or conviction regarding the Chernobyl
'reality'.65 
The discussion surrounding the specific role scientists occupy in the Chernobyl debate
touches upon the topics of study of STS researchers. Therefore, it is opportune to explain the way in
which this approach informed my own research. Within the field of STS, concepts such as 'expert',
'knowledge', or 'lay person' are not thought of as fixed categories. Rather, they are seen as part of a
societal discourse and the result of the specific formation the power structures under examination
assume. For this reason, much of the work from the field of STS focuses on questions such as: Who
is attributed the role of an expert in a specific field? What structures and dynamics come into play
when a certain finding is attributed with the label 'true'? And, most importantly, what is the societal
impact of these dynamics, particularly with regard to the implementation of new technologies? In
this regard, STS goes a step further than Thomas Kuhn in his Structure of Scientific Revolutions in
which he explains the emergence and establishment of new scientific paradigms.66 From an STS
perspective, it is not the internal structures of science as a system that require special attention, but
the interface between science, technology, and society. The way in which I pay tribute to STS
approaches in my own work is precisely the way in which I perceive categories such as 'expert',
'knowledge', or 'lay person' as fluid concepts as results of a specific power setting. This, however, is
not to say that I place every statement that has ever been pronounced on Chernobyl on par with all
of the others and declare one to be just as valid as any other.67 Anna Veronika Wendland, in her
65 The variety of topics that render Chernobyl a research topic for natural scientists is discussed in the paragraph on 
Natural Sciences, see 1.2.7. The purely inter-scientific debate, which takes place primarily through journal 
publications, does not fall within the scope of this research project. In this study, I specifically focus on the 
Chernobyl narratives present in public discourse. This implies that the communication of an actor must target a 
wider audience than only his or her academic peers. Therefore, the sources analysed in this study are publications 
that were purposely made available to a wider audience, hence, articles exclusively published in scientific journals 
have not been included in the range of sources considered here.
66 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1962).
67 I do not intend to apply here the categories introduced by Collins and Evans and claim my work to compatible (or 
not) with their categories of 'Wave Two' or 'Wave Three' of Science Studies. I do not agree with their assumption 
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review on my book on Chernobyl and France, criticized that I discussed and placed 'obscure
theories about the course of the accident on par with the relevant literature.'68 To be sure, according
to the internal logic of the scientific community it is 'incorrect behaviour' to dedicate equal space to
both. But my argument, as it was in my book and still is now, is not about making a judgement of
these statements; it is about asking what the logic behind these statements is and investigating in the
reasons why they are brought forward. 
It goes without saying that the field of STS is much broader than what I have described
above, which was only a brief description of how the field influenced my methodological approach.
Most of the research undertaken in this field, in fact, is not primarily concerned with historical
perspectives but rather turns its attention toward current debates. But since the Chernobyl debate is
still ongoing and, through Fukushima, has become even more pertinent than it was even ten years
ago, connecting my work to STS was more fitting than connecting my work to the History of
Knowledge,69 although both approaches overlap in many regards, not least through their strong
connection to Michel Foucault and Bruno Latour.70 However, the methods used in STS most often
originate from empirical social science research rather than from the hermeneutical approach of the
humanities. It is for this reason that I (above) 'self-classified' my research in the field of 'Social and
Cultural History of the Nuclear Age' and not in the very empirical social science-dominated
discipline of STS. Although I did indeed borrow some very important research questions from STS,
the tools I used in my search for the answers were drawn from the classical method of source
analysis used in history as an academic discipline.
Approaching my material through the method of hermeneutical source analysis involved
three different steps. First, I had to find out about the background of a specific source: who was the
that the deconstruction of a narrative or statement necessarily means to put an end to all reference points and, in 
doing so, making any agency impossible. To shed light on how arguments are constructed and on the existing power 
structures within a certain discourse is not the same as being indifferent with regard to the action taken in this 
thematic field. Therefore, a deconstructive approach also very much allows one to formulate an opinion and, 
especially when the 'precautionary principle' is applied, renders it possible for one to provide very clear 
recommendations for action.
68 Anna Veronika Wendland, “Rezension zu: Kalmbach, Karena: Tschernobyl und Frankreich. Die Debatte um die 
Auswirkungen des Reaktorunfalls im Kontext der französischen Atompolitik und Elitenkultur. Frankfurt am Main 
2011,” H-Soz-u-Kult, 20.08.2012 (http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/rezensionen/2012-3-086). 
69 A kind of conceptual manifest of the History of Knowledge is: Philipp Sarasin, “Was ist Wissensgeschichte,” in 
Internationales Archiv für Sozialgeschichte der deutschen Literatur 36, 1 (2011): 159-172. Interestingly, this article 
refers to many works that are considered to be classics among STS scholars (like Donna Haraway) without, 
however, directly mentioning this flourishing field of research, which holds a strong position in Anglo-Saxon 
academia.
70 It is particularly in relation to Actor-Network Theory (ANT) that STS scholars and in recent years also progressively 
more historians refer to Bruno Latour. The growing interest of historians in ANT is closely linked to their greater 
focus on materiality within the framework of the 'material turn'. Although I do not follow this methodological 
approach in this book, the prospect of looking at the Chernobyl debates from an ANT perspective, in my opinion, 
seems promising. From this perspective, the radiation would be perceived as the actant and the ways in which it has 
shaped the action of the various actors of the debate and their interrelations, i.e. the network, would be examined.
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author, when was it published, etc. The second step consisted of an analysis of the narrative
presented in the source. When reading or contemplating the sources, I asked the following
questions: How are the causes and the consequences of Chernobyl described? What kind of
metaphors, references, and explanatory frameworks are used? What statements and wider
interpretations are implied in this account? Following this analysis, I then attempted to locate the
narrative presented in this source within the sphere of the Chernobyl debate. In order to be able to
map this debate, I focused on specific key elements during my analysis of the narratives. In my
work on the sources, I found that most of the narratives were based on an underlying structure. This
structure consisted of key elements that can be described as a kind of variable. Depending on an
author's point of view of these aspects, the narrative on Chernobyl took a certain shape. Identifying
these key elements made it possible not only to compare the narratives but also to consider the
Chernobyl debate as a discursive field. Elements from other debates had been imported to this
discursive field, making it possible to assign meaning to Chernobyl. This discursive field can be
seen as the wider reference frame within which Chernobyl was interpreted.71 The key elements that
constitute any given Chernobyl narrative are the following aspects: self-affectedness,
radiophobia/apocalypse, and anti-Russian/anti-Soviet stereotypes. In the next section, I will provide
a more detailed account of these key elements and explain why they are so decisive for the shape a
given Chernobyl narrative will take on. For the moment, in the context of the methodological
approach, I just wish to call attention to them and their general role.
This methodological approach of looking for elements that constitute and shape the
Chernobyl debate is, in many regards, similar to the concept of frame analysis; in fact, in the
previous paragraph I myself used the term 'reference frame' when speaking of the Chernobyl debate.
However, I prefer to describe my approach with the concepts of 'narrative', 'debate' and 'discourse',
and not 'frames'. The reason for this choice lies, again, in the general conceptualization of my
research project: It is a project grounded in the discipline of history and not an empirical social
sciences study. But the fact that within the social sciences a concept does exist, namely framing,
that indicates a very similar perspective on the Chernobyl debate reveals just how fluid the boarders
between disciplines often are and how important it was for my own research to take into
consideration research undertaken in the fields of sociology and political science.
 To conclude this section on the methodological approach of my research, I will discuss the
last in the three-step process: the contextualization. Contextualization has already played an integral
role in mapping the Chernobyl debate and in identifying its discursive referential framework.
71 I use the term 'discourse' here in order to differentiate between the topic-bound term 'Chernobyl debate' and the more
general topics that are linked to and, at the same time, negotiated in this debate. In using this term, I do not refer to 
any specific author from the field of discourse theory. 
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However, this is not all it has done. Contextualization also takes into account the temporal and
locational spheres, i.e. the when and where. It asks for the context, or rather contexts, in which the
Chernobyl debates have taken place. These contexts include, on the one hand, French and British
national histories and political systems, with the various implications that these had on the different
developments of the Chernobyl debates in each respective country. On the other hand,
contextualization implies that not only the nuclear politics, policies and polities of each country are
taken into consideration, their changes over time and the global debates regarding the civil use of
nuclear energy are as well. Over all, it means the background knowledge that I extracted from the
various works and authors (described in section 1.2) must be taken into account in order to
understand why the Chernobyl debates in France and Britain developed the way they did. Many of
the aspects that have shaped each debate become more visible from a comparative perspective. This
is why the following section discusses the added value that the comparative approach brought to my
work and explains the categories of comparison.
1.3.3 Chernobyl compared
The comparative work I undertake in this book takes place on several levels. First, I compare the
different narratives within each national72 Chernobyl debate. Second, I compare the different
debates in Britain and France. And third, by comparing the debates on the different anniversaries of
the accident, I examine the changes and continuities over time. 
The comparison within the debate
With regard to the first kind of comparison, that which takes into consideration the narratives within
each national context, I already introduced the categories of comparison: self-affectedness,
radiophobia/apocalypse, and anti-Eastern European/anti-Soviet stereotypes. This paragraph aims to
describe these categories in detail and explain why they are central to the Chernobyl debate.
Although I refer to them one after the other, it goes without saying that they are very much
interdependent, i.e. a certain conviction regarding one of these variables directly influences the
72 The term 'national Chernobyl debate' does not imply that the debate has taken place on a national level. Many of the 
contributions to the debate actually addressed a local or regional level, e.g. the Lake District in the UK and Corsica 
in France. In some cases, these regional or local debates reached a national level and enjoyed wider public interest, 
while in other cases the issue remained at the regional or local level. Thus, when I speak of 'national Chernobyl 
debate' I am speaking of the larger contextual setting in which the debate took place and do not mean for this term to
be a judgement on the scale of the debate.
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statements on the others. However, as each category points to a different topic field addressed in the
Chernobyl debate, I have decided to handle them separately. The different topic fields, or frames,
that the narrative elements I compare are connected to are: national nuclear politics (→ self-
affectedness), general debates on the health impact of low-level radiation (→ radiophobia
/apocalypse), and the Cold War setting (→ anti-Eastern European/anti-Soviet stereotypes).
Firstly: The category of self-affectedness. Self-affectedness, as it is used here, is the way in
which a certain actor considers his or her direct environment to have been impacted by the accident.
This impact can either consist of a physical impact in terms of the radioactive fallout. Or it can take
on a less physical connotation, meaning the perceived impact can consist in the transfer of the
accident's scenario to national nuclear plants. The fear of eating contaminated vegetables bought in
the local market or the fear that a similar accident would happen in a nearby nuclear plant are the
direct result of perceived self-affectedness. Self-affectedness addresses primarily the local, regional
and national context. If an actor perceives a strong self-affectedness, this could, for instance, result
in a call for a certain policy to be implemented at the national level, such as: banning certain
foodstuffs, increasing controls of radioactivity levels in the air and soil, instituting safety checks of
national nuclear power plants, or even the shut down of national plants. On the other hand, in the
case in which an actor perceives a low self-affectedness or even none at all, he or she would
consider these claims to be the product of 'panic' or 'exaggerated fear' and would see no reason why
the accident in Chernobyl ought to influence national nuclear policies. 
Secondly: The category of radiophobia/apocalypse. The second category of comparison
grasps the different ways in which the situation in Eastern Europe's regions most impacted by the
radioactive fallout was evaluated. The two extremes of the scale used in the evaluation are marked
by the explanatory concepts of 'radiophobia' and 'apocalypse', one on each end. The radiophobia
concept implies that the increase in illnesses that can be observed in these regions is not actually the
result of the radiation itself but rather a result of the exaggerated fear of the radiation and the
psychological stress provoked by the resettlements and the rapid changes in the political situation in
Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 'Radiophobia' is often paraphrased in the sources,
for instance as 'stress induced illnesses', as a means to avoid using the term itself since it was
discredited in the early 1990s; the basic underlying concept, however, remains very much the
same.73 From the 'radiophobia' point of view, the best cure for the illnesses would be to bring these
73 It is particularly in Eastern Europe where the term has become discredited. This occurred in the early 1990s with the 
emerging anti-Soviet protest movement, where the term evoked the Soviet authorities' cynicism towards the health 
situation of the clean-up workers, evacuees, and inhabitants of affected regions. See the section 'The concept of 
radiophobia' in chapter 3.3.2 for a detailed description of this concept. In reference to my work on radiophobia 
narratives within the context of Chernobyl, Joachim Radkau recently stressed that there is a long tradition of framing
nuclear fears as psychologic illness: Joachim Radkau, “Der 'Größte Anzunehmende Unfall.'” In Ökologische 
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regions 'back to normal' and to give incentives for the resettled populations to move back to their
home regions. The other end of the evaluating scale is informed by an apocalyptic image.74 This
reading of the situation considers that the worst is still to come: due to genetic mutations in humans,
plants, and animals the true impact of the accident will come to light only very gradually, and there
is nothing anyone can do to stop this process. From this perspective, it is necessary to take measures
to resettle even larger portions of the affected populations. These evaluations of the situation in
Eastern Europe are, of course, closely linked to an actor's perception of self-affectedness: If one
believes that exaggerated fear is the source of increases in illnesses in Belarus, a health impact of
the fallout in Western Europe would not even be considered possible. At any rate, the frames of
reference are different. Self-affectedness refers to the actor's direct environment, whereas
radiophobia and apocalypse focus on the situation in Eastern Europe. 
Thirdly: The category of anti-Eastern European/anti-Soviet stereotypes. The third aspect I
identified as being a basic structural element of a Chernobyl narrative is the way in which an actor
draws on anti-Eastern European or anti-Soviet stereotypes to describe the accident scenarios. Using
a kind of Cold War rhetoric, many narratives of Chernobyl contain comments on alcohol
consumption and general imprudence with regard to how dangerous technologies were handled
within the USSR and contrasts them with statements on the 'good behaviour' modelled in the West.75
Yet, other actors dismiss forthright these framings and denote them as propaganda aimed to cover
up problems in the Western nuclear enterprise. Thereby, Chernobyl narratives became a statement
against the political opposition in the East-West discourse. Again, it is not my interest here to judge
which of these points of view is more or less 'true';76 what I am concerned with is the question as to
Erinnerungsorte, ed. by Frank Uekötter, pp. 55: 'Es fehlt in der Geschichte der Kernenergie nicht an Versuchen, 
Widerstand zu pathologisieren und als irrationale Psychose hinzustellen; der Topos der „Radiophobie“, den Karena
Kalmbach in ihrem Beitrag diskutiert, steht insofern in langen Traditionen.'
74 As with the case of radiophobia, the way in which Chernobyl is narrated as an apocalypse must also be placed in a 
wider discursive context. In this regard, the tradition of framing disasters and catastrophes with apocalyptic images 
and vocabulary ought to be considered. Furthermore, the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the images that 
show the destruction of these cities have deeply influenced the imagery surrounding the impact nuclear technology 
has and has had.
75 Interestingly, Wolfgang Bonß pointed to this inherent element of Chernobyl narratives already in 1995 and predicted
that it would continue to play a crucial role in evaluations and interpretations of the accident. Bonß, Vom Risiko, p. 
242: 'Auf der einen Seite werden tatsächliche Schwierigkeiten häufig aus politischen Fehlentscheidungen, 
Nachlässigkeiten und / oder kalkulatorischen Fehlern erklärt, die unter „exakten“ Bedingungen und bei 
entsprechender Sorgfalt angeblich nicht auftauchen – typisch hierfür ist etwa der nach Tschernobyl auftauchende, 
stereotype Verweis auf unhaltbare Zustände in „östlichen“ Atomkraftwerken, die im Westen undenkbar seien. […, 
footnote] Zwar läßt sich nicht bestreiten, daß die Präventions- und Sicherheitsmaßnahmen ausgerechnet in jenen 
Gesellschaften unterbelichtet waren, die nach außen Planung und Gestaltbarkeit auf ihre Fahnen geschrieben 
hatten. Aber dies ändert nichts daran, daß die von Perrow (1984) beschriebenen und durch lineare Erhöhung der 
Sicherheitsmaßnahmen keineswegs zu behebenden Unsicherheiten auch im Westen gegeben sind. An eben dieser 
Stelle ist offensichtlich der alte Ost-West-Gegensatz ungebrochen erhalten geblieben, und sofern sich hierdurch 
traditionelle Grenzziehungen und Perzeptionsmuster aufrechterhalten lassen, dürfte diese Akzentsetzung noch 
einige Zeit die Diskussion beherrschen.'
76 For a well-informed account on the security culture in the Chernobyl plant, see: Schmid, When safe enough is not 
good enough. Schmid's work also points to the fact that within the Chernobyl debate in the Soviet Union, the 
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how the legacy of Cold War propaganda and side-taking is present in the Chernobyl debate and the
role it held in the interpretation of the accident. In relation to the other two categories of
comparison, self-affectedness and radiophobia/apocalypse, this aspect of anti-Eastern
European/anti-Soviet stereotypes plays a less prominent role in many of the sources. It was
primarily used in accounts published in 1986 and 1987, which addressed the acute phase of the
accident: the event as it unfolded and the immediate aftermath. The moment that the focus of my
research was directed more toward the debate surrounding the health impact of the fallout than on
the technicalities regarding the accident, the other two categories of comparison were more central
to my analysis. 
However, in March 2011, reflections on cultural stereotypes present in the reception of
nuclear plant accidents gained new momentum. In many regards, the way in which many of the
actors I had researched within the context of the Chernobyl debate reacted towards the events in
Japan and how they narrated and framed Fukushima were extremely similar to the way in which
they had narrated and framed Chernobyl. But there was one decisive element that was not
applicable in 2011: the Cold War frame. This 'lack' in the narrative structure, however, was quickly
filled with an element that in a way resembled the argument of anti-Eastern European stereotypes:
i.e. the usage of the 'Japanese hierarchy bondage' stereotype.77 What had now come under fire was
not the 'Eastern European carefreeness' but the 'Japanese authoritative culture', which was held
responsible for the course of the events. This change in a decisive element of the discursive
structure of the narrative explaining the occurrence of a large scale nuclear accident highly
influenced also the other discursive categories of self-affectedness and radiophobia/apocalypse that
are present in the Fukushima narratives, as well. As I stated above, a conviction that regards one of
the variables will directly influence the statements made with regard to the other variables. In this
regard, in Western Europe, the perception of self-affectedness (in the way in which the accident's
scenario is transferred to the national fleet of nuclear plants) was even stronger in the case of
Fukushima than in the case of Chernobyl. The very fact that a stress test was applied to all rectors in
the European Union (EU) is a telling example of this perception. To be sure, the technical features
and the design of the destroyed reactors in Chernobyl and Fukushima was completely different.
argumentative use of national and cultural stereotypes had yet another dimension: Moscow placed the blame on the 
Ukrainian plant workers. However, in the Western European Chernobyl debates, the differentiation between 
different groups and ethnicities within Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union barely played a role. Therefore, I did not 
consider this differentiation in my comparison.
77 The interpretation of Fukushima as a 'Japanese Disaster' that has figured prominently in many accounts on the 
events was in some regards certified by the English executive summary report of the Nuclear Accident Independent 
Investigation Commission (NAIIC). In his foreword to this report, the chairman of this Diet-appointed commission, 
Kiyoshi Kurokawa, called the events at Fukushima a 'disaster “Made in Japan”': The National Diet of Japan, The 
official Report of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission. Executive Summary 
(2012), p. 9, http://www.nirs.org/fukushima/naiic_report.pdf (last accessed: 15 October 2013).
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Thus, technical considerations played a decisive role in the decision to re-evaluate the security
features of all of the reactors within the EU. But in public discourse, the fact that reactor design of
the Fukushima Daiichi reactor was more similar to Western European plants than those of the
Chernobyl RBMK reactor was not the primary issue that triggered the sudden concern Europeans
had with regard to the safety issues of their neighbouring power plants. The reasoning was rather: 'If
such an accident can happen in such a well organized country like Japan, then a severe nuclear
accident might very well be possible in the Western world, too.' In the case of Chernobyl, however,
the reasoning had been the opposite: 'Since the accident happened in the USSR, it is impossible that
a similar disaster could strike in the West.' Contemplation of this crucial difference between
perceived Western European self-affectedness in the case of Chernobyl and Fukushima directed my
focus toward the anti-Eastern European/anti-Soviet stereotypes present in the Chernobyl narratives.
Therefore, in this regard, the events of 2011 changed the perspective on my topic but did not alter
my project as such. Although many suggested I should change my project and conduct a
comparison of Chernobyl and Fukushima debates in one country rather than compare the Chernobyl
debates of different countries, I stuck with my initial project. This decision is based on two reasons.
On the one hand, I think that the Fukushima debate is far too 'fresh' and is still in the process of
unfolding rendering an accurate analysis of the narratives and interpretations on this event difficult
if not impossible. On the other hand, the constant and often not very well informed references to
Chernobyl within the Fukushima discourse have proved that there is serious need to carry out
research on the Chernobyl debate. 
This book does not provide a general theory on how to analyse discourses on nuclear
accidents. I think, however, that my analytic categories, findings, and hypotheses can indeed prove
useful for researchers who deal with other (nuclear) disasters.78 With the Fukushima disaster, it
became evident that regardless of where the disaster occurs, the ways in which large-scale nuclear
disasters are technically, socially, and discursively approached are rife with parallels and
similarities. But this work is not only about Chernobyl and nuclear accidents in general. This
research also sheds light on important aspects of the social and cultural history of France and
Britain. The following section introduces these aspects, which served as the comparative categories
78 A workshop in 2012 cast light on the important role research on Chernobyl has in the emerging field of disaster 
studies: Historical and Contemporary Studies of Disasters: Placing Chernobyl, 9/11, Katrina, Deepwater Horizon, 
Fukushima and Other Events in Historical and Comparative Perspective, Society for the History of Technology 
annual conference 2012, Copenhagen Business School, co-sponsored workshop by SHOT Prometheans, SHOT Asia
Network and Teach 3.11, information on the workshop participants, papers and discussions are available online: 
http://shotprometheans.wordpress.com/workshops/2012-workshop/ (last accessed: 15 October 2013). Recently, in 
the context of Fukushima research, strong efforts have been made to establish a transnational research agenda for the
new field of disaster STS. See in this regard the documentation of the inaugural meeting of this forum in Berkeley in
May 2013: http://fukushimaforum.wordpress.com/workshops/sts-forum-on-the-2011-fukushima-east-japan-disaster/ 
(last accessed: 15 October 2013).
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that gave structure to my comparison of the two nations.
The comparison of the French and British debates
Why choose national entities for a comparison when we are dealing with a nuclear power plant
accident – a transnational event par excellence – whose fallout completely ignored every border,
even an iron curtain? The answer is, because it is the framework of the nation state that most
influentially determines the debates on nuclear power in a society and therefore also the debates on
Chernobyl, which is entangled with the former. Transnational aspects clearly play an important role
in this debate, especially when it comes to the exchange of information, expert evaluation, networks
of anti-nuclear activists, globally acting companies and lobbying groups, and international
organizations; it is for this reason that an entire chapter of this book is dedicated to the
transnationality of the Chernobyl debate.79 But how all these influences interact and impact a debate
on a specific political topic, such as nuclear energy, is very much dominated by legal and
institutional aspects, and therefore by the nation state. The field of nuclear politics is a particularly
clear example. Although many aspects of this field are regulated at the international level, through,
for example, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the International Commission on
Radiological Protection (ICPR), or Euratom the decision to build or close down nuclear plants is
taken at the national level. Concerned neighbour states might raise their voices, as Austria recently
did in the debate about the Czech power plant Temelín, but the ultimate decision is made by national
authorities: be it the German Bundesrat a n d Bundestag in the 2010-2011 debate on the
Laufzeitverlängerung (the extension of the active lifespan of German nuclear power plants); the
French President, Prime Minister and selected technocrats in the case of the plan Messmer; or the
Austrian people in the form of a referendum against activating the power plant Zwentendorf. 
As I stated above, the comparison of the two national case studies France and Britain is
particularly fruitful due to their shared history as nuclear powers.80 Between the two, there are many
similarities regarding their social and cultural nuclear history. Therefore, it is even more interesting
to ask why the trajectory of the Chernobyl debates in these two countries has been so different; why
Chernobyl did become a lieu de mémoire81 in France, but did not in Britain? In order to find an
79 For a recent publication that emphasized the importance of transnational approaches in nuclear history, see: Astrid 
Mignon Kirchhof and Jan-Henrik Meyer (eds.), “Global Protest against Nuclear Power. Transfer and Transnational 
Exchange in the 1970s and 1980s,” in Historical Social Research 39, 1 (2014): 165-190.
80 In considering a tertium compartionis other than the status as nuclear power, it could be very interesting to conduct, 
for instance, comparative research into Chernobyl debates in Sweden and Turkey, two non-USSR countries that 
received significant levels of fallout, or to compare reactions in Denmark and Germany, two countries in which anti-
nuclear convictions were particularly strong in 1986.
81 On Chernobyl as a lieu de mémoire, see Karena Kalmbach, “Radiation and Borders: Chernobyl as a National and 
32
answer to this question, I compared the discursive frameworks within which the debates are based. I
was interested to see whether there were different reference points that structure the various
narratives brought forward in the two national contexts. Once I identified the different reference
points and arguments in the debate, I researched their historical and political context in order to find
out why a certain reference worked or was needed in narratives in one national context and why it
was not in the other. Through my research, I identified the following aspects as central to the
different development of the debates: the formation, role and status of nuclear 'experts' and 'counter
experts'; the changes to the national nuclear politics, policies and polities as well as to their pro-
nuclear versus anti-nuclear orientation; the shape, political role and protest culture of the anti-
nuclear movement; (the problematic issues of) the national fleet of nuclear power plants; and the
importance of charities. I will come back to all of these aspects in more detail during the course of
the book, when I analyse and contextualize the sources. I mention them here in order to indicate
along which lines I conducted the inter-national comparison. However, in relation to these elements
of the historical and political context, there is one important term I must introduce inasmuch as it
will figure prominently in my arguments: techno-political regime. This term was shaped by
Gabrielle Hecht in The Radiance of France. Hecht used this term to explain the different
approaches employed by the Commissariat à l'Énergie Atomique (CEA) and Électricité de France
(EDF) with regard to nuclear policies in the post-war period. My use of the term differs from her
use insofar as I do not make a distinction between different regimes within one state. Nevertheless,
my use of the term describes the same 'linked sets of individuals, practices, artefacts, programs,
and ideologies'.82 In this regard, I consider techno-political regimes to constitute an essential part of
the historical and political context of the two countries. I use this expression to cluster together the
contextual aspects listed above in as far as they are linked to the nuclear complex of a country.
I would like to conclude this introduction with an explanation as to how I structured the
following chapters and why I have structured them as I have. In addition, I will give a brief
summary of my analytic categories.
1.3.4 The time frame and structure of the book
Because I approach the Chernobyl debate from an historical perspective, and because I am
interested in changes and continuities in the debate over time, I structured the text along a time line.
Transnational Site of Memory”, in Global Environment, 11 (2013): 130-59.
82 Hecht, Radiance of France, p. 56.
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I begin my analysis in 1986, the moment of the accident, and – for the comparative part of this book
– I will stop in 2006, at the 20th anniversary of the accident. I elaborated on the reasons for my
choice regarding the anniversaries above, but I have not yet specified why my analysis stops in
2006. Why did I not include the next important anniversary, 26 April 2011? The reason for which I
did not include the 25th anniversary is that the memory work on Chernobyl as well as the nuclear
discourse as a whole at this moment in time have been strongly influenced and overshadowed by
the recent Fukushima accident. Therefore, I decided to limit my analysis to 2006 in order to
concentrate on the Chernobyl debate as such. Of course, I will need to make references throughout
to events, developments, persons, etc. that lie outside this time frame, especially when explaining
the contexts of the debate. There are also moments in which I follow a certain actor over time and
then jump back in time to do the same with another actor. However, the basic red line in this book
goes from 1986 to 2006. 
With regard to the actors: I tried to assemble them into actor clusters. This was not only a
way to avoid confusion and reduce the risk that the reader would get lost in an endless list of
individuals and organizations, but it was also a good way to highlight the similar backgrounds of
the narratives that emerged from these actor clusters. I identified the following four clusters as the
basic structural reasons underlying an actor's involvement in the Chernobyl debate: public
authorities (government, radiation protection agencies); nuclear power industry (companies,
associations); anti-nuclear groups; Chernobyl solidarity movement groups. I analysed the
publications of each and paid careful attention to the narrative categories: self-affectedness,
radiophobia/apocalypse, anti-Eastern European/anti-Soviet stereotypes; this is the other red line that
runs through this book. From an inter-national perspective, I contrast the narratives brought forward
by the actors of each separate cluster. Throughout the text, I interweave my explanations and
hypotheses as to why different narratives have developed in theses two national debates. This means
that within each sub-chapter – primarily in their conclusions – I highlight the context within which a
certain actor cluster operates. This context primarily consists of references to the formation, role
and status of nuclear 'experts' and 'counter experts'; the changes to the national nuclear politics,
policies and polities as well as to their pro-nuclear versus anti-nuclear orientation; the shape,
political role and protest culture of the anti-nuclear movement; (the problematic issues of) the
national fleet of nuclear power plants; the importance of charities. In this regard, I have not written
just one single chapter to explain context; instead, I tried to combine throughout the book the
analysis of the sources with their interpretation and contextualization. 
In order to fully focus on the comparison between the French and British debates in the first
chapters, I decided to dedicate a separate part of the book to transnational aspects of the Chernobyl
34
debate. By analysing the reception of Eastern European authors in the different national contexts
and investigating Chernobyl as a cultural element in literature and photography, I wish to call
attention to the entanglement of actors and arguments; this is an entanglement that is responsible for
the fact that different national Chernobyl debates exist as does a transnational Chernobyl debate that
brings together actors and arguments that originate from various national contexts.
This book gives more space to British sources than to French sources. There are two reasons
for this decision: on the one hand, my book on the French Chernobyl debate already discusses and
quotes the French material in detail. On the other hand, I considered it important to deal with the
British Chernobyl debate in depth and introduce as many actors as possible since this debate has not
yet been a topic of historical research. One abundantly clear illustration of this fact is that a search
for the key word 'Chernobyl' in the Bibliography of British and Irish History (BBIH) in 2012
showed zero results. In addition, the civil use of nuclear energy in Britain has, in comparison to
works on the military use, been rather underrepresented in nuclear history. Regarding the more
recent time span, which has not been covered by the work of the two main British nuclear
historians, Margaret Gowing and Lorna Arnold, only a handful of publications exist that analyse the
nuclear complex through historical sources. From the social science perspective, only Brian Wynne
has written anything on the topic of Britain and Chernobyl, albeit with a clear STS perspective on
knowledge production and experts-laypersons-relations regarding the early restrictions on sheep
farms. Therefore, I decided to place a stronger emphasis on British material. The accounts on
France are more of a synthesis, and only parts of the material that was already presented in my
publication on the French Chernobyl debate is quoted again; in approaching the French content as
such, I have given a strong focus to the categories of comparison. Last but not least, I was not
always able to deal with each actor cluster in the same depth because of differences in the number
of available sources.
Before turning to the comparative analysis, I would like to give a brief summary of my
analytic categories. In the first part of this book, I analyse the narratives and statements on
Chernobyl that different French and British actors83 have published in the period of time between
1986 and 2006. These narratives and statements consist of many different elements. The elements
83 The main actors of the Chernobyl debate can be grouped into clusters: public authorities (government, radiation 
protection agencies), nuclear power industry (companies, associations), anti-nuclear groups, and Chernobyl 
solidarity movement groups.
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central to this analysis are: self-affectedness,84 radiophobia85/apocalypse, and anti-Eastern
European/anti-Soviet stereotypes. I refer to the way in which these statements and narratives differ
and contest as the Chernobyl debate, i.e. the Chernobyl debate is the variety of and relation between
statements, interpretations and narratives on Chernobyl that have circulated in public discourse over
time. The Chernobyl debate is a discursive field that incorporates elements from other debates in
order to give meaning to Chernobyl. This discursive field can be seen as the wider frame of
reference within which Chernobyl has been interpreted. The most prominent of these frames are:
national nuclear politics, general debates on the health impact of low-level radiation, and the Cold
War setting. These discursive frames are mirrored in the main narrative elements detailed above:
self-affectedness (→ national nuclear politics), radiophobia and apocalypse (→ general debates on
the health impact of low-level radiation), and anti-Eastern European/anti-Soviet stereotypes (→ the
Cold War setting). The national Chernobyl debates must be located in their relative national
contexts. The most important thematic aspects of these national contexts are as follows: the
formation, role and status of nuclear 'experts' and 'counter experts'; the changes to the national
nuclear politics, policies and polities as well as to their pro-nuclear versus anti-nuclear orientation;
the shape, political role, and protest culture of the anti-nuclear movement; (the problematic issues
of) the national nuclear fleet of power plants; and the importance of charities. In as far as these
contextual elements are linked to a country's nuclear complex, I refer to them as the techno-political
regime. In the following chapters, the French and British Chernobyl debates will be analysed
against the backdrop of these different national contexts. In the second part of the book, I examine
the transnational elements of the Chernobyl debate.
For readers who are unfamiliar with the British or French nuclear sector, and who therefore
run the risk of getting lost in the many abbreviations of the myriad institutional names, I include
below a rough overview of the main actors in this field. The juxtaposition in the following chart
does not in any way suggest a similarity of responsibilities, status, size, budget, etc. between the
French and British institutions; its only intent is to locate these institutions in their respective fields
of activity. In addition, the clear division of tasks is rarely clear, especially in the early days of the
nuclear enterprise: at this time, the main nuclear authorities, CEA in France and UKAEA in Britain,
84 'Self-affectedness' means here the way in which a certain actor considers his or her direct environment to have been 
impacted by the accident. This impact can consist of a physical impact in terms of radioactive fallout; but it can also 
take on less physical connotations and refer to the transfer of the accident's scenario over to national nuclear plants. 
Thus 'self- affectedness' refers to the national context, whereas 'radiophobia and apocalypse' refer to the situation in 
Eastern Europe.
85 The concept 'radiophobia' (which is often paraphrased in the sources since the term has been discredited) implies the
assumption that the increase in illnesses that can be observed in the most affected regions in Eastern Europe is not 
the result of direct radiation exposure but rather is a result of an exaggerated fear of this radiation and the 
psychological stress provoked by the resettlements and the rapid changes in the political situation linked to the 
break-up of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
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not only carried out research but were at the same time responsible for radiation protection and
nuclear security on their sites; and upon which nuclear plants had been built, the operation of which




SCPRI, IPSN, IRSN, ASN NRPB, NII, HPA
Plant Operation EDF CEGB
Research CEA (UK) AEA
'Counter-expertise' CRIIRAD, ACRO, GSIEN
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II BRITISH86 AND FRENCH87 CHERNOBYL DEBATES: A COMPARISON
In the night between 25 and 26 April 1986, the nuclear power plant Lenin, situated approximately
100 km north of the Ukrainian capital Kiev, was the scene of an accident that would go down in
history under the name of the nearby town called Chernobyl. Lenin consisted of four reactor units of
the RBMK model88, each capable of generating up to 1,000 Megawatts. The plant had been build
during the 1970s and 1980s, and in 1986 two new blocks were under construction. The supply city
Pripyat had been contemporaneously erected nearby the power plant. At the time, it was one of the
most modern cities in the USSR, a place that attracted young engineers and their families from all
over the country. This symbiotic industrial-living-complex was considered the materialization of the
USSR's technical progress. In this night in April, during a systems test, a series of explosions
occurred in unit number four. The cooling system broke down and the graphite, used as a moderator
in RBMK reactors, caught on fire. As the building housing the reactor was destroyed by the thermal
explosions, radioactive material was released directly into the environment.89 The fires generated
smoke and dust that carried radioactive particles high into the air, which led to a global dispersion
of the radionuclides. The intensity of local contamination however, was dependent on more than
just the movement of the air masses. It also depended on the meteorological constellations and
geographical settings. But Chernobyl was not only a transnational event with regard to its physical
fallout. Its media coverage also spread on a global scale. The public in the USSR only read about
the events on 28 April in a short news brief released by the state press agency TASS, and no further
information was provided. Several days later, Soviet television reported two deaths and declared
that the radiation situation had been stabilized. At the same time, the media in the West, alarmed by
the detection of radioactive fallout in Scandinavia, was already speculating about the causes of the
accident and the possible total death toll. But while outside the USSR anti- and pro-nuclear activists
had already engaged in a fight over the interpretation and political consequences of Chernobyl, the
accident was still ongoing. Firefighters were only able to extinguish the graphite fires days later,
afterwhich rescue and clean-up workers moved in to take their place. These liquidators, as they
86 Although the terms Great Britain or Britain in their strict geographical sense only refer to the largest of the British 
Isles, I use these terms in this text in conformity with the most common use of these expressions, i.e. as synonyms 
for the state of The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, or in short United Kingdom, or the UK.
87 In my book Tschernobyl und Frankreich, I offer a detailed account of the French Chernobyl debate. An article that 
offers a synthesis of my work on France is forthcoming in: Arndt, “Anthropologischer Schock”. The parts of this 
book that address the French Chernobyl debate are based on the material I used for these publications. However, in 
this book I look at them through the categories of comparison I introduced above.
88 The Reaktor Bolshoĭ Moshchnosti Kanalnyĭ (RBMK) is a graphite-moderated and light-water-cooled reactor that 
was developed in the Soviet Union and built only in facilities on its (former) territory.
89 A detailed description of the evolution of the accident may be found in most publications that provide information 
on Chernobyl to a broad audience. Therefore, I refrained from adding yet another description to the already existing 
literature keeping the account of the accident itself rather short.
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were called, were those responsible for de-contaminating the other plant buildings, but they also
erected the sarcophagus – the containment building that even today encloses the destroyed reactor
number 4 – and buried the contaminated soil, machines and debris. In all, more than 600,000 men
and women were called to Chernobyl to work in the clean-up crews. Even while the other three
units were reconnected to the grid by the end of the year, an area with a radius of 30 km around the
plant was declared a forbidden zone, and placed under military control. All of the people in this
region were evacuated, most of which hoped and believed that they would soon return to their
homes. But that would never happen. Pripyat became a ghost town and the smaller settlements in
this region were demolished in the years to come. As measurements of the radioactivity in the
environment continued to reveal dangerously high levels in the most contaminated areas of Belarus
– the country that was hit with the most intense fallout – the initial number of 116,000 evacuees
climbed to 350,000.90 
2.1 1986–1988: Direct reactions and early narratives
The news of the accident in Chernobyl reached France and the UK at the same time. In France, it
was the Première Cohabitation – with François Mitterrand as President and Jacques Chirac as
Prime Minister – that was confronted with the events in the Ukraine, while in the UK, Margaret
Thatcher's government received the news. In both countries, public authorities initially proclaimed
that the radioactive fallout would not have any serious impact on their country. This statement was
profoundly called into question in France and resulted in an intense debate regarding whether the
authorities had deliberately held back the true figures of the fallout intensity, a polemic referred to
as the affaire Tchernobyl. In Britain, strong restrictions had to be implemented with regard to sheep
farms some weeks after the accident when it was discovered that the highland sheep had become
too radioactive to be marketed after having grazed on contaminated soil; however, these restrictions
did not result in a long lasting public scandal. This chapter will focus on why the perception of the
dangers associated with the radioactive fallout deposited in France and Britain differed so greatly
and why the role public experts played in the evaluation of this fallout was perceived so differently
in these two countries. The French and British news reports presented below are intended to give
the reader an idea of the way in which the public first learned about the accident.91 
90 For further details on the resettlements and clean up workers, see for example: Sahm/Sapper/Weichsel, Tschernobyl:
Vermächtnis und Verpflichtung.
91 Although I use media reports as sources, it is not my aim to provide a broad media content analysis on Chernobyl. 
Through this account on media reporting I want to illustrate the narratives and images the public was presented with 
when it first learned about the event. In this study, the media is not considered an actor in its own right but is 
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Britain 
As an example of early British newspaper reporting, this section provides a synthesis of articles on
Chernobyl published in the daily national quality newspaper The Guardian.92 This choice results
from the fact that The Guardian can be considered as the newspaper including the widest range of
opinions on nuclear power in its editorial. In addition, it is the British newspaper most dedicated to
investigative journalism; its readership is mostly left-liberal oriented.
'Radioactive Russian dust cloud escapes' was the headline presented to the British public on
29 April; it was the first article of the Chernobyl disaster to be released by The Guardian. Readers
were informed: 'a major nuclear power accident in the Soviet Union yesterday sent a cloud of
radioactivity drifting across much of Scandinavia.'93 The article went on to quote the TASS
announcement: 'an accident has occurred at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant as one of the
reactors was damaged. Measures are being taken to eliminate the consequences of the accident. Aid
is being given to those affected. A government commission has been set up.'94 Asides from reporting
on the radiation levels in Scandinavia, the article essentially focused on the technical details
regarding radioactive fallout detection and not on its possible health consequences. In this regard, a
positive story of British preparedness for such an event was provided: 'If the Soviet plume begins to
drift towards Britain – and there have been easterly winds – the National Radiological Protection
will quickly pick up the signs from its fall-out monitoring stations.'95 
The articles printed in The Guardian the following day addressed various aspects of the
accident. It was not only the situation at the site of the accident itself that was discussed,96 but
Chernobyl was discussed within the context of global energy policies,97 and the possible impact this
disaster would have for the national movements in Belarus, Ukraine, Latvia, and Lithuania.98 An
entire article was dedicated to the particularities of the RBMK reactor, interestingly mentioning that
'it was also a graphite-uranium core which caught fire in the Windscale accident of 1957, releasing
primarily attributed the role of a 'distributor' and 'amplifier' that obtains – in the further course of the Chernobyl 
debate, namely on the anniversaries – input from the actors of the debate and spreads (or not) these arguments to a 
broader audience than the actors would normally have reached with their own publications. However, there are of 
course journalists who became themselves actors within the Chernobyl debate, such as Hélène Crié and Noël 
Mamère in the case of France.
92 The articles have been accessed through the ProQuest Database in the British Library, using the search key 
'Chernobyl'.
93 David Fairhall, “Radioactive Russian dust cloud escapes,” in The Guardian, 29 April 1986, p. 1.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
96 Martin Walker, “Silence covers 'zone of death',” in The Guardian, 30 April 1986, p. 1.
97 Hamish McRae, “The Soviet nuclear disaster seems likely to put King Coal back on the throne,” in The Guardian, 
30 April 1986, p. 24.
98 Martin Walker, “The vision consumed in the fire this time,” in The Guardian, 30 April 1986, p. 23.
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large amounts of radioactive iodine and other materials over a wide area.'99 Comparisons to the
Windscale Fire – the worst accident ever to have occurred in a British nuclear plant100 – were also
made in this news article to describe the ongoing situation at Chernobyl and touched upon such
aspects as the amount of radioactivity, the size of particles released into the environment, and the
actions taken to extinguish the fires. The author of this article was rather critical towards the first
official statements and asserted that 'although it is being claimed by Western “experts” that all
power reactors in the West have secondary containment, this is not true. Britain's Magnox reactors
– which have dominated the nuclear programme – are without secondary containment because it
was regarded as unnecessary at the time they were designed.'101 The journalist David Fairhall, in a
different article, took his analysis of the official statements on Chernobyl a step further and
questioned the reasons underlying the strategy to put distance between the RBMK reactor and the
events in the Soviet Union from the actual situation in the UK: 'The winds in Russia are blowing
eastwards, not westwards towards the UK, and the burning Chernobyl reactor is of a type not used
in the West. So can we now relax and get on with our own nuclear power programme without
worrying about the Soviet disaster? That is certainly what the British nuclear industry will be
recommending. They will point out that the Chernobyl plant is a peculiarly Soviet design […].'102
Thus, in the reporting during the days immediately following the accident at Chernobyl, the articles
i n The Guardian instantly and directly made the connection between Chernobyl and the British
nuclear enterprise. The event was first explained drawing on the background provided by the
national Windscale Fire incident, afterwhich the articles enquired into how the Chernobyl accident
would impact the new build Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) project in Sizewell. Thus with regard
to national nuclear policies, the journalists expressed a strong perception of self-affectedness. With
regard to possible (health) effects of the fallout in Western Europe, however, their perceived self-
affectedness was quite low: 'In Britain it seems unlikely that we shall feel any effects at all.'103 
During the next days, reporting was primarily concerned with the British students evacuated
from Kiev,104 speculations on the death toll105 and the debate over whether the accident should have
99 Anthony Tucker, “Unquenchable core of fear inside the poisoned furnace,” in The Guardian, 30 April 1986, p. 23.
100 In 1957, this accident caused the release of substantial amounts of radionuclides into the environment. The areas 
most affected by the fallout were the immediate surroundings of the Windscale plant which is a part of today's 
Sellafield site located on the coast of the Irish Sea right next to the Lake District of north-west England. 
101 Tucker, “Unquenchable core of fear inside the poisoned furnace.”
102 David Fairhall, “Chernobyl factors,” in The Guardian, 30 April 1986, p. 23.
103 The Guardian, “A disaster without frontiers,” in The Guardian, 30 April 1986, p. 10.
104 For example: Paul Keel and Martin Walker, “British evacuees fly home to health checks,” in The Guardian, 1 May 
1986, p. 1; Martin Walker and Edward Valliamy, “Airport radiation tests for students,” in The Guardian, 2 May 
1986, p. 1.
105 For example: Michael White, Martin Walker, Alex Brummer, “US estimates up to 3,000 victims from satellite 
information,” in The Guardian, 1 May 1986, p. 1.
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an impact on the new build project Sizewell B,106 a question the Labour Party was openly discordant
about.107 Although the issue of the possible health effects in the UK was further discussed, it did not
garner a prominent role in the press. Regardless of the fact that the article by Medical
Correspondent Andrew Vletch 'Parents scour chemists shops for iodine tablets' clearly stated that
there would be health effects in the UK, albeit very minor ones, it only made it to page 6 on 2 May.
According to the author 'all it [the low-dose radiation from Chernobyl] will do is increase the
incidence of cancer by an undetectable amount over the next 20 or 30 years.'108 Interestingly,
however, this article quoted Joseph Rotblat, who said 'it would be nonsense to start taking iodine
tablets. People are panicking because the reports of what has happened in Russia have been
exaggerated.' This 'all-clear' from the most well-known opponent to nuclear weapons, a man who
had received the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to achieve a nuclear weapons test ban and nuclear
disarmament and who had worked intensively on the health impact of nuclear fallout, was without a
doubt a statement that was received within the circle of nuclear critics as being credible to the
utmost. The front-page article published the very next day in The Guardian (3 May) corroborated
this rather untroubled stance on radioactivity levels in Britain. Under the headline 'Radiation cloud
reaches Britain' the readers were informed that 'the radioactive cloud from the Soviet nuclear
disaster reached Britain yesterday. But the National Radiological Protection Board [NRPB]
described the contamination level as very low and the Department of Health said it posed no health
risk to the public.'109 The article quoted Mr Donald Acheson, the Department of Health's Chief
Medical Officer, who stated that 'there was absolutely no need to take potassium iodine tablets' and
that 'it was most unlikely that those returning home from affected areas were at risk.'110 Similar
reporting continued on into the next day after: 'Radioactivity from the Chernobyl disaster was still
being recorded all over Britain yesterday. Nationwide checks are being made on milk after traces
were found in supplies. The National Radiological Protection Board emphasised that there was no
danger.'111 
After heavy rainfalls and thunderstorms had occurred in some parts of the UK on 3, 4 and 5
May and had 'washed' the radionuclides to the ground, the NRPB slightly changed its evaluation
and began advising that 'rainwater should not be drunk if it can be avoided.'112 However, this advise
was not considered a major news event by The Guardian and rather than being given first page
106 John Hooper, “Britain sticks to policy,” in The Guardian, 1 May 1986, p. 8; The Guardian, “PM rejects Sizewell 
rethink call,” in The Guardian, 30 April 1986, p. 5.
107 Paul Brown, “Labour at odds over nuclear power,” in The Guardian, 1 May 1986, p. 20.
108 Andrew Vletch, “Parents scour chemists shops for iodine tablets,” in The Guardian, 2 May 1986, p. 6.
109 David Fairhall, Michael White, Mark Tran, “Radiation cloud reaches Britain,” in The Guardian, 3 May 1986, p. 1.
110 Ibid.
111 Brown, “Labour at odds over nuclear power.”
112 Anthony Tucker, “Europe fears effects of high radiation,” in The Guardian, 6 May 1986, p. 1.
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coverage, it was located half a page down in an article that compared different counter measures
taken all over Europe. Eventually, on 7 May, the issue of fallout self-affectedness gained
momentum, as did the question of information policies: 'Radioactivity alarms Scotch makers,'113
'Baker acts to soothe radioactivity fears,'114 'MPs told: there is no health risk,'115 'Levels dropping
fast as cloud moves away,'116 'Contaminated rain sets Welsh alarms ringing,'117 read the headlines. In
order to deal with rising concerns and calm the people's anxiety a special incident room was set up
so that people could call for advise on foodstuffs. The Chernobyl accident slowly transformed into a
British political issue, not only because the opposition had begun to protest 'that there had been
considerable confusion about the advice being offered by officials'118 but also because opinion polls
showed a rapid increase in the people's opposition to nuclear new build projects.119 Aside from an
increase in public opposition to the government's nuclear policies, these polls also revealed that
there was a 'crisis of credibility': 'At least half the population, if the polls are right, does not accept
that the new radioactivity is harmless.'120 Hugo Young, in his comment on 8 May, partly attributed
this lack of trust121 to the nuclear 'tradition from which his [Mr Baker, the Environment Secretary]
own honesty cannot disconnect […] the folk-memory is filled more with lies than with truth: lies
about the Windscale fire, evasions about numerous subsequent incidents, official documents
spelling out a calculated policy of misinformation and subterfuge.'122 Young believed this mistrust
went far beyond the specific case of Chernobyl and needed to be explained as a result of the general
problematic issues connected to the British political system: 'If ministers are not trusted, it is
because they personify a world which has always taken a minimalist approach to public
information. This world, of Whitehall and Higher Westminster, sees the media as organs to be
feared or manipulated but not respected: sees politicians themselves as sometimes a menace to
good government: sees voters as people who, in their own best interest, need to know as little as
possible about a crisis – and the bigger the crisis, the less they should know.'123 
113 Jean Stead, “Radioactivity alarms Scotch makers,” in The Guardian, 7 May 1986, p. 2.
114 The Guardian, “Baker acts to soothe radioactivity fears,” 7 May 1986, p. 6.
115 James Naughtie and David Rose, “MPs told: there is no health risk,” in The Guardian, 7 May 1986, p. 1.
116 Anthony Tucker, “Levels dropping fast as cloud moves away,” in The Guardian, 7 May 1986, p. 2.
117 Tony Heath, “Contaminated rain sets Welsh alarms ringing,” in The Guardian, 7 May 1986, p. 2.
118 Naughtie/Rose, “MPs told: there is no health risk.”
119 Ibid.
120 Hugo Young, “Crisis of credibility exposed by Chernobyl,” in The Guardian, 8 May 1986, p. 21.
121 It is very interesting to observe that from the very beginning on, the issue of trust (trust in politicians, trust in public 
experts) and the question as to how trust in their evaluations could be (re-)gained took a central role in the 
Chernobyl debate. In this regard, the Chernobyl debate reflects Ute Frevert's considerations on trust as an obsession 
of modernity, a tendency in modern times to subsume progressively more relations under the discursive and 
emotional umbrella of trust and to consider trust in persons or entities as a major goal to achieve. Ute Frevert, 
Vertrauensfragen. Eine Obsession der Moderne (München: C.H. Beck, 2013).
122 Hugo Young, “Crisis of credibility exposed by Chernobyl.”
123 Ibid.
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The moment it was activated, people made extensive use of the government's information
hotline.124 The very fact that the hotline was soon overwhelmed with queries revealed a bigger
problem at hand: whereas contingency plans and clear assignment of responsibilities had been
established in the event of a nuclear accident on British soil, no such precautions had been taken
with regard to the eventuality of a nuclear accident overseas.125 However, even the adequacy of
existing response measures for eventual accidents on British soil were now being called into
question.126 Press releases on 9 May that radiation levels in Scottish milk had indeed exceeded the
safety levels and that it was still unsafe to drink rainwater did little to calm the growing anxiety.127
The most obvious result of this confusion and anxiety of large portions of the British population
were the approximately 800,000 phone calls made to various agencies in the search for
information.128
France129
In France, late in the evening of 28 April, France 3, in its news show Soir 3, was the first TV
channel to transmit the press release by TASS to the French audience.130 In order to gain more
information, the journalists contacted their correspondent in Moscow, who was only able to add
some additional data regarding the nuclear plant to the original TASS press release but had no
further information. The staff of the Swedish power plant Forsmark, since they were the first to
have discovered the radioactive fallout from Chernobyl in Western Europe, was able to provide
some more information. The first articles on the accident were published in the French newspapers
on the morning of 29 April. For example, a section in the national daily social-democratic
124 Richard Norton Taylor, “Chernobyl cloud jams Whitehall phones,” in The Guardian, 8 May 1986, p. 2.
125 This problem was addressed later through the UK Response Plan, which established the rules for dealing with the 
effects an overseas nuclear accident would have on the UK. In the UK Response Plan framework, the Radioactive 
Incident Monitoring Network (RIMNET) database was created. The plan was implemented in the 1990s as the 
national radiation monitoring and emergency response system. I am thankful to Ian Fairlie for providing me with 
information on RIMNET. For early proposals of the outline of the Response Plan, see: Department of the 
Environment (Her Majesty's inspectorate of pollution), Nuclear accidents overseas: the national response plan and 
radioactive incident monitoring network (RIMNET). A statement of proposals (London: HMSO, 1988).
126 Paul Lashmer, Robin McKie, Geoffrey Lean, “Confusion in Britain,” in The Guardian, 11 May 1986, p. 11.
127 See: Jean Stead, “Scottish fallout four times critical levels,” in The Guardian, 9 May 1986, p. 2.
128 This number is given in Jennifer Brown, “The impact of television coverage on the United Kingdom public 
following the Chernobyl nuclear accident.” In Television and Nuclear Power. Making the Public Mind, ed. by J.M. 
Wober (Norwood: Ablex Publishing Corporation, 1992), p. 196.
129 The following pages on France are somewhat a revised synthesis of the corresponding paragraphs in Kalmbach, 
Tschernobyl und Frankreich. pp. 65. The account is based on my research in the press clipping collection of 
Sciences Po Paris and in the TV news report archived at the INA. For a compiled edition of selected French 
newspaper articles reporting on Chernobyl in 1986, see: Jérome Strazzulla and Jean-Claude Zerbib, Tchernobyl – 
Les médias et l’événement (Paris: La Documentation française, 1991). 
130 France 3, Soir 3, 28 April 1986, 10.25 p.m.
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newspaper Libération informed its audience that, according to the news agency TASS, there had
been an accident at the Chernobyl plant that had caused victims and that abnormally high levels of
radioactivity had been measured in Scandinavia. With regard to the situation in France, the article
went on to state that there was no cause for alarm, as the measurements taken thus far had not
shown any abnormalities.131 A similar 'all clear' was given in the conservative Le Figaro and the far-
left l'Humanité newspapers, revealing that initial reporting on Chernobyl was independent of the
political orientation of the newspapers. In this regard, Le Figaro informed its audience on 30 April,
that another radioactive mass of air was approaching Poland and Germany but that, according to the
Service centrale de protection contre les rayonnements ionisants (SCPRI), no radioactivity had yet
been measured in France.132 The same day, l'Humanité declared, quoting the Commissariat à
l’énergie atomique (CEA), every care had been taken to ensure that no similar accident could
happen in a French nuclear reactor.133 Thus, the alienation of the problem, through reassurances to
the French public that the 'nuclear cloud' had not yet touched their country and that the French
plants were safe, was an intrinsic element of the first French news reports. Interestingly, in this
regard, the articles printed in the Quotidien de Paris shifted perspective from one day to the next:
On 29 April the newspaper mentioned a slight design similarity in some of the USSR reactors with
the Western PWRs.134 The following day, however, it back-pedalled emphasizing that the Soviet
nuclear fleet had nothing in common with Western plants. It then added that the USSR, in general,
was incapable of preventing and controlling such accidents.135 French journalists often made
connections between these kinds of statements and national nuclear policies. For example, the
article in Quotidien de Paris that day stated that it was ridiculous to call into question the nuclear
programme as such just because of this 'set-back in progress.'136 Because of the national holiday on
1 May, no newspapers were published. But on 2 May, the reporting continued as it had begun and
131 Vincent Tardieu, “Catastrophe dans une centrale nucléaire soviétique,” in Libération, 29 April 1986: 'L’accident 
survenu à la centrale de Tchernobyl en Ukraine, au nord de Kiev, a selon l’Agence Tass, causé des victimes. Des 
taux de radio-activité anormalement élevés ont été mesurés hier dans tous les pays scandinaves […] En France, on 
apprenait que plusieurs relevés ont été effectués hier soir en région parisienne, sans réléver la moindre anormalité'.
132 Jean-Paul Croizé, “Le syndrome ukrainien,” in Le Figaro, 30 April 1986: 'Un nouveau flux pollué se dirige vers la 
Pologne et l’Allemagne, mais semble pour l’instant devoir éviter notre pays où, selon le Service centrale de 
protection contre les rayonnements ionisants (SCPRI) aucune augmentation de la radioactivité n’a été décelée hier.'
133 Gérard Streiff, “Le syndrome de Tchernobyl,” in l’Humanité, 30 April 1986: 'Le Commissariat à l’énergie atomique 
(CEA) a indiqué hier que toutes les précautions avaient été prises pour éviter que ne se produise en France un 
accident semblable.'
134 Quotidien de Paris, “Catastrophe nucléaire en URSS,” 29 April 1986: 'Le parc de centrales nucléaires compte des 
centrales à eau bouillante, d’un type voisin de celles de la société américaine General Electric, à eau pressurisée, 
un peu semblable à celles de Westinghouse et des centrales françaises actuellement en service.'
135 Dominique Jamet, “Le S.O.S de l’URSS,” in Quotidien de Paris, 30 April 1986: 'l’URSS [...] ne maîtrise pas la 
filière graphite-eau bouillante, abandonnée partout ailleurs, et, inapte à prévenir de tels accidents, elle est 
également incapable d’en contrôler les suites.'
136 Ibid.: 'Il serait ridicule, en fonction de cette ‚retombée’ du progrès, la première de cette ampleur après quarante ans,
de jeter l’anathème sur une technologie qui a fait et continue tous les jours de faire ses preuves.'
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the French public was assured once more that Chernobyl posed no threat to the country. Le Matin
declared 'there is zero threat': thanks to the current meteorological conditions, France was being
protected from the Chernobyl fallout.137 The newspapers also reported on the 'overreactions' of other
countries, as did the Libération in its article on the iodine intoxications of children in Poland caused
by the panicked reaction of their parents.138 French parents were warned not to follow this example:
for there was no need for any counter measures to be taken.139 In general, journalists placed the
chaotic reactions in other countries, especially in West Germany, in contrast to how the situation
was being calmly and professionally handled in France. In so doing, they were relying on the
evaluations and statements of the official experts they had consulted with regard to this nuclear
emergency: the SCPRI, the CEA, and the national meteorological service. 
2.1.1 Public authorities
France 
Representation in early media reporting
In France in 1986, the main institutions concerned with radiation140 protection and nuclear safety
were the SCPRI and the Institut de protection et de sûreté nucléaire (IPSN).141 In this field, these
two institutions provided the official expertise. In late April 1986, the government as well as French
journalists turned to these institutions for an informed evaluation of the risks the Chernobyl fallout
posed. Therefore, their statements figured prominently in the newspapers and their representatives
were invited to speak on talk shows and TV interviews. The SCPRI was responsible for measuring,
observing and evaluating radioactivity levels and their impact on the French people. In terms of
organizational structures, the SCPRI reported to the Ministry of Health. The aim for which it was
137 Robert Clarke, “Le Matin répond aux 10 questions que vous vous posez,” in Le Matin, 2 May 1986: 'La menace est 
nulle. Si les observatoires spécialisés relèvent une radioactivité, cette dernière est très loin des seuils dangereux. 
[...] La Météorologie nationale prévoit que l’anticyclone, cette zone de hautes pressions qui règne actuellement sur 
la France, nous protège de toute arrivée d’un nuage radioactif.'
138 See: Pierre Vodnik, “Le syndrome du nuage panique les Polonais,” in Libération, 2 May 1986.
139 See for example: Libération, “L’Europe dans le nuage,” 3 and 4 May 1986: 'Aucune ‚contre-mesure sanitaire’ n’est 
justifiée, et les prises préventives d’iode ne sont‚ ni justifiées, ni opportunes’ a déclaré le professeur Pierre Pellerin, 
directeur du SCPRI.'
140 In this book, the term radiation always means ionizing radiation. The terms radiation protection and radiological 
protection are used synonymously. 
141 The different institutions and responsibilities within the French radiation protection and safety sector can be only 
outlined here. I have concentrated on the SCPRI and the IPSN inasmuch as they are the two central actors in this 
field in relation to the French Chernobyl debate. For a detailed description of this sector between 1986 and 2006, 
see: Philippe Renaud, Didier Champion, Jean Brenot, Les retombées radioactives de l’accident de Tchernobyl sur le 
territoire français. Conséquences environnementales et expositions des personnes (Paris: Éditions Tec & Doc, 
2007), pp. 175.
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founded in 1956 was to create an agency responsible for radiation protection that was situated
outside of the CEA, the French national agency for nuclear research and development for civil and
military applications.142 Over the years, as the SCPRI expanded it was accorded more and more
responsibilities. Therefore, by 1986, it was the national authority in charge of radiation protection.
By this time it maintained a network of monitoring stations in order to keep track of radiation levels
in the air. 
The French public became familiar with Pierre Pellerin, the founder and long-term director
of the SCPRI, through his public statements on the impact of Chernobyl in the spring of 1986. From
there on in, his name was closely linked to the affaire Tchernobyl,143 and very negatively, from the
point of view of French anti-nuclear activists. Given the close links with its founder, Pellerin's
involvement in the affaire Tchernobyl may have been one of the main reasons why, after his
retirement, the activities of the SCPRI were terminated (in 1994) and its responsibilities were taken
over by the newly instituted Office de protection contre les rayonnements ionisants (OPRI). 
Alongside the SCPRI, the other main French institution in 1986 that was in the field of
radiation protection and nuclear safety was the IPSN. Founded as a sub-division of the CEA, the
IPSN was primarily in charge of protection et sûreté nucléaire (nuclear protection and safety) in the
CEA, but it also conducted research and provided expertise in this field in general. The close
connection between the CEA, the principal institution in the French nuclear sector, and the IPSN
was the source of much criticism that there was a lack of independent control in the nuclear sector.
Therefore, in 2002, a reform was undertaken and the French radiation protection and nuclear safety
institutions were restructured. The result was that the OPRI and the IPSN were merged into a single
federal agency independent from the CEA: the Institut de radioprotection et de sûreté nucléaire
(IRSN).144
Back in 1986, however, Pierre Pellerin and his SCPRI were the central source of information
regarding the intensity of radioactive fallout from Chernobyl in France. The SCPRI published a
series of commuiqués which were in part reprinted in the newspapers. Members of the French
government, like the Minister of Environment, Alain Carignon, also based their public statements
142 On the history of the SCPRI see: SCPRI, Organisation pratique de la radioprotection en France dans le cas de la 
santé publique et du travail. Rapport SCPRI no 75 (août 1962).
143 When Pierre Pellerin died in March 2013, Le Figaro published an obituary with the title: 'Tchernobyl: mort du 
Professeur Pierre Pellerin', http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2013/03/03/01016-20130303ARTFIG00110-
tchernobyl-mort-du-professeur-pierre-pellerin.php?
m_i=oNnoRG4G7Ei_JD_rxn_QBtIOh5HZNZ5_7xL7rLMwcZo37bwUE (last accessed: 15 June 2013). 
144 I will only provide here a rough outline of how these institutions were restructured and will not elaborate further on 
other institutions than the OPRI and the IPSN, such as the DSIN and the DGSNR. For a complete account on the 
creation of the IRSN and the other institutions involved, see: Ministère de l’Économie, des Finances et de 
l’Industrie, Une pièce essentielle dans l’organisation de la sûreté nucléaire et de la radioprotection: le nouvel IRSN.
Extrait du rapport annuel 2001 de la DGEMP, Paris 2002. 
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on the evaluation of this state agency. But the SCPRI did not communicate to the French public
exclusively through its communiqués. It sent its representatives to give interviews to newspapers
and on the TV. This direct communication is what is of particular interest here. On the one hand, the
choice to concentrate on this form of communication was informed by how the official nuclear
experts had behaved in their public appearances, which played a decisive role in the triggering and
shaping of the affaire Tchernobyl. On the other hand, the history of the communiqués is a history in
and of itself given that, over the course of the affaire Tchernobyl, many French journalists claimed
Pellerin and the SCPRI had intentionally withheld the true figures regarding the fallout and had not
communicated all their data and insights to the media, an accusation the SCPRI and Pellerin
rigorously refuted.145 
The first point at which the SCPRI began to give public interventions was when Pierre
Pellerin came on TV for an interview with channel TF1 at noon on 29 April. When asked how he
had evaluated the situation in Sweden regarding the public health risks, Pellerin responded: 'I had
information this morning directly from the Scandinavian [radiation protection] services that work
with us within the framework of the international centre I am directing. These are very thorough
people, and they tell us exactly this: yesterday, the iodine-131 reached 10 Becquerel per cubic
meter of air and this morning it went down to below 2,5 Becquerel per cubic of meter air. This is a
radioactivity that is noticeable, that is mensurable, but it does not represent any inconvenience with
regard to public health. There has been so much doom mongering with regard to nuclear that one
risks unleashing panic. I would like to say it here, clearly, that even for the Scandinavians, there is
absolutely no menace to health. It is a phenomenon that we are all observing, all the competent
people in this field in Europe and in the world, a phenomenon which is very interesting to observe
because of the lessons we will learn regarding the movements of air masses, masses of air ra..., of
eventually radioactive air resulting from an accident, but that does not threaten anybody at the
moment, except perhaps in the immediate neighbourhood of the plant and, furthermore, it is
foremost in the plant that the Russians admitted there were people who had been injured.'146
145 For a partial analysis of the SCPRI's communiqués, see: Sezin Topçu, L’agir contestataire à l’épreuve de l’atome, 
pp. 196. However, in order to definitely answer the question of who had access to which numbers at what time a full
comparison of the archives of the SCPRI and the archives of different newspapers and TV channels would need to 
be carried out. This important aspect of the affaire Tchernobyl still represents a lacuna in French media history that 
merits further research.
146 TF1, Interview with Pierre Pellerin, in 13 h, 29 April 1986. Transcription and translation from the original recording 
held by the INA by the author: 'J’ai eu ce matin des informations directement des services scandinaves avec 
lesquels nous travaillons dans le cadre du centre international que je dirige, et ce sont des gens très solides, qui 
nous disent exactement ceci: hier on est arrivé en iode 131 à 10 Becquerel par mètre cube d’air et maintenant, c’est
redescendu à moins de 2,5 Becquerel par mètre cube ce matin. Il s'agit d'une radioactivité qui est notable, qui est 
mesurable mais qui ne présente aucun inconvénient sur le plan de la santé publique. On a fait tellement de 
catastrophisme sur le plan du nucléaire qu’on risque de déclencher des paniques. Je voudrais bien dire ici, 
clairement, que même pour les Scandinaves, la santé n'est absolument pas menacée. C’est un phénomène que nous 
suivons tous, toutes les personnes compétentes dans ce domaine sur le plan européen et mondial d’ailleurs, et qui 
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Pellerin's interview was characterized by his cold, arrogant behaviour towards his interviewer, who
presented Pellerin as an ivory tower scientist, interrupting his speech with a call for: 'En clair, en
clair, en clair!' ('In plain language!'); an interruption to which Pellerin did not pay any attention
whatsoever. 
But the SCPRI did not comment only on aspects of radiological protection. In addition, it
provided evaluations on nuclear safety issues. For example in an interview published in Le Parisien
on 30 April a representative of the SCPRI stated that 'a major accident like the one in Chernobyl
just cannot take place in France because of the difference in design that exists between the plant
concerned and the type of plants which we build. […] Our quality, safety and maintenance controls
are a lot more rigorous than those in the USSR.'147 
The IPSN provided statements on Chernobyl in the early days of the accident, as well, and its
representatives were present in the media, too. Like the statements released by SCPRI, those of the
IPSN provided evaluations of both nuclear safety and radiological protection. In this regard, on 29
April, IPSN's director François Cogné gave an interview on channel Antenne 2. When asked if
something similar could happen in France, Cogné answered: 'With regard to secrecy, I don't believe
so. The electric power plants are totally controlled by the public and open to all controls.' And in
response to the interviewer's questions of whether 'there is a risk these winds will reach  France', he
stated: 'Measurements have been taken […] these measurements are completely negative and there
isn't any reason, just in terms of the meteorological conditions, that whatever it may be would be
measured in France.'148 Cogné even provided a statement on the Chernobyl death toll – at a moment
in time, when there was almost no information available on the details and evolution of the
accident. Nevertheless, Cogné declared: 'the only deaths are probabilistic deaths. […] At this
moment, the only consequences are probably consequences for the workers in the plant itself and
not for the neighbouring inhabitants.'149  
An analysis of these early public statements on Chernobyl made by French official experts
est très intéressant à suivre pour les enseignements qu’on en tirera sur le plan des mouvements d’air, des masses de 
ra... d’air, éventuellement radioactif, provenant d’un accident, mais ça ne menace personne actuellement, sauf peut-
être dans le voisinage immédiat de l'usine et encore c’est surtout dans l’usine que je pense que les Russes ont admis 
qu’il y avait des personnes lésées.'
147 Le Parisien, “Le nucléaire en France: la sécurité avant tout,” 30 April 1986, translation by the author: 'Un accident 
majeur comme celui de Tchernobyl ne peut pas se produire en France en raison de la différence de conception qui 
existe entre la centrale en cause et les types de centrale que nous construisons. [...] Les contrôles de qualité de la 
sûreté et de la maintenance sont beaucoup plus rigoureux qu’en U.R.S.S.'
148 A2, Interview with François Cogné, in MIDI 2, 29 April 1986. Transcription and translation from the original 
recording held by the INA by the author: 'Sur le plan du secret, je ne crois pas. Les installations produisant de 
l’électricité sont totalement contrôlées sur le plan public et sont ouvertes à tous les contrôles. […] Des mesures ont 
été faites [...] ces mesures sont tout à fait négatives et il n’y a de fait aucune raison, de par les conditions 
météorologiques elles-mêmes, que quoi que ce soit, soit mesuré en France'.
149 Ibid.: 'Les seuls morts sont des morts probabilistes. [...] Actuellement, les seuls conséquences sont probablement des
conséquences pour les travailleurs de la centrale elle-même et non pas pour les populations avoisinantes.'
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reveals that the categories of comparison central to this study – self-affectedness, radiophobia and
apocalypse, anti-Eastern European/anti-Soviet stereotypes – all figured prominently in their
narratives. With regard to the aspect of self-affectedness, the representatives of SCPRI and IPSN
emphasized that there would be no fallout of any proportion that could pose a threat to French
public health. Furthermore, they emphasized that the Chernobyl plant had nothing in common with
French nuclear power plants and that, additionally, safety and security standards were superior to
the practices applied in the USSR. These were the two points upon which they based their
reassurances that there was no reason to worry that a similar accident could occur in a French
plant.150 Within the framework of self-affectedness, this strategy of alienation aimed to prevent the
French public from transferring the Chernobyl scenario over to the French nuclear fleet. This
element was underpinned with and reinforced by references to anti-Soviet stereotypes, which
heavily relied on the images of Western (technical) superiority and Eastern unsoundness. These
evaluations of Chernobyl by the public experts also included statements on the situation in the
vicinity of the plant. Speculations of a death toll of 2,000 people that had circulated in the US media
reporting were strongly dismissed by French public experts. French state officials were convinced
that a bigger risk lay in the panic induced overreactions fuelled by nuclear fears than in the fallout
itself. In this regard, their narratives were clearly situated in the argumentative field of 'radiophobia',
the intent of which were to oppose the narratives that described the situation as an 'apocalypse'. 
Britain
Representation in early media reporting
In Britain, as well, statements by official radiation protection and nuclear safety experts formed an
essential part of early media reporting on Chernobyl. The National Radiological Protection Board
(NRPB) – basically the British counterpart to the SCPRI in 1986 – was the main source of
information about radioactivity levels in Britain.151 And, like their French colleagues, the British
public experts initially saw no reason to worry about potential radioactive fallout from Chernobyl in
150 In addition to the discursive strategy of alienation which was applied in the case of Chernobyl by arguing that it was 
Soviet plant design and security standards that made this accident possible, the statements by Western public 
authorities after Chernobyl also reflect a strategy of coping with uncertainties and risk that Wolfgang Bonß has 
theorized, namely the discursive strategy to characterize a factual falsification as 'exception' or 'anomaly', Bonß, 
Vom Risiko, p. 92: 'Sofern Erwartungssicherheiten normativen Charakter haben, sind sie auf der anderen Seite aber 
auch in erheblichen Maße enttäuschungsfest. Denn ebenso wie Normen bei ihrer Verletzung nicht abgeschafft 
werden, sondern Sanktionen nach sich ziehen, werden Erwartungssicherheiten keineswegs bei jeder empirischen 
Erschütterung außer Kraft gesetzt. Faktische Wiederlegungen werden vielmehr zunächst nach Möglichkeit 
bagatellisiert oder als „Ausnahme“ oder „Anomalie“ interpretiert.'
151 The NRPB was instituted in 1970 and existed until 2005 when it became part of the newly founded Health 
Protection Agency (HPA). For a history of the NRPB, see: Mike O’Riordan, Radiation protection: a memoir of the 
National Radiological Protection Board (Didcot: Health Protection Agency, 2007).
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their own country. On 29 April, people could read in The Guardian: 'Britain has no need to fear the
radiation, the Protection Board said. The fall-out reaching Scandinavia was only twice the natural
background level of radiation. This was so low that it should not cause any harm if it was ever
carried to Britain. There was no need for any special precaution to be taken in this country. […]
Close to the plant the radiation doses may be lethally high but the amount of radioactivity so far
detected in the west presents no immediate hazard especially as the isotopes are apparently of a
kind which does not accumulate in bone or other tissues.'152 A couple of days later, this narrative
had still not changed. An article in The Guardian on 3 May quoted a representative of the official
radiation protection institute: 'since the NRPB has already checked nearly 100 people from places
known to be affected by the accident – that is Minsk and Kiev – it is clear that people in Britain will
not be placed at risk by the cloud.'153 
The British government also gave an 'all clear' very early on. In an article of 30 April, The
Guardian reported on the debate held in the House of Commons the previous day during which
'MPs were assured by both the Prime Minister and the Environment Secretary, Mr Kenneth Baker'
that 'Britain has escaped the effects of the nuclear plant disaster in the Soviet Union.'154 However,
the article also included critical voices that were raised in this debate, namely Mr. Tony Benn, a
Labour MP of Chesterfield, who was calling for a nuclear power phase out and a full debate on
nuclear power in Britain. Tony Benn specifically placed the Chernobyl event in relation to the
nuclear policies regarding the ongoing new build project: 'He demanded that the Government give a
full report on the Chernobyl incident before any authority was given to proceed with a pressurised
water reactor at Sizewell.'155 But the Thatcher government saw no reason why the Chernobyl
accident ought to influence British nuclear policies. As the Prime Minister declared herself, 'the
reactor in the USSR is totally different from that planned at Sizewell. The record of safety and
design, operation maintenance and inspection in this country is second to none. I hope, therefore,
you will think it right to support the furtherance of such an excellent nuclear industry.'156 Margaret
Thatcher was certainly not alone in emphasizing the differences between the Soviet reactor design
and British plants: 'The energy secretary, Mr Peter Walker said during a visit to the Sellafield
reprocessing plant that the Chernobyl disaster could not happen in Britain because there was no
reactor comparable to the Soviet one anywhere in the western world.'157 However, this narrative was
strongly attacked by Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth: According to them, the question was not
152 Fairhall, “Radioactive Russian dust cloud escapes.”
153 Fairhall/White/Tran, “Radiation cloud reaches Britain.”
154 Alain Travis, “No radiation threat to the UK, Commons told,” in The Guardian, 30 April 1986, p. 4.
155 Ibid.
156 The Guardian, “PM rejects Sizewell rethink call.”
157 Peter Murtagh, “Soviet reactor 'saver than British AGR',” in The Guardian, 8 May 1986, p. 2.
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whether or not the same thing could happen in the UK. Rather the question was whether the
consequences of an accident in the UK would be even more immediate given that 'British reactors
were not totally contained with a protective shell whereas the Chernobyl reactor had been.'158
Nevertheless, the government did not consider design issues to be the major obstacle to the
furtherance of its nuclear policies. The greatest obstacle lay in people's exaggerated perception of
the risks connected with this technology. This risk perception was, however, in the opinion of
Energy Secretary Mr Peter Walker not specific to nuclear power but inherent to 'anything that is
tolerable new and innovative. If I tried to introduce gas for the first time now, there'd be no
possibility of having explosive gas going down every street and into every house.' In order to
overcome this fear of nuclear power, he suggested following the good example of France. An article
in The Guardian quoted his reasoning: 'Instead of looking at the disaster in the Soviet Union where
the design concerned had in any case raised widespread concern among experts, Britain should be
taking its cue from France, where there was virtually no controversy about nuclear power. This, Mr
Walker said, was because electricity was 20 per cent cheaper there – a direct consequence of the
intensive use of atomic energy. He pointed out that 60 per cent of France's nuclear capacity was
accounted for by Pressurised Water Reactors (PWRs) of the type which the CEGB wants to build at
Sizewell. […][For Walker] there is no doubt that the only form of energy that is likely to give
enough energy at tolerable costs and safety is nuclear.'159
Asides from the individual members of government, journalists turned to one person in
particular in order to acquire information on the impact Chernobyl would have on Britain: John
Dunster, the Director of the NRPB. When Dunster died in 2006, the obituary published by the
Health Protection Agency (HPA) – which the NRPB had by then become part of – did not forget to
mention the role Dunster had played in the direct aftermath of Chernobyl: 'John Dunster will also
be remembered for the response of NRPB to the Chernobyl accident in 1986. The plume from
Chernobyl arrived in the UK on Friday, 2 May, just before a bank holiday weekend. John Dunster
led the NRPB response to the accident throughout that weekend and appeared on all the major
television and radio networks to explain what the impact was likely to be in the UK. He understood
the need for clear communications and drove forward efforts to get sensible advice on Ceefax and
Teletext. There was understandable public concern at the time and John Dunster argued strongly
that providing accurate public information about possible risks should be a priority.'160 However, in
158 Ibid. The question surrounding the definition of 'containment' was not unique to the British debate. It was also 
discussed at the international level, particularly within the IAEA.
159 Hooper, “Britain sticks to policy.”
160 Michael Clark, “John Dunster CB ARCS BSc FSRP(1922-2006),” 
http://www.hpa.org.uk/Publications/Radiation/MiscellaneousRadiationPublications/rad20misc_pub_DunsterObituar
y/ (last accessed: 15 June 2013).
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1986, there were also some who critically viewed his public appearances. They were suspicious of
Dunster because of his role in waste dumping at Windscale and in the evaluation of the Windscale
Fire.161 An article in The Guardian on 7 May 1986 phrased this reservation as follows: 'During the
past few days, Dr John Dunster, director of the National Radiological Protection Board, has done
sterling work in calming public fears. Keep taking the milk but cut down on the rain water, his
latest reassuring message goes. Only “a few tens” would die. This is the same Dr Dunster who
reported in 1958 on a two-year ongoing experiment to increase radioactive waste discharges from
Windscale deliberately in order to find out where the waste was going. […] Four of the young
leukaemia victims in the neighbouring village of Seascale, listed in the Black Report, were born in
1957 – also the year of the plant's fire. Dr Dunster subsequently replied that the discharges were
properly authorised and within safety limits. In 1984 he urged a hunt for the “missing factor” other
than radiation that must be responsible for leukaemia cases in the area.'162 Whatever this missing
factor may be or if indeed it exists at all, John Dunster's prediction regarding the impact Chernobyl
would have on Britain proved to be wrong. In an article in The Guardian of 7 May he was quoted as
saying: 'But if the cloud does not come back the whole thing will be over in a week or 10 days .'163
This was definitely not the case, as the restrictions on sheep farms implemented over that summer
would so clearly show.
Comparing the early statements of French state officials with their British counter-parts, it is
first and foremost important to stress that representatives of the British institutions in charge of
radiological protection and nuclear safety provided very similar statements to those pronounced by
their French colleagues. Both dismissed any kind of self-affectedness and proclaimed that the
radioactive fallout from Chernobyl would not lead to worrisome consequences in the country itself
nor was the event in the USSR cause to call into question the country's own nuclear programme. In
addition, the experts of both countries who intervened did not figure in the media reporting as
anonymous members of a public agency but were personalized, namely Pierre Pellerin and François
Cogné in the French case and John Dunster in the British case.
Early reports
161 The obituary published by the ICRP mentioned this important period of Dunster's professional life, as well. 
However, it might be questioned whether the metaphor 'baptism of fire' used in the obituary is suitable in relation to 
the Windscale Fire: 'ICRP regrets to announce that our emeritus member, Herbert John Dunster, passed away on 
Sunday 23 April 2006 at an age of close to 84 years. John, who spent almost all of his professional life in 
radiological protection, had his baptism of fire in the Windscale accident in October 1957. […]', 
http://www.icrp.org/page.asp?id=101 (last accessed: 15 November 2013).
162 Stuart Wavell and Stephen Cook, “Case of missing isotope,” in The Guardian, 7 May 1986, p. 32.
163 Naughtie/Rose, “MPs told: there is no health risk.”
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While the immediate reactions to the Chernobyl accident in late April and early May are crucial for
understanding the tenor of the official response, to consider only this time frame would be reductive
insofar as it is far too brief to properly reflect how the early narratives and interpretations developed
and were communicated by the public authorities. By widening the perspective it is possible to take
into consideration the statements that the actors initially transmitted in their newspaper and TV
interviews and also to refer to statements that the actors published themselves once they had
received more detailed information, either through their own means or through the evaluations that
had been communicated at the international level, primarily through the IAEA. 
NRPB
In a conference organized by the British Nuclear Energy Society in October 1986 (the proceedings
were published in 1987 as a book),164 representatives of the NRPB presented their evaluation of the
accident. Their statements offer interesting insights into the NRPB's evaluation of the health impact
of Chernobyl. Regarding the 'Radiological consequences in the USSR', M.D. Hill of the NRPB
stated in his paper that there had been 31 deaths, adding that 'no one from the off-site area had to be
taken to hospital for treatment of radiation injuries.'165 Here, like many others, he drew upon the
information provided by the report that had been presented to the IAEA by the USSR delegates in
the Chernobyl conference in Vienna in 1986. However, Hill went on to criticize this very same
Soviet evaluation with regard to a different aspect of the accident, namely the consequences
connected to the collective dose received by the evacuated population. He was convinced the Soviet
estimation was an exaggeration and wrote that 'more realistic assumptions could produce an
estimate which is a factor of 10 lower.'166 Therefore, his statement that 'fatal cancers expected to
occur in the 135,000 evacuees as a result of the external irradiation would be about 200,'167 ranks
among the lowest estimates of the expected death toll that can be found in the Chernobyl debate.
With regard to the wider population, the NRPB estimated a low health impact of the Chernobyl
fallout, as well. Hill's NRPB colleague, J.R. Simmonds, wrote in his paper that, based on the
NRPB's own assessment of the radiation dose received in Eastern European countries, 'in all cases
the doses are lower than those received annually from natural background radiation.'168 This
164 British Nuclear Energy Society, Chernobyl: a technical appraisal. Proceedings of the seminar organized by the 
British Nuclear Energy Society held in London on 3 October 1986 (London: Telford for the British Nuclear Energy 
Society, 1987).
165 Ibid., p. 64.
166 Ibid., p. 67.
167 Ibid.
168 Ibid., p. 77.
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evaluation of the situation in Eastern Europe is indeed far from any apocalyptic scenario.
Interestingly, the consequences of the fallout in Britain itself were not included in any of the papers
presented by the NRPB representatives. However, this topic was raised in the final discussion, and
in the proceedings of this discussion John Dunster was quoted having said: 'I do not know what the
results in lamb show at the moment, and I have no idea for how long the restriction is going to
persist, but probably not much longer.'169 The fact that the Director of the NRPB was not up to date
on the levels of radioactivity in sheep at this peculiar moment in time is quite remarkable.
Only a few short months after this conference, in January 1987, the NRPB submitted its
'Preliminary assessment of the radiological impact of the Chernobyl reactor accident on the
population of the European Union'170 to the Commission of the European Communities, a report the
NRPB had been commissioned to carry out. 'The aim of the study was to review information on the
environmental contamination measured in member states of the EC; to make a preliminary
assessment of individual and population doses for each country; to make an estimate of the
resulting health impact and to indicate the effects of the various countermeasures.'171 In the general
description of the accident, the authors stated that 'a series of human errors, whereby safety systems
were deliberately switched off and operating rules were ignored, brought the reactor into unstable
condition.'172 With regard to the health impact, the NRPB calculated that 'the expected number of
additional thyroid cancers occurring within EC countries due to Chernobyl is estimated to be some
two thousand, of which about 5% are expected to result in fatality. The number of additional
fatalities from cancer of all types due to Chernobyl is expected to be in the region of thousand.
These extra cancers are predicted to occur spread out in time over a few decades following the
accident. These estimates need to be seen against the background of cancers that would occur in
the population even if the Chernobyl release had not happened. Over the next fifty years about
thirty million people in the EC countries are expected to die from cancer of one type or another.'173
Therefore, NRPB reached the conclusion that 'it will be impossible to detect the health impact of the
accident.'174 When this statement is reframed using the analytical categories of this research, it
asserts that the grounds for perceptions of self-affectedness in Western Europe did not exist. 
169 Ibid., p. 86.
170 NRPB, A preliminary assessment of the radiological impact of the Chernobyl reactor accident on the population of 
the European Union, January 1987. The authors of the report were: M. Morrey, J. Brown, J.A. Williams, M.J. Crick,
J.R. Simmonds, M.D. Hill.
171 Ibid., abstract.
172 Ibid., chapter 2.
173 Ibid., p. 23.
174 Ibid., p. 26. 
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AEA
The brochure circulated by the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA, or more
commonly AEA) is another example of early Chernobyl reports published by British public
authorities. In some regards, the AEA filled a similar role in the early British nuclear history as the
CEA in France. It was founded in 1954 as the principal authority of the British nuclear programme,
for its military and civil divisions alike. It coordinated the research programmes and operated the
sites. Soon after its foundation, however, parts of its activities were outsourced and new institutions
were founded. This led, for example, in 1971 to the formation of the NRPB – as aforementioned
UK's central radiation protection agency – and British Nuclear Fuels Limited (BNFL), a private
sector company that from then on was responsible for fuel production, including the operation of
the Windscale site. As a result, the AEA's field of activity shifted to that of decommissioning the old
Magnox plants and to nuclear fusion research, its main area of operation today. Although in 1986 it
was no longer the central actor that it had been at the time of its establishment, the AEA continued
to play an important role within the British nuclear sector and was considered the leading authority
in nuclear research. As such, it published a brochure in 1987 on 'The Chernobyl accident and its
consequences'.175 Lord (Walter) Marshall of Goring, chairman of the Central Electricity Generating
Board (CEGB) wrote the foreword.176 In the 1980s, Lord Marshall was one of the key figures of the
British nuclear energy sector. In 1981 he was appointed chairman of the AEA, was knighted the
following year and the year after moved over to the CEGB. His enthusiasm for nuclear energy
generation was highly appreciated by the British government, namely Margaret Thatcher. For 'the
British anti-nuclear movement [however] he occupied the top slot in their demonological lexicon
for a decade and a half, as he advocated the virtues of pressurised water reactors and a major
construction programme of nuclear power plants in Britain.'177 His role in the aftermath of
Chernobyl was so important that even when he died ten years later, his obituary in The Independent
stated that Marshall of Goring had 'bent all his powers of communication to explaining to
professional and lay audiences what had gone wrong and what the essential differences were
between the Russian and Western concepts of nuclear safety management.'178 This commitment
clearly came across also in his foreword of the AEA brochure, where he stressed that the British
nuclear sector had to give 'as much information as possible to the British public in a language
175 John Gittus et al., The Chernobyl accident and its consequences (London: United Kingdom Atomic Energy 
Authority, 1987).
176 Further consideration of the CEGB and its role in the early Chernobyl debate is given in the following sub-chapter 
2.1.2.
177 Johan Baker, “Obituary: Lord Marshall of Goring,” in The Independent, 26 February 1996.
178 Ibid.
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which is both correct and understandable'179 in order to convince the people of the trustworthiness
of the national nuclear operators.180 
The different sections of the AEA booklet covered a wide range of topics, including the
USSR power reactor programme, the evolution of the accident, the Chernobyl source term, and its
consequences for the environment. The information given was primarily based on the USSR report
to the IAEA conference in August 1986, and the authors of the brochure included in their reasoning
that, based on this evaluation, such an accident could simply never occur in the UK. The section
that treated the environmental consequences of Chernobyl was the shortest section of all. Therein
the AEA delimited the area of the health impact of Chernobyl exclusively to Eastern Europe and
even presented a precise number: '7,500 fatal cancers in the European part of the USSR [have to be
expected] as a result of the accident.'181 This number was then statistically compared to other health
risks. More specifically, the AEA chose one case in particular for the comparison, one that I will
refer to henceforth as the smoking-topos. The smoking-topos, i.e. the comparison between the
yearly death toll from smoking and the Chernobyl death toll, was used to call attention to how
minor the health impact of the accident really was. The smoking-topos, however, was not presented
as a death toll in the AEA brochure but as a proportion. The number of 7,500 fatal cancers attributed
to the Chernobyl accident was declared to be 'equivalent to the compulsory smoking of less than 3 /
10,000 of a cigarette per week for 30 years.'182 Understanding the underlying argument behind this
comparison is particularly useful as it sheds light on the way in which the AEA approached the
problem of Chernobyl induced health effects. The authors of the brochure had summed up the
health effects that would occur if were each individual inhabitant of the European part of the USSR
to smoke the tiny amount of 3/10,000 of a cigarette every week for 30 years. The total sum of all
these minute statistical health effects was 7,500 – i.e. the number of cancers that was statistically
calculated to appear in Eastern Europe in consequence to the Chernobyl fallout, as well.183 Right
179 John Gittus et al., The Chernobyl accident and its consequences, p. 3.
180 This claim clearly reflects what is referred to in STS terms as the strategy of 'educating the public'. According to this
strategy, the public is considered to be contesting a certain technology because of a lack of information or false 
information. The provision of more or better information to the public on this technology is considered to be the way
to overcome their opposition. This strategy implies that there is a presumption of knowledge hierarchies between 
experts and the uninformed public and considers knowledge to be something that is produced in a certain circle of 
experts and then needs to be passed on to laypersons in a top-down-scheme.
181 John Gittus et al., The Chernobyl accident and its consequences, p. 7.11.
182 Ibid., p. 7.12.
183 There haven been numerous criticisms raised against these kinds of comparison. The first is that smoking is an 
active decision that one can chose to refrain from, while there is no choice with regard to inhaling air containing 
radioactive iodine. (A letter to the editor published in The Guardian on 9 May 1986 summed up this criticism in a 
humorously sarcastic way: 'I have successfully given up smoking and am now trying desperately to give up nuclear 
power.'). In addition to questions of unequal agency, it is also criticized that these kinds of statistical comparisons 
create unrealistic scenarios to call attention away from individual problematic cases: It is extremely unlikely, if not 
impossible, that a person would smokes 3/10,000 of a cigarette. Rather, the individual would smoke an entire 
cigarette on a daily basis, and probably even more than one. Therefore, this person would run a higher risk of 
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from the outset, public authorities used these kinds of comparisons of statistical data as major tools
to 'put Chernobyl into perspective', to illustrate that everyday life was rife with health threats that
were far bigger than the risk imposed by the Chernobyl fallout and that in comparison to other
causes of death the Chernobyl health impact was at best negligible; this argumentative strategy has
already been encountered in the NRPB report above, in which the calculated Chernobyl death toll in
the EC was put in relation to the general death toll from cancer.184
To extend the range of sources upon which my argument on the AEA’s early Chernobyl
narrative is built, it is opportune to include the 1988 AEA publication 'Nuclear Safety after Three
Mile Island and Chernobyl', which evaluates the accident.185 This book contained the proceedings of
the 'International Approach to Nuclear Safety' conference that had taken place in June 1988 in
Blackpool. The book's editor was G.M. Ballard, Head of the National Centre of System Reliability,
based at the AEA. The preface opened with a very reassuring statement declaring that: 'There are
slightly different viewpoints around the world on some of the detailed technical areas, but the
overall picture pointed by the papers is one of a well considered and researched approach to
developing a lung cancer. Were this person placed into a group of non-smokers, the average risk of every individual 
in this group would be lower than the risk that had been calculated for the smoker. This same underlying logic and 
statistical calculation were frequently used to establish Chernobyl's long-term effects. The totality of the 
radioactivity that was released was divided evenly amongst the total number of people affected by the fallout, i.e. all
people living in Eastern Europe. Consequently, the calculated individual dose was very small indeed. But, as with 
the case of the smoker, this individual dose insofar as it was established through a statistical calculation does not say
very much about individual risk. Wolfgang Bonß's work reflects on the wider implications of probabilistic risk 
assessments and describes how this way of thinking has impacted how risks and uncertainties are dealt with. See for 
example: Bonß, Vom Risiko, p. 97: 'Durch das Denken in Wahrscheinlichkeiten kommt es zu völlig neuen 
Kontingenzen im Umgang mit Unsicherheit, denn die lebensweltlich erfahrene vorgängige Strukturiertheit und 
Komplexität wird in einer spezifischen Form außer Kraft gesetzt. Wer die Welt als einen Zusammenhang von 
Wahrscheinlichkeiten begreift, nimmt die Struktur des Erscheinenden in reflexiver Distanz und unter einem größeren
Zeithorizont wahr. Die Wirklichkeit wird gleichsam visualisiert, nämlich in einem abstrakten Raum von 
Möglichkeiten aufgelöst, die kombiniert und kalkuliert werden können, und deren Realisierung sich gleichsam 
„hinter dem Rücken“ des Handelnden vollzieht.' Furthermore, Bonß has reflected on the changes of probabilistic 
thinking that occurred in modernized modernity and that have profoundly called into question this way of assessing 
risks and uncertainties. See for example: Bonß, Vom Risiko, p. 239: 'Mit dem Übergang zur modernisierten Moderne
verschiebt sich allerdings der Stellenwert der Wahrscheinlichkeit als Instrument des verwissenschaftlichten 
Umgangs mit Unsicherheit. Zwar wird keineswegs weniger in Wahrscheinlichkeiten gedacht und gehandelt als 
zuvor – im Gegenteil. Aber in dem Maße, wie der Wechsel vom Dispositiv der vermeidbaren und unvermeidbaren zu
dem der akzeptablen und inakzeptablen Risiken voranschreitet, entstehen Probleme jenseits der Kalkulation von 
Wahrscheinlichkeiten. Zugleich schwindet das Vertrauen in die instrumentelle Kraft und Beherrschbarkeit des 
Wahrscheinlichkeitskalküls, und es taucht die Frage auf, wieweit die auf dieser Grundlage eingeübte „einfache“ 
Verwissenschaftlichung der Unsicherheit überhaupt trägt.' A telling example of the way in which probabilistic risk 
assessment has been called into question in relation to the nuclear enterprise is the position paper written by John 
Downer, Nuclear Safety: A (Charlie) Brownian Notion, Working Paper No. 07-12, University of Bristol, School of 
Sociology, Politics and International Studies, http://www.bristol.ac.uk/global-insecurities/workingpapers/downer.pdf
(last accessed: 15 November 2013).
184 The use of statistics in public discourse as a means to illustrate 'facts' or 'truth' is a longstanding tradition. For the 
history of the political function of statistics in the Early Modern period, see: Lars Behrisch, “Political Economy and 
Statistics in the Late Ancien Régime.” In Writing Political History Today, edited by W. Steinmetz, I. Gilcher-Holtey,
H.-G. Haupt (Frankfurt a. M./New York: Campus, 2013): 175-190.
185 G. M. Ballard (ed.), Nuclear safety after Three Mile Island and Chernobyl (London/New York: Elsevier Applied 
Science Publishers, 1988).
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ensuring that nuclear power plants are designed and operated to high standards of safety.'186 The
fact that not only were the viewpoints on technical details 'slightly different', but a profound
disagreement had already sprung up by 1986 about the death toll as well, was, however, not
mentioned in the preface. In his introduction, Ballard described the underlying frame of AEA's
interpretation of the impact of Chernobyl. According to him, there was no reason at all to call into
question nuclear power as a result of the Chernobyl accident. This was not only because it 'offers
the only viable, economically-competitive source able to provide secure supplies'187 but also because
there was simply nothing to worry about with this technology. 'The safety experts know nuclear
power is safe but must bridge the gap between their views and the public perception.'188 For Ballard,
how little the public perception of the risk surrounding nuclear energy was really grounded in truth
became obvious in the debate over low-level radiation, as 'all attempts to explain leukaemia
clustering on the basis of radiation from nuclear installations have failed.'189 He stressed, on the
contrary, that instead of posing a threat, nuclear power was 'environmentally benign', and that the
'nuclear community is intensifying its effort to get this message across to the public.'190 That nuclear
advocates had succeeded in positioning nuclear power as an environmentally benign source of
energy was to become obvious in the 1990s, when the public image of nuclear power was largely
transformed into one of a saviour from the threats of climate change, a process commonly known as
'the greening of the atom'.191 But in 1988, shortly after the Chernobyl disaster, this positive image
had yet to be (re-)established. Ballard, in an attempt to do so, pointed out that the 'emphasis on
reactor safety has a key role to play in the future of nuclear power by helping to ensure that […] the
public are satisfied that the technology is safe and that they are completely protected.'192 Given the
importance the editors placed on this matter, the differences between the 'faulty RBMK design' and
the 'safe design' of British reactors were greatly emphasized in the book. Thus, in his paper the
'Analysis of the RBMK against UK safety principle',193 P. G. Bonell (AEA) presented a list of 13
points in which the RBMK and the UK safety principle were simply not comparable. Other papers
concentrated on such issues as the problem of the man-machine interface and the protection
measures against fires and earthquakes. One representative from France presented the EDF's safety
policy as an example of good practice. The paper written by other members of the AEA, 'Modelling
186 Ibid., p. v.
187 Ibid., p. 18.
188 Ibid., p. 9.
189 Ibid., p. 12.
190 Ibid., p. 22.
191 For an analysis of the implementation of this image, see: Emmanuelle Mühlenhöver, L’environnement en politique 
étrangère. Raisons et illusions  : une analyse de l’argument environnemental dans les diplomaties électronucléaires 
française et américaine (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2002).
192 G. M. Ballard (ed.), Nuclear safety after Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, p. 23.
193 Ibid., pp. 90–105.
60
the consequences of reactor accidents,'194 underpinned the point made by Ballard in the introduction
that the effects of low-level radiation on health were not a crucial topic insofar as the they listed the
fields in which research was currently carried out in the US and the UK: the health effects of low-
level radiation was not among them. For an analysis of the AEA narrative of Chernobyl, it is also
important to consider the death toll that was presented in the paper 'Consequences of the Chernobyl
accident' by W. Nixon and M.J. Egan (both AEA employees). Although they had calculated 'a total
number of cancer fatalities in Western Europe, arising from the Chernobyl accident over the next
decades, of around 1500', this number was followed by the statement: 'this figure should be
regarded as a likely upper estimate'.195 The way in which the Chernobyl death toll had been
calculated by the AEA (as well as most of the other nuclear authorities in the years following the
Chernobyl accident) was based on two main assumptions. Firstly, models created using research on
the health impact of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were applied to the Chernobyl fallout; i.e.
radionuclides set free by the atomic bombs and the way they were taken up by humans were
equated with radionuclides released into the air by the burning reactor in Chernobyl. Secondly, a
linear relationship between radiation dose and the risk of cancer mortality was hypothesized; this
relationship was deemed to be 'conservative' and would therefore result in figures that were likely to
be too high. In the years to come, these two assumptions became the centre of attention of actors
criticising the numbers presented by the official experts. Many of the counter-experts, when
evaluating these results, called into question these assumptions claiming that completely new
models were necessary to fully and accurately evaluate the health impact of Chernobyl. But before
considering the criticisms that were brought against these kinds of official Chernobyl reports, it is
important to first add the narratives provided by some other British state officials.
The Government
In order to respond to and overcome the accusations raised by critics in early May 1986 that the
government's response to Chernobyl severely lacked coordination and that not all information
available on radioactivity levels in Britain had been correctly passed on, the government decided to
take a pro-active strategy. In July 1986, Her Majesty's Stationary Office (HMSO) published the
report 'Levels of radioactivity in the UK from the accident at Chernobyl USSR, on 26 April 1986,
HMSO July 1986.'196 It was jointly edited by all the public entities197 that had been involved in the
194 Ibid., pp. 354-389.
195 Ibid., p. 406.
196 DoE et al., Levels of radioactivity in the UK from the accident at Chernobyl USSR, on 26 April 1986 (London: 
HMSO, July 1986).
197 In alphabetic order, these were: Department of Agriculture for Northern Ireland, Department of the Environment, 
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post-accident monitoring and decision-making process and contained 'information available to
NRPB up to and including 1986. The data are arranged by environmental medium and
geographical location in chronological order.'198 In practice, this meant pages and pages (almost
200 in total) of columns of numbers. In addition to the data, the report explained in detail the
methods used in the procurement of these measurements, i.e. the ways in which the samples had
been taken. However, this report did not include any analysis of the data. As a result, rather than
truly bringing transparency to the decision-making process, the intent of this report was a move to
show the public the amount of data on which public authorities had based their decisions, and in so
doing demonstrate that their decisions were grounded in science and as such valid.199 
But publishing a series of numbers proved not to be enough to mitigate all doubts about the
appropriateness of the government's response to Chernobyl, doubts that persisted not only beyond
Westminster' walls but also within the House of Commons. To gain further insight into the
government's action during the aftermath of the accident, the House of Commons Agriculture Select
Committee requested that the government write a report, which was delivered in early summer
1988.200 The Ministry of Agriculture, Fishery and Food (MAFF) compiled a supplementary
memorandum to the Government's response.201 Although this memorandum was not intended to
reach a particularly large audience, I refer to it nevertheless, as it is a very interesting source that
gives detailed insight into the tasks and problems the MAFF was confronted with in the wake of the
accident, particularly with regard to the aforementioned sheep farm restrictions. In addition, the
memorandum elaborated on newly introduced EC regulations on radioactive food contamination
and provided a detailed list of its post-Chernobyl research projects; for instance on the 'Dynamics of
Department of the Environment of Northern Ireland, Department of Health and Social Security, Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, National Radiological Protection Board, Scottish Office, Welsh Office.
198 DoE et al., Levels of radioactivity in the UK, p. 7.
199 From an STS perspective, there are different ways to interpret this form of communication with the public. On the 
one hand, the report can be considered as a statement against the involvement of laypersons in questions pertaining 
to radiation safety, seeing as the numbers are undecipherable to non-experts and therefore emphasized the technical 
knowledge required in the decision-making process. On the other hand, this publication gave the opportunity to 
informed readers, who were not part of the community of official state experts, to use the data to make their own 
calculations.
200 Despite intense efforts, I was unfortunately unable to get a hold of this document which seems to have been made 
public by HMSO (at least, it was quoted in various publications in this way). However, Chris C. Park in his book 
Chernobyl. The long shadow (London: Routledge, 1989) referred to this report and included some interesting 
quotes: 'The report stated that there was no convincing evidence that public health had been put at risk, although it 
was likely that some lamb with radiation levels above the statutory limit had been eaten by the public after 
Chernobyl. Contaminated lamb could have reached the shops by several routes, and the report concluded that “it 
must therefore be probable that some did so”. However Mr Jerry Wiggin, Conservative chairman of the committee, 
stressed that “someone would have had to have an exclusive diet of contaminated meat for a lengthy period for any 
harm to come about”.' (pp. 104) Park showed that despite some severe criticism, in particular with regard to the late 
revelation of a radioactive hot spot in North Yorkshire, 'the committee concluded that the Government has been on 
the whole successful in its objective of ensuring safe food in Britain, and that it had “got it right for nearly 
everybody”.' (p. 105)
201 House of Commons Agricultural Committee, Chernobyl – The Government's response, supplementary 
memorandum by the MAFF, June 1988.
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Radionuclide Uptake in Sheep' and 'Effects of Minerals on Reducing Caesium Uptake and
Distribution in Upland Pastures.'202 Despite the considerable difficulties the MAFF had encountered
regarding the sheep farm restrictions – difficulties that went from identifying appropriate marking
colours to compensation of the farmers – its conclusion about the situation was rather positive: 'The
extensive monitoring and rigorous controls imposed within the UK have proved successful in
retaining confidence in the safety and quality of UK foodstuffs at home and abroad and UK exports
of foodstuffs have not been adversely affected. In particular British exports of sheepmeat rose by
around 28% in 1986 compared to 1985. Maintenance of confidence in British produce remains a
high priority for the Ministry.'203
It is interesting to contrast this memorandum, which was not intended to reach a wider audience,
with the communications of the British nuclear authorities: in their publications, the issue of
contaminated sheep was practically omitted. For British radiation safety experts, the link between
the UK and Chernobyl consisted in the necessity of improving the man-machine interface in a
power plant but not in radioactive fallout. Chernobyl, for them, had demonstrated that the weakest
link in nuclear technology was the 'human factor' in running the plants and not the risks the
technology itself posed for humans and the environment in general. In this regard, E.A. Ryder, Her
Majesty's Chief Inspector of Nuclear Installations204 stated in a conference in London in December
1986 that 'the main lessons from Chernobyl were the need to adopt a safe design and to rely more
on layers of automatic control and protection equipment rather than on fallible human operators.'205
Much like their French colleagues, British state officials focused their early Chernobyl
narratives on three main aspects: the design differences between the RBMK and national plants, the
low-hazardousness of the nuclear fallout in Western Europe, and the limited impact to public health
in Eastern Europe. These aspects combined provided a narrative of Chernobyl that de-emphasized
or dismissed the importance of the accident for the global nuclear programme. Undoubtedly, the
accident could serve as an occasion to conduct further research in radiation ecology in order to gain
more information on the transport mechanisms of radioactive particles in air, water and soil.
Regarding the health impact of these particles, however, French and British state officials were
completely convinced that they had the means to calculate its impact (and thus the death toll),
202 For the list of Post-Chernobyl research and development, see: Annex B to the memorandum.
203 Ibid., p. 37.
204 Aside from this comment by E.A. Ryder, I did not find any other public statements on Chernobyl by the Nuclear 
Installations Inspectorate (NII). The NII, once named by Lord Marshall  'the independent nuclear “watchdog”', was
the UK's national nuclear safety inspectorate. In 2011, when the British radiation safety sector underwent a period of
restructuring, the NII was incorporated into the newly founded Office for Nuclear Regulation.
205 E.A. Ryder, “Regulation of nuclear power in the UK after Chernobyl,” in Nuclear risks: reassessing the principles 
and practice after Chernobyl. Conference: Papers and discussions (London: IBC, 1987), p. 11.
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although they admitted that there were some unknown variables in their equations. And although
people would most certainly die because of Chernobyl, in relation to other threats to public health,
such as smoking, these few deaths were not even observable. Yet, one result of Chernobyl was very
clear to French and British nuclear state experts, who in it had identified a new task to add to their
work agenda: they needed to better educate the panicking public about the safety of nuclear
installations and about the benignity of nuclear radiation. 
2.1.2 Nuclear power industry 
The previous paragraph was dedicated to the analysis of the early interpretations of Chernobyl of
the public authorities in France and Britain. This paragraph looks at the early narratives provided by
actors connected to the nuclear power industry. The border between these two actor clusters is,
especially with regard to 1986, actually quite artificial, the moment that all major institutions and
companies in the nuclear sector were state-owned at this time. But because this analysis will take
these actors and their narratives through the next 20 years, it makes sense to introduce this
differentiation from the start. The nuclear sector, in France and in Britain alike, underwent profound
reorganization and privatization in the years following the Chernobyl accident. For this reason, the
'public authorities' and 'nuclear power industry' clusters are discussed separately. To be sure, in the
field of nuclear technology, which is strongly dependent on state funding and guarantees, the
nuclear sector will always be closely linked to the state. Because of this, the categories introduced
here should be understood as a way to structure my material as coherently as possible rather than as
a statement on public-private interdependencies in the nuclear enterprise.206 
France 
EDF
In the case of France, statements made in 1986 by the plant operator Électricité de France (EDF)
could very well be discussed under the category of 'public authorities'. The EDF had been
established in 1946 as the national public electricity producer and provider. This implementation
had meant that the multitude of regional and local producers and providers were socialized and
centralized under this overarching operator. The EDF's nuclear history was marked for a long time
206 Another option would have been to draw a line between operators and inspectorates. But with this categorization, 
we are confronted with the situation that in many regards, nuclear institutions, for a long time, controlled 
themselves, as may be exemplified by the IPSN, which was as an inside-institution of the CEA.
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by its rivalry with the CEA within the context of the guerre des filières, i.e. the struggle over which
reactor design should be implemented on a large scale in France.207 Due to its size – in 2008, the
EDF had 104,000 employees – and its important decisively political role, the EDF has been often
characterized by its critics with such terms as toute-puissance (all-powerful) and État dans l’État
(state within the state). In 2004, the company was transformed into a stock corporation. Almost all
of the stocks, however, have remained in public hands. In 2008, approximately 85 per cent of the
stocks were still direct assets of the French state.208 
Back in 1986, the EDF was not just a state-owned company, but its representatives were also
attributed the role of public authorities. In this regard, Pierre Tanguy, the EDF's inspector general
for security and safety, gave interviews and figured prominently in the media like his colleagues
Pierre Pellerin and François Cogné – suffice is to say he gave very similar statements. For instance,
in an interview on 30 April 1986 on a channel Antenne 2 news show, Pierre Tanguy stated: 'If it [the
'nuclear cloud'] will arrive here, I think one should ask the weather specialists, but the toxicity […]
that absolutely does not represent any danger […] that becomes totally insignificant.'209
Interventions of EDF representatives in the early media reporting on Chernobyl were not the only
statements provided to a broad public. In October 1986, the company published a dossier
d'information recapitulating the topics discussed in the IAEA conference in Vienna.210 Like the
British AEA brochure, it claimed that 'it is possible to take a more or less complete picture of the
causes, the evolution and the consequences of the accident'.211 There were still some questions on
details that the Soviet participants of the conference had left unanswered, but this information
would be provided soon. However, the causes for the accident were clear, they 'can be found in its
design 'deficiencies', but at the same time, it was provoked by an incredible sequence of human
207 Underpinning this question of reactor design (a gas-graphite reactor developed in France versus a light-water reactor
developed in the US) there were two competing techno-political regimes, i.e. (very simplified) two different ways of
theoretically and practically approaching the nuclear future of France. In her detailed analysis of the French post-
war nuclear enterprise, Gabrielle Hecht identified a 'nationalist' regime on the part of the CEA and a 'nationalized' 
regime on the part of the EDF, see: Gabrielle Hecht, The Radiance of France. Markku Lethonen, Claire Le Renard 
and Arthur Jobert identified a similar situation in the British case, where the CEGB favoured the American PWR 
design, while the AEA favoured the Advanced Gas-Cooled Reactors (AGR) developed in Britain. See for this 
interesting comparison: Markku Lethonen, Claire Le Renard, Arthur Jobert, The diverging trajectories of Fast 
Breeder Reactor development in France and the UK (1950s-1990s): a tentative comparison, paper presented at the 
6th Tensions of Europe plenary conference “Democracy and Technology: Europe in Tension from the 19th to the 21st
century” Paris, 19-21 September 2013.
208 EDF, Rapport annuel 2008 (Paris: Groupe EDF, 2009).
209 A2, Interview with Pierre Tanguy, in MIDI 2, 30 April 30 1986. Transcription and translation from the original 
recording held in the INA by the author: 'Si ça va venir chez nous, je crois qu’il faudrait le demander aux 
spécialistes de la météo, mais par contre, la toxicité [...] ça ne représente absolument aucun danger [...] ça devient 
totalement insignifiant.'
210 EDF, Tchernobyl. Dossier d’information (EDF 1986). The following account on EDF's publications is an adaption of
chapter 5.2 in: Kalmbach, Tschernobyl und Frankreich, pp. 87.
211 Ibid., p. 1: 'Il est possible de dresser un bilan à peu près complet des causes, du déroulement et des conséquences de
cet accident.'
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error.'212 Also like the statements released by French public authorities, the EDF's dossier placed
emphasis on the differences between France and the USSR regarding reactor designs, approaches to
safety, and operating conditions. Furthermore, the EDF drew parallel conclusions to that of the AEA
with regard to the Chernobyl accident, reasoning that what could be learned from the incident was
that the possibility for human error in plant operation had to be further reduced. In addition,
information on nuclear issues needed to be provided to the public in a more comprehensible
manner. So while the nuclear experts in Britain placed emphasis on educating the public, their
French colleagues rather than passing on more information, believed the information that was
already available had to be made easier to understand. Already during the Vienna conference, in an
interview with Quotidien de Paris, Jaques Leclercq, the EDF's responsable de la production (Head
of Production) had announced that 'from now on, we will work together with communication
specialists.'213 
One of the first pieces in this announced communication campaign was the 'Tchernobyl'
brochure, published in 1987.214 The intention to keep the information simple and comprehensible
was openly addressed on the first page of the brochure, where the reader was told that it was the aim
of the EDF to 'simply re-explain, in a way that would be comprehensible for everybody, these
regrettable events which should not have a successor after Chernobyl.'215 Like the early publications
on Chernobyl disseminated by British public authorities, the authors of the EDF brochure
considered a comparison between the risk imposed by Chernobyl and health risks encountered in
daily life the most suitable way to put into perspective the impact of the accident. Thus, the first
page compared people's nuclear fears of today with the fears former generations exhibited towards
the first railways and airplanes; the brochure added that this comparison, however, was misleading
given that railways and airplanes had 'provoked infinitely more deaths than Chernobyl.'216 A general
account on nuclear energy was given in the first section of the publication. In order to ensure that
everybody could understand the narrative, the basic vocabulary along with descriptions of the
different kinds of ionizing radiation and the basic physics of how nuclear plants functioned were
provided. The text then addressed Chernobyl, describing the accident as a result of 'human error, an
unqualified operation crew, […] and a less stable reactor than ours.'217 In this regard, the narrative
212 Ibid.: 'Si l’accident a trouvé ses causes dans les ‘insuffisances’ de conception, il a été aussi provoqué par une 
incroyable séquence d’erreurs humaines.'
213 Pascale Richard, “Tchernobyl: Quelles rétombées en France?,” in Quotidien de Paris, 23 and 24 August 1986: '[…] 
désormais travailler avec des spécialistes de la communication.'
214 EDF, Tchernobyl (Dijon: EDF, 1987).
215 Ibid., p. 1: '[…] de réexpliquer simplement, à la portée de tous, les événements éminemment regrettables, mais qui 
devraient être, après Tchernobyl, sans lendemain.'
216 Ibid., p. 1: '[…] pourtant ont entraîné infiniment plus de morts que Tchernobyl.'
217 Ibid., p. 28: '[…]  des erreurs humaines, un encadrement peu qualifié [...], un réacteur moins stable que les nôtres.'
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strategy of alienation was underpinned by references to anti-Eastern European/anti-Soviet
stereotypes, which were expressed in the way that such statements intimated that plant workers
were less skilled and reactors less well designed in the East than in the West. In terms of the
evaluation of the health impact of Chernobyl in Eastern Europe, the narrative was far from
apocalyptic. The brochure stated that apart from the firemen who were fatally irradiated during the
emergency response, there would not be 'any short-term deaths'.218 Moreover, the long-term health
impact would be negligible: '300 supplementary fatalities over the next twenty years within the
totality of the evacuated population (135.000 inhabitants).'219 In this 40-pages brochure, the topic of
health effects in France was only mentioned in one sentence, a sentence that read: 'One can say that
in France, the general radioactivity was a hundred times lower than during the atomic [weapons]
tests of the [19]60s, and that the most exposed citizen will not experience more damaging health
effects than were he to have undergone one or two pulmonary x-rays.'220 Hence, the EDF rejected
entirely the issue of French self-affectedness with regard to the transfer of the accident scenario to
French plants as well as in terms of the possible health effects of the fallout. Instead, the emphasis
was placed on the issue of 'radiophobia': The section devoted to the health effects closed with the
remark that 'the political and journalistic exploitation of this phenomenon [of very low doses of
radioactivity] contributed to create panic in certain countries, in particular in Germany.'221
Other than publishing information brochures on Chernobyl, another strategy actuated to rebuild
public trust in the national nuclear fleet by the operators, in France as well as in Britain, was the
encouragement of direct interaction with the technology itself. Even before the accident at
Chernobyl, many sites already contained information centres, and guided on-site visits had been a
popular weekend family activity for quite some time.222 These kinds of direct interactions with the
interested public were intensified after Chernobyl.
218 Ibid., p. 34: '[…] aucun décès à court terme.'
219 Ibid., p. 34: '[…] 300 décès supplémentaires dans les vingt ans à venir pour la population totale évacuée (135.000 
habitants).'
220 Ibid., p. 34: 'On peut dire qu’en France, la radioactivité générale était cent fois inférieure à celle connue pendant 
les essais atomiques des années 60, et que le citoyen le plus exposé ne subira pas plus d’effets dommageables à sa 
santé que s’il avait subi une ou deux radios des poumons.'
221 Ibid., p. 34: 'L’exploitation politique et journalistique du phénomène [des doses très faibles] a contribué à créer un 
effet de panique en certain pays, en particulier en Allemagne.'
222 For the French case, see: Hecht, Radiance of France. In Britain, it was primarily the Sellafield visitor's centre that 
had been in great demand. It was only closed recently, due to the vigilance policies that have emerged in Britain for 




Similar to its French counter-part the EDF, the British Central Electricity Generating Board
(CEGB) also took an active role in providing the broader public with a 'first hand expert evaluation'
of the impact of Chernobyl. Until its privatization in the 1990s, the CEGB was the key player in
UK's electricity industry as it was responsible for electricity generation in England and Wales; it
owned the nuclear and other power plants in these parts of Britain, and the grid itself. Furthermore,
it served as a research institution. In this regard, the CEGB and the EDF held similar positions in
their respective national nuclear sectors. However, in the following decades, the privatization of the
EDF would consolidate its role in France and even transform it into a global actor, whereas the
CEGB would be broken up by the privatization of the British electricity sector – a process,
incidentally, during which most of the British nuclear power plants were taken over by the EDF. 
But, coming back to September 1986, when the CEGB published its information dossier
'Chernobyl',223 just as the EDF was to do the following month. This brochure spoke of the RBMK
reactor design, how the accident occurred (for which the faulty design and the operators were
claimed responsible) and the containment measures, but also the fallout that had spread over Europe
and its health impact. With regard to the death toll at that time, it stated that 'some 31 people have
died as a result of the accident either directly or as a result of receiving lethal radiation doses.'224
The long-term health effects were also discussed. Theses effects were directly compared to 'natural
background cancers' – alongside with the smoking-topos, this was another common topos used to
place Chernobyl's health effects into perspective. The authors, John Collier and Myrddin Davies,
formulated this comparison as follows: 'Current estimates indicate perhaps 6 – 40,000 thyroid
cancers and other cancers resulting over the next 40 years in the affected parts of Russia and
Western Europe. This figure needs to be compared to a figure of 40 million cancer deaths expected
in the same population over the same time period'.225 Thus, the health impact the accident had in the
immediate and would in time was declared to be rather limited. In this regard, the narrative by the
CEGB was quite similar to that which would be provided by the EDF. However, the aspect of anti-
Soviet stereotypes was less present. On the contrary, the CEGB actively praised the Soviet
management of the emergency. It provided a picture of the situation in the near vicinity of the
reactor that was far from being chaotic, when the authors wrote in the last sentence of the brochure:
'Given that no accident of such a magnitude had previously happened to any nuclear power plant in
the world, the co-ordination and response of the many Soviet recovery services appears to have
223 John G. Collier and L. Myrddin Davies, Chernobyl (Glouchester: Central Electricity Generating Board, 1986).
224 Ibid., p. 1.
225 Ibid., p. 18.
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been exemplary.'226 Many other accounts, however, had placed these emergency operations under a
rather different light, speaking of a 'general irresponsibility' of the Soviet leaders towards the
population. This criticism regarded foremost the claim that Pripyat had been evacuated far too late
and that the firefighters had been sent in to get the fire in the burning plant under control without
having first been properly warned of the risk to their lives from the radiation. Although anti-Soviet
stereotypes were not used in this brochure to frame the emergency operations, the CEGB did use
them on other occasions to explain the reasons for the accident. In a paper that B. Edmondson,
Director of the Nuclear Co-ordination Group of the CEGB, presented in the conference 'Nuclear
Risks – Reassessing the Principles and Practice after Chernobyl' that took place in London in
December 1986,227 he attributed the accident to a kind of 'simplemindedness' of Soviet nuclear
engineers and plant operators: In his paper on 'The Chernobyl accident and its implications for
operators of civil Nuclear Power Plants in the UK', B. Edmondson elaborated that 'the RBMK
designers had suffered a tremendous psychological blockage in not foreseeing that the plant
operators would commit an extensive series of violations of vital safety procedures.'228 Regarding
the safety of British nuclear power plants, on the other hand, Edmondson saw no cause for worry
given 'the RMBK reactor design is very different indeed from anything elsewhere in the world.' For
him, this fact 'by itself could perhaps provide a satisfactory and resounding “No”' to the question
'Can it happen here?'.229 Thus, Edmondson's narrative contained a strategy of alienation, of putting
the responsibility on an entity alien to the British nuclear program. However, seeing as 'operator
action is a common threat with all reactor types,'230 the UK was, from Edmondson's point of view,
not completely free of risk from possible future accidents. Therefore, he proposed that action should
be taken in order to guarantee operator training 'in the deeper “educational sense.”'231 The nuclear
expert of the CEGB did not consider the technology in itself dangerous. Rather it was the personnel
that posed the true problem.232 In that way, like the AEA, the CEGB called for an improvement in
226 Ibid., p. 20.
227 IBC Technical Service, Nuclear risks: reassessing the principles and practice after Chernobyl. Conference: Papers 
and discussions (London: IBC, 1987).
228 B. Edmondson, “The Chernobyl accident and its implications for operators of civil nuclear power plant in the UK,” 
in Nuclear risks: reassessing the principles and practice after Chernobyl. Conference: Papers and discussions 
(London: IBC, 1987), p. 1.
229 Ibid., p. 8.
230 Ibid.
231 Ibid.
232 This identification of the personnel as the source of the problem is well in line with Wolfgang Bonß's general 
reflections on the efforts to create clear accountabilities in the period after an accident. Bonß, Vom Risiko, p. 201: 
'Auf der anderen Seite folgt aus dem konstitutiven Handlungsbezug keineswegs eine Verantwortbarkeit, und noch 
komplizierter ist es bei der Frage der Haftung. Derartige Umdefinitionen sind bei Unfällen nämlich nur begrenzt 
möglich, auch wenn dies bei einschlägigen Ereignissen vom Autounglück bis hin zur Tschernobyl-Katastrophe in 
der Tradition des liberalen Modells gerne gemacht wird. Beliebt ist beispielsweise der stereotype Verweis auf 
angebliche Bedienungsfehler und Nachlässigkeiten – ein Argument, das unabhängig von seinem Wahrheitsgehalt 
eindeutig Verantwortlichkeiten schafft. […] Ungeachtet dessen müssen Unfallursachen auch und gerade unter 
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the man-machine interface.
This narrative of placing the blame for the accident on a technical setting, alien to the British
nuclear sector, and on unqualified 'Russian' operators was also espoused by the chairman of the
CEGB, Lord Marshall of Goring. In his contribution to the House of Lords debate on 'Nuclear
Power in Europe' on 20 November 1986 – later published by the CEGB as a leaflet for wider
distribution – he explained why 'Chernobyl could not happen here'.233 Marshall reached this
conclusion using the information provided by the report the 'Russian' delegation had submitted to
the IAEA conference in August. The 'shortcomings' of the reactor design were what had caused the
accident, shortcomings that did not exist in British plant design and safety culture, shortcomings
that had, as it happened, already been 'identified by a team of British engineers who studied this
reactor in 1975'.234 Nuclear engineers had identified one 'shortcoming' in particular of the RBKM
reactor design, its positive void coefficient. This system specificity required the operators to take an
active role in the decision-making process in the event an unstable situation in the reactor
developed. In this regard, Western nuclear engineers drew a line between 'Western safety culture'
that was based on built-in protections, versus the 'Soviet safety culture', which, from their point of
view, gave far too much responsibility to the plant operators. Based on these assumptions, Lord
Marshall reasoned: 'We are satisfied that there is no narrow technical issue which we in the West
could or should learn from the disaster. We have very well established safety rules which we follow
meticulously. The Russians have chosen to ignore many of them and sadly have now paid the
price.'235 Thus, there was no reason to let the Chernobyl accident influence the decision on reactor
new build projects in Britain, namely on the Sizewell B project. After all, Britain had to keep up
with other nations in this important economic field: 'Our competitors in France and Japan have
reaffirmed their intention to expand their nuclear programme, and the Russians themselves have
recently outlined ambitious plans to increase nuclear power production.'236 
Watt Committee on Energy
The reasoning used by the CEGB was replicated by another key player of the British energy sector,
the Watt Committee on Energy. The Watt Committee on Energy was instituted in the aftermath of
the oil crisis of 1973/74 and assembled 61 British engineering and research institutions, ranging
Risikogesichtspunkten geklärt werden, und zwar vor allem, um sich selbst zu versichern, daß sich das „unglückliche
Zusammentreffen verschiedener Umstände“ in der unsicheren Zukunft nicht wiederholen lässt.'
233 Lord Marshall, The Chernobyl Accident (London: CEGB, December 1986).
234 Ibid., p. 1.
235 Ibid., p. 3.
236 Ibid. (last sentence of the text)
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from the British Nuclear Energy Society to the Royal Institution of Naval Architects.237 In 1988, the
Watt Committee on Energy published the report 'The Chernobyl accident and its implications for
the United Kingdom.'238 The report was compiled by an internal working group239 and consisted of
eight sections each written by different members of the committee, with an additional ninth section
on recommendations and conclusions of the working group as a whole. The report was published
with the financial support of the CEGB, the South of Scotland Electricity Board, British Nuclear
Fuels, the UKAEA and the National Nuclear Corporation. It was intended to reach and inform a
broad audience on Chernobyl, and not just people linked to the nuclear sector. In the formulation of
its work objectives, the Watt Committee perceived its role to be 'to promote and assist research and
development and other scientific or technological work concerning all aspects of energy; to
disseminate knowledge [… and] to promote the formation of informed opinion on matters
concerned with energy.' Therefore, by publishing this report, it clearly intended to claim the role of
'an independent actor' in the Chernobyl debate, by stressing at the same time that it represented
'some 500,000 professionally qualified people', i.e. the UK's community of energy experts as a
whole. 
In his foreword, the chairman of the Watt Committee, G.K.C. Pardoe, hinted that for the
committee the impact of the accident consisted more in its political than in its health effects when
he wrote that 'there are comparatively small numbers of people, mainly in limited areas, for whom
the direct effects of Chernobyl are still important, and the long-run indirect effects are important
for almost everybody.'240 Regarding the report's narrative on Chernobyl, particular attention must be
paid to section 4, 'The radioactive release from Chernobyl and its effects' by Barry Smith and Arthur
Charlesby; section 5, 'Accident management in the USSR and the United Kingdom' by Glynne
Lewis; as well as section 9, 'Comments, recommendations and conclusions'.241 The authors of
section 4, after discussing the inventory of the release, its deposition to the ground in the UK, and
the contamination of foodstuffs caused by the deposits, commented on Chernobyl's health effects.
Their remarks are worth being quoted in detail: 'Beyond 100 km from Chernobyl, the effects of the
237 All member institutions of the Watt Committee on Energy are listed on page 141 of the report to which I will refer in
this paragraph. A list of all reports published by the Watt Committee on Energy until 1988 can be found on page 142
of the report quoted here.
238 Norman Worley and Jeffery Lewins (eds.), The Chernobyl accident and its implications for the United Kingdom 
(London/New York: Elsevier Applied Science Publishers, 1988).
239 The members of the working group were (in alphabetical order): F.L. Allen, J.L. Bindon, R. Bulloch, A. Charlesby, 
D.R. Cope, P.M.S. Jones, J.D. Lewins, G. Lewis, J.G. Mordue, G.F. Oliver, G.K.C. Pardoe, P.D. Potter, F.B. Smith, 
G.N. Walton, N.G. Worley.
240 Worley/Lewins, The Chernobyl accident and its implications for the United Kingdom, p. vi.
241 The other sections of the report dealt with the design of the Chernobyl reactor (2); the description of the evolution of
the accident, which was mainly based on the USSR-report to the IAEA of August 1986 (3); United Kingdom and 
USSR reactor types (6); reactor operation and operator training in the UK (7); and international dimensions of the 
implications of the Chernobyl accident for the UK (8).
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additional uptake of radioactivity into the human population are likely to be so small that they will
be impossible to detect even by the most careful of medical surveys over the next few decades. This
simple truth was largely ignored by the media and has led to considerable anxiety and exaggerated
fear of the nuclear industry. On the other hand, some deaths may well result, although how these
should be interpreted is a matter of some debate: for example, many may occur in old people
nearing the end of their lives anyway. This is not intended to sound callous; but it is intended to put
the problem in perspective. W. K. Sinclair has given statistics of deaths per year in the US from
avoidable 'accidental' causes. Nuclear power generation, including the very occasional release, is
said to cause typically 100 deaths per year. Smoking causes 150,000, alcohol 100,000, road
accidents 50,000 and accidents with guns 17,500. Chernobyl almost fades into insignificance by
comparison.'242 Leaving aside the problem of a comparison in which, as the authors stated
themselves, the exact figures on one of the sides are not known, it is difficult not to consider this
statement as biased ('callous' might be not the right word).243 For the most recent numbers of the
Chernobyl death toll at the time, the Watt Committee report listed two plant workers who had died
in the explosions and resulting fires and 29 others who had died in the following days due to their
radiation exposure. With regard to the health impact on the 135,000 evacuees, the report stated that
'none of these people showed any clinical symptoms, although it is estimated that up to 1,000 of
them may develop cancers in the next few decades.'244 For the health impact in the UK – which,
according to their calculations, would amount to 80 thyroid cancers, 4 fatal cancers and 40 general
fatal cancers over the next 50 years245 – the report presented a comparison that can be considered
yet another topos in the Chernobyl debate: The comparison of the Chernobyl fallout with natural
background radiation. The authors wrote: 'A much greater risk affects people living in areas with
high radon concentrations, for example in Cornwell. Well-sealed modern housing in such areas
can, it is believed, give rise to a risk of 1 in 2,500 of developing associated lung cancer in each
year. This is some 104 times greater than the risk from Chernobyl fallout.'246 The topos of the
'Chernobyl fallout vs. natural background radiation' comparison can also be found in the French
discourse, where in terms of a 'problematic area' with high radon background radiation, the Massif
Central can be equated with Cornwell. The intrinsic flaw with this comparison, and also with the
smoking-topos, is the problem of an un-weighted comparison: whereas the exposition to radon in
242 Worley/Lewins, The Chernobyl accident and its implications for the United Kingdom, pp. 31.
243 As stated above, the comparison of the Chernobyl death toll to the smoking death toll was used from the beginning 
by nuclear advocates to 'put Chernobyl in perspective'. It has been criticized mainly for comparing death tolls caused
by individual choices and actions to a death toll caused by an external event upon which the people affected did not 
have any influence.




Cornwell is a natural environmental condition, the Chernobyl fallout was men-made and could have
been avoided.247 When the Watt Committee's statements on the health impact are analysed in terms
of the analytic categories of self-affectedness and radiophobia/apocalypse, the report clearly argued
against exaggerated nuclear fears, in Western as well as in Eastern Europe. Though Chernobyl had
produced an undeniable health impact, as the authors themselves phrased it, it 'faded into
insignificance by comparison' to other risks. 
What is even more interesting regarding the narrative on Chernobyl presented by the Watt
Committee report is how it described the way in which the accident was handled in the USSR
(section 5). The whole evacuation process was presented as having been well organized, and to
having been executed in such a way as to ensure that the accident would not cause any harm to the
people in the region. For example, the schedule of the evacuations – which had been severely
criticized in many other accounts, especially from authors from within the USSR – was described as
having been rather well planned: 'the delayed evacuation of the population in the vicinity of the NPS
[Nuclear Power Station] is understood to have been in accordance with official Soviet evacuation
plans, which closely followed the recommendations of the International Commission of
Radiological Protection.'248 According to the Watt Committee report, the evacuees were well taken
care of, as 'the relocation centres were equipped with medical and other emergency service
resources to carry out personal decontamination, compulsory dosimetric monitoring, blood
sampling for laboratory testing and replacement of contaminated clothing.'249 Likewise, the
procedures followed to extinguish the fires and to build the sarcophagus were described as good
examples of organization skills: 'Dose limit controls meant a large replacement work force over a
considerable period of time – a formidable task.'250 The word liquidator was not mentioned once in
this account. The only time when the work force was personalized, was when it was given the name
247 In his reflections on the strategies of the normalization and re-definition of risks and uncertainties, Wolfgang Bonß 
referred explicitly to the topic of background radiation in Chernobyl evaluations to illustrate his point. Bonß, Vom 
Risiko, p. 82: 'Unter dieser Voraussetzung sind „Normalisierungen“ auch nur vor dem Hintergrund einer 
Umdefinition und Verharmlosung der Gefahren zweiter Ordnung denkbar. Exemplarisch lässt sich dies an der viel 
zitierten „Hintergrundstrahlung“ studieren. Zwar ist diese nicht erst durch Tschernobyl gestiegen; mindestens 
ebenso wichtig sind frühere, zum Teil nach wie vor unbekannte Unfälle und die extensiven Atomwaffenversuche der 
fünfziger und sechziger Jahre. Gleichwohl verweist die Rede von der „Hintergrundstrahlung“ auf eine 
bemerkenswerte Umdefinitionsleistung. Denn der Begriff suggeriert, daß es sich hier um ein Phänomen handelt, das
zu den unveränderbaren Rahmenbedingungen gehört – eine zweifellos richtige Einschätzung, die freilich 
unterschlägt, daß die jetzt unveränderbaren Rahmenbedingungen zuvor durch Risikohandlungen affiziert, wenn 
nicht hergestellt worden sind.' Moreover, in the comparison between Chernobyl fallout and natural background 
radiation, we are dealing with different matters that can threaten human health. In simple terms, leaving aside the 
debate on low-level radiation health effects, we have, in the one case, a radon, the inhalation of which can cause 
lung cancer and, in the other, we are dealing with the radioactive isotopes of iodine and caesium, the ingestion of 
which can cause thyroid diseases and leukaemia.
248 Worley/Lewins, The Chernobyl accident and its implications for the United Kingdom, p. 38.
249 Ibid.
250 Ibid., p. 39.
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of 'volunteer miners.'251 However, when assessing this Chernobyl narrative using my third category,
this account cannot be described as 'pro-Soviet'. This rather positive account of how the accident
was contained and managed by the Soviet authorities was rather intended to illustrate the
manageability of a nuclear accident. My hypothesis is that the reasons underlying this narrative
should be understood as follows: 'If the Russians can handle such an accident, there is even less
reason to worry that an accident might occur in a Western plant'. 
This narrative of a manageable accident reinforced the narrative of easily calculable health
risks. Alltogether, Chernobyl was presented in the Watt Committee report as a 'normal' industrial
accident. According to this interpretation, the 'Comments, recommendations and conclusions'
(section 9) pointed in a very clear direction. For instance, it was proposed that 'nuclear experts from
the industry should be encouraged to provide specialist lectures to graduates and undergraduates
as well as, perhaps, to schools.'252 Here again, it was the public's ignorance on 'scientific facts' that
had resulted in a problem and not the technology as such. Alongside the ignorance of the public, lay
another disturbing factor that had to be tackled: the plant worker. The question as to whether 'such
an accident could occur in the United Kingdom' was answered with a 'no' – as long as it could be
guaranteed that 'failure of the human system' would be avoided.253 'Reactor operation and operator
training in the United Kingdom' (the topic of section 7 of the report) were thus seen as the most
important fields within which action ought to be taken. After all, 'the accident would not have
occurred if the plant operators had proceeded to carry through correctly the special instructions
necessary for the operation of the test.'254 A second strategy of alienation becomes obvious in this
account, too: the scientific experts of the British nuclear sector not only drew a clear line between
their own expertise and knowledge in reactor design and nuclear safety and the expertise and
knowledge in these fields on the part of their colleagues in the USSR. In addition, they clearly made
a strong distinction between scientists and plant workers. In either case, the fact that the distinction
was made at all denoted the inherent belief that the others, i.e. the Soviets and the plant workers,
were inferior.
However, this distinction made between the 'knowledgeable scientist' and the 'untrustworthy
operator' was not exclusive to British narratives. Also in France, the 'man-machine interface' was
identified as the area in which French nuclear experts saw room for improvement. But aside from
these two national cases, the 'failure of the plant operators' became, next to 'the faulty design', the
universal narrative used to explain the cause of the accident.255 In this regard, during the IAEA
251 Ibid., p. 38.
252 Ibid., p. 95.
253 Ibid., p. 98.
254 Ibid., p. 61.
255 Wolfgang Bonß interpreted this ascription as a general strategy to create strong causalities in the evaluation of an 
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Chernobyl conference in Vienna in August 1986, the delegation from the USSR had declared –
Western accounts on this conference often preferred the term 'admitted' – that the accident had been
caused by the irresponsible actions of the plant personnel. It was this argument that led to the trial
against six technicians and officials of the Chernobyl plant in 1987 – often referred to as the scape-
goat trial. It did not help the accused that though 'three defendants blamed the reactor's design or
equipment for the disaster, soviet officials said the accident, which occurred April 26, 1986, was
entirely a result of human error.'256 In accordance with this interpretation, research in risk
management in the nuclear industry in the following years focused on the question as to how staff
could be better trained to trust the machines and not their own evaluations in the case of an
emergency.
To conclude this consideration of early Chernobyl narratives that have been provided by the actors
from the field of the British nuclear power industry, one more institution that took over an active
role in the early Chernobyl debate must be mentioned: The British Nuclear Energy Society (BNES).
The BNES was a learned society for professionals working in the nuclear sector. In 2009, it merged
with the Institution of Nuclear Engineers into the Nuclear Institute (NI). Like many other
publications on Chernobyl provided by actors of the British nuclear sector, the 'appraisal' BNES
published of Chernobyl in 1987 consisted of a compilation of papers that had been presented in a
conference the BNES had held in London in October 1986.257 Representatives of the nuclear sector
along with those of the public authorities – namely from the NRPB and the AEA – participated in
the conference. The opening address of BNES's Director General, J Rimington, clearly expressed
where he situated the impact of the accident: 'The principle immediate effect of the Chernobyl
accident is political and throws the future of nuclear power generation into the political
cauldron.'258 It is quite interesting that the BNES only started to consider nuclear power generation
accident in order to demonstrate that a similar event could be avoided in the future. Bonß, Vom Risiko, pp. 80: 'Wie 
am Beispiel von Tschernobyl in breitenwirksamer Form deutlich geworden, schlagen bei derart unübersichtlichen 
Systemen die Folgen in einer verselbständigten Form zurück, und zwar auf Entscheider und Betroffene 
gleichermaßen. Zwar mag es möglich sein, den Unfall ex post auf ein entscheidungsbezogenes Risikohandeln 
zurückzuführen und starke Kausalitäten zu konstruieren – genau dies ist die Aufgabe aller Unfallkommissionen, die 
sich stets hektisch bemühen, die entscheidende Ursache für den zur Diskussion stehenden Unfall zu finden, um so 
eine Vermeidbarkeit und die prinzipielle Beherrschbarkeit des Prozesses zu demonstrieren. […] So wurde im Falle 
von Tschernobyl sofort auf die sicherheitstechnisch bedenkliche Konstruktion des Unglücksreaktors oder auf 
Schlampereien der Bedienungsmannschaft und der Leitung hingewiesen.'
256 The New York Times, “Chernobyl trials begin,” 8 July 1987. The accused were: Anatoly S. Dyatlov, assistant to 
Chernobyl's chief engineer; Viktor P. Bryukhanov, plant director; Yuri A. Laushkin, senior engineer and inspector; 
Nikolai M. Fomin, chief engineer; Boris V. Rogozhin, shift director of Reactor 4; Aleksandr P. Kovalenko, chief of 
Reactor 4.
257 British Nuclear Energy Society, Chernobyl: a technical appraisal. Proceedings of the seminar organized by the 
British Nuclear Energy Society held in London on 3 October 1986 (London: Telford for the British Nuclear Energy 
Society, 1987).
258 Ibid., p. 1.
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to be a political topic after the Chernobyl accident had taken place. This claim indirectly reveals
how minor a role the anti-nuclear power plant protests had played in the nuclear history of Britain. 
Perhaps one of the most salient points present in all of the early evaluations of Chernobyl's
health impact released by the various actors of the British nuclear energy sector, is that they deemed
that the effects would be quite limited. It is also clear that, with regard to the immediate victim
count and the evolution of the incident, they had accepted as true the narrative provided by the
USSR to the IAEA conference of August 1986 and went on to present these details as uncontested
facts. In those instances in which they were critical, it was because they expected the level of the
health effects in the vicinity of the plant and the rest of Eastern Europe to be much lower than that
which had been presented by the USSR delegates at the conference. On the cause of the accident,
these narratives willingly adopted the explanation that it had been caused by combination of factors,
the faulty reactor design and the violation of clear safety rules by the staff of the plant. From this
stance, the narratives were able to build their argument that such an accident could simply not
happen in the UK. If the British nuclear sector was to learn any lesson from the Chernobyl accident,
then it was that the human element had to be contained as much as possible and the mechanical
procedures had to take precedence. Furthermore, the narratives pushed for increased
communication with the concerned public, or rather the education of this misinformed public had to
be improved the moment that the reactions towards Chernobyl had shown that a great number of
people were needlessly worried about ionizing radiation. This situation definitely needed to be
changed in order to ensure that the good of nuclear energy would be further appreciated, not least
because this technology was to be expanded further in the nearer future. Compared with the
advantages of nuclear electricity generation, the impact of the Chernobyl accident, in the short- as
well as in the long-term, was relegated to the position of just another industrial accident among
others.
2.1.3 Anti-nuclear groups and other critical voices
Britain
Sheep Farmers
Following the heavy rainfalls in early May, the MAFF started to collect samples of foodstuffs in
order to monitor radioactive contamination. Aside from radioactive iodine, which has a very short
half life and therefore ceased to cause concern already after several days, another radionuclide with
a longer half life needed to be monitored: caesium. Levels of radiocaesium remained high in one
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foodstuff in particular: upland sheep. Many of the meat samples collected by the MAFF exceeded
the newly established EC-threshold of 1,000 Becquerel per kilogram. Therefore, restrictions on the
movement, sale and slaughter of sheep were imposed: in England and Wales on 20 June, in
Scotland on 24 June, and in Northern Ireland on 14 September.259 Over the following months,
several compensation schemes were introduced, and a mark and release system was implemented
for the sheep in restricted areas. Initially, the restrictions were imposed on nearly 7,000 farms, i.e. 4
million sheep or one-fifth of the UK sheep population.260 The farmers were told that these
restrictions would only last a couple of weeks: the radiocaesium would soon be washed into deeper
layers of the ground or locked into the soil and thus would not be taken up into the pasture, and as a
result by the grazing sheep. However, this was not the case: levels of radioactivity remained high
and although the ban was lifted for most of the restricted farms over the next three months, many
farmers would have to live with the restrictions for many years. 
The way in which the governmental agencies handled the restrictions on sheep farms wasn't
much appreciated by the people most affected by this action: the farmers. A direct source, namely a
series of interviews conducted by a research group working under Brian Wynne with sheep farmers
from the Lake District (Cumbria, England) in 1986, has recorded their opinions and experiences.261
What is particularly interesting in these interviews is the way in which many farmers directly
connected the events to those of the nearby Sellafield site and the Windscale Fire of 1957, not least
because the bans that lasted the longest were imposed on farms located on the hills neighbouring
Sellafield. Back in 1957, farmers in the Lake District had been told to dispose of all of their milk,
without however being given hardly any information on the accident and its impact. As I
demonstrated in the analysis of the early media reporting, the memory of and unease regarding the
cover-up of the Windscale Fire was directly evoked by the events of 1986. This dynamic is best
259 These dates are given in A.S. Nisbet and R.F.M. Woodman, Options for the management of Chernobyl-restricted 
Areas in England and Wales (NRPB, 1998).
260 These numbers are taken from: Wynne, Sheepfarming after Chernobyl, p. 14.
261 Wynne, Misunderstood Misunderstanding. This article was re-published under the same title (only an 's' was added 
in order to turn 'Misunderstanding' into plural) in: Alan Irwin and Brian Wynne (eds.), Misunderstanding Science? 
The Public Reconstruction of Science and Technology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996): 19-46. The 
1996-version of this article is completed by a 3-pages reflection on the assumptions that had shaped the scientific 
knowledge of the official experts and on the 'cultural questions' central to Wynne's analysis: trust and credibility. In 
his analysis, Wynne particularly focused on the interplay of state experts and local framers. The case of the Lake 
District uphill farmers served as an example to illustrate 'the unacknowledged reflexive capability of laypeople in 
articulating responses to scientific expertise.' (p. 301) Wynne's work on the Lakeland sheep farmers has become a 
classical work within STS. In their famous book The Golem at Large. What you should know about Technology 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch even chose Wynne's work on 
Chernobyl and the sheep farmers in Cumbria as one of their seven examples to illustrate the mechanisms of 
knowledge production in science and technology. However, the topic of sheep farm restrictions is barely known 
outside the STS-community and the success of Wynne's work has obscured the fact that there were other regions in 
Britain, too, that were severely affected. This interest in the restrictions on Lakeland farms might be not least linked 
to the special position the Lake District holds amongst Britons as a nostalgic tourist and outdoor destination.
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illustrated by a letter to the editor published on 3 May in The Guardian, which asked: 'Sir, am I the
only reader who feels better informed about the current disaster at Chernobyl than about the 1957
fire at Windscale with which it is compared? Yours anxiously, Vince O'Connell, London.'262
Although the link between Chernobyl and the Sellafield-Windscale complex was made explicit in
media reporting,263 as aforementioned this connection was also noted by the members of the
community most directly impacted by these events. Wynne's interviews show that some of the Lake
District farmers actually considered the restrictions to be a result of the contamination from the
Windscale Fire and the routine discharges from Sellafield. According to their reasoning, the
radioactivity levels were only as high as they were because they had been high ever since 1957. The
only difference between now and then was that because of Chernobyl, action had now been taken;
action that was necessary because of the British nuclear enterprise and not because of the accident
in the Ukraine.264 
 Despite their affectedness by the Chernobyl fallout and the particular narrative on Sellafield
and Windscale produced by this setting, the farmers in the Lake District did not become a distinct
anti-nuclear actor in the Chernobyl debate. Wynne offers a coherent explanation for this fact: 'These
more private beliefs were rarely displayed in public, and the farmers refused to confess to such
dissent in media interviews. It was made clear to us that one reason for this was that the farmers
identified socially with family, friends and neighbours who were part of the Sellafield industrial
workforce. They recognized their own indirect and sometimes direct social dependency upon the
plant – not only neighbours but also close relatives of the hill-farmers work there. Thus, underlying
and bounding their expressed mistrust of the authorities and experts, there was a countervailing
deep sense of social solidarity and dependency – of social identification with material kinship,
friendship and community networks which needed to believe Sellafield was well-controlled and its
surrounding experts credible.'265 Thus, the issue of monetary compensation soon became the central
issue in the dispute over sheep farm regulations in the Lake District. But this was also true for
Northern Wales. Here, the triangular area between Bangor, Conwy and Dolgellau was most
affected.266 As with the Lake District, the restrictions here had led the local population to make a
262 Vince O'Connell, “Letter to the editor,” in The Guardian, 3 May 1986, p. 12.
263 For the way in which media reports linked the sheep farm restrictions in the Lake District with Sellafield and the 
Windscale Fire, see for example: John Cunningham, “When lamb provides the beef,” in The Guardian, 23 June 
1986, p. 21; Geoffrey Lean, “Nuclear family hunted by a testing legacy,” in The Observer, 29 June 1986, p. 5.
264 State experts dismissed this argument by making reference to different isotope ratios of caesium 134 and 137 in the 
discharges from Sellafield and Chernobyl. See: Brian Wynne, Sheepfarming after Chernobyl. The catalogue of the 
British Library lists a comparative study undertaken by the AEA into the discharges of Windscale and Chernobyl. 
However, this item is unfortunately missing, and I was unable to consult it in another archive: A.C. Chamberlain, 
Comparisons of the emissions in the Windscale and Chernobyl accidents (Harwell: UKAEA Atomic Energy 
Research Establishment Environmental and Medical Sciences Division, 1987)
265 Wynne, Misunderstood Misunderstanding, p. 299.
266 For a map of the restricted areas in Cumbria and Wales, see: Nisbet/Woodman, Options for the management of 
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connection between these measures and the nearby nuclear plant in Trawsfynydd. In Northern
Wales, the protests against the government's compensation policy went so far as to farmers
blockading the hotel of representatives of the Welsh Office during a visit to the most affected
areas.267 
But unlike the Lake District farmers, the Welsh farmers openly communicated their views on
the events to a broader audience. In January 1988, the Farmer's Union of Wales published a
memorandum on the government's reaction to Chernobyl,268 addressing it to the Agricultural
Committee of the House of Commons. They then used this report as an opportunity to tell their side
of the story. The fact that the famers agreed with some aspects of the government's policy could not
cover up their harsh criticism of the way this policy had been implemented. Although the Union
'supported the Government's resistance to pressure to institute a slaughter programme' for the very
specific reason that such a measure 'would have further undermined the public image of lamb at
that time,'269 it openly expressed its resentment of the chaotic situation caused by the
unpreparedness of the official institutions. These criticisms were very specific. For instance, there
was not enough paint to colour-mark the sheep that had come under the restrictions. Moreover, the
fact that the government had plenty of time to get prepared for the situation, given the sheep
slaughter occurred in late summer, did not prevent that 'by 26th August there was a total confusion
amongst farmers.'270 In addition, there was much room for improvement in the payment of the
compensations – until mid-December 1986, 1,507,313 GPB had been paid within the framework of
the direct loss compensation scheme.271 In order to provide the House of Commons with concrete
answers to the problems, the Union's report concluded with a list of suggestions. The most
remarkable was the tenth suggestion, insofar as it reflects that the Farmer's Union of Wales had
clearly identified one source of the problem in particular: 'The Government should halt the
programme of nuclear power development.'272
Landowners 
The issue of sheep farm restrictions was not only of major concern to the farmers but also the land-
owners. Once again, it was a group from North Wales that communicated its views to a broader
Chernobyl-restricted Areas in England and Wales, p. 2.
267 Tony Heath, “Farmers take Chernobyl 'hostages',” in The Guardian, 5 September 1986, p. 3.
268 Farmers’s Union of Wales, Chernobyl - the government reaction (Farmers’ Union of Wales, 1988).
269 Ibid., p. 6.
270 Ibid., p. 10.
271 Ibid., p. 13.
272 Ibid., p. 17.
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public. In 1987 the group published a report,273 openly criticizing the government's crisis
management: 'The experience of 1986 appeared to the population of North Wales to be one of
chaos.'274 As had the sheep farmers, the landowners blamed MAFF for this mismanagement:
'MAFF's management throughout has been characterised by remoteness. At no time has it sought
the practical advice of the farming industry and has consequently earned itself a reputation for
evasion and incompetence.'275 The report asserted that this mismanagement led to a loss of
government authority in risk definition, and as such endangered the British nuclear enterprise:
'People turned to television for their information. This is an unsatisfactory state of affairs because
local opinion can be, and is, targeted wherever television programmers choose. At the moment, the
target is the power station at Trawsfynydd and the government's nuclear policy. It could equally
easily be shifted to any other target.'276 The scientific expertise of the government was directly
called into question by posing a list of questions: 'Firstly, is there a need for a scientific inquiry?
Secondly, how can similar incidents be better managed? These two parts are closely related
because the second part implies doubt about the organisational structures at national and
international levels and that implies that there is a lack of comprehension of the subject of large
scale.'277 However, the Landowner's Association was in no way concerned that the risks linked to
the fallout had been under-estimated. More than anything, they were concerned that the restrictions
were superfluous and aimed only at covering up the government's ignorance.278 Therefore, the
Association called for an independent scientific inquiry, the establishment of a national institution
responsible for handling situations like Chernobyl, as well as the creation of an international
indemnity fund for trans-border nuclear and chemical accidents. This last recommendation
highlights how the landowners, in contrast to the sheep farmers, identified the greatest risks to lie
beyond and not within the British borders. Their stance was rendered explicit, when in the report
they expressed their concern that, for instance, 'a massive accident in a French Channel reactor
could cause immense damage to London.'279
This severe criticism against the government was further excited by the fact that after
273 Country Landowners' Association North Wales Group, North Wales Group report on the effects of the Chernobyl 
accident (1987).
274 Ibid., p. 19.
275 Ibid., p. 9.
276 Ibid., p. 19.
277 Ibid., p. 2.
278 Ibid., p. 16: 'The problems of dealing with the long-term, contaminated peat areas and their side effects are outside 
the remit of MAFF. Advice to the Ministries concerned can best be procured through a Scientific Inquiry by a 
qualified committee. The present policy of secrecy is unproductive. […] Government must resist the temptation of 
banning sheep from grazing the peaty areas in order to overcome the problem. The removal of livestock from these 
areas will not only have adverse social and economic effects on the communities which derive their livelihoods from
the mountain sheep, but also will result in the degradation of the landscape. It must not be forgotten that areas such 
as the Snowdonia National Park owe much of their beauty and grandeur to the management by farmers.'
279 Ibid., p. 20.
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restrictions on Welsh farms had been lifted at the end of October 1987, they were re-introduced in
July 1987.280 While the same happened in Northern Wales and Scotland, the restrictions were not
lifted at all in the Lake District. The topic of sheep farm restrictions was prominently taken up by
British newspapers in the spring and summer of 1987. At the general level they reported on the
increasing number of farms and sheep that had come under the ban once more.281 But they also
featured the personal life stories of affected farmers and their families282 and covered the protest of
the farmers from North Wales in Whitehall, who had demonstrated against the government's
compensation policies.283 This protest was accompanied by 'a growing chorus from opposition
politicians farmers, landowners and environmental pressure groups for a full inquiry into all
aspects of the disaster' – not least because in some places the records now showed radiation levels
that were even higher than the year before.284
Anti-nuclear power activists: Friends of the Earth, The Greens, and Greenpeace
The two main environmental pressure groups that were concerned over the way the British
government was handling the crisis were Friends of the Earth (FoE) and Greenpeace. FoE and
Greenpeace are the only anti-nuclear power NGOs in Britain that are active nationwide. FoE is
Britain's most important environmental NGO. Unlike Greenpeace, it does not have a centralized
organizational structure, but rather provides an umbrella name for various independent local groups;
the organization has a central office in London. In addition to these two organizations, other various
local or regional anti-nuclear power groups in Britain have sprung up, among which Cumbrians
Opposed to a Radioactive Environment (CORE), or the Scottish Campaign to Resist the Atomic
Menace (SCRAM).285 However, they neither gained central importance at the national level nor did
they succeed in forming a publicly visible network, all the more evident since the British national
280 Ibid., p. 34.
281 See for example: John Ardill, “Chernobyl leaves shadow over 270,000 sheep,” in The Guardian, 22 April 1987, p. 2;
Geoffrey Lean, Tony Heath, David Siddell, “Fell lambs born under N-cloud,” in The Observer, 3 May 1987, p. 5; 
Edward Vulliamy and Tony Heath, “Chernobyl controls on sheep extended,” in The Guardian, 13 August 1987, p. 1;
Paul Brown, “Welsh sheep farmers suffer new clampdown over Chernobyl accident,” in The Guardian, 18 
September 1987, p. 2. According to the article Chernobyl controls on sheep extended the number of affected farms 
at the end of August 1987 was 345 in Wales, 69 in Scotland (of which 39 were not yet restricted in 1986), and 150 in
Cumbria. 
282 See for example: Micheal Jopling, “Sheep still too hot to handle,” in The Guardian, 7 March 1987, p. 11; Martyn 
Halsall, “New controls spur fall-out inquiry call,” in The Guardian, 15 August 1987, p. 3; Eileen MacDonald, “High
radiation levels scar rural families,” in The Observer, 23 August 1987, p. 6.
283 See for example: Angella Johnson, “Walker pledges review of Chernobyl claims,” in The Guardian, 29 September 
1987, p. 3.
284 Tony Heath, “Radiation checks on people in North Wales,” in The Guardian, 28 September 1987, p. 4.
285 For an account on the British anti-nuclear power movement, with a focus on the protests in Torness in 1979, see: Ian
Welsh, Mobilising Modernity.
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anti-nuclear discourse – contrary to the French anti-nuclear discourse – focused on military nuclear
applications and not on power plants.286
In early May 1986, FoE used Chernobyl as an occasion to inform a wider audience about its
anti-nuclear stance and, at the same time, to recruit new members and funds. In this regard, FoE ran
an advertisement on 6 May 1986 in The Guardian titled: 'The accident they said would never
happen. Friends of the Earth – Campaigning against nuclear power since 1973. Join us now!'287
The same message was communicated via various motifs. An advertisement in The Observer a
couple of days later offered a more detailed statement, which is worth citing in its entirety: 'A
positive message on Chernobyl from Friends of the Earth: It need not happen again. The nuclear
accident happened 2000 miles away. Yet we in Britain were still warned not to drink fresh
rainwater. What does that say about the likely affects of a similar accident here? And does anyone
now doubt that it could happen? Of course we are tempted to say “We told you so,” for we warned
at the Windscale Inquiry, we warned at the Sizewell Inquiry, we have warned for fifteen years that
there was danger in the combination of human fallibility and technology with such unprecedented
capacity for environmental harm. But there is no satisfaction in being proved right on this issue.
What matters is that a similar disaster in Britain is avoidable as it is at present predictable.
Nuclear power amounts to only four per cent of Britain's energy supply. Think about it... all the
286 This different focus of the British and French anti-nuclear movements is analysed in: Chafer, Politics and the 
perception of risk. Christopher Rootes has provided a concise summary of British anti-nuclear power activism from 
its inception up through to the mid-1990s. I quote the full paragraph as it illustrates well the state of British anti-
nuclear power activism at the time of the early Chernobyl debate and might be a useful summary for readers 
unfamiliar with British nuclear history: 'FoE committed itself to arguing the case against the proposed nuclear 
reprocessing facility at Windscale at the 1976 public inquiry. Some activists saw this a diversion of energies that 
defused the potential of the environmental movement to influence policy by direct action. Partly as a result, a UK 
branch of Greenpeace was established and distinguished itself by spectacular acts of protest to draw attention to 
Windscale's pollution of the Irish Sea. Nevertheless, by comparison with its European counterparts, the anti-nuclear
campaign confirmed the moderate character of environmental protest in Britain. Anti-nuclear protest was amplified 
when in 1979 the Thatcher government envisaged the construction of ten pressurized water reactors. Yet, although 
the campaign did, at various points during 1978-81, employ the forms of non-violent direct action familiar in 
Britain since the rise in 1958-63 of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, by comparison with events in France 
and Germany, protests in Britain were notably small and resolutely non-violent. Indeed, the violence of 
confrontations in France and Germany inhibited British campaigners from enlarging the campaign of direct action 
(Welsh 2000: 163). The most confrontational actions were locally intense protests designed to obstruct evaluation 
of/construction at possible reactor/waste repository sites. These were protests mounted by some of the “350 mixed 
membership groups actively campaigning on the issue throughout the UK”(Welsh 2000: 185) and at best loosely 
linked to campaigning organizations such as FoE. The anti-nuclear issue was subsequently deprived of salience 
when the Conservative government adopted a deliberately low profile approach as it sought to avoid distracting 
confrontations with environmentalists whilst it concentrated its fire power on the trade unions. The need for 
additional nuclear capacity evaporated with the arrival of cheap and plentiful North Sea gas, the nuclear power 
programme was quietly shelved, and so the British environmental movement was deprived of the issue that in 
continental Europe was the chief stimulus to radical environmentalism. The revival of the peace movement during 
the early 1980s largely eclipsed the environmental movement and, despite its lack of direct interest in the 
environment, probably attracted many who might otherwise have been drawn into environmental protest.' In: 
Christopher Rootes, “Britain.” In Environmental Protest in Western Europe, ed. by Christopher Rootes (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 21.
287 Friends of the Earth, “The accident they said would never happen,” in The Guardian, 6 May 1986, p. 31.
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danger, all that cost, all the unsolved problems of waste for just four per cent of our energy. When
we have 300 years' supply of coal. When we have North Sea Oil. When we have North Sea Gas.
When we haven't even started to conserve energy. When we haven't even started to explore
alternative energy sources... such as sun, wind and waves. You now know that the human cost of
nuclear energy is too high. This is the time to add your voice to ours. Demand that no more nuclear
power stations are built. So, join us now. Or at least give us financial support. Someone has to
speak on your behalf – we have the expertise and experience to do it.'288 This text illustrates a
central element of British anti-nuclear power protest: Since the successful campaign of British anti-
nuclear activists in the late 1970s against the CEGB's and government plans to build a fleet of
PWRs,289 British anti-nuclear power protest had focused on preventing new build projects and not
on calling for a phase out of existing plants. This was not least due to the fact that the existing
British AGR design was considered less accident prone than the imported PWRs. Another central
element of the FoE advertisement – also inherent to British anti-nuclear power arguments in general
– is the question of 'costs'. Addressed here as 'human cost', this issue has been predominantly
framed in terms of purely financial costs: Why build expensive nuclear power plants when there are
cheaper alternatives available, like gas?290
With regard to the question of phase-out there was, however, one anti-nuclear actor who was
clearly in favour: The Greens. This political party, like FoE, used the occasion to communicate their
stance to a wider audience, for instance, in an advertisement run on 8 May: 'Windscale 1957 …
Three Mile Island 1977 … Chernobyl 1986 … Who really opposes nuclear power? A growing
number of people. And no wonder. Yet ONLY ONE political party stands UNEQUIVOCALLY
against nuclear power. Neither sitting on the fence, nor suffering from internal division in this
crucial issue. So which is the party to support if you oppose nuclear power? There is only one. The
green party. The Greens have ALWAYS sought a nuclear-free future. We'd stop building more
nuclear plants. And start closing EXISTING ones. MAKING BRITAIN A SAFER, CLEANER
PLACE. And creating thousands of jobs in conservation and renewable energy.'291 
To be sure, British anti-nuclear power activists did not consider the accident only as an
occasion to publicize their own stance, and garner more support. FoE and Greenpeace also openly
challenged the official 'this cannot happen here' narrative by pointing to the insufficiencies in the
288 Friends of the Earth, “A positive message on Chernobyl from Friends of the Earth,” in The Observer, 11 May 1986, 
p. 15.
289 I am thankful to Walt Patterson for providing me with information on the anti-PWR campaign.
290 This issue will be discussed in more detail in the chapter on the Chernobyl debate of 2006 as it gained central 
importance within the climate change debate and led to the split of the British environmental movement over the 
question whether or not nuclear power is environmental benign or 'green'.
291 The Greens, “Windscale 1957...,” in The Guardian, 8 May 1986, p. 4.
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containment design of British reactors.292 Furthermore, they called for a full inquiry into the effects
of the fallout in Britain. From my analysis of Chernobyl newspaper articles, their positions,
however, did not play an essential role in media reporting. Their representatives were not attributed
the role of 'counter-experts'. Moreover, if statements of FoE or Greenpeace were cited in articles,
they were placed at the very end of the article – which is not a prominent place, considering the fact
that the end paragraphs of newspaper articles are often cut to ensure their fit into the page layout.293
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament / European Nuclear Disarmament 
Another actor whose statements must to be taken into consideration in order to understand the
trajectory of the British Chernobyl debate is the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND). In
1986, the CND was the dominant force in the British anti-nuclear discourse. The campaign had
been launched in 1958 and had garnered extensive support for its call for unilateral nuclear
disarmament. After a decrease in the number of its activists from the mid-1960s onwards, the CND
experienced a major revival in 1979 due to the NATO double-track decision. Not only did hundreds
of thousands of people participate in their demonstrations, they were also successful in creating a
network of activists who tracked and protested the cruise convoys in Britain – the so called Cruise
Watch – and in establishing the Women's Peace Camp at the Royal Air Force base Greenham
Comman in Berkshire.294 Due to the CND's success, British public debate on nuclear issues in the
mid-1980s almost entirely revolved around the military use of nuclear technology, and nuclear
power plants played more the role of an annex to the military-dominated nuclear enterprise. CND's
early communications on the Chernobyl accident conformed to this frame in the way that it was
inserted into the British disarmament debate and was not expressed in relation to British nuclear
power plants. Two advertisements that the CDN ran in British newspapers, to attract potential new
members and donors, nicely illustrate this argument. The headline of the first was 'What if nuclear
WAR was just an ACCIDENT,'295 while the other read, 'Sellafield Libya Chernobyl. “But mum, will
292 In 1987, Greenpeace published the report 'Chernobyl UK' in which it was argued that a similar accident like the one 
in Chernobyl could also happen in Hinckley Point B. Unfortunately, I could not procure a copy of this publication. 
Cutler and Edwards, however, specifically refer to this argument and this publication in their book Britain's nuclear 
nightmare (which I discuss later in this chapter).
293 Questions regarding how FoE, The Greens, and Greenpeace communicated on Chernobyl in newsletters to their 
members, press releases or the like, cannot be answered here. The collection of the British Library does not hold any
items that match the organizations names with the key word 'Chernobyl' for the period 1986-1988, and my research 
visits to London did not provide the opportunity for research in the archives of each organization.
294 I am thankful to Rebecca Johnson for sharing her thoughts on the impact of Chernobyl on the CND campaign. There
are various publications on the history of the CND, from inside as well as from outside the campaign. For the early 
history of the CND, see for example: Holger Nehring, “Cold War, Apocalypse and Peaceful Atoms.” For an account 
from within the CND, see for example its website: http://www.cnduk.org/about/item/437 (last accessed: 15 
November 2013).
295 CND, “What if nuclear war was just an accident,” in The Guardian, 2 May 1986, p. 27.
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there be a nuclear war?” You always meant to join. Fill in the coupon today.'296 The proliferation
issue was used to bridge the gap and connect their arguments to the civil nuclear enterprise as is
exemplified by the famous graphic, depicting missiles lurking out of an open reactor, used by the
CND in their campaigns following Chernobyl.297
Some of the very few remaining anti-nuclear power activists, who had gathered together in
the 1970s in the Anti-Nuclear Campaign, hoped that Chernobyl would serve to reshape the British
anti-nuclear discourse and bring the question of power plants back on the agenda. In this regard,
Royce Logan Turner publicly called for a re-launch of the Anti-Nuclear Campaign. His article
entitled 'Let the campaign roll again' also included his reasoning as to why the last campaign had
ended: 'The campaign fizzled out after a short period, however, partly because the decision to go
for another 10 reactors based on the PWR was quietly dropped, but mainly because it was eclipsed
by CND. People decided to concentrate on stopping nuclear weapons rather than nuclear power,
given the new political circumstances of the time. Cruise, and the deterioration of East-West
relations, meant that nuclear bombs became a political issue, whilst nuclear power did not.'298
However, Turner's manifesto did not succeed in shifting the relationship between the military and
the civil aspects within the British anti-nuclear discourse.
The way in which Chernobyl was framed within the disarmament-dominated British anti-
nuclear movement is illustrated by the book 'Something in the wind. Politics after Chernobyl.'299 The
book was edited by the British anti-nuclear activists Louis Mackay and Mark Thompson. Both were
part of the European Nuclear Disarmament (END) movement, while Mark Thompson was even
one of the central figures of its British division: UK END. In their introduction, Mackay and
Thompson outlined the scope of their reflections: 'this book was germinated by Chernobyl, but [its]
subject is much wider than that single catastrophe.'300 The accident at Chernobyl was almost treated
more as a point of departure used to unveil the mechanisms governing the nuclear sector in general,
in the USSR, the UK and at the global level. In this regard, Zhores Medvedev's 'The Soviet Nuclear
Energy Programme'301 was followed by two articles on 'Accidents, Risk and Consequences' and on
'Secrecy, Policy-Making and the Nuclear State.' The other two sections of the book compiled
general accounts on anti-nuclear and peace movements worldwide and spoke of alternative forms of
electricity generation. According to the authors, the secrecy policies instated by various
governments with regard to the Chernobyl fallout was a clear indication of how the nuclear system
296 CND, “Sellafield, Lybia, Chernobyl,” in The Guardian, 7 May 1986, p. 10.
297 I am thankful to Ian Fairlie calling my attention to this issue.
298 Royce Logan Turner, “Let the campaign roll again,” in The Guardian, 12 May 1986, p. 9.
299 Louis Mackay and Mark Thompson (eds.), Something in the wind: politics after Chernobyl (London: Pluto, 1988).
300 Ibid., p. 1.
301 For further information on Zhores Medvedev see chapter 3.1.1.
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functioned in general. Furthermore, Mackay and Thompson called into question the reliability of
the 'facts' upon which official evaluations of the accident had been based, for example, stating that
'the information provided by the Soviet Union to the 1986 IAEA symposium following the accident
was generally regarded as very inadequate.'302 The resulting IAEA report and subsequent reports
had placed emphasis on the statistically concealed non-existence of health effects rather than
carrying out research on the long-term health effects. According to Mackay and Thompson, the
concept of 'radiophobia' provided in the IAEA reports to explain the increase in illnesses in the most
affected areas conformed to the general communication strategies of the nuclear establishment in
the way that it negated the real threats. The intention behind Something in the wind was, as defined
by the title, to look at Chernobyl from the perspective of global nuclear politics. Therefore, the book
did not include specific statements on the health effects of the accident in Western Europe or
Britain. Rather, it aimed to reveal the politics that governed the formation of the official narratives.
In this regard, the criticism was not directed only at the Soviet nuclear programme. Through its
analysis of how Chernobyl had been handled internationally, the authors intended to shed light on
the universal structures underpinning the nuclear programme. Therefore, the Chernobyl narrative
provided in this book cannot be considered anti-Eastern European/anti-Soviet, but rather anti-
nuclear in a way that went beyond the East-West divide. The aspect of self-affectedness (in terms of
health effects in Britain) was not addressed at all. With regard to the third category of comparison,
the radiophobic-apocalyptic dimension, Something in the wind took a clear stance, refuting the
concept of 'radiophobia'; yet at the same time it did not elaborate an apocalyptic scenario of the
most affected regions. 
Thorpe / WISE
Another decidedly anti-nuclear publication that situated Chernobyl within the context of global
nuclear politics was the graphic novel Doc Chaos: The Chernobyl effect by Dave Thorpe.303
Thorpe's narration of the broader context of the politics surrounding the Chernobyl accident was
quite different from the political scientific analysis provided by Mackay and Thompson. He
presented 'the real truth behind the horrors of Chernobyl'304 in the form of a sado-masochistic
science fiction story that culminated in the explosions at Chernobyl. The storyline was the life story
of 'Doc Chaos': born severely disabled, this character survived only thanks to modern medicine.
Having spent the greater part of his childhood in a sterile incubator, the boy – whose personality
302 Mackay/Thompson, Something in the wind, p. 7.
303 Dave Thorpe, Doc Chaos: the Chernobyl effect (Hooligan Press, 1988).
304 Ibid., back of book.
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was warped by this experience – grew to become the negative ideal type of science nerd. The young
man, characterized as a mean, arrogant, narcissistic, sexually obsessed, sadistic genius, graduates
Oxbridge, henceforth dedicating his life to his dream of ruling the world, exterminating and
destroying everything non-scientific, and earning his money by making obscure transplants. This
life story, time-wise, paralleled the development of nuclear energy generation: In 1957, for instance,
the year of the Windscale Fire, is the year Doc Chaos learned to speak. The author interweaves his
narrative of the events that occurred on the eve of the Chernobyl disaster with the life story of Doc
Chaos. On the evening of the accident, two plant operators were on duty: Aleksandr Akimov and
Anatoly Kurguza. Similarly to Doc Chaos, Thorpe characterized both as being sexually obsessed
with the science they worked with. To give the reader an idea of the language Dave Thorpe
employed to transmit this sexually charged perspective, I want to give a short quote of the 'thoughts'
one worker had while carrying out the test: 'A nuclear power station is the ultimate woman. When
she goes critical I think of her as having multiple repeat orgasms. Petra. God what a bitch she can
be when she is on heat.'305 Thorpe joins the story of Doc Chaos and the events at Chernobyl at the
precise moment of the explosions; these explosions were symbolic of the sexual intercourse Doc
Chaos had with his wife Jo, the moment when they made their 'own nuclear family.' 
The following chapter was entitled 'Don't call it human error', and was Thorpe's allusion to
the fact that in the story Chernobyl was not an accident but was an event that was inherent to the
development of nuclear technology from its inception. But Doc Chaos: The Chernobyl effect was
not intended to be just an apocalyptic science fiction graphic novel. The afterword by Ayn Lowry
and Nicola Ramsden of the anti-nuclear World Information Service on Energy (WISE) Amsterdam,
an NGO to which the proceeds of the book were donated, clearly stated that the story, for them, was
grounded in reality: 'Doc Chaos is the personification of science. At least as it is practised today. A
science gone out of control, accountable to no one, responsible to no one. And his/her story […] is
macabre, perverted, sadistic, violent, misanthropic and disgusting. But then, so is the nuclear
industry. Or to be more accurate, the awful alliance between the nuclear industry and the
“destructive monster” that science has become.'306 
What is interesting about this interpretation of Chernobyl, of course, is not the account of the
course of the events or the reasons for the accident, which is not the central topic of the book. The
central topic was made specified in the aforementioned quote from the afterword: the
irresponsibility of scientists towards the public. In this regard, Doc Chaos: The Chernobyl effect
presented a clear counter narrative to the official evaluations of British and international nuclear
305 Ibid., p. 72.
306 Ibid., p. 83.
87
experts because it called into question not only their arguments and figures, but the way they
thought about their subject as such. 
With regard to the three narrative elements, it is not possible to provide an analysis of the
dimensions concerning the health impact of the radioactive fallout, as the account ends in the
moment of the explosions. The way in which Thorpe characterizes the plant workers, however,
clearly plays with anti-Eastern European/anti-Soviet stereotypes. The focus of his criticism,
however, is not directed against the Soviet nuclear programme. The narrative is more far-reaching
than these anti-Soviet stereotypes and may be characterized as anti-nuclear in general. But, it goes
further than that, exceeding this scope even, and draws on a wider anti-scientific discourse.
France
GSIEN, CRIIRAD, ACRO
In France, too, the statements on the impact of Chernobyl provided by public authorities and actors
of the nuclear sector elicited severe criticism. Members of the Groupement des scientifiques pour
l’information sur l’énergie nucléaire (GSIEN) were the first to publicly challenge the official
narrative and evaluation of the accident. GSIEN was founded in the mid-1970s by a group of
physicists who opposed French nuclear policies, in particular the large-scale new build project,
Plan Messmer. As Sezin Topçu phrased it, the aim of founding this group was 'to bring scientific
legitimacy to anti-nuclear action and to provide the movement with technical arguments.'307 The
French anti-nuclear movement was particularly strong in the 1970s and culminated in the protests
against the construction of the fast breeder reactor Superphénix in Creys-Malville (Isère) in 1977.
However, it neither succeeded in reversing nuclear policies nor in weakening the nuclear consensus
of the French political and technical elites. The militant anti-nuclear protests of the 1970s were in
many regards a sequel to the 1968 protest movement and in this regard, challenged not only French
nuclear policies but the French state as such.308 
In 1986, in reaction to the early news about the accident, the GSIEN linked its interpretation
of the events in Chernobyl to a global criticism of French nuclear politics.309 The public attention
307 For the history of the GSIEN, see: Sezin Topçu, “Les physiciens dans le mouvement anti-nucléaire : entre science, 
expertise et politique,” in Cahiers d'histoire. Revue d'histoire critique 102 (2007): 89-108. The GSIEN can be 
compared to the American Union of Concerned Scientists.
308 The French anti-nuclear movement, its activists as well as its transnational linkages, has been a prominent topic of 
research for sociologists, political scientists and historians. For classic works, see for example: Alain Touraine et al.,
La prophétie antinucléaire (Paris: Seuil, 1980); Nelkin and Pollak, The Atom Besieged. For more recent 
publications, see for example: Sezin Topçu, La France nucléaire; Rivat, La transnationalisation de la cause 
antinucléaire; Andrew Tompkins, “Better Active Today than Radioactive Tomorrow!” Transnational Opposition to 
Nuclear Energy in France and West Germany, 1968-1981 (Oxford: PhD dissertation, 2012).
309 For the GSIEN's reactions to Chernobyl, see: Topçu, Confronting Nuclear Risk, p. 233.
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that was directed toward Chernobyl, however, very quickly focused on very precise concerns: Was
the radioactive fallout in France perhaps more dangerous than the authorities had claimed? Did it
pose a threat to public health? Were French nuclear authorities deliberately lying about there being
no real danger? This public concern paved the way for the foundation of the first French 'counter-
expert' radioactivity laboratories: the Commission de recherche et d’information indépendantes sur
la radioactivité (CRIIRAD) and the Association pour le contrôle de la radioactivité de l'ouest
(ACRO). The novelty of these two organizations lay in the fact that, unlike the GSIEN members,
the initiators of CRIIRAD and ACRO were not professionals from within the nuclear sector. As
Sezin Topçu has aptly noted, an entirely new dynamic was introduced to the French nuclear
discourse: 'Both CRIIRAD and ACRO were created by a majority of “lay-persons” (teachers,
doctors, nurses, pilots, farmers, shopkeepers), aided by scientists (biologists and physicists) and
technicians (ex-CEA workers, especially in the case of ACRO). Hence, unlike GSIEN in the 1970s,
in the case of ACRO and CRIIRAD, scientists were no longer central to the claim for a counter-
competence on nuclear risks.'310 In the years to come, CRIIRAD and its founding director Michèle
Rivasi would play a leading role in the French Chernobyl debate and would dedicate themselves to
keeping alive the public memory of the affaire Tchernobyl. The role of this actor is more easily
described and understood once it is clear how the affaire Tchernobyl actually emerged.
French journalists and the 'affaire Tchernobyl'311
In the days immediately following the accident, the statements released by the representatives of the
SCPRI, IPSN and EDF dominated French media reports on Chernobyl. Journalists had turned to
these authorities in order to obtain information on the impact the accident would have in Eastern as
well as in Western Europe. The explanatory pattern used by these agencies – to criticize other
countries for their overreaction and at the same time to stress that there was no reason to worry
about the radioactive fallout in France – had been transmitted 1:1 to the French public. However, at
the end of the first week of May, progressively more journalists began to wonder why on the other
side of the Rhine, in Germany, protective measures had been instated and even intensified while in
France their interview partners continued to insist that everything was completely fine. In this
regard, for instance, in an article published on 9 May 1986 in Libération, the author speculated that
'it would, however, be extraordinary if Alsace and Lorraine, like a paradisical island, totally escape
this fallout that is so important just some kilometres further away.'312 Also in this period more
310 Ibid., p. 235.
311 This paragraph is an adaption of the accordant account in: Kalmbach, Tschernobyl und Frankreich, pp. 72.
312 Vincent Tardieu, “L’état de l’hexagone après le nuage,” in Libération, 9 May 1986: 'Il serait tout de même 
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journalists had begun to criticize the way the SCPRI and the nuclear sector were providing them
with information. One journalist, Hélène Crié, in her articles for Libération, was particular blunt
with her criticism and framed it in a general attack on the structure of the French nuclear sector:
'The most nuclearized country in the world, France, is the most avaricious too with regard to
information. Even when the accidents don't take place on her soil. […] However, it is not the
competent and official authorities that are lacking. But, as soon it comes to obtaining the slightest
information, you run against a wall. […] With regard to nuclear, three partners communicate
between each other, but only between each other: the constructors, the operators and the public
authorities. […] The only experts that are capable providing information on the risks belong to the
family that produces this type of energy.'313 To palliate this growing number of statements criticizing
French nuclear policies, the public authorities chose to adopt a strategy of providing clear counter
statements. The press communiqué released by the French Minister of Agriculture on 6 May
exemplifies this strategy: 'The French territory, because of its distance, was completely exempted
from the fallout of the radionuclides consequent to the accident at the Chernobyl plant.'314 However,
these unrealistic statements only instigated more public speculations on the 'true impact' of
Chernobyl in France. In order to put an end to these speculations, Pierre Pellerin appeared in a TV
interview on 10 May. In the show 13 h on channel TF1, he presented a map that indicated the
quantities of radioactivity that had come from the Chernobyl fallout over continental France.315
Monique Sené, the president of GSIEN, had been invited to speak on the same show. At the start of
the show she had a serious argument with Pellerin about the protective measures that had been
implemented in Italy and West Germany. She claimed the instated measures were justified, a
statement Pellerin did not at all agree with. Furthermore, Sené then accused Pellerin of having
withheld information; an accusation Pellerin refuted by pointing to the more than 200 Telex the
SCPRI had sent out to journalists, politicians and others since news of the accident had been
communicated to them. After this argument, the talk show hosts asked Pellerin to present the maps
that indicated the intensity of radioactivity the SCPRI had measured in France in late April and
extraordinaire que l’Alsace et la Lorraine, comme un îlot paradisiaque, échappent totalement à des retombées aussi
importantes à quelques kilomètres de là.'
313 Hélène Crié, “La France, lanterne rouge européenne de l’information,” in Libération, 9 May 1986. Translation by 
the author: 'Pays le plus nucléarisé d’Europe. La France est aussi le plus avare d’informations. Même lorsque les 
accidents ne se produisent pas sur son sol. [...] Ce ne sont pourtant pas les instances compétentes et officielles qui 
manquent. Mais, dès qu’il s’agit d’obtenir le moindre renseignement, on se heurte à un mur. […] Pour le nucléaire, 
trois partenaires communiquent entre eux, rien qu’entre eux: les constructeurs, les exploitants, et l’autorité étatique.
[…] les seuls experts capables de renseigner sur les risques appartiennent à la maison qui produit ce type 
d’énergie.'
314 Cited in: Vincent Tardieu, “La France miraculée,” in Libération, 7 May 1986: 'Le territoire français, en raison de 
son éloignement, a été totalement épargné par les retombées de radionucléides consécutives à l’accident de la 
centrale de Tchernobyl.'
315 TF1, Interview with Pierre Pellerin, in 13 h, 10 May 1986. Transcription and translation from the original recording 
held by the INA by the author. Presentation of the map from minute 21 onwards.
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early May. And Pellerin obliged: He showed a map for every single day, from April 28 to May 5.
These maps were followed by another map indicating the total deposition of radioactivity for each
region. All the data were measured in the unit Curie, a fact that Monique Sené directly criticized as
an attempt to render the evaluation of these data more complicated seeing as the Becquerel had
become a more standard unit of measure. While Pellerin presented his maps, the show host
interrupted him to ask how much these levels were above the normal background radioactivity.
Pellerin's answer that in some local spots, the radioactivity had been up to 400 times higher than
normal was commented upon by his interviewer with the exclamation: 'These are numbers that we
discover today!' But as with his first Chernobyl interview on 29 April, Pellerin paid very little
attention to the interruptions of others and continued his presentation. However, this sentence
'These are numbers that we discover today!' was the statement people remembered about this
interview, which can be considered as the starting point of the affaire Tchernobyl. After the TV
interview, many people reached the conclusion that the radiation protection experts and the
government, over the last two weeks, had lied to the French public and covered up the true amount
of radioactive fallout that had hit France. And in doing so, these authorities had put French public
health at risk. Some journalists felt personally betrayed, especially since it was they who had passed
the message to the their audience that there was no need for any protective measures to be taken. So
what would happen if it indeed turned out that the reactions and measures taken in other countries
had been appropriate, while in France the stance to maintain the status quo had placed the French
people's health at risk?316
On 11 May, the day after the interview with Pierre Pellerin had been broadcasted, the French
Minister for the Environment, Alain Carignon, was confronted in a news show on channel Antenne
2 with the accusation that state authorities had purposefully withheld important information. The
show's host opened the interview with the question: 'How do you explain the fact that the French
have been so badly informed in this affaire, because we journalists, we tried to obtain information
on these issues and we were given the wrong information.'317 Carignon refuted this allegation and
declared that all the data had been available before, the only new element was that the SCPRI had
assembled the data into one single map removing the background radioactivity. However, the news
host insisted that these data had not been available to the public, asking Carignon: 'How do you
explain that the French never knew about them.'318 But Carignon parried this question with the
316 For further reflections on the reasons underlying the reactions of French journalists, see: Kalmbach, Tschernobyl 
und Frankreich, p. 75.
317 A2, Interview with Alain Carignon, in MIDI 2, 11 May 11 1986. Transcription and translation from the original 
recording held by the INA by the author: 'Comment expliquez-vous que les Français étaient si mal informés dans 
cette affaire parce que nous, journalistes, nous avons essayé de savoir et on nous a donné des informations fausses.'
318 Ibid: 'Comment expliquez-vous que les Français ne l’ont jamais su?'
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reply: 'I beg your pardon, but it is the task of the media to collect these numbers.'319 The question as
to who had access to which data was not resolved in the interview, nor was it ever, even to this day.
Instead, a cellule de coordination de l'information was created in order to prevent further
'misunderstandings' between the French nuclear experts and journalists should a nuclear accident
ever occur again. In this regard, the French authorities had identified in its communication with the
public the area that needed improvement and that needed to be re-evaluated. After all, Pierre
Pellerin and his colleagues were scientists and not public relations managers. Had there been better
communication with the media, the whole affaire Tchernobyl would never have emerged. State
officials, however, never called into question their stance on the radioactive fallout. Carignon's
declaration in the interview that 'these amounts are not dangerous'320 perfectly conformed to this
position.
The fact that the French government and nuclear authorities saw no reason to re-evaluate
their position that the fallout in France was not dangerous and that protective measures were
unnecessary, however, did not mean that everybody else felt the same. On Monday, 12 May, after
Pellerin and Carignon had given their statements on TV over the weekend, newsstands all over the
country displayed the headline printed on the front page of Libération: 'The radioactive lie' and,
below, the statement: 'The public authorities in France lied, the radioactive cloud of Tchernobyl did
indeed fly over a part of the Hexagon: Professor Pellerin in fact admitted it two weeks after the
nuclear accident.'321 On TV, as well, the news anchors continued to state that they had not received
the correct information from the public authorities. A news show on channel Antenne 2 informed its
audience that 'Between April 1 and 4, not even a single official communiqué. On these dates, the
cloud advances and swells over France. […] With no particular information, no media reports on
this cloud.'322 After the fourth, however, Pierre Pellerin had provided the information that the cloud
had moved on, but nothing had been said about levels of radioactivity on the ground: 'Reassuring
comments, but we have not been given any data.'323 Thus the mensonge de l'état ('the state lie')
narrative of Chernobyl was born. Moreover, the person responsible for putting put the French public
at risk had been directly identified as well: Pierre Pellerin. The fact that Pellerin in the TV
interviews had not come across as a particularly nice and empathetic person but had appeared to be
319 Ibid: 'Excusez, c’est aux médias de récupérer ces chiffres.'
320 Ibid: '[…] les taux ne sont pas dangereux.'
321 Libération, cover page, 12 May 1986: 'Les pouvoirs publics en France ont menti, le nuage radioactif de Tchernobyl 
a bien survolé une partie de l’Hexagone: le professeur Pellerin en a fait l’aveu deux semaines après l’accident 
nucléaire.'
322 A2, “Tchernobyl: rétro des mensonges,” in A2 Dernière, 12 May 1986. Transcription and translation from the 
original recording held by the INA by the author: 'Entre le 1er et le 4 mai aucun communiqué officiel. A ces dates le 
nuage évolue et gonfle sur la France [...] Sans information particulière, aucun média ne reparle de ce nuage.'
323 Ibid.: 'Commentaires rassurants, mais on nous donne aucun chiffre.'
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rather arrogant and gruff helped to create the portrayal of him as 'the bad nucléocrate'. Media
reports were replete with accusations against Pellerin and speculations as to who was involved in
this French state plot against its own people.324 One possible motive for this secrecy policy quickly
surfaced: the government had wanted to prevent the French agricultural sector from being hit with
bad publicity: rumours about radioactive contamination of French foodstuffs could have had
disastrous consequences for its export sector. In this regard, the regional newspaper Les Dernières
Nouvelles d’Alsace wrote on 12 May, 'the consumer might get the feeling that the interests of the
French farmers have been set above the general interest.'325 But journalists did not stop at placing
the blame on specific individuals for having made the wrong decision. They inserted the affaire
Tchernobyl into the wider context of the French nuclear sector – its structures and how it functioned
– and its entanglement with the French state. Thus, they used the occasion of Chernobyl to criticize
the French nuclear techno-political regime as a whole. The notions of 'disinformation' and 'secrecy'
in particular heavily drew on the 'nucleocratic' frame, which constituted a central topos of French
anti-nuclear criticism.326 A particularly telling example of this is found in an article published on 13
May in Libération, where the recent events were framed as follows: 'Since the start of the adventure
in 1956, France has placed herself resolutely in the heart of secrecy. Sometimes even escaping the
politicians, the atom is the privilege of a few great engineers who graduated from X [short for
Ecole Polytechnique] and mines [short for École des Mines]. […] From the beginning, the 'X-
mines' had a hold on the atom, which turned into a family affair, i.e. an affair of corps and clan.
Pierre Guillaumt [327], their president, always carried with him a little notebook with the names of
the corpsard (ingénieurs des mines). He himself placed them in the state apparatus, applying
unwritten but terribly subtle laws.328 It was without doubt that articles from the left wing press
framed the affaire Tchernobyl in an anti-state manner. Another example is the article of 12 May in
324 This dispute was noted and observed from abroad as well. For instance, the British newspaper The Guardian 
reported on the ongoing dispute in France in an article on 12 May: Campbell Page, “'Information withheld' on 
radioactivity in France,” in The Guardian, 12 May 1986.
325 Les Dernières Nouvelles d’Alsace, “Polémique sur l’information nucléaire en France,” 12 May, 1986: 'Le 
consommateur peut avoir le sentiment que les intérêts de la paysannerie française ont prévalu sur l’intérêt général.'
326 Nucléocratie is a specific French adaptation of the term technocracy. The term is used in a rather negative way to 
refer to the group of people holding certain key positions in the French nuclear sector and includes both the 
engineering as well as the administrative/policy side. The term was shaped by French economist and journalist 
Philippe Simonnot, Les nucléocrates. 
327 Pierre Guillaumat, was an alumnus of the École Polytechnique and an ingénieur des mines. He was also president of
the CEA and later of the EDF and was Minster of Defence. Thus, he served as the ideal type of a nucléocrate. For 
his biography, see: Pierre Lucien Jean Guillaumat (1909-1991) (website of the Annales des Mines): 
http://www.annales.org/archives/x/guillaumat.html.
328 Jacques Chiquelin, “Le clan de l’atome français,” in Libération, 13 May 1986: 'Depuis le début de l’aventure en 
1956, la France s’est résolument placée au coeur du secret. Echappant même parfois aux politiques, l’atome est le 
privilège de quelques grands ingénieurs sortis de l’X et des mines. Dès le départ, les ‘X-mines’ ont fait main basse 
sur l’atome, devenue une affaire de famille, c’est-à-dire de corps, de clan. Pierre Guillaumat leur président, avait 
toujours sur lui un petit carnet avec les noms des corpsards (ingénieurs des mines). Il les plaçait lui même dans 
l’appareil d’Etat en appliquant des lois non écrites mais terriblement subtiles.'
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Rouge, a magazine published by the Jeunesse communiste révolutionaire (JCR), that described the
group responsible for the secrecy surrounding the impact of Chernobyl in France as a 'caste of
conspirators graduated from the Grandes Écoles, Polytechnique, les Mines etc., the masters of
nuclear.'329 In this regard, the very strong anti-state sentiment that characterized the French anti-
nuclear movement of the 1970s was promptly revived during the affaire Tchernobyl. Furthermore,
this stance found in Chernobyl an outlet from which to express itself after the French anti-nuclear
movement had lost momentum at the end of the 1970s. 
The left-leaning media, however, was not alone in criticizing the French government and the
nuclear authorities for how they had handled Chernobyl. The topic of a lack of independent
expertise in the French nuclear sector was, for example, also addressed in an article in l'Express:
'What will be changed by this new cellule put into place by Alain Madelin? Rigorously nothing. Not
a single independent scientist, not one syndicalist, not one ecologist, not one specialized journalist
will be part of it.'330 This gap, however, would come to be filled by the new 'counter expertise' that
had emerged within the context of the affaire Tchernobyl: CRIIRAD and ACRO. It is for this reason
that their statements gained such prominence in the further development of the French Chernobyl
debate. Furthermore, not quick to forget how they had been – in their opinion – misled by the state
experts, journalists no longer relied exclusively on the national radiation protection agencies for
their information, but now also turned to these 'counter experts' when reporting on radiation issues. 
The following section on the individual interpretations that gained a voice in the public arena
will conclude this chapter on the direct reactions to and early narratives of Chernobyl.
1.1.4 Individual voices
This section will be exclusively dedicated to British publications. As far as I have been able to
discern, there were only a handful of books on the topic of Chernobyl published in France during
the two years that followed the accident, of which the only two that received further attention were
Tchernobyl-sur-Seine by Hélène Crié and Yves Lenoir and L'affaire Tchernobyl by Yves Lecerf and
Édouard Parker. However, these publications were publicly associated with specific pro- or anti-
nuclear actors and therefore are not considered the contribution of individual voices to the
329 Michel Morel, “L’état français a déjà fait le choix du tout-nucléaire,” in Rouge, 15 May 1986: '[…] caste de 
conspirateurs sortis des grandes écoles, Polytechnique, les Mines, etc., maîtres du nucléaire.'
330 Yves Guihannec, “Nucléaire: les silences de la France,” in l’Express, 16 May 1986: 'Qu’y changera la cellule mise 
en place par Alain Madelin? Rigoureusement rien. Pas un scientifique indépendant, pas un syndicaliste, pas un 
écologiste, pas un journaliste spécialisé n’y figurera.'
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Chernobyl debate.331 Naming this sub-chapter 'Individual voices' does not imply that individual
agency did not play a role with regard to the actors analysed in the previous sections. Lord Marshall
of Goring, Pierre Pellerin, Monique Sené, and many others indeed acted as individuals in the
Chernobyl debate, and, driven by their personal convictions, considered it important to transmit
their evaluation of Chernobyl to a broader public. At the same time, these people were, especially
according to public perception, closely associated with a certain institution or organization: Lord
Marshall of Goring with the CEGB, Pierre Pellerin with the SCPRI and Monique Sené with GSIEN.
The actors of the Chernobyl debate that will be discussed in this section, however, do not represent
any institution in particular. Though they may, of course, (or have been at one time) associated with
a certain interest group or organization, in their public appearances they did not act as
spokespersons. Moreover, in their publications, they did not refer to specific institutions, as did
Louis Mackay and Mark Thompson, or Dave Thorpe. For all these reasons, this actor cluster has
been denominated 'Individual voices'. It is quite interesting to note that in Britain, these individual
voices existed, whereas in France the debate was directly taken over by the usual actors active in the
general nuclear debate, actors who clearly situated themselves either in the pro- or in the anti-
nuclear camp. In this regard, the early Chernobyl debate in Britain was more open than in France in




One such individual voice in the British Chernobyl debate is that of Richard F. Mould. Mould
published his first book on Chernobyl in 1988. For this popular science publication, he chose the
title Chernobyl. The real story.332 One motivation for the detailed analysis that follows of this book
in particular is that it would go on to be quoted in many of the subsequent British Chernobyl
publications. Mould presented himself to the reader as a neutral expert, capable of delivering a
trustworthy judgement of 'what really happened'. Leaving no doubts as to his intentions, the
opening sentence of his preface read: 'Now, what I want is Facts' and clarified: 'My objective in
writing this book was to produce an historical account of what happened before, during and after
the accident, rather than embroiling myself in the political arena over Chernobyl's implication for
the environmental issue.'333 The contradiction inherent in this statement, for which an 'historical
331 These two books, one written from an anti-nuclear perspective – Yves Lenoir has been one of the key figures of the 
French environmental and anti-nuclear movement – and the other written from a pro-nuclear perspective, are 
analysed and compared in: Kalmbach, Tschernobyl und Frankreich, pp. 83.
332 Richard F. Mould, Chernobyl: the real story (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1988).
333 Ibid., p. ix.
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account' to be accurate would incorporate statements on 'the environmental issue', even if only to
present the sequence of events as they unfolded, was completely glossed over. Instead, Mould tried
to include 'as much photographic evidence as possible' in his book – starting with photos of himself
visiting the Chernobyl plant in 1987 – because he believed that this was the way to present his
audience with a neutral assessment of the events. That some of these pictures could be considered
propagandistic material provided by the Soviet state authorities rather than neutral 'copies of reality'
will be discussed in more detail below. 
Mould considered his authority as a neutral expert to derive from his profession and therefore
described himself as 'an internationally known medical physicist, cancer statistician and radiation
historian. As well as serving as a technical expert to the World Health Organisation and the
International Atomic Energy Authority, [I] was a United Kingdom Government delegate to the
IAEA Chernobyl Post-Accident Review meeting in Vienna, 25–29 August 1986.'334 Apparently, this
statement was convincing, because in the years to follow, Mould's book figured in numerous British
Chernobyl bibliographies, including research publications that listed only nature science papers and
reports.
The first few pages of the book consisted of a technical description of the Chernobyl nuclear
power plant; several paragraphs on Kiev underlining the fact that the town had luckily been saved
from the worst of the fallout and that the river Dnieper 'was not contaminated'; and a minute-by-
minute account of how the accident unfolded. The series of photos that were inserted just after this
section provided a somewhat particular narrative in and of themselves. The first photo showed the
lively and well kept main street of Kiev in 1986, whereas the picture bellow showed this street in
1943 after its destruction during World War II, to which was attached the corresponding caption:
'This is not a nuclear landscape, but the aftermath of the German invasion of the Ukraine during
World War II.'335 The next page showed a smiling wedding couple in the streets of Kiev in May
1986 – no caption was included here, and therefore, no information imparted to the reader
regarding, for instance, the fact that the people of Kiev in May 1986 had not been warned or told of
the high levels of radioactivity in the air. By allowing these pictures speak for themselves, as the
author wanted them to do so, they told the story of a town that had not been affected at all by the
Chernobyl fallout, but had lived through disasters that were on a scale incomparable to this
accident, disasters that had nothing to do with radioactivity but with German belligerence.
Throughout the chapter, there are several more photographs that – through their interplay with
(missing) captions – imply a particular narrative. For instance, one photograph captured a group of
334 Ibid., p. 256.
335 Ibid., p. 23.
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workers as they were preparing for their shift on the reactor roof. The caption below the image read:
'the protective suits are constructed of lead and rubber'.336 The important additional information that
these suits often were taken off since the workers could barely move in them was neither provided
by the caption under the picture, nor in the main text. Mould did not overlook, however, the
devastating side of the accident, which was illustrated by photos of the firemen who had been
brought to Moscow and that revealed them lying in their beds, bald and with black spots all over
their bodies.337 Yet, the imagery did not form a coherent narrative and was completed with rather
peculiar pictures such as, in one instance, a photograph of a bottle of Ukrainian vodka with the short
description: 'Original firewater prepared according to selected traditional Ukrainian recipes form
spirit of the highest quality with addition of natural honey and blackcurrant. Refrigeration is
recommended before use.'338 Mould left it to the reader to decide the way in which this item ought to
be included in the narrative of the accident. 
The next chapter, 'The Victims', begins by giving a broad definition of the term 'Chernobyl
victim': Mould in fact elaborated that not only the 31 direct fatalities had fallen prey to the accident,
but that 'the 135,000 evacuees from the 30-kilometer zone and the people who eventually will be
included in the number of excess cancer deaths statistics are also victims of the disaster, as I
suspect will be some national nuclear power plant programmes for the production of electricity.'339
The severe health effects resulting from the radiation exposure were presented as having been
limited to those who had been at the site of the plant: '299 were diagnosed as having radiation
syndrome, but these cases were confined to firemen and plant workers and there were none in the
general population.' As for the worries about other kinds of health effects, Mould treated them as
though they were unfounded or even ridiculous: 'There were recorded cases of people diagnosing
themselves as having radiation sickness when all they had was a stomach upset. More unusual
stories included the vegetarian who survived 3 days by eating only peanuts, the lady who wanted to
know if she should dodge rainspots because of radioactive fallout, and the newly returned visitor
from Eastern Europe who wanted to know if he was radioactive because an Eastern European lady
had recently been breathing heavily on him.'340 An anecdote about the IAEA conference in Vienna in
August 1986, which Mould had attended, also conformed to this stance: 'Some Soviet officials were
against the idea of a visit of Dr Hans Blix, Director General of the IAEA, and gave as their reason
that they “were worried that the radiation might harm Dr Blix's organism”'.341 Apparently, this
336 Ibid., p. 35.
337 Ibid., p. 61.
338 Ibid., p. 48.
339 Ibid., p. 63.
340 Ibid., pp. 63.
341 Ibid., p. 64.
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exaggerated fear had raised 'a certain amount of laughter'342 among the assembled group of Western
radiation experts. Mould's closing remark to this chapter that 'not all of the irradiated firemen
victims died'343 was finally designated to add yet another example to his argument that the health
effects of the accident were not as devastating as many people seemed to believe. To have come up
with such exaggerated ideas, people simply had to have been far too influenced by the media
reports which had seminated panic. Therefore, 'one of the resolutions following the accident should
be to educate the general public, as far as possible, on radiation risks and benefits (the benefits of
radiation treatment and diagnosis in medicine should not be forgotten).'344 The photos that were
used to illustrate this chapter underpinned Mould's narrative that health effects were rather limited.
The series of pictures started with a portrait of 'one of the oldest evacuees', happily smiling, like the
others in the photo. The same happiness and easiness was present in the next photograph, too,
which depicted evacuated children in 'a summer camp'.345 The subject of 'happy, healthy evacuees'
was again revisited at the end of the photo series in a picture that showed a group of smiling people
inaugurating a new settlement for the clean-up workers.346 Of note here are also the pictures of the
firemen that had survived the accident: a group of smiling middle-aged men standing in the sun
outside a rehabilitation centre. The caption provided an explanation for why some of the men were
wearing hats: 'The caps cover bald scalps which have been shaved as part of the decontamination
process.'347 This is indeed a surprising explanation seeing as theses men had just lived through a
radiation sickness that induced severe hairloss. Not less surprising is the caption of the next picture
which depicted three of the Chernobyl firemen on exercise machines: 'Lung capacity of the firemen
could well have been impaired due to inhalation of smoke, dust and dirt.'348 Not a single word,
however, was uttered about the health effects of the radionuclides they had inhaled. The degree to
which much Mould himself believed in these photographs, or wanted to believe in them, can be
deduced from a comment he wrote in the chapter on the evacuations. A 'photograph [that] showed
seven of the babies all well wrapped up from head to toe, like Russian dolls, with only their little
faces peeping out!' provided for him the proof that these babies born to evacuated mothers were all
doing well.349
Of the other chapters, which addressed the 'decontamination of the environment', 'the
entombment of the reactor' and 'the food chain', it is of interest to more closely examine the last. In
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this chapter, Mould listed the radiation levels observed and the counter measures taken in various
European countries. His remarks with regard to the UK were rather short and included the statement
that 'levels in milk are below the recommended levels at which restrictions on milk supplies would
be considered in the United Kingdom.'350 While this was not inaccurate information, it is interesting
that Mould failed to mention even once the radiation levels that had been registered in the sheep
meat. After all, at the moment of publication, hundreds of sheep farms in the UK were still subject
to the restrictions that had been put into place shortly after the Chernobyl accident because the
animals were still too radioactive to be sent to market.
Like the authors of the Watt Committee report, Mould considered the Chernobyl accident
above all to be an interesting object for natural science research. In this regard, he added to his
account on the babies born to evacuated mothers: 'It is to be hoped that all these babies will receive
medical follow-ups for the rest of their lives. This will ensure, not only that they will promptly
receive any necessary treatment, but it will also provide extremely valuable data for the future on
the effects of low-level radiation doses.'351 Although Mould stressed that there were still many
unknowns regarding the long-term health effects of Chernobyl, he considered the death toll
estimation given in an IAEA report dating from August 1986 – a report written by Dan Beninson,
Director for Licensing Nuclear Installations in Argentina – to be the most trustworthy and even
quoted it: Beninson had calculated 2,000 excess deaths and put this number directly into relation
with the health impact of naturally occurring background radiation.352 
In summary, the narrative Mould presented in Chernobyl: The Real Story, emphasizes the
position that the people's fear of radiation and the possible health effects was an exaggeration. The
implicit belief was quite clearly conveyed that though the Chernobyl accident had caused many
deaths – each one was one too many – people had to learn to better put these deaths into
perspective, for the simple reason that: 'like it or not, civil nuclear power remains the only viable
alternative for the foreseeable future.'353 The fact that this statement was inserted only at the end of
the book is misleading. In fact, Mould did not deduce this conclusion from the information
presented. Instead, the 'facts' he presented were organized according to the underlying assumption
that, in the end, the impact of the Chernobyl accident could not have been so terrible nor so terribly
shocking because we had accepted to live with its consequences when we entered the nuclear age.
When Mould's narrative is analysed for the presence and weight assigned to the three main
components – self-affectedness, radiophobia versus apocalypse, and anti-Eastern European/anti-
350 Ibid., p. 128.
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Soviet stereotypes – it is quite clear that the first, self-affectedness, plays no role in Mould's
account. This is particularly evident given the fact that Mould did not even deem it important to
mention the restrictions on British sheep farms. Anti-Eastern European/anti-Soviet stereotypes,
however, are a clear part of his narrative: the photograph of the vodka bottle is a telling example. In
addition, the way in which Mould portrayed the evacuees provided a picture of them as a strong
natured but simple (minded), rural and traditional people who willingly did what they were told.
Mould played on this stereotype in order to prove his point that the health impact of the accident
was rather limited: the little Russian children and baby 'dolls' looked so healthy and prosperous, so
what could possible be wrong with them? In general, Mould's account on the health effects was far
from apocalyptic. The apocalypse for Ukraine had not been Chernobyl; it had been the German
occupation during World War II. When the ruins of Kiev in the aftermath of World War II are
compared to images of Kiev and the new towns built for the evacuees following the Chernobyl
accident, happy smiling faces can be seen filling the decorated streets. Like the British authorities
and actors of the British nuclear power industry, Mould identified the need to better educate the
public about the true scale of risks of ionizing radiation and its benefits to be the main conclusion
that was to be drawn from the Chernobyl accident. At no point did he call into question the nuclear
programme as such and actually considered nuclear power production to be a given fact to which
people simply had to adapt. Mould's self-promotion as neutral nuclear expert was willingly taken up
by many people who shared his evaluation of Chernobyl. In this regard, referring back to Mould's
book provided the illusion of using an independent, neutral source that was not informed by an
inherent pro-nuclear point of view. However, the underlying assumptions that shaped Mould's
account were far from neutral and were indeed very much pro-nuclear. 
Hamman / Parrot 
Mould was not the only individual voice in this debate, nor was his stance in support of the
narratives released by the state authorities and nuclear sector the only stance. Others partook,
calling into question these official narratives and to shed light on the dynamics and power structures
at play in the formulation of these evaluations. One of the earliest of these 'counter narratives' was
the book Mayday at Chernobyl by Henry Hamman and Stuart Parrot.354 The London-based
journalist of Radio Free Europe and the specialist of Eastern European history and politics
presented a critical assessment of the reports published thus far by the official institutions. From the
outset, the opinion of the two authors was evident with regard to the emergency measures adopted
354 Henry Hamman and Stuart Parrott, Mayday at Chernobyl (Sevenoaks: New English Library, 1987).
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by the various governments: 'The drifting winds spread the fallout across Europe even as
politicians and nuclear power supporters insisted that there was no real danger.' The aim of the
publication, however, was not to offer a concrete counter-evaluation to the official statements, but to
cast light on the context within which the Chernobyl narratives of the international nuclear
community had been generated. The author's oft-sarcastic approach was an attempt to direct
attention to the implicit immorality of many of these official statements. A telling example lies in
their comment on what so many radiation scientists had professed an interest in, i.e. the 'positive
learning opportunity' that Chernobyl had provided them with: 'The explosion of the American atom
bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki provided scientists with an unique opportunity to study the
devastating consequences of exposure to radiation and the effects of radiation sickness. Now, the
accident at Chernobyl will also provide unique opportunities for study and research.'355 In order to
give readers an overview of the aspects relevant to the Chernobyl debate, the range of topics
touched upon in the book discussed the nuclear history of the USSR; how the accident had been
covered up by the Soviet government and media; the dispersion of the radioactive plume; and the
widespread fallout. Moreover, an entire chapter was dedicated to the 'liquidators'. As for the
available data on Chernobyl's health impact, Hamman and Stuart included as many sources as
possible and duly noted any areas in which knowledge was still vague or patchy. In their detailed
account of the low-level radiation debate and the different points of views, rather than presenting
'their own truth', they concluded that 'the effect of low level radiation exposure is one of the most
politically charged issues in science.'356 The authors applied the same neutrality when
communicating information on the death toll: They presented different estimations but did not
provide their 'own' figures. Rather, their description contained general statements and quotes,
among which: 'Radiation biologists said many other people will die prematurely in the years ahead,
not only in the Soviet Union, but across Europe.'357 
Despite their remarkably balanced account on the health impact of the fallout, Hamman and
Stuart did not refrain from taking a clear stance on the way in which the states had carried out their
risk management measures. This is especially true with regard to their chapter 'No one thought it
could happen'. Their account of the events, for the Soviet Union as well as for Western European
countries, stood in direct contrast to narratives provided by the various actors of the British nuclear
sector which had, as shown above, praised the USSR's emergency action as well as how they
themselves had handled the situation. The perspective provided by Hamman and Stuart differed
enormously: 'The nuclear accident caught European governments by surprise, and their response
355 Ibid., p. 151.
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was slow and confused. The problem everywhere was inadequate planning.'358 The unpreparedness
of the governments is what led, according to the two authors, to their adoption of tactics and
strategies to cover up this incompetence; this was particularly true for Belgium and France.
But Hamman and Stuart did not limit their criticism to individual national governments.
Rather, they analysed this action, or non-action, within the bigger framework of nuclear politics that
had been cultivated by the IAEA. In their chapter 'Atomic Politics' they conveyed a detailed
interpretation. According to Hamman and Stuart, the IAEA was 'not meant to be a neutral
inspectorate or regulatory board but a nuclear energy promoter and a forum for nuclear power
vendors to display the plants they have to sell.'359 In this regard, in the immediate aftermath of the
accident, the task of the IAEA had been nothing less than to save the nuclear industry as a whole. To
this end, intensive behind-the-doors politics were undertaken during the summer of 1986 in order to
find an official narrative that suited everybody; it was a narrative that was central to the Chernobyl
accounts that had been released by the various actors of the British nuclear sector. The argument,
with its logical progression, offered by Hammam and Stuart is worth quoting in detail: 'The crucial
battle was the one between the Soviet Union and the Western nuclear powers. The struggle was
over the question of placing the blame for the Chernobyl accident. The Western nuclear strategy
was clear from early on – to argue that the Soviet nuclear programme was both different from and
inferior to Western programmes. In the halls around the IAEA board room, the word went out from
the French, the West Germans, the British and the Americans that the RBMK was a badly designed
reactor that lacked containment and could not be licensed in the West. A French delegate said that
the goal in his mind, at least, was to make sure that when people looked at the Chernobyl accident
they drew the “correct conclusions”. The Soviet side preferred to see Chernobyl as one of a series
of major technical disasters. They pointed to the American Three Mile Island accident, the
American Challenger spacecraft explosion and the Union Carbide disaster in Bhopal. What linked
them all, in the Soviet view, was that men had failed to deal adequately with technology. For the
Soviets, the goal was to present Chernobyl as a human failure rather than a failure of Soviet design.
This was not what the West wanted for a verdict. If human fallibility were predominantly the cause
of Chernobyl, then how could Western plants be safe from similar human failures? Throughout the
summer, the battle was fought out sotto voce. Finally, a compromise was reached: the failure was to
be attributed to the “men-machine-interface”, the way that the operators interacted with the
technology. It was a phrase both sides could live with.'360
Thus, the criticism brought forward by Hamman and Stuart was less about concrete numbers.
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Rather, they considered highly problematic the politics that had dictated and conditioned the
establishment of the 'official facts', facts that had been presented to the public as 'absolute truths'
and not the 'lowest common denominator' between clashing economic interests. Like Mackay and
Thompson's publication, Mayday at Chernobyl focused on shedding light on the universal structures
of the global nuclear programme through the lens of the Chernobyl accident. Instead of providing a
coherent narrative on the causes, the evolution and the consequences of the accident, Hamman and
Stuart concentrated their efforts on pointing out the still unanswered questions and on explaining
the politics underlying the creation of 'scientific facts' in the field of nuclear energy.
Haynes / Bojcun
In 1988, two other authors chose a similar approach for their account on The Chernobyl disaster.361
Viktor Haynes and Marko Bojcun – two academics working in the field of Eastern European studies
– provided directly in their book's subtitle the summary of their interpretation of the events: 'The
true story of a catastrophe – an unanswerable indictment of nuclear power.' Based on a wide range
of sources, including eyewitness reports, Russian and Ukrainian newspaper articles, and IAEA
papers, the authors gave a detailed description of RBMK-technology, the progression of the
accident as it unfolded, the spread of the radioactive plume, the evacuations, and the estimates of
the health effects of the fallout. Regarding the estimates of health effects made by Soviet and British
radiation experts, Haynes and Bojcun were particularly shocked about the systematic comparison
between the Chernobyl death toll and the overall number of cancer deaths which, to use their own
words, 'strikes one as perverse.'362 'The logic of such an argument leads inexorably to the view that
nuclear accidents don't matter, as they affect only thousands of people while millions will die
anyway; and from there to the notion that killing people is justified because they will die eventually
in any case.'363 Moreover, the authors considered the comparison of the fallout intensity with natural
background radiation to be a particularly dishonest presentation, insofar as the 'natural' background
radiation itself was to a large degree also a man-made phenomenon caused by the 'routine and
accidental emissions from nuclear power stations, uranium mining and atomic blasts, as well as by
medical treatment involving radioactivity.'364 Haynes and Bojcun did not present a concrete death
toll, but rather pointed to the implicit assumptions that underpinned the various calculations and
spoke of a range of 'between a few thousands to over 100,000 people (depending on which experts
361 Viktor Haynes and Marko Bojcun, The Chernobyl disaster (London: Hogarth, 1988).
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are to believed) over the next half a century.'365 In so doing, they made a very important assumption
themselves: 'As long as it was thought that low-level radiation was not dangerous, nuclear reactors
were deemed to be 'safe'. Evidence has shown that any amount of radiation is dangerous.'366 This
last was a statement many radiation specialists would not agree with at all.
When they examined the question of who was to blame, the authors presented a response that
lay in direct opposition to the 'official narrative' that had been provided by the IAEA and the British
nuclear experts. According to Haynes and Bojcun, it was unreasonable to saddle the workers with
the responsibility for the accident. Rather, it ought to have been allocated at a much higher level in
the hierarchy: 'The faults in construction of Chernobyl's Number 4 reactor, the difficulties in its
operation and the lack of a containment structure to withstand the explosion cannot be blamed on
its builders and the station's operators and managers. The responsibility rests with the Politburo,
Gosplan and the ministries in charge of construction.'367 Haynes and Bojcun also went on to contest
the narrative of the 'well organised evacuation'. They dedicated a whole chapter to 'Unnecessary
Irradiation' and concluded that the commission responsible for the evacuations had 'failed
miserably to protect the health not only of those living within the five kilometres of the station,'368
but also those in a more extensive geographic area. 
Criticism towards the Soviet political system was evident throughout the book, but it was
perhaps most clearly and explicitly formulated in the chapter on 'Lessons of Chernobyl': 'Simply put,
the disaster assumed its full dimensions as the result of a particular system of political rule, of the
habits and self-interest of its bureaucratic elite, of the ways in which it has become accustomed to
valuing the security, prestige and economic might of the state above the welfare of its labouring
classes.'369 Interpreting Chernobyl as a 'Soviet accident' rather than a 'nuclear accident' not only
became increasingly more common in the late 1980s/early 1990s, but this interpretation was also
voiced elsewhere and not just in Britain; this is to a great extent due to the diffusion of the 'insider
stories' of Vladimir Chernousenko, Grigori Medvedev, Alla Yaroshinskaya, and Zhores
Medvedev.370 Haynes and Bojcun did not stop here, however. The sentences that followed the
statement cited above, therefore, are of crucial importance to the narrative of their book: 'We do not
suggest for one moment that the leaders of Western nuclear power states behave in a fundamentally
different way. The participation of the IAEA member states in the cover-up of the Chernobyl
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disaster speaks for itself.'371
Thus, according to Haynes and Bojcun, Chernobyl was not a single isolated event, given that
'serious accidents at civilian installations have been happening on average once a decade.'372
Furthermore, Chernobyl was by no means the worst nuclear accident that could have happened, for
only about 10 per cent of the radioactive inventory had been discharged and the fires were
contained before they could engulf the other reactors.373 Therefore, the fundamental problem could
not be identified in the Chernobyl accident, but rather in the hunger for 'superpower status' of 'the
ruling classes of the advanced industrial societies', a status that was guaranteed by the civilian and
military exploitation of nuclear energy.374 The presence of these statements excludes Haynes and
Bojcun's narrative from being analysed and classified amongst those with anti-Eastern European or
anti-Soviet components. Although they undoubtedly criticized the Soviet state for its failures in
carrying out the emergency measures, the Western states certainly did not walk away unscathed by
their criticism, and hardly looked better in this regard. The authors believed the problem was to be
found on an entirely different scale that went beyond the borders of each political system: it was to
be found in the logic inherent to industrial societies and their thirst for power and constant growth.
When assessing the authors' narrative using the categories of self-affectedness and
radiophobia/apocalypse, or rather the role played by the health impact of the fallout in Britain and
in Eastern Europe, it is clear that Haynes and Bojcun did not formulate their own narrative but
instead spoke of the political dimension of reports that evaluated these health effects. They did
dismiss, however, the assumption that low levels of radiation have a positive impact on the human
body – an assumption that is still widely accepted amongst nuclear scientists and engineers today
and figures under its scientific name, radiation hormesis.
Cutler / Edwards
Individual voices in Britain also openly attacked the British nuclear enterprise, military and civil
divisions alike. With regard to the aftermath of Chernobyl, the book Britain's nuclear nightmare
written by James Cutler and Rob Edwards is probably the most important exemplar.375 Although the
focus of the book was not Chernobyl, its importance to this analysis resides in the fact that it is a
telling example of the way British anti-nuclear power activists placed Chernobyl in relation to the
British nuclear enterprise. The book's main topic was the Sellafield-Windscale complex. It provided
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detailed descriptions of the history of the site, the Windscale Fire, the discharges that were released
into the Irish Sea, and the cancer rates in children living near the site. In addition, it addressed
issues connected to the working conditions of plant workers and questions of proliferation. 
In chapter 9, titled 'Patterns of Deceit', the authors incorporate Chernobyl into their
considerations; they do so to link the British official reaction in 1986 to their main topic: the
Sellafield-Windscale complex. The chapter opens with the following phrases: 'Three days after
Chernobyl exploded, Britain's Environment Secretary, Kenneth Baker, told the House of Commons:
“There is openness and frankness in this country in dealing with the nuclear industry … if there had
been an accident of that kind in this country, there is no question, but that we would have been open
and frank about it straight away.” Britain's honesty, the Government suggested, contrasted
favourably with the Soviet Union's secretiveness. Yet the full report of the inquiry into Britain's only
comparable accident at Windscale was only published three decades after the event.'376 Yet, this
blatant secretiveness had not begun with Windscale, it was an intrinsic feature of the British nuclear
enterprise from its inception. To prove this point, Cutler and Edwards referred to the main authority
of British nuclear history, Margaret Gowing.377 'According to the official atomic historian, Professor
Margaret Gowing, Britain's post-war Prime Minister, Clement Atlee, was “obsessively secretive”
about the development of the atomic bomb. In a lecture at Cambridge in 1978, she highlighted the
secrecy in which all the early decision-making was shrouded: “The Cabinet as a body was
completely excluded from major atomic decision-making. A small inner ring of senior ministers
took decisions in a confusing number of ad hoc committees with science fiction titles which never
reported to the Cabinet.”378 This built-in secretiveness did not apply just to the military applications
of this technology. The same was also true for electricity generation: 'When it came to beginning
development of nuclear power for civil purpose, even the chairman of the electricity generating
authority, Sir Walter Citrine, was kept in the dark. In 1954, when the Government convened a
working party to discuss plans for Britain's first reactor programme, it never told Sir Walter of its
existence.'379 And this secretiveness was very much preserved even during the 1980s: 'When the
Government papers for 1954 were released in 1984, a large number relating to nuclear energy were
376 Ibid., p. 164.
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withheld, some of them under a provision which enabled them to be kept under wraps forever.'380
The change that Chernobyl brought to this setting was 'a veritable avalanche of brave new
intentions.'381 However, the initiatives taken were, from the point of view of the authors, primarily
superficial. One example of such was when Sellafield's chairman Christopher Harding in 1986,
'launched a ₤2 million advertising campaign to try to close the “comprehension gap” which had
been opened up on the subject of nuclear power.'382
In the last chapter of the book, 'The Faustian Bargain', the authors again refer to Chernobyl
to reinforce their argument. The chapter opens with a fictional description of an accident at
Sellafield. This scenario was intended as a direct challenge to the British 'industry's most persistent
post-Chernobyl riposte: “It could not happen here.”'383 The authors argued that such a statement
needed to be clarified, specifying: 'Britain does not run any reactors designed exactly like the
Soviet reactor, so a Chernobyl-type accident is logically impossible. A Chernobyl-scale accident,
though, is quite possible.'384 This way in which Cutler and Edwards transfer the scenario over to the
national nuclear fleet, by showing what a similar accident would mean to the home country, is an
expression of self-affectedness common to many direct accounts of Chernobyl.385 Chernobyl, here,
was mainly used as proof that 'it can very well happen'. Cutler and Edwards even made the intention
underlying this reference explicit when they wrote that 'until 26 April 1986 no one in the industry
ever really thought that a reactor in the Soviet Union could explode and dump its radioactive debris
all over Europe.'386
But Cutler and Edwards spoke of Chernobyl as more than just an abstract event. They
provided information on its impact on public health, and rather than adhere to one estimate or
another, they supplied the two extremes of the death toll estimates – and in so doing, called
attention to the dramatic disparity between them: 'According to official estimates it will kill up to
2,000 people in Europe, including perhaps forty-five in Britain, and as many as 40,000 people in
the Soviet Union. According to Ernst Sternglass, radiology professor at the American University of
Pittsburgh, the eventual overall death toll could exceed 1,000,000.'387 To illustrate the global impact
of the fallout, the authors pointed to the case of Britain: 'Eighteen months later, more than 700
farms in Cumbria, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland were still affected by restrictions on sheep
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movement and slaughter because of radiation from the accident.'388 From here they directly
identified a grave error and failure on the part of the British nuclear authorities: 'The response of the
monitoring and regulatory agencies in Britain was manifestly incompetent. Dozens of children
throughout the country will contract thyroid cancer over the next thirty years because of the
Government's failure to warn of the dangers of drinking Chernobyl-contaminated milk.'389 Their
greatest failure, however, was that the British government had not learnt the right lesson from the
accident in terms of its energy policies. While almost all European countries had never embarked on
the nuclear enterprise, had abandoned their plans or now, after Chernobyl, had at least postponed
their new build projects, 'there were only three exceptions to the rule: the USSR, France and
Britain.'390 But at least, there was a positive message to the British public on which the authors
ended their account: 'In the last resort, the decisions which have to be taken about nuclear power
and nuclear weapons are not technical or economic, they are political. The only necessity for the
abandonment of civil and military nuclear technology is political will. The essential prerequisite for
public will is public demand. Unlike poor Dr Faustus, the British public still has a choice. Even at
the eleventh hour, we can escape damnation. We can opt for a future powered and perverted by
plutonium, or a future free from nuclear contamination. We can chose to wake from Britain's
nuclear nightmare.'391
Three reasons underpinned the decision to quote this book in such detail. First, by
highlighting the criticisms put forth by the authors, it was possible to show that similar language
was used to describe the British nuclear sector as had been when speaking of the French nuclear
sector, namely with regard to the secrecy with which it carried out its affairs and its description as a
sphere restricted to a close circle of insiders. Secondly, these quotes illustrate well the close
connection that was made in Britain between Chernobyl and the Sellafield-Windscale complex. As I
have shown above, this link was made in media reports and by the local sheep farmers. Britain's
nuclear nightmare reveals the importance of the Sellafield-Windscale complex in the British anti-
nuclear argument. Even in the direct aftermath of Chernobyl, the main concern was not how many
people could possibly die in Britain from the fallout but rather the risk Sellafield represented. In this
regard, Chernobyl's impact in Britain figured more as a footnote in Britain's nuclear nightmare as
an illustration of the geographical reach of a large-scale nuclear accident – and the risk that soon the
next large-scale nuclear accident could occur was right there in Britain crouched on the Cumbrian
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an entirely anti-power-plant-argument could not be thought of in Britain without linking the
question back to the military nuclear complex.
2.1.5 Conclusion
A comparison of the initial statements released by French and British authorities in response to
news reports about the accident at Chernobyl demonstrates how similar they were.392 In both
countries, state officials focused on dismissing rumours that the fallout from Chernobyl could have
any negative consequences for the countries themselves.393 In addition, they stressed that the
national plants were simply not comparable to Chernobyl because the reactor designs in the West
were completely different from that used in the USSR. Thus, they declared that there was no cause
for worry, about the fallout or the risk that a similar accident could happen in the homeland.
However, in France, in the second week of May, the very same authorities were publicly confronted
in the media with the accusation that they had purposely held back the real data on radioactive
fallout in France in order to protect the agricultural sector and the French nuclear enterprise from
negative publicity. These accusations were brought forward by anti-nuclear activists and alarmed
journalists who had closely observed the protective measures taken in other Western European
countries, particularly those in West Germany and Switzerland. These critical voices were puzzled
about the disparity between these measures taken abroad and the lack of official concern in France
and therefore called into question the statement that France had not been touched by any serious
fallout. This dispute came to be commonly referred to as the affaire Tchernobyl. The counter side
expressed their criticism of the official French response to Chernobyl and the behaviour of the state
experts, adopting the 'traditional' French anti-nuclear strategy which included strong anti-state
arguments. From this perspective, the nucléocratie and the internal logic of the French nuclear
techno-political regime as a whole were blamed for the 'lies' and 'cover-ups' surrounding the
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Chernobyl accident and how it had been handled thus far. In this way, the French Chernobyl debate
very quickly reached national proportions and focused on the role of the French state experts. It was
precisely this role – the role these nuclear experts played within the power structures of the French
state – that was called into question in the affaire Tchernobyl. 
British discussions in the immediate aftermath of Chernobyl were quite different, although it
was soon revealed that the public authorities had completely misjudged the impact of fallout in the
UK. Their predictions were proven wrong not once but several times. Firstly, in early May 1986, in
some parts of Britain, rainwater and milk were found to exceed radiation safety levels. Secondly, in
June 1986, upland sheep farmers were informed that they could not continue to handle their animals
as usual since over the previous weeks, the grazing sheep had ingested too many radionuclides, and
thus restrictions needed to be implemented to keep the contaminated meat from entering the human
food chain. Later, it turned out that these restrictions would not last a mere couple of weeks, as was
initially predicted by British nuclear authorities, but some farmers would have to live with them for
many years to come. However, even these openly observable miscalculations of the state experts
did not in any way lead to something like a 'British Chernobyl affair'. Such a thing simply never
took place, and today only a few people even remember or know about the impact Chernobyl had
on Britain. No state official was publicly accused of having purposely held back the 'truth' about the
fallout. This argument is almost completely absent in the British Chernobyl debate and applies for
the institutions and individuals alike. There was no 'British Pierre Pellerin', an individual accused of
having communicated incorrect information. If somebody was indeed blamed for mismanagement
of this emergency situation it was the government and more specifically the MAFF. But the
accusations were of incompetence and not of a deliberate cover-up. They gained in importance
mainly at the local and regional levels but not at the national level. And after the government had
delivered a detailed report to the House of Commons and created the UK Response Plan, all public
debate on the issue was closed. Obviously Britain was not without its critical voices, especially in
May 1986: they blamed the British nuclear techno-political regime for its secrecy regarding the true
impact of the accident and for refusing to reconsider the new build plans in the face of the evidence
that severe accidents were indeed possible. But these critical voices soon lost steam, or at least lost
their public visibility. It seems that the narrative released by the public authorities – 'what needed to
be learnt had been learnt' – had supplanted these objections and views; now Britain was better
prepared in the event such an accident abroad should ever happen again. Given that the integrity of
the state experts had not been publicly called into question, but the government's management of
the emergency, Chernobyl could be framed, from the state experts' perspective, as an experience
from which to learn, which would in turn make it possible to improve the existing system.
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In general, it appears as though the British public placed more trust in their experts than in
their politicians in May 1986. The public, in fact, had turned to these experts – in the form of the
800,000 calls to different agencies cited above – in a moment when contradictory statements on
Chernobyl had been released by members of the national and local governments. This trust, at least
with regard to radiation protection, does not seem to have been lastingly damaged, not even by the
confusion about sheep farm restrictions. In France, however, the critical voices neither trusted the
state experts nor the politicians insofar as they were considered to be one single entity within the
French nuclear techno-political regime. 
The one group of people who could potentially have turned the sheep restrictions into a
'British Chernobyl affair', the sheep farmers, however, did not frame their assumptions of bigger
politics at stake in connection to Chernobyl. Rather, the sheep farmers in the Lake District related
the restrictions to the Sellafield-Windscale complex. They considered the restrictions on sheep
farms as a measure to cover-up the regional impact the Sellafield plant and the continuing impact
the 1957 Windscale Fire had had on the area. The Windscale Fire, and not Chernobyl, was, in fact,
the discursive arena within which nuclear state officials were publicly accused of having
deliberately held back the 'truth' about the fallout. Moreover, the Chernobyl fallout was considered
by British nuclear critics to be negligible when compared to the level of threat represented by
Sellafield.394 In this regard, even after Chernobyl, Sellafield continued to be perceived as the
primary incarnation of nuclear risk. For this reason, anti-nuclear plant protest in Britain has focused
on Sellafield and never on Chernobyl. The opposite occurred in France, where the affaire
Tchernobyl became the focal point for anti-nuclear protest. But these aspects will be further
discussed in the following chapters, in which the role of Chernobyl commemoration in anti-nuclear
plant campaigning will be examined. For the moment, I only want to point to the interesting fact
that in Britain the Chernobyl experience was put into the context of the Sellafield experiences,
whereas in France it became the general frame used in the criticism of the nucléocratie as opposed
to experiences with accidents or incidents in French nuclear plants or the emissions from La Hague
– the reprocessing plant in Normandy. In France, the Chernobyl experience also reinforced the
394 The book Britain's nuclear nightmare (discussed above) is a telling example of this view. It starts with a description 
of the landscape around Sellafield: 'On the western border of the Lake District a narrow single-track road winds 
through a series of hairpin bends over the crest of Corney Fell. In the shadow of the mountains, rolling pastures 
stretch along the shores of the Irish Sea. It is one of those special lakeland places the sight of which can give you a 
physical thrill. It can make you feel that life is worth living. Standing on the edge of the fells and surveying the 
coastline to the west, it is hard to believe that the beaches and estuaries are irredeemably polluted by one of the 
most poisonous of all man-made substances – plutonium. It is impossible to credit that the only places in the world 
more contaminated with radioactivity are the ghost town of Pripyat next to the burnt-out hulk of Chernobyl, and the 
remote sites around the globe where nuclear bombs have been deliberately exploded.' (p. 1) Although this region 
was one of the British areas most affected by the Chernobyl fallout, the authors only referred to the plutonium 
emitted by Sellafield and did not even mention the caesium and iodine deposited by the rainfall in 1986.
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profound mistrust many activists had of French nuclear experts, a mistrust that through the affaire
Tchernobyl spread to the French public. Chernobyl had much less of a crucial impact on the
credibility of public radiation safety expertise in Britain than it did in France. Even the open dispute
between public experts and farmers in Britain did not lead to a lasting general distrust in nuclear
experts. Wynne explains that the outcome of this dispute was to be found in the direct interaction of
the two groups. This interaction implied that in spite of the confrontation both sides were able to
gain a better understanding for the other's positions, working methods, and shortcomings: 'This
serendipitous and limited interaction improved the credibility of these scientists and of their
associated institutions, even though such encounters revealed scientific uncertainty. The Institute
for Terrestrial Ecology was most fortunate in this respect because, as a locally based institution, it
had the closest such practical contact. Through the farmers' informal grapevine, it subsequently
gained a reputation as being plainspeaking, open about uncertainty, independent and trustworthy.'
A similar dynamic enabled the rehabilitation of the MAFF in whose case 'the situation was rescued
only by the mediation of local MAFF officials who were personally known and trusted by the
farmers.'395 
In this regard, the fact that public experts had to publicly admit their ignorance of certain
aspects of their field of expertise resulted in the restoration of their public credibility and
authority.396 Because events had not played out as the experts had predicted, these last were
perceived to be on par with laypersons with regard to their fallibility. When seen like this, it was
possible for even the people most troubled by their miscalculations, the sheep farmers, to pardon
them. The blame was phrased as 'They should have know better!'. In France, however, the blame
was phrased as 'They did know better!'. The public experts were not perceived to have failed in their
task but to have withheld their knowledge from the public, to have kept it for a restricted circle of
individuals.397 And though the public waited for an apology, this apology never came, since the state
395 Wynne, Sheepfarming after Chernobyl, p. 38.
396 This interpretation does not necessarily conflict with the British 'institutional mistrust' identified by Bickerstaff et al.
and applied by Lethonen in his analysis of British reactions to Fukushima. The notion of 'institutional mistrust' is 
linked to British nuclear policy debates for which Bickerstaff et al. demonstrated that the British public has more 
trust in markets than in their government and public authorities, a discursive strategy referred to by the authors as 
'markets-know-best'. In this regard, 'institutional mistrust' would then be concerned with the question of whether a 
privatized radiation protection authority would have reacted better than a public entity. Thus, it does not oppose the 
hypothesis that the credibility of public authorities in the field of radiation protection could be restored through the 
interaction of state experts with the public.
397 Sezin Topçu considers this accusation as a proven fact; see: Topçu, L’agir contestataire à l’épreuve de l’atome, pp. 
196. She considers a policy of secrecy to underpin the French management of the Chernobyl crisis, which she 
declares to have been unique in terms of its denial of an impact of the fallout in the country itself. According to 
Topçu, the official handling of the Chernobyl crisis in France is the perfect example of the French way to govern the
nuclear sector with secrecy. I think Topçu's analysis gives too little space to the role journalists played in the 
construction of the affaire Tchernobyl. Initially, many journalists simply repeated the statements by French nuclear 
experts instead of critically questioning them, despite the fact that the French nuclear sector had been blamed for its 
secrecy long before the Chernobyl accident took place. Moreover, the fact that radiation experts communicated their 
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experts were convinced that they had not committed any mistake in their risk evaluation. Therefore
it never came to a point, like in Britain, in which state authorities could enter into a dialogue at eye
level with the concerned public. When this condition never materialized, the ground was effectively
prepared for the affaire Tchernobyl to live on in the French public memory, and this because in the
months following the Chernobyl crisis the loss of trust was never resolved. When the French public
experts believed the problem to be one of communication, this 'gap in trust', so to speak, was
widened even further. They believed, much like their British counterparts, that if they could only
communicate with and better educate the public on radiation risks, their credibility and authority
would be restored. But the opposite proved to be true: the more they communicated, the more their
communications were perceived and framed by their critics as a way to cover-up a crime they had
committed. This analysis, however, alludes to a period of time beyond 1988 and therefore will be
discussed in more detail in the following chapter.
In France, the affaire Tchernobyl set the precedent for the institutionalization of nuclear
counter expertise, namely the foundation of CRIIRAD and ACRO. In Britain, however, such strong
and publicly visible counter expertise on the impact of radiation from the civil nuclear enterprise
did not exist. Nor were any trials conducted at the time to implement some such similar structure in
relation to Chernobyl.398 This implies that the personal histories of anti-nuclear power activists in
Britain were not particularly closely linked to Chernobyl, while in France, for example, Michèle
Rivasi the founder of CRIIRAD became one of the most well-known anti-nuclear activists and
politicians of the Green Party. Also, few journalists in Britain personally engaged in unveiling the
'truth' about Chernobyl's impact; from the early 1990s onwards, the topic of sheep farm restrictions
almost completely disappeared from newspapers despite their continued enforcement. In France, on
the other hand, several journalists felt personally betrayed by the information policies of the public
authorities. They went on to figure prominently in the creation of the affaire Tchernobyl and, as will
be shown in the following chapter, kept its memory alive for years to come, especially on 26 April
estimations of environmental effects did not automatically imply that these calculations were correct, as the case of 
Britain shows clearly. Thus, in order to understand the trajectory of a Chernobyl debate in a given country, it is 
necessary not only to take into consideration the state experts' crisis management and the communicated fallout 
intensity but a wide range of other factors, as well.
398 The non-existence of 'Alternative' Environmental Research Organisations (AEROs) in Britain might be, among 
other reasons, due to a less centrally organized political system as well as strong stakeholder participation through 
the important role of committees, inquiries and hearings in the decision-making processes. The inquiries especially 
have served as a 'security valve' (Walt Patterson) in the identification of new zoning for nuclear plants. However, 
these forms of stakeholder participation have been severely criticized, namely with regard to the Sizewell B inquiry; 
see: Brian Wynne, Rationality and Ritual. However, seeing as AEROs haven't yet been a prominent topic for 
research, any statement about the non-existence of AEROs in Britain is rather speculative. One very important 
exception to this rule of non-knowledge about AEROs is the case of West Germany; see: Wolfgang Rüdig, 
Mobilising Environmental Expertise: 'Alternative' Research Institutes in Germany (University of Strathclyde 
Working Paper, 2000).
113
each year.399 This driving force to spur public commemoration of Chernobyl does not exist in
Britain.
Regardless of all these differences in the contextual setting between the two countries,
however, it is interesting to observe that the political parties of both did not play a prominent role in
the early history of the Chernobyl debate, as actors or as the subject of debate. This is not to say the
political parties were entirely absent, in fact, the Green Parties in both countries took up the topic in
order to position themselves against the government's nuclear policies. In the Labour Party, the
topic of Chernobyl led to profound debates about the future role of nuclear power in British energy
policies. However, in neither of the countries did Chernobyl alter the general cross-party agreement
on nuclear energy issues, which had existed since the launch of the national nuclear endeavour. Due
to this general cross-party agreement, opposition against this technology was limited to the streets
and expressed by the public – thus the topic of anti-nuclear protest has always been closely
associated with the rise of new social movements. According to many anti-nuclear campaigners, the
established political parties adhered to the nuclear agenda of the nucléocratie, an agenda that was
intrinsically in opposition to anti-nuclear convictions. This perception was particularly strong in
France and might explain why the affaire Tchernobyl revolved more around nuclear experts and less
around the government. From an anti-nuclear activist's point of view, it was not surprising that the
government acted in a way that protected the French nuclear enterprise. But within such a system, at
least the public experts should be trustworthy. This would also explain why Pierre Pellerin soon
became the main target of criticism. At the same time, this profound loss of trust in official nuclear
experts paved the way for the new counter experts to rapidly gain credibility and attention.
Based on these observations for France, where the crisis management was interpreted as a
striking example of the way the nucléocratie governed public policies, I would like to hypothesize
why the British restrictions on sheep farms did not spark a similar 'British Chernobyl affair'. Like in
France, the topos of a nuclear technocracy has been a central element of the British anti-nuclear
discourse. It has been used not only with regard to the military complex, but also in relation to the
large-scale new build projects for nuclear power plants.400 As Markku Lethonen has argued, 'in the
UK, the power of the nuclear technocracy has declined since the split-up of the UKAEA [in
399 However, I do not consider the media as a whole to be an actor in the French Chernobyl debate. It is rather the 
engagement of certain journalists like Hélène Crié, Noel Mamère, or Galia Ackerman that has been responsible for 
the presence of Chernobyl in the French media over the years. This is why it is important to not take into 
consideration only the action of institutions and organizations but to link this action back to individual agency 
within these organizational structures and power relations.
400 For instance, Ian Welsh, in the introduction to his book Mobilising Modernity – a book based on his 1988 
dissertation 'British Nuclear Power: Protest and Legitimation 1945-1980' – uses the term 'British nuclear 
technocracy'.
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1971].'401 In addition, the successful campaign of British anti-nuclear power activists in the late
1970s against the government's plans to build a series of Pressurized Water Reactors (PWR)
succeeded in weakening 'British nuclear technocracy' not only institutionally but also discursively.
Thus in the mid-1980s, this topos with regard to the civil use of nuclear power had lost much of its
Wirkungsmacht ('power to influence'). Not even the anti-nuclear power activists framed in this way
the poor manner in which the sheep farm restrictions had been handled. The incidents involving the
Sellafield-Windscale complex, however, were very clearly considered to have been wilfully
covered-up by the British nuclear technocracy – in the very moment Chernobyl drew public
attention toward the question of radioactive fallout in Britain. But somehow this was framed as a
story from the past, and this narrative was not transferred over or projected on to the situation
caused by Chernobyl. In particular, the miscalculations of the public experts regarding the scale and
duration of the sheep farm restrictions were not interpreted in this way. The NRPB and the MAFF
were indeed criticized for their incompetence, but their actions were not considered to be part of the
actuation of a bigger nuclear technocratic policy. In France, on the other hand, the statements
released by the SCPRI and the Minister of Agriculture were considered to be part of a larger
nucleocratic policy. Though, as the example of the publication Britain's nuclear nightmare
illustrates, there were still activists in the late 1980s who argued against the power of the British
nuclear techno-political regime and blamed it for having a devastating impact on Britain's
environment and public health. But Chernobyl was barely part of this argument, as is again seen in
Britain's nuclear nightmare.
The scientists who evaluated the impact of the fallout in the highlands were not considered to
be part of the British nuclear techno-political regime. They were seen as independent experts who,
in the end, ensured that the radionuclides would not enter the human food chain. Although they had
failed academically in their predictions, they were still considered to be independent from the
nuclear policies of the state. Thus, in this regard, the French nuclear sector was perceived to be far
more powerful and influential than the British nuclear sector and to have penetrated society far
more intensively. From today's perspective, when the sheer size of the national nuclear fleets and
the resulting shares of nuclear power in electricity generation are compared – 80% in France versus
16% in Britain – it seems completely logical that the French nuclear sector is perceived to be more
powerful and influential than the British nuclear sector. Thus, again, from today's perspective, one
might argue that there was simply no need to turn the miscalculations by British nuclear experts into
401 Markku Lethonen, “Reactions To Fukushima in Finland, France and the UK – Rupture or Continuity in the Nuclear 
Techno-Politics?,” Second 3.11 Virtual Conference (2013), http://fukushimaforum.wordpress.com/online-forum- 
2/second-3-11-virtual-conference-2013/reactions-to-fukushima-in-finland-france-and-the-uk-rupture-or-continuity-
in- the-nuclear-techno-politics/ (last accessed 15 June 2013).
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a wider debate about power dynamics of the nuclear techno-political regime since the topic of
nuclear power just did not play an important role in every day life. However, this argument only
partly conforms to the setting of 1986. Already back then, France had more nuclear power plants
than Britain. But the predominant generation of electricity in France by nuclear power plants was
quite a recent development that came about in the 1970s with the Plan Messmer. Like France,
Britain had for some time considered itself to be a lead player in nuclear engineering. The nuclear
power programme boosted national pride, of which the opening of the Calder Hall reactor in 1956
by Queen Elisabeth II is among the most illustrative examples. Furthermore, in 1986, British plans
to build – like France – an entire fleet of new PWRs had been struck from the programme only a
couple of years earlier. In the late 1970s, following the oil crisis of 1973/74, the CEGB and the
British government had entirely dedicated themselves to nuclear power and considered it the future
of electricity generation, the only way to 'keep the lights on'. That initially there were also plans to
not import this new fleet of reactors was yet another similarity with the French nuclear policies.
Britain, in fact, had invested intensively in the development of its own reactor design. Although the
plans for large-scale new build projects were eventually rescinded, the Thatcher government was
very much pro-nuclear and pushed for the construction of new reactors on the already existing sites
at Sizewell and Hinkley Point. Plans for more new build were only totally abandoned in the early-
and mid-1990s with the privatization of the British energy sector. Thus, in 1986, Britain and France
were much closer in terms of their political elites' 'nuclear mind-set' than today's shares of nuclear
power in electricity generation might suggest. Therefore, it makes indeed sense to raise the question
as to why the civil nuclear techno-political regimes were perceived so differently in France and
Britain, and why, in the first case, the regime's power dynamics were associated with the official
handling of the Chernobyl crisis, while in the second, this interpretative framework barely played a
role in the public debate at all.
To explain this difference, we must look at the different points the anti-nuclear protest had
focused on in each country. In France the anti-nuclear power movement (or, as Lisa Lynch labelled
it: anti-reactor activism) was very strong, whereas the British anti-nuclear protest was far more
concerned with nuclear weapons. And while there were also activists who directed their actions
against nuclear power plants, they found themselves in a quasi-competition with the CND for public
attention, a competition the CND clearly won. The argument of the majority of British anti-nuclear
campaigners was more global in scope as it turned its focus on the universal threat of a nuclear war.
The issue of nuclear power plants, then, was grouped together with the threat of proliferation. Even
if it was considered to be a more minor part of a larger enemy, the British weapons-focused anti-
nuclear protest did not entirely overlook the national civil nuclear sector, but considered it in a more
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global context. This contextualization of the civil nuclear sector is very much represented in the
book Something in the wind by Mackay and Thompson: the two authors used Chernobyl as an
argument to underpin their position within the context of the global nuclear disarmament discourse
but did not frame their interpretation of the event in such a way that it could serve as a direct
argument against the British civil nuclear programme. Only adhering to this discursive framing of
Chernobyl, the book was not concerned with the impact of the nuclear fallout in Britain the moment
that Britain was just not the level upon which they situated their argument. In the end, what benefit
would come of phasing out nuclear power in Britain when the nuclear arms race continued to go
unchecked at the global level? Therefore, the national and global military nuclear techno-political
regime was what the British anti-nuclear campaigners protested. This framing is clearly presented in
the writing of other critical authors, as well: namely in Hamman and Parrot, and Haynes and
Bojcun. In France, however, nuclear politics, policies, and polities were not primarily addressed at
the global scale. It was within the very concrete French national nuclear power techno-political
regime that Chernobyl was discursively embedded.
A broader conclusion may be drawn from this reasoning whereby the source of the different
trajectories of the French and British Chernobyl debates lay in the different perception of how
powerful the national civil nuclear techno-political regime was. In France, Chernobyl's impact was
considered at the national level and was framed within the discursive context of criticism against
the nucléocratie. In Britain, such an interpretative framework did not exist for the civil nuclear
programme, since criticism against the nuclear enterprise had been predominantly directed against
the military complex and had focused more on aspects of international relations than on the national
nuclear energy complex. Thus, in Britain, Chernobyl was inserted into a global perspective, whereas
in France the focus was placed on the impact the accident had had in the national territory.
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2.2 1989–2005: Chernobyl memory in the making.
Before delving into the topic of this chapter – i.e. how the memory of Chernobyl has been
constructed over time – it is worth calling attention to the British media reporting on Chernobyl on
the occasion of the 10th anniversary. The reporting in 1996 exhibited an interesting aspect that was
generally not characteristic of reporting on Chernobyl: for a short window of time, the health effects
of Chernobyl in Britain were publicly debated. Whereas self-affectedness became the dominant
issue of the French Chernobyl debate from 1996 onwards, this proved to be somewhat an exception
to the dominant rule of non-perceived self-affectedness in Britain.
On the occasion of the 10th anniversary of Chernobyl, British media did not allocate much
space to reporting on the accident's impact. According to Lynn Frewer et al. in their study on
Chernobyl media reporting in different European countries, the absence of this aspect in Britain was
mostly due to the intensive reporting on the Dunblane tragedy402 and the BSE (more commonly
referred to as 'mad cow disease') crisis: 'Both events dominated media coverage during the time
period covering the Chernobyl anniversary in the UK, and it is likely that the total amount of
reporting about Chernobyl was reduced.'403 However, the authors did not consider competing news
events to be the predominant variable that dictated the extent to which Chernobyl was covered in
the national news. The authors of the British study stated that 'this reporting appears to reflect the
degree to which a country is affected by the hazard (in terms of risk exposure and associated
effects, such as economic impact).'404 This reasoning implies that neither Frewer's research group
nor British journalists considered the radioactive fallout, which had led to the massive restrictions
on sheep farms – many still place in 1996 – to be a major hazard to British public health, or at least
not when compared to others, such as BSE.
The situation in France at the time was quite different. Although Chernobyl did not figure as
a major news event in 1996, newspapers reported on the accident's impact. As such, the attention
was directed toward the situation in Eastern Europe. But at the same time, the articles also referred
to the affaire Tchernobyl, reminding readers of the government's 'cover-up' of the fallout in France.
The question of the health effects induced by this very fallout gained extensive coverage several
months after the 10th anniversary of Chernobyl, when in December 1996 a wild boar in the Vosges
402 On 13 March 1996, a mass murder was carried out at the primary school in Dunblane (Scotland). After killing 16 
children and one adult, the killer committed suicide. This school massacre was intensively reported in the media at 
the time.
403 Lynn Frewer et al., Media reporting of risk in 5 European countries at the time of the 10th anniversary of the 
Chernobyl accident, Report to the European Commission (Norwich: Institute of Food Research, 1997), p. 17. The 
newspapers included in the research on the UK are listed on page 25: Guardian, Observer, Times, Sunday Times, 
Sun, News of the World, Daily Mirror, Sunday Mirror, Reading Evening Post, Whitehaven News.
404 Frewer et al., Media reporting, p. 38.
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was found, through random veterinary testing, to have significant levels of contamination. The
ensuing testing of the surrounding forest resulted in the discovery of radioactive hotspots from the
Chernobyl fallout. These findings let to a revival of sorts of the affaire Tchernobyl. By analysing
measurements taken in other areas that had been subject to high rainfall in 1986, critics of the
French government's narrative of 'non-affectedness' could show that there were indeed other regions
as well that had noticeably higher levels of the radionuclides with longer half lives from the
Chernobyl fallout: in the Mercantour, and on Corsica. After detecting an increase in a rare thyroid
disease in the children on the island of Corsica, local doctors called for an epidemiological
investigation into the causes. According to them, the increase in incidents might possibly be linked
to the radioactive iodine from the Chernobyl fallout. Once this debate came to be known, Corsica
became a focal point of the French Chernobyl debate, particularly since the island had not been
included in the first maps that delineated the radioactive contamination in the country.
Essentially, where speculations about Chernobyl health effects were already circulating in
1996 in France – especially with regard to children on Corsica – this was basically a non-issue in
Britain. This setting renders the contents of a short article in the Scottish tabloid newspaper The
Daily Record on 23 April 1996 all the more interesting: 'Experts have ruled out any link between
cancer in the Western Isles and the Chernobyl disaster. A Benbecula doctor claimed a big rise in
cases could have been caused by radiation fall-out from the atomic plant in the Ukraine. But a
study by Western Isles Health Board said there was no link – and revealed that cancer rates in the
islands were below the Scottish average.'405 The case of Benbecula, a Scottish island situated 20 km
west of the Isle of Skye, deserves further attention insofar as it sheds light on the way the question
of Chernobyl-induced health effects was navigated in Britain. Not even a month earlier, on March
31, 1996, the readers of the The Independent were presented with an article titled 'Chernobyl link to
cancer cluster on Scottish island.' The article informed them that 'a sharp rise in cancer cases on a
Scottish island is being linked to radioactive fallout from the Chernobyl explosion a decade ago.
Doctors on Benbecula in the Outer Hebrides say the number of cancers has more than tripled in the
past 18 months. They are demanding urgent investigation of the alarming rise, which they believe
could be the result of people eating contaminated home grown vegetables, and locally produced
mutton, venison, and seafood, over 10 years.'406
The fact that parts of England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales had received significant
amounts of radioactive fallout in the first week of May 1986 was not discovered in 1996. The
extensive restrictions on sheep farms, many still in place in 1996 as aforementioned, were a visible
405 The Daily Record, “Nuke link to cancer ruled out,” 23 April 1996.
406 Liz Hunt, “Chernobyl link to cancer cluster on Scottish island,” in The Independent, 31 March 1996.
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and direct result of this fallout. But what was new in the case of Benbecula was that local doctors
linked this fallout to an increase in the incidence of cancer407 – an increase they were confronted
with in their daily work and for which they could find no obvious explanation. The doctors on
Benbecula asked themselves a series of interconnected questions: how did the island differ from
other places with regard to environmental factors, and what about the environment had changed that
could trigger such a change in the recorded cancer rates. Making the connections, the local doctors
remembered that there had been news reports that the radioactive fallout of 1986 had been
particularly 'high' in the Western Isles because of the intense rainfalls in that region at the time.
They then went on to wonder whether the consumption of contaminated home-grown foodstuffs
and the inhalation of these radioactive particles could have resulted in the local increase in cancer
rates. 
There are some remarkable similarities between the cases of Benbecula and Corsica. The
debate on health effects from the ingestion of contaminated home-grown foodstuffs on Corsica was
also started by local doctors who had observed an increase in the incidence of cancer among their
patients. But unlike the case of the 'forgotten island' – a nickname that was attributed to Corsica in
the French Chernobyl debate since it was not included on the maps released by the radiation
protection agency in 1986 indicating the intensity of regional nuclear fallout – Benbecula did not
instigate a nation-wide search for Chernobyl victims. On the contrary, the Benbecula story appeared
for a few days more in British newspapers – articles on this topic were also printed in The
Independent,408 The Daily Record,409 The Times,410 and The Herald Scotland411 – only to disappear
forever. The exception appeared four weeks later on the anniversary of the Chernobyl accident as
the short article printed in The Daily Record (cited above) on 23 April 1996, which communicated
that any link between the increase of cancer on Benbecula and Chernobyl had been ruled out.
It is not my intent to delve deeper into the medical details of these two cases,412 even if there
is an important difference between the two insofar as the cancers debated in Corsica regarded
thyroid cancers in children, whereas on Benbecula the doctors were confronted with lung and bowel
407 As far as I can tell from the sources I have researched, the case of Benbecula was the first occasion on which the 
Chernobyl fallout in Britain was publicly claimed to have resulted in observable health effects.
408 The Independent, “Experts to investigate island cancer deaths - Scottish health scare: Doctors on Benbecula fear 
high incidence may be linked to food contaminated in fall-out from Chernobyl,” 1 April 1996.
409 The Daily Record, “Fags to blame for isle cancer scare - Health chief’s claim,” 2 April 1996.
410 Helen Johnstone, “Health director to study big rise in Benbecula cancer,” in The Times, 1 April 1996.
411 Elizabeth Buie, “Cancer island inquiry Health board to probe GPs’ fears of Chernobyl or Sellafield link to 
Benbecula deaths,” in The Herald Scotland, 1 April 1996; Calcun MacDonald, “Isle of desolate beauty haunted by 
the spectre of Chernobyl. Benbecula fears grow as cancer numbers rise years after the rain with the orange-red 
dust,” in The Herald Scotland, 1 April 1996; William Tinning, “Chernobyl fall-out denial over Benbecula cancers,” 
in The Herald Scotland, 4 April 1996.
412 With regard to the most affected areas in Eastern Europe, there is an intense dispute under way regarding the health 
effects of the long-term ingestion of foodstuffs contaminated with low-level radiation. One of the major points that 
distinguish 'radiophobic' from 'apocalyptic' interpretations can be made using this very same debate.
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cancers in men in their 40s and 50s. Even the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear
War (IPPNW) – one of the most critical counter expert groups regarding the health effects of low-
level radiation – would agree that the cases of thyroid cancer in children are far more likely to be
linked to an ingestion of radionuclides than cases of lung and bowel cancers in grown men. But as it
is rather unlikely that these differences would be known to a wider audience of newspaper readers,
one could suppose that French reactions to a headline proclaiming 'Chernobyl causes cancers in
Corsica' would be similar to British reactions to a headline proclaiming 'Chernobyl causes cancers
in Benbecula'. Yet, the reactions in the two countries were not at all similar. In France, Corsica
became the linchpin of the debate on Chernobyl self-affectedness, while in Britain, the topic of self-
affectedness in the Western Isles disappeared as rapidly as it had appeared, fading into history when
reporting on Benbecula ceased.
The reason for this discrepancy can be found in the role state experts respectively played in
the two countries, or, more specifically, the confidence people placed in them at the time. As
discussed in the previous chapter, trust in official radiation protection experts in Britain was not
profoundly called into question or challenged during the Chernobyl crisis, whereas the French
public trust in its institutions as well as individual scientists was badly damaged. Therefore, in
France, every study undertaken and every report published by radiation protection and health
protection agencies on the topic of Corsica only added fuel to the fires of the Chernobyl debate.
Critics perceived any release of official evaluations to be an attempt on the part of the public
authorities to disguise and bury the true health effects in statistical calculations that would not take
into consideration the individual cases and in so doing negate the existence of specific risks
associated with certain diets. In Britain, however, the opposite occurred, and the debate on the
health effects Chernobyl had had on Benbecula was over the second Dr Robert Kendell, Chief
Medical Officer of Scotland, released his statement that it was 'exceedingly unlikely' that Chernobyl
was responsible for the increase in the cancer rate413 – i.e., the debate was over after only one day.
No calls for proof of the statement were made, nor were there requests to first await the final 'expert
report', which was published three weeks after Kendell's initial declaration.414 By that point, the
news value of the report was so low that it was not even mentioned in the article in The Daily
Record of 23 April 1996 (cited above). Although sceptical of the dismissal of health officials, not
even the doctors who had started the debate defended their hypothesis of a possible link between
413 This quote by Dr Robert Kendell can be found in all articles cited above that were published in the wake of the 
article published in The Independent of 31 March 1996.
414 To compile this report, Western Isles Health Board officials had checked the records of all general practitioners on 
Benbecula in order to find if the incidents in cancer were statistically different from the average cancer numbers in 
Scotland as a whole.
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Chernobyl and the increase in cancer rates.415 In an interview published in the Glasgow-based daily
newspaper The Herald Scotland on 4 April 1996, Dr Francis Tierney 'said that he and his partner,
Dr Andrew Senior, had not sought to make any connection with Chernobyl. He blamed the media
for exaggerating the connection because of the forthcoming 10th anniversary of the explosion. Dr
Tierney said he regretted the board's haste in dismissing radiation as a possible cause of any rise in
cancer cases. He questioned why the board insisted that radiation caused only thyroid and
leukaemia-type cancers, adding: “What evidence is there for that? I certainly do not accept that
theory.”'416 But rather than looking further into Dr Tierney's doubts about the underlying
assumptions of the Health Board's evaluation of the situation – which would have necessarily
included further reporting on the intensive debate on the effects of low-level radiation in the natural
sciences – the file on the visible cancer effects of Chernobyl in Britain was so solidly closed that it
was not even reopened on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of Chernobyl a couple of weeks later.
This chapter follows the structure used in the previous chapter to examine the national
Chernobyl debates and their narratives. In order to focus on the narrative element of self-
affectedness, however, the other two elements, 'radiophobia versus apocalypse' and the 'anti-Eastern
European/anti-Soviet stereotypes' will take a secondary role. The reason is that – as pointed out in
the paragraphs above – perceived self-affectedness, as in what the health effects were from the
fallout, never dominated the British Chernobyl debate, whereas in France, it took centre stage, at the
latest from 1996 onwards. The aim of this chapter is to closely examine this central difference
between the trajectories of the British and French debates.
2.2.1 Public authorities
Britain
In addition to improving the man-machine interface, the other sphere within which action was
undertaken in Britain in response to the Chernobyl accident was research in the transport and
deposition of radionuclides in the air, water and soil. Several state agencies, universities and private
415 The crisis management effectuated by Dr Robert Kendell can be considered to be in accordance with what Harry 
Collins and Trevor Pinch have identified as a strategy of 'paternalistische Beschwichtigung' ('paternalistic 
appeasement') inherent to the way British public authorities react towards threats to public health: 'Die Regierung 
befindet, daß die Gefahr einer Panik gewöhnlich schwerer wiegt als jedes reale Risiko für die Bürger. Daher sieht 
sie ihre Aufgabe darin, die Befürchtungen der Bevölkerung zu zerstreuen.' Collins and Pinch considered the British 
government's reactions on Chernobyl in 1986 and the BSE crisis to be ideal exemplifications of this strategy. See: 
Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch, Der Golem der Technologie. Wie unsere Wissenschaft die Wirklichkeit konstruiert 
(Berlin: Berlin Verlag, 2000), p. 168.
416 William Tinning, “Chernobyl fall-out denial over Benbecula cancers,” The Herald Scotland, 4 April 1996.
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research institutes were involved in these projects, these last of which came under the supervision of
the Ministry for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF). Often, the results of these studies were
published by Her Majesty's Stationary Office (HMSO), making them available to the broader
public. 
Of those studies I was able to gain access to, not one commented on the topic of possible
health effects the Chernobyl fallout had had or will have in Britain. The authors cleaved to their
researched topic and all comments and observations strictly adhered to the precisely defined
parameters, pertaining only to the objectives of the study. This is a decidedly markedly different
approach to what may be found in the reports published by French agencies. French state experts in
their work on topics related to the fallout almost always included a section or comments connected
with the debate regarding possible French Chernobyl victims. This issue was simply not raised in
British publications. A silence that is all the more surprising given that the topic of a probabilistic
increase in cancer deaths due to the fallout had been discussed already in spring 1986. However, the
estimate released by the NRPB in 1986 that the fallout would result in 'a few tens' of deaths in
Britain was neither challenged nor taken up in the years to come. Not even the report 'The transport
and deposition of airborne debris from the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident with special
emphasis on the consequences to the United Kingdom'417 – which even contained the word
'consequences' in its title – made the slightest mention of the possible effects that this debris could
have on the environment and public health. This report provided in-depth information on the
quantity of radionuclides that had been deposited in Britain, and the where and when; it included
detailed maps and described the progression of the plume over the UK in increments of several
hours.418 The report went on to present model calculations, combining data collected from
meteorological observations on rainfall and air pressure with data from measurements of deposition
on grass that diverse government departments and the NRPB had collected.419 From these
calculations the researchers were able to generate the total deposition on the United Kingdom.420
The authors then went on to broach the issue of the fate and behaviour of this deposition, namely in
the chapter on 'levels observed in cow's milk', in which they stated that 'the deposition of I-131 and
Cs-137 led directly to incorporation in the human food-chain.'421 But the report stopped there. It did
not discuss the behaviour of the radionuclides, as it had above, once it entered into the human food-
417 F. B Smith and M. J Clark, The transport and deposition of airborne debris from the Chernobyl nuclear power plant
accident with special emphasis on the consequences to the United Kingdom. (Bracknell: Meteorological Office, 
1989).
418 Ibid., p. 14.
419 Ibid., p. 37.
420 Ibid., p. 48.
421 Ibid., p. 49.
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chain; it did not speak of the possible total amounts of radionuclides that individuals may have
ingested, nor did it contemplate any potential health effects that this food contamination may have
induced or may yet induce. In the same way, the section describing the 'longer-term agricultural
effects' stated that, regarding sheep farms, 'even 2 years after the event, levels remain sufficiently
high for continued restrictions in some areas.'422 However, the authors again did not elaborate
further on any risks that may have been linked to the contamination of these animals. Their interest
exclusively lay in the composition of the soil in these regions, where the poor acidic soils did 'not
lock-in the free caesium so that it becomes unavailable to the vegetation.'423 The report clearly
identified the central issue to be the unforeseen behaviour of the soil with regard to radionuclide
capture and not the radioactive contamination in and of itself. At any rate, Smith and Clark did not
consider the radioactive fallout from Chernobyl to be a major hazard even for the most affected
regions in Eastern Europe. This can be deduced from the report's first chapter, 'The accident at
Chernobyl'. In this chapter, the authors stated the well-known facts that 'two people died
immediately and 29 others died shortly afterwards as a result of severe radiation injuries incurred
trying to contain the accident, whilst some 200 other people, mainly station personnel, sustained
serious injuries resulting from being exposed to very high levels of radiation,'424 but said no word of
long-term health effects the radiation could have caused or the probabilistic increase in the
incidence of cancer in this area. As they expressed in their conclusion, the Chernobyl fallout was
first and foremost an interesting subject and means with which to improve existing models: 'The
experience gained from the behaviour of the radioactivity released from Chernobyl into the
atmosphere and subsequently deposited on the surface is proving invaluable in the preparation of
models, monitoring networks and other procedures for use should another major accident ever
occur in the future.'425 
These improvements of existing models would prove invaluable not only in the event of a
future nuclear accident should occur in an area as far away as the Ukraine was, but the knowledge
gained from the Chernobyl 'exercise' would be even more crucial for the survival of the British
agricultural business should a severe accident take place in Western European states on the
continent or even on British soil. Thus, the objective of the 'self-affectedness' researched by diverse
governmental agencies was less intended to evaluate the Chernobyl impact in Britain and its
potential health effects, than it was to use the accident as an opportunity to conduct experimental
research into the effects of nuclear accidents, or more precisely, into the behaviour of nuclear fallout
422 Ibid., p. 52.
423 Ibid.
424 Ibid., p. 2.
425 Ibid., p. 53.
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in general. This was clearly expressed in a joint publication by the AEA and MAFF. In the report
'Hot particles from Chernobyl' it was stated that 'the release of hot particles in a severe nuclear
accident is shown to be an important factor to be taken into account in nuclear accident
contingency planning. Their long-term behaviour in soils, especially with reference to migration
and soil-to-plant transfer may be dominant factors in the feasibility of land reclamation.'426 
It is interesting to compare this British perspective on the usefulness of Chernobyl related
research to the situation in France. Also in France – and the global nuclear sector in general –
Chernobyl was primarily considered to be an interesting source of data, which could refine the
models based on the data collected after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki when collated
with these last. The difference between the two countries lies in the public response to the experts'
approach to Chernobyl, i.e. to see Chernobyl as a source of learning; while no major criticism was
elicited in Britain, the opposite may be said of France. French anti-nuclear activists raised harsh
criticism against the CORE-programme, a programme that had been initiated by French institutions
to monitor and improve the living conditions of people in the most contaminated areas of Eastern
Europe. The critics felt that the real motivation underlying this programme was to create a training
ground for French radiation protection experts to test out the practicability of their guidelines in real
life conditions.427 They also accused the programme of being an attempt to prove that living in areas
with high levels of radioactive contamination was indeed possible, and thus severe nuclear
accidents would not be as fatal as most people believed. In Britain, however, where national
radiation protection authorities even openly communicated that their main interest in Chernobyl
research consisted of preparing themselves for future accidents, this stance never led to wider
criticism. 
The wide range of studies undertaken by various British research institutes conformed to this
approach of taking Chernobyl as an opportunity to review existing models. In addition to
investigations into the transport and deposition of airborne radionuclides, transport in water
systems, and uptake mechanisms in plants and animals, these studies focused on transport
mechanisms in different types of soils. The systematic protraction of the sheep farm restrictions was
proof that the existing models were inaccurate. Thus, sizeable amounts of money were spent to
measure and collect samples and to adjust the databases and algorithms. In order to give the reader
an idea of the scope of this research, a number of theses studies will be mentioned without,
however, citing them in detail. They most consisted of pages and pages of measurements followed
426 F. J. Sandalls, Hot particles from Chernobyl: a review (Great Britain, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, 
1991), p. 1.
427 See for example: Stéphane Lhomme, L’insécurité nucléaire  : bientôt un Tchernobyl en France  ? (Barret-sur-
Méouge: Y. Michel, 2006).
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by a one- or two-page conclusion in which the authors strictly discussed their topic and never
referred to broader issues such as the possible health effects of the researched radionuclides, for
instance. One example, the report by the Department of Agriculture and Fisheries for Scotland
'Chernobyl accident: Monitoring for radioactivity in Scotland',428 published in August 1990, gave a
detailed analysis of how much radioactivity may have been taken up according to the amount of
beef or sheep meat consumed. However, it said nothing on the possible (or statistical) health effects
of this uptake. Other examples of this kind of report include: the MAFF, Radionuclide levels in
Food, Animals and Agricultural Products 1987. Post Chernobyl Monitoring in England and Wales
(1988);429 Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Pollution, Chernobyl: Evaluation and radiological
assessment of factors affecting drinking water supplies (1989);430 Department of Agriculture for
Northern Ireland, Levels of radioactivity in the UK from the accident of Chernobyl USSR (1986);431
the AEA, A survey of radioactive caesium in British soils (1990);432 the AEA, A survey of
radioactive caesium in soils in Cumbria and North Lancashire (1990);433 Her Majesty's Inspectorate
of Pollution, Measurements of radioactivity form Chernobyl in population groups in Scotland
(1991);434 the MAFF, Radioactivity in freshwater systems in Cumbria (UK) following the Chernobyl
accident (1989);435 the AEA/MAFF, Hot particles from Chernobyl: a review (1991);436 and the AEA,
Transport mechanism and rates for long lived Chernobyl deposits in mid-Wales (1991).437
Some might ask 'why ever would scientists have commented on the possible health effects of
the radiation in these reports.' Given that the studies were rooted in the natural sciences and were
ideated to examine one specific aspect of a larger question, were the authors to have proceeded to
make comments on aspects that did not directly fall within the sphere of their specific research
topic, their statements would have amounted to ungrounded speculation. The point here is not to
428 Department of Agriculture and Fisheries for Scotland, Chernobyl accident: monitoring for radioactivity in Scotland 
(Department of Agriculture and Fisheries for Scotland, 1990).
429 Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Radionuclide levels in food, animals and agricultural products 1987: 
post Chernobyl monitoring in England and Wales (London: HMSO, 1988).
430 Paul Kane, Chernobyl: evaluation and radiological assessment of factors affecting drinking water supplies (Her 
Majesty’s Inspectorate of Pollution, 1989).
431 Department of Agriculture for Northern Ireland, Levels of radioactivity in the UK from the accident at Chernobyl, 
USSR on 26 April 1986: a compilation of the results of environmental measurements in the UK (London: HMSO, 
1986).
432 P. A. Cawse and S. J. Baker, A survey of radioactive caesium in British soils: comparison of accumulations pre- and
post-Chernobyl (Harwell: AEA Environment and Energy, 1990).
433 P. A. Cawse and S. J. Baker, A survey of radioactive caesium in soils of Cumbria and North Lancashire: comparison
of accumulations pre- and post-Chernobyl (Harwell: AEA Environment and Energy, 1990).
434 B. W. East, Measurement of radioactivity from Chernobyl in population groups in Scotland: report 2 (Her Majesty’s 
Inspectorate of Pollution, 1991).
435 W. C. Camplin and Great Britain Directorate of Fisheries Research, Radioactivity in freshwater systems in Cumbria 
(UK) following the Chernobyl accident (MAFF, 1989).
436 F. J. Sandalls, Hot particles from Chernobyl (MAFF, 1991).
437 P. J. P. Bonnett, Transport mechanisms and rates for long lived Chernobyl deposits in Mid-Wales (AEA Technology 
Environment and Energy, 1991).
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criticize the studies or the authors either way, but to highlight the fact that their narrow focus on
their research topics reflects the perception of the fallout as a 'neutral object' of scientific interest.
This is remarkably different from the French case where research on the Chernobyl fallout from the
outset was anything but a neutral topic.438 As a consequence of the affaire Tchernobyl in 1986, any
French research on Chernobyl had to locate itself on one or the other side of the debate: either on
the side of the 'official experts', who had to defend their expertise against 'the irrational' behaviour
of laypersons', or on the side of the 'counter-experts' whose research on Chernobyl aimed to uncover
the 'mensonge d'état' ('state lie') and was frequently connected to an overarching criticism of the
French 'nucleocratic' system. For this reason an increase in the literature on Chernobyl was verified
from the mid-1990s on, at a time when the debate on French self-affectedness had really begun to
gain momentum. In Britain, however, where this debate was marginal, British research activities
came to an abrupt halt in the early 1990s. Once 'everything' had been said with regard to the
transport and deposition of radionuclides, no further publications were released by British state
agencies on the impact of Chernobyl. What this essentially means is that research into 'self-
affectedness' in Britain had come to a close before it had even really begun in France.
The fact that the topic of health-related self-affectedness never attained a prominent role in
the UK might also be linked to the perception of the fallout's health impact of British doctors. The
importance of medical practitioners in relation to the debate on self-affectedness is particularly
obvious with regard to Benbecula and Corsica. In both instances, local doctors called attention to
the possible connection between a rise in the local incidence of cancer and the Chernobyl fallout. In
France, Corsican doctors and their evaluation of the health impact took centre stage in the
Chernobyl discourse, while in Britain, this topic was not further investigated or corroborated within
the wider group of medical practitioners. In France, this local or regional issue rose to become a
national issue, and in Britain it never won a national audience, remaining local news at best. One
interesting source that supports this observation with regard to Britain is a publication of the
Institute of Physical Science in Medicine of 1986 consisting of the proceedings of two round tables
that brought together medical physicians from hospitals all over the UK to discuss their experience
with the anxiety people had expressed in early May 1986.439 It is worthy to note that none of the
papers presented in these round table meetings dealt with possible health effects of the radioactive
fallout. Instead, the papers focused on developing strategies to reassure anxious people that their
health was not threatened. A statement in a paper by P.P. Dendy et al. on 'Whole body monitoring in
438 Instead of framing how the fallout was handled as 'neutral' or 'non-neutral', it makes sense to apply here Gabrielle 
Hecht's concept of nuclearity, see: Hecht, Nuclear Ontologies. For an application of this concept to the Chernobyl 
debate, see the conclusion of: Bauer/Kalmbach/Kaspersky, From Pripyat to Paris.
439 J. K. Haywood and Institute of Physical Sciences in Medicine, Chernobyl: response of medical physics departments 
in the United Kingdom (London: Institute of Physical Sciences in Medicine, 1986).
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Cambridge' clearly illustrates the manner in which problems were allocated: 'Most people
monitored were reassured and were most grateful for our help. However, we were inundated by
inquiries, which demonstrated that the amount of reassurance required by the public is beyond the
resources of an average Medical Physics Department to provide.'440 Thus, it was the people's fear of
the fallout and not the fallout itself that British doctors considered to be problematic. 
It is important to stress that although British nuclear and health experts primarily perceived
the Chernobyl fallout to be an interesting research topic or a psychological problem that needed to
be resolved, public authorities were also confronted with a decisively concrete challenge caused by
the accident: radioactivity in sheep. Heavy rains in the west and north-west of the country in early
May 1986 had caused high levels of radioactivity to fall on the ground, and in the highland regions
the radionuclides were taken up by grazing sheep. Consequently, sheep farm restrictions were
instated in June 1986 and, contrary to the forecasts announced by British radiation protection
agencies, these restrictions would not be lifted after just a couple of weeks.441 In 1999, in fact, there
were still 13,000 sheep in Cumbria and 180,000 sheep in North Wales that were subject to the
restrictions because their levels of radioactivity were too high for them to go to market.442 These
restrictions continued to be extended in time due to the continued uptake of radionuclides by the
sheep. Contrary to the official assumption that the radionuclides would rapidly be locked into the
soil and no longer be taken up by the vegetation growing in the top soil – and so would also not be
taken up by grazing sheep – the radioactive particles in the highland soil behaved quite differently
than predicted. The experts' surprise at this phenomenon is reflected in the number of research
projects undertaken to study the transport and deposition of radionuclides in soils, to which I
referred above. 
However, with the exception of British natural science academia and the farmers' community
the topics of sheep farm restrictions and the persistence of radionuclides in upland soil soon sank
from public view. Thus, the nuclear industry was able to omit this impact on Britain entirely from
its publications on Chernobyl. A telling example is the Watt Committee report of 1988, which was
analysed in detail in the previous chapter.443 Although this report comprised chapters on 'Affected
areas of the UK' and 'Contamination of Foodstuffs', sheep farm restrictions and the possible health
effects of consuming contaminated food were not discussed. The levels of wet and dry deposition
440 Ibid., p. 26.
441 For more detailed information on the British sheep farm restrictions and Brian Wynne's analysis of the conflict 
between sheep farmers and state experts see chapter 2.1.3. For a summary of Wynne's work, see: Collins/Pinch, The 
Golem at Large, p. 153-168.
442 Anne Nisbet, “Management of Chernobyl-restricted areas in England and Wales,” in Radiological Protection 
Bulletin 211, (April 1999): 11–15.
443 Worley/Lewins, The Chernobyl accident and its implications for the United Kingdom.
128
were mentioned as was the research carried out by the MAFF and other government departments,
but no study regarding the uptake of radionuclides in British sheep and fish was cited. The same is
true for the updated version of this report from 1991, which will be analysed in more detail below.
In general, whenever publications from the mid-1990s on made reference to British sheep farm
restrictions, they mostly did so to illustrate the geographical range of the fallout; and it seems as
though this topic figured more often in international than in British publications. Only a handful of
publications are entirely dedicated to this topic, and these are essentially the studies carried out by
Brian Wynne. 
Asides from the academic STS-community, it was primarily the NRPB that published on
British sheep farm restrictions. In 1998, A. S. Nisbet and R. F. M Woodmann compiled a 60-page
high-gloss brochure in which they summarized the monitoring programmes that were in place and
discussed ways in which the existing compensation scheme could be improved.444 Yet, this
publication considered the issue of radioactivity in sheep to be a predominantly administrative
problem to which a cost-effective solution had to be found. Priority was given to the challenge of
implementing a more efficient and less expensive monitoring and compensation regime, and
questions on the dangers of radioactivity in foodstuffs or on nuclear power and public health were
not raised. In this report, the authors played through different possible scenarios for the
management of the sheep monitoring system, assessing these options using the following criteria:
'technical feasibility, capacity, cost, impact and acceptability.'445 The conclusion the authors reached
was that 'the extensive nature of the current restrictions in Wales means that none of the alternative
options to mark and release monitoring is practicable.'446 Yet, the system currently in place was too
expensive due to the large number of animals being monitored. Thus, according to them, there was
only one possible solution: 'Priority should be given to reducing the size of the restricted area. It is
expected that a comprehensive derestriction survey would identify only a few tens of farms by the
use of temporary stockproof boundaries.'447 Over the following years this recommendation was
indeed implemented448 and the number of sheep farms subjected to the restrictions was gradually
reduced. 
But criticisms on how the government was handling the sheep farm restrictions were voiced
much earlier than in the late 1990s; it is of note that these criticisms were external of the NRPB.
444 Nisbet/Woodman, Options for the management of Chernobyl-restricted Areas in England and Wales. A summary of 
this study was published a year later in the Radiological Protection Bulletin (see footnote 442).
445 Ibid., p. v.
446 Ibid., p. vi.
447 Ibid.
448 It is possible to establish the contamination of a given area with a specific radionuclide (regarding the long-term 
contamination caused by Chernobyl, the abundant important radionuclide is radiocaesium) by taking soil 
measurements or by conducting aerial surveys.
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The way in which the government had initially implemented the restrictions in 1986 had already
been the cause of heated arguments between the public authorities and public scientists on one side
and the sheep farmers and landowners on the other.449 Not long after, however, the object of
criticism shifted towards the effectiveness of the restrictions and the underlying policies. The
government was accused of using sheep farm restrictions as a way to boost public trust in British
foodstuffs – the measures were considered to be a public relations strategy for which the sheep
farmers had to pay the price. In an article printed in The Guardian in June 1990 this criticism was
neatly summed up as follows: 'The most embarrassing thing for the Government is that it is stuck
indefinitely with a system of compensating farmers for radioactivity in their sheep which was
attractive as a short time measure, but is beginning to look increasingly expensive and
questionable. Many scientists believe the restrictions are unnecessary, but politicians fear that
removing them could produce a consumer outcry and jeopardize exports. This means that the
Ministry of Agriculture is sticking with the scientists and defying public opinion over “mad cow”
disease, but disregarding scientists and bowing to public concern over radioactive sheep, even
though this has cost the tax payer ₤ 7 million so far, payed mostly in north Wales.'450 Aside from the
fact that this quote clearly illustrates how the protraction of the sheep farm restrictions was
criticized, it is also interesting for another reason. This quote underpins a hypothesis I presented in
the previous chapter: scientists in Britain, unlike their French counterparts, were not considered part
of the nuclear techno-political regime. On the contrary, they were perceived to be independent from
the government; and the government was perceived to have used them as a pawn in pursuit of its
own goals.451 
When the entire debate over the policies governing the sheep farm regulations are taken into
consideration, it may seem less striking that British anti-nuclear groups did not take up this topic to
use in their anti-nuclear campaign, although at first it may have seemed to be a perfect anti-nuclear
platform. After all, the number of sheep farms subject to the restrictions decreased only thanks to
the more accurate identification and localization of hot spots that continued to persist and not to a
reduction of the level of dangerous radionuclides in the soil. Moreover, the contaminated soil was
located in the most beloved hiking destinations of Britons: the highlands of Lakeland and
Snowdonia. Anti-nuclear activists very well could have referred to these hotspots as reminders of
449 See on this early criticism chapter 2.1.3.
450 Stephen Cook, “Render unto caesium 134,” in The Guardian, 1 June 1990, p. 23.
451 In their summary of Brian Wynne's work, Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch stressed that sheep farmers in Cumbria 
had also considered the scientists who evaluated the radioactive contamination of the Lakeland as being 'Opfer des 
politischen Drucks von Seiten der Regierung' – a government that had waited for a 'perfekten Vorwand wie 
Tschernobyl, um die bisher verschwiegene Kontamination aus Sellafield darauf abwälzen zu können'; Collins/Pinch, 
Der Golem der Technologie, p. 167.
130
what can happen when a severe nuclear power accident occurs even thousands of kilometres away
and in so doing could have called attention to the danger of having nuclear facilities just mere
kilometres away from Lakeland and Snowdonia. Yet, such a strategy was not adopted by anti-
nuclear groups. What is more, in contrast to France, these persistent hot spots were neither
considered a threat to public health, nor did they spark a debate about the possible health effects of
the fallout. This difference may be explained in part by the fact that the studies carried out on in the
contamination of highland soils revealed that the radioactivity levels of 1986 were only partially
caused by Chernobyl. On one farm in Cumbria, on which The Guardian reported in 1990, '35 per
cent of the caesium came from atmospheric nuclear weapons testing, and 15 per cent from routine
discharges from the nearby Sellafield reprocessing plant.'452 It is likely that such reporting decreased
the public perception of how serious the health threat from Chernobyl was. At the same time, this
re-evaluation of Chernobyl fallout discursively underpinned the anti-weapon and anti-Sellafield
argument rather than affirming Chernobyl fallout in Britain as an independent anti-nuclear argument
of its own. Therefore, public interest in the sheep farm restrictions almost entirely disappeared after
the mid-1990s. It is important to note that it was not impossible for people to know about the lasting
legacy of the Chernobyl fallout in Britain. Although newspaper reports were rare, some did exist
and appeared mostly in the days surrounding the anniversary of the accident in April. But the
protraction of the restrictions on sheep farms was not considered a major news event. This can be
deduced from the fact that none of the articles made it to the front page, and for some years in the
1990s and early 2000s, no articles on the sheep farm restrictions were even published in The
Guardian and The Observer.453 From the few articles that were printed, however, it was indeed
possible to obtain information regarding the scale of the restrictions and that at least some sheep
farmers, whose statements formed an essential part of the articles, were willing to talk about this
issue.454 But there was no further public demand for more information or clarification, and the little
information that was reported was not linked in a way to doubts or questions about the national
nuclear fleet or criticism of the British radiation protection authorities.
452 Cook, “Render unto caesium 134.”
453 These articles have been accessed through the databases ProQuest and Newsbank in the British Library, using the 
search key 'Chernobyl sheep farm'.
454 See for example: Tony Snape, “Chernobyl pay-out reaches ₤ 1.7 m,” in The Observer, 17 September 1989, p. B5; 
Polly Ghazi, “Chernobyl fall-out may affect British farmland for decades,” in The Observer, 29 April 1990, p. 9;  
Robin McKie, “Britain's deadly Chernobyl legacy,” in The Observer, 21 April 1991, p. 11; David Ward, “Hill 
farmers living under cloud as effects of Chernobyl linger,” in The Guardian, 25 April 1994, p. 7; Martin Wainwright,
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France
In France, however, the situation was quite the opposite. Media reporting on persistent hot spots of
Chernobyl fallout in France almost always included a reference to the affaire Tchernobyl. Thus, the
material legacy of Chernobyl fallout in France was discursively embedded in the criticism of the
French techno-political regime and particularly in those instances in which the credibility of the
radiation protection authorities was called into question. The moment they proclaimed in 1986 that
the fallout would have no negative impact in France, radiation protection authorities became central
actors in the French debate on Chernobyl health effects. The research they conducted in the
following years was primarily intended to prove that their initial evaluation had been correct. In this
regard, for instance, the IPSN annually published, from April 1996 on, a dossier on the state of the
art of Chernobyl research; the IPSN never failed to assert in the conclusions that the whole debate
about visible health effects in France was pointless. But every comment released by state experts
with regard to Chernobyl induced health effects only succeeded in fuelling the debate by providing
critics with a new occasion to lambaste the official evaluation. 
The debate on the possible health effects in France of the Chernobyl fallout had already
surfaced by the second week of May 1986 hand in hand with the affaire Tchernobyl. The logic
underpinning the position of the critics was: if French public authorities had lied with regard to the
true levels of fallout that hit France, then the revelation that the fallout had been even more intense
would consequently imply that the threat to public health was greater than experts had led the public
to believe. However, shortly after May 1986 this debate lost force. Fodder for debate was removed
when the public authorities wrapped up its investigation and analysis of Chernobyl. Critical voices
like CRIIRAD continued to call for a re-evaluation of the fallout intensity, but this never happened;
the public authorities had effectively blocked further criticisms by eliminating the spaces and
occasions in which critics could dispute their official evaluations. The French nuclear industry also
adjusted its behaviour and began to refrain from advertising the origin of French electricity supply.
Thus, the whole topic of nuclear energy became less visible in the public sphere during the late
1980s, which made it more difficult for critical voices to mobilize and bring a broader audience to
their cause. Therefore, anti-nuclear activists and critics directed their efforts against various
incidents that had occurred in French nuclear power plants as well as the strongly contested
construction of the fast breeder reactor Superphénix. As in many other European countries, French
public institutions drafted a series of reports on Chernobyl for the national government and
international organizations such as the IAEA. But these reports barely attracted any attention
outside academic and political circles, and furthermore did not incite the production of 'counter
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literature'. 
In the early 1990s and even more so in 1996, when the question of the impact of the
Chernobyl fallout on France itself was 're-discovered' by a broader public this all changed. On the
occasion of the 10th anniversary of Chernobyl, the public radiation protection agency IPSN
published a detailed information brochure that was primarily directed toward journalists.455 In this
brochure, the nuclear experts repeated their evaluation of the situation in 1986 declaring that, after
ten years, there was still no evidence that the French government and the French scientific elite had
committed any errors.456 This brochure did not have the desired effect and was used by journalists
less to praise French clear-sightedness and more as a newsworthy statement to remind their readers
of the affaire Tchernobyl and to point out that the contested official narrative had not changed even
over time. Another event at the end of 1996 decisively launched Chernobyl from its allotted
position in the past directly into the present: In the Vosges, a hunter shot a wild boar, which when
subjected to a completely random veterinary analysis, proved to be significantly contaminated.
Tests and measurements in the surrounding forest were carried out and mushrooms and berries were
also found to show far higher rates of radioactivity than would have been normal for this region.
Thus, in 1996, the legacy of the Chernobyl fallout in French soil reared up to made its public
appearance. The boar incident sparked a search for other hotspots. Measurements were taken in
areas that had received high rainfall in 1986, and CRIIRAD revealed that hotspots could be found
not just in the Vosges, but also in the Mercantour (close to the Italian border) and on Corsica.
Concurrent with this search for the still-present radionuclides in French soil, was an active search
for the French victims of this radiation; a search that focalized on the claims by local doctors on
Corsica that they had seen increases in thyroid diseases in children after the Chernobyl plume had
passed over Europe.
In an attempt to bring an end to the speculations about the 'true impact' of Chernobyl in
France, the Direction de la sûreté des installations nucléaires (DSIN) and the Direction générale de
la santé (DGS) commissioned the IPSN and the OPRI – the successor to the SCPRI – to provide a
synthesis of all the information currently available on the effects Chernobyl had had in France.457 In
November 1997, the IPSN and OPRI delivered their report.458 By compiling the various groupings
of data from the different agencies and institutions, the IPSN and OPRI were able to generate a map
of France indicating the total fallout deposition. With regard to some regions, this map varied
significantly from what the SCPRI had presented to the public in 1986. The authors of the 1997
455 IPSN, Tchernobyl, 10 ans après — dossier de presse (Fontenay-aux-Roses: IPSN-Mission communication, 1996).
456 For an analysis of this brochure, see: Kalmbach, Tschernobyl und Frankreich, pp. 93.
457 The following account is a summary of: Kalmbach, Tschernobyl und Frankreich, pp. 95-99.
458 IPSN (Ph. Renaud, K. Beaugelin, H. Maubert, Ph. Ledenvic), Conséquences radioécologiques et dosimétriques de 
l'accident de Tchernobyl en France (Fontenay-aux-Roses: IPSN, 1997).
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IPSN-OPRI report emphasized that the levels of radioactive contamination of foodstuffs had
exceeded the safety levels in 1986; they also communicated that there were constellations in which
the contamination levels of foodstuffs, and especially mushrooms, could continue to exceed the
defined safety limits even in 1996. The report contained extreme case scenarios on the specific diets
of people living in the particularly exposed regions of the Vosges, Mercantour, and Corsica. The
kind of sanitary effects these doses might have had on the population, however, was not discussed.
Like their British colleagues, the French scientists rigorously remained within the bounds
established by their topic: their task was to conduct a radio-ecological and dosimetric analysis of the
fallout, not a study on low-level radiation health effects. 
When the report was published as a book two years later,459 the authors felt compelled to
include a statement on the health-related effects of the fallout; they had felt the pressure of the
French Chernobyl debate. In the conclusions of the 1999-edition, the authors stated that it might
indeed be justified to commission an epidemiological study of thyroid cancers in the children of
some specific regions in France, but not because the estimated doses seemed to result in observable
negative health effects, rather as a means to give a clear response to the multiple inquiries into this
topic by the population and medical practitioners.460 The foreword to the book by the DSIN's
director, André-Claude Lacoste, was as much a concrete statement of the French Chernobyl debate
as was the book's conclusion. He wrote: 'I have walked away with several important lessons from
this book: with regard to the estimated doses, the influence of the fallout from the Chernobyl
catastrophe in France has remained below a level that could have provoked a justified reaction on
a sanitary plan.'461
But the critics of the official narrative on French self-affectedness, in particular CRIIRAD
and numerous people who were suffering thyroid diseases, in no way considered this study to be
proof that there were no observable health effects in France. According to these critics, the IPSN's
publications were rather proof that the French nucléocratie continued to try to cover up their lies of
1986. In response to these tenacious accusations, the Direction générale de la santé (DGS)
commissioned the IPSN and the Institut de veille sanitaire (InVS) to compile a report on the
sanitary effects of the Chernobyl fallout in France. The IPSN and the InVs delivered this report in
December 2000.462 However, an epidemiological study was not carried out and the results published
459 Philippe Renaud et al., Les retombées en France de l'accident de Tchernobyl: conséquences radioécologiques et 
dosimétriques (Les Ulis: EDP sciences, 1999).
460 Ibid., p. 140.
461 Ibid., p. IV: 'Je retire de cet ouvrage plusieurs enseignements essentiels: au regard des doses estimées, l’influence 
des retombées de la catastrophe de Tchernobyl en France est restée en dessous d’un niveau qui aurait pu susciter 
une réaction justifiée sur un plan sanitaire.'
462 IPSN and InVS (P. Verger, L. Chérié-Challine), Évaluation des conséquences sanitaires de l'accident de Tchernobyl 
en France (Saint-Maurice: InVS, 2001). At the same time the full report was released, a synthesis was also 
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in the report were derived from modelled calculations based on the IPSN's 1997 report on the radio-
ecological and dosimetric consequences of the fallout in France. The authors stated clearly from the
beginning that such calculations were very problematic given there was so little knowledge about
the health effects of exposure to low-level radiation, and this was particularly true when speaking of
internal exposure. In spite of this admitted lack of scientific knowledge, the report came to the
conclusion all the same that an increase in thyroid cancers in children in France provoked by the
Chernobyl fallout would not be an observable. Even were some individual cases to exist, they could
not be discerned from the total amount of naturally occurring thyroid cancers.463 The report readily
admitted that there had been a measurable and observable increase in thyroid cancers in adults, but
went on to state that this increase was not a phenomenon of national scope but had been observed at
the global level. Moreover, because this increase had already manifested prior the Chernobyl
accident, its occurrence could not be attributed to the Chernobyl fallout. As such, no explanation
had been found thus far for the increase.464 
This evaluation that it was not possible to establish a connection between these thyroid
illnesses and the Chernobyl fallout on the French territory did nothing to convince CRIIRAD and
the many French citizens that were afflicted with thyroid diseases. This was why the Association
Française des Malades de la Thyroïde (AFMT) together with CRIIRAD filed a suit in 2001 at the
Tribunal de grande instance (TGI) of Paris.465 The claim was: 'failure to protect the French people
in general and groups of risk in particular against the radioactive fallout of the Chernobyl
accident.'466 The claim made by the AFMT and the CRIIRAD was supported by numerous single
claims and later supplemented by class action suits, which resulted in a number of complainants
involved in this case of approximately 500 individuals in 2006.467 This claim and other individual
claims were brought primarily against Pierre Pellerin but also members of the French government
of 1986.468 In reaction to the severe public criticism brought forward against Pierre Pellerin, many
published: IPSN and InVS (P. Verger, L. Chérié-Challine), Évaluation des conséquences sanitaires de l'accident de 
Tchernobyl en France – synthèse du rapport (Saint-Maurice: InVS, 2001).
463 Ibid., p. 17: 'Les excès de cas estimés sont inférieurs ou comparables aux incertitudes sur l’estimation du nombre de
cancers spontanés: ces excès devraient dès lors être difficilement détectables du point de vue épidémiologique.'
464 Some anti-nuclear activists blame this increase to be the direct result of the global weapons testing fallout.
465 For a detailed analysis of this court case, see: Kalmbach, Tschernobyl und Frankreich, pp. 116. The court took its 
decision in September 2011: the claim was dismissed. This decision was followed by strong public criticism and was
widely covered by the French media (see for example Le Monde and Libération of 7 September 2011). Not only was
the decision as such contested but also how the case was processed and the dismissal of the juge d'instruction Marie-
Odile Bertella-Geffroy, who had taken the arguments of the plaintiffs seriously and had also invited experts external 
to the French nuclear sector to testify. After ten years of investigations she was dismissed in March 2011 and, within
months, the case as such was dismissed as well.
466 Original phrasing: 'Défaut de protection des populations françaises en général et des groupes à risques en 
particulier contre les retombées radioactives de l'accident de Tchernobyl.'
467 CRIIRAD and AFMT, Communiqué joint: Mise en examen du Pr Pellerin pour tromperie aggravée dans le dossier 
Tchernobyl / malades de la thyroïde, 1 June 2006.
468 Since the late 1990s, it has become increasingly more common in France to bring claims against politicians and hold
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professionals of the French nuclear sector openly took his side. Thus, with the advent of the 2000s,
the debate about the health effects Chernobyl had in France got entangled in juridical proceedings
and also with this public side-taking in favour of either the complainants or the accused. The
question of the experts's credibility and responsibility had to a great deal become a question of
personal accountability – that and a question of monetary compensation.
2.2.2 Nuclear power industry
France 
EDF
After the EDF published its 1986 brochure – discussed in the chapter above – the company made no
further communications about Chernobyl to a broader public. One important reason that may have
underpinned this decision may have been that the EDF did not want to unintentionally create any
links between its own activities and the accident. As a general rule, the company did not place
particular emphasis on the source of French electricity during the late 1980s. This changed,
however, in the early 1990s when nuclear power became the focal point of the EDF's advertising
and PR campaigns.469 It was at the same time, in 1992, that the EDF published an information
brochure on Chernobyl for its employees.470 This brochure offers a very clear narrative of
Chernobyl, given it consisted mainly in the classification of information that had been published in
media reports: it identified which were 'true', 'false' and 'uncertain'. One piece of information that
had been classified as 'true' was that the cause of the accident was to be attributed to human failure
and faulty reactor design, the RBMK, which was different from French plants.471 The statement that
child mortality had increased in the most contaminated areas in Eastern Europe, however, was
labelled 'false', and on the contrary, the brochure stated that the infant mortality rate had actually
gone down thanks to improved medical surveillance.472 The claim that there was an increase in
cancer rates because of radiation from Chernobyl was also classified as 'false'. The observed
increase in thyroid cancer in Belarus was only due to an increase in cancer screening.473 In general,
them legally responsible for the negative outcomes of their decisions, see: Violaine Roussel, “Scandales et 
redéfinitions de la responsabilité politique. La dynamique des affaires de santé et de sécurité publiques,” in Revue 
française de science politique 58, 6 (2008): 953-983.
469 For the EDF's communication on nuclear power and in particular the campaign 'Aujoud'hui, 75% de l'électricité est 
nucléaire', see: Topçu, L’agir contestataire à l’épreuve de l’atome, pp. 310.
470 The analysis of this brochure is adapted from: Kalmbach, Tschernobyl und Frankreich, pp. 89-90.
471 EDF, Tchernobyl: le vrai, le faux et l'incertain (Paris: EDF, 1992) p. 2.
472 Ibid., p. 7.
473 Ibid., p. 6.
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the causal association between the many manifest illnesses in the part of the population living in the
most contaminated areas and the radioactive fallout from Chernobyl was to be considered 'false'.
Instead, these illnesses were really 'linked to stress, the modification of daily habits, and the poor
quality of nutrition.'474 In this regard, the narrative presented in the EDF brochure of 1992 clearly
drew on the concept of radiophobia. It also played on anti-Eastern European/anti-Soviet stereotypes
insofar as it asserted that the (Western) medical aid brought to the most contaminated regions after
the Chernobyl accident was far more advanced than what the Soviet health system was capable of
providing. Regarding the aspect of self-affectedness, the EDF brochure took a clear and decisive
position: any information stating that the public authorities had denied the presence of fallout on
French soil was 'false'. The brochure went on to assert that the opposite was true, that on 30 April
1986, the SCPRI had send a communiqué to the press agencies stating that the radioactive plum had
reached France.475 The brochure, however, did not limit itself to discussing and taking a stance on
the radioactive fallout in France. The EDF took an active position regarding the health effects of
this fallout, asserting: It was 'false' that Corsica was one of the most contaminated areas in all of
Europe; and the thyroid cancer rates on the island were not abnormally high.476 Once it made these
points clear to its employees, the EDF published no further statements on Chernobyl. However, the
EDF continued to systematically distance itself and its activities from the accident. Regarding the
20th anniversary of Chernobyl, this behaviour will be discussed in more detail in the following
chapter.
Britain
The Watt Committee on Energy
In 1991, on the occasion of the 5th anniversary of the accident, the Chernobyl working group of the
Watt Committee came together once again to review the material that had been published on
Chernobyl in the meantime and to present a compendium of the reports they judged trustworthy.477
The Committee clearly stated its motives: 'the material published by the popular media often
fail[ed] to separate clearly opinion from fact or to give due weight to the important as compared to
the trivial.' Thus, given this state of affairs, the Watt Committee intended to take on the role of
independent expert in the Chernobyl debate once more so that it could inform the public in a purely
scientific and neutral manner what information was true and what was false. In the foreword, the
474 Ibid., p. 7: 'liés au stress, à la modification des habitudes de vie, et à la mauvaise qualité de l’alimentation.'
475 Ibid., p. 10.
476 Ibid., p. 11.
477 Watt Committee on Energy, Five years after Chernobyl. 1986-1991: a review (London: Watt Committee on Energy, 
1991).
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authors clearly stated what kind of reports they considered to be trustworthy – thus the foreword
provides us with an interesting insight into what the authors considered to be unbiased: 'It is the
Watt Committee's experience that, at least in the United Kingdom, technical experts in the nuclear
industry present frank and objective reports, certainly as far as publishing data. The IAEA presents
material which is reliable although it is an organisation which publicises the world nuclear scene
as well as regulating and inspecting installations. The British official bodies such as the National
Radiological Protection Board also have no interest in promoting the nuclear case.' The Watt
Committee's account of how the accident unfolded, the release of radiation into the atmosphere, and
the effects on health and the environment was thus based on reports, papers, and press releases
published by the IAEA, the NRPB, the UKAEA and other official institutions as well as on articles
published in scientific journals such as Health Physics and Radiation and Health.478 To a large
extent, the interpretation of the Chernobyl accident and the narrative presented in the report were
identical to those in the Watt Committee's publication of 1988. The death toll, for instance, had
remained unchanged at 31. Yet, the denomination 'volunteers' had now been put into quotation
marks, indirectly implying that the Soviet crisis management of the accident had been less than
democratic. However, the Committee continued to maintain that there were no health effects
observable in this group. Although they stated that 'no special checks on the health of those
engaged in the clean-up operations have been published in the review material,' some sentences
further down they specified: 'there is no reason to anticipate any radiation linked health problems
with the clean-up workers as long as the published irradiation doses are realistic.'479 Regarding
health effects in evacuees and people living in the most affected regions, the authors not only gave
an 'all-clear' – essentially dismissing that there had been any negative health effects on these groups
– but declared that the health situation in children had even improved. Under the section title 'Birth
Defects and Increase in Birth Mortality' they cited a representative of the Kurchatov Institute in
Moscow saying that 'growth in infant mortality rate has not been observed in the contaminated
regions since 1986 and in most cases has been reduced.' Furthermore, 'in Gomel, infant mortality
decreased from 16 per thousand in 1985 to 12 per thousand in 1988.'480 On leukaemia and other
cancers, the authors were brief, because, as they explained, 'there are no reports at this stage, or
data, on cancer incidence in the area.'481 The Committee did release more statistical information on
thyroid cancer and asserted that the 17 thyroid cancer cases that had been verified between 1986
and mid-1989 were 'in reasonable agreement with the prediction.'482 Despite the fact that no detailed
478 For a comprehensive overview of the sources used for this report, see the list of reference: Ibid., pp. 45.
479 Watt Committee on Energy, Five years after Chernobyl, p. 26.
480 Ibid., p. 29.
481 Ibid., p. 32.
482 Ibid., p. 31.
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data was available, the authors affirmed all the same that 'there is no reliable evidence that harmful
health effects had been observed by June 1990.'483 The Committee's consequent statement regarding
Western and Southern Europe conformed to its evaluation of the health situation in Eastern Europe:
'The medical effects of the fallout over Western and Southern Europe must be small and
undetectable.'484
Therefore, there were no particular discrepancies between this publication and the narrative
expressed in the 1988 report. However, one new element was included in the 1991 publication: the
authors added an eloquent description of the concept of 'radiophobia'. By this time, 'radiophobia'
had already been renamed and now figured under the expanded and more 'politically correct' term
'post-Chernobyl stress-induced illnesses'. Although the word 'radiophobia' itself only appeared in
the last paragraph of the conclusion of the Watt Committee report, the concept as such was
paraphrased throughout the text. For instance, the authors extracted the information from a 1991
Red Cross Survey that 'psychological stress and anxiety was evident in the Red Cross team who
found that people were anxious to know their radiation dose and about future pregnancies.'485
Within the context of a summary of an IAEA report from November 1989, the Watt Committee
similarly quoted Morris Rosen (Head of the IAEA's Department of Nuclear Safety) saying that 'the
health effects reported as the outcome of Chernobyl may be due to factors other than radiation
[…]: deficient diet, increase in medical examination, better diagnostic technique and added stress
and anxiety arising from the current uncertainties.'486 Finally, in their conclusion, the authors of the
Watt Committee report gave a name to the interpretative frame they had applied throughout their
assessment of the health situation in the most affected regions and presented their recommendation
for concrete action. They concluded the report with the words: 'While the radiation linked to
illnesses is likely to be low because of the timely precautions taken by the authorities, these same
precautions, and the lack of credible information, have led to a serious decline in the general health
of the population, at one time called “radiophobia”. […] The way that radiation is dealt with by
the media, the obscure terminology and the links with cancer has led to an exaggerated fear of
small doses of radiation. One of the lessons of Chernobyl is that it is urgent to present powerfully in
an easy to understand form a balanced view on the health impact of low level radiation.'487
483 Ibid., p. 33.
484 Ibid., p. 36.
485 Ibid., p. 33.
486 Ibid., p. 37. 
487 Ibid., p. 44. With regard how Chernobyl health effects should be addressed, the report had already provided a clear 
answer at the very beginning, p. viii: 'Whether there has been “cover up” is more difficult to determine; ultimately 
there has to be an assessment of the care that can be given to those who might be affected. It is not feasible to extend
limitless funds on correcting some perceived defect and it is naïve to suppose that such an absolute can be 
sustained.' 
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The Watt Committee report also presented a very clear narrative of the impact of the
Chernobyl fallout in Britain. The authors indeed cited the amount of fallout that had passed over
and settled on British soil and elaborated that 'while in Southern England, where there was little
rain while the plume was overhead, radiation levels were 100 – 1,000 Bq/m2, wet deposition of
Caesium 137 in Cumbria and South of Scotland gave levels from 10,000 to 25,000 Bq/m2.'488 A map
showing the wet and dry depositions of Caesium 137 in the UK was inserted. However, the authors
absolutely made no mention of the possible health effects of these radionuclides in humans, not
even in the chapters on 'Environmental effects' and 'Farms'. Thus, while it clearly classified the
debate on Chernobyl health effects in Eastern Europe as radiophobic, the Watt Committee report
provided at the same time a clear statement negating the perception of health-related self-
affectedness in Britain.
2.2.3 Anti-nuclear groups and other critical voices 
France
GSIEN and CRIIRAD
Amongst the first to contest the official French statements on Chernobyl's impact, the activists from
the GSIEN continued to call into question the official evaluations on the impact of the accident. In
particular two GSIEN activists, Bella and Roger Belbéoch, followed this issue closely. In the 1980s,
Bella and Roger Belbéoch were among the most known and publicly visible French anti-nuclear
activists and would go on to found the Comité Stop Nogent in 1987. From the start, the Belbéochs
were involved in the French Chernobyl debate. In May 1986, Bella Belbéoch had contributed an
article to Écologie, the magazine of the Société Française d'Écologie. Her predictions on the
trajectory of the official evaluations of Chernobyl became a common point of reference for critical
voices in the French Chernobyl debate. On 1 May 1986, she wrote: 'In the coming days, we can
expect an international complot of official experts who will try to minimize to the maximun the
number of victims of this catastrophe. The continuance of the civil and military nuclear
programmes imposes on the collectivity of states a tactical complicity that exceeds ideological or
economic conflicts. The international health organizations, which are in principle independent from
the states but strictly controlled by the Great Powers, will serve as liaison agencies to uphold the
appearance of objectivity and neutrality.'489 Because of this concern, Bella and Roger Belbéoch
488 Ibid., p. 17.
489 Bella Belbéoch, “Le complot international,” in Écologie, 371 (1986): 'Il faut s'attendre dans les jours qui viennent à 
un complot international des experts officiels pour minimiser au maximum l'évaluation des victimes que causera 
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continued to closely follow the work and reports of the international committees and expert groups
that had been put in charge of evaluating the impact of Chernobyl in the most affected regions in
Eastern Europe. In so doing, Bella and Roger Belbéoch paid careful attention to the publications
released by the WHO and the IAEA. In 1992, in their contribution to the first edition of the journal
L'Intranquille, they addressed the wider public with their strong criticism of the official narrative of
the impact of Chernobyl that had been diffused at the international level.490 The following year, a
revised and expanded version of this article was published as a book.491 In this publication, Bella
and Roger Belbéoch addressed various aspects of the Chernobyl issue: the contemporary situation
in the most affected regions, the struggle to define the dose limit for evacuation, the changing
estimates of the number of victims, the alienation strategies applied in the West, and so on. A central
aspect of their argument consisted in the contestation of the 'radiophobia' concept that had figured
prominently in the evaluations of the Soviet and international experts groups. In the chapter 'Le
complot international' ('The international conspiracy') the authors incorporated all of the various
aspects on Chernobyl they had presented into one central claim: 'There is nothing surprising about
what is happening at the moment within the circle of experts.'492 As Bella Belbéoch had predicted in
her article in Écologie in 1986, all Chernobyl-related activities and communications were aimed at
protecting the international civil and military enterprise from being profoundly called into question:
'The complicity of the Western experts, scientists, technicians, doctors, sociologists and specialists
in humanitarian aid was, without reservations, aimed at helping the central power to 'manage' the
social, economic, and political crisis that had emerged as a consequence of the accident. It was
necessary to convince the people living in the contaminated areas that they had nothing to fear for
their health. Those who were sent to 'liquidate' the consequences of the catastrophe at the site itself
were not to question the doses of radiation they received or would receive. The rapid re-start of the
undamaged reactors provided the proof that there was nothing to fear from nuclear energy.'493
cette catastrophe. La poursuite des programmes civils et militaires impose à l'ensemble des États une complicité 
tacite qui dépasse les conflits idéologiques ou économiques. Les organismes internationaux de la Santé, en principe 
indépendants des États mais strictement contrôlés par les grandes puissances, pourront servir d'organes de liaison 
entre celles-ci tout en maintenant une apparence d'objectivité et de neutralité.' Translation by Karena Kalmbach 
from the quotation in: Corinne Castanier, “Contamination des sols français par les retombées de l’accident de 
Tchernobyl – les preuves du mensonge.” In Contaminations radioactives: atlas France et Europe, ed. by 
CRIIRAD/A. Paris (Barret-sur-Méouge: Éditions Yves Michel, 2002), p. 7.
490 Bella Belbéoch and Roger Belbéoch, “Tchernobyl, une catastrophe. Quelques éléments pour un bilan,” in 
L'Intranquille, une libre contribution à la critique de la servitude, 1 (1992): 267-373.
491 Bella Belbéoch and Roger Belbéoch, Tchernobyl, une catastrophe. Quelques éléments pour un bilan (Éd. Allia: 
Paris, 1993). A re-edition of the book is envisaged and the text is available online: http://www.dissident-
media.org/infonucleaire/Tchernobyl_une_catastrophe_1993.pdf 
492 Belbéoch and Belbéoch, Tchernobyl, une catastrophe, p. 17 (online edition): 'Ce qui se passe actuellement dans les 
milieux d'experts n'a donc rien de surprenant.'
493 Ibid.: 'La complicité des experts occidentaux, scientifiques, techniciens, médecins, sociologues, spécialistes en 
actions humanitaires fut sans réserve pour aider le pouvoir central à « gérer » la situation de crise, sociale, 
économique, poli- tique, conséquence de l'accident. Il était nécessaire de convaincre les gens vivant dans les zones 
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Although the book focused entirely on the (health) impact of Chernobyl in Eastern Europe and did
not tackle the radioactive fallout in France, the discursive impact Chernobyl had had on the French
nuclear debate was indeed addressed: 'For a long time our experts were the primary providers, if
not the producers, of information. They simply denied the catastrophe, reduced the event to some 30
victims. But it was impossible to conceal the mass evacuations, and the non-return of the people to
their homes was clear proof the soil decontamination had failed utterly. Because the reality of the
catastrophe could not be denied, the discourses changed: Chernobyl had indeed been a major
catastrophe, but its objective consequences were minor.'494 As had the early critical voices in
Britain, Roger and Bella Belbéoch directed their criticism toward the global nuclear policies at
stake in the official Chernobyl narrative. The difference was that while the aspect of possible health
effects from low-level radiation exposure was central to their analysis, this issue had barely been
debated in detail in British publications and had mostly been referred to only as an 'unresolved
question'.
In addition to the 1993 book written by Roger and Bella Belbéoch, various articles on
Chernobyl appeared in GSIEN's magazine La Gazette Nucléaire. Their work scrutinizing and
criticizing the official Chernobyl narratives provided by international expert groups was flanked by
Soviet dissident voices that had been made available to the French audience.495 In 1990 Grigori
Medvedev's book on the causes of the accident was published in France,496 and in 1993 Alla
Yaroshinskaya's book followed suit.497 These examples illustrate how, in the early 1990s, focus had
been placed on the revelation of the 'truth about Chernobyl' with regard to Eastern Europe. Only
after the 10th anniversary of the accident public interest turned to the question of the 'true' impact of
Chernobyl in France.
It was the CRIIRAD who took the leading role in the struggle to reveal the 'true' level of
contamination in France. It was specifically with this aim that the organization was founded by
Michèle Rivasi in May 1986. The 1997 report released by the IPSN on the impact of Chernobyl in
France (discussed above) was proof to Michèle Rivasi and the CRIIRAD that since the Chernobyl
contaminées qu'ils n'avaient rien à craindre pour leur santé. Ceux qu'on envoyait « liquider » les conséquences de 
la catastrophe, sur le site même de Tchernobyl ne devaient pas s'interroger sur les doses de rayonnement qu'ils 
recevaient ou allaient recevoir. Le redémarrage rapide des réacteurs non endommagés de la centrale fournirait la 
preuve qu'on n'avait pas à craindre l'énergie nucléaire.'
494 Ibid.: 'Pendant longtemps nos experts furent les fournisseurs, pour ne pas dire les producteurs, prioritaires des 
informations. Ils niaient tout simplement la catastrophe, réduisant le bilan à une trentaine de victimes. Mais il 
n'était pas possible d'escamoter les évacuations massives, et le non-retour des populations chez elles était 
manifestement la preuve de l'échec total des techniques de décontamination des sols. Comme la réalité de la 
catastrophe ne pouvait être niée, les discours changèrent : Tchernobyl avait bien été une catastrophe majeure, mais 
ses conséquences objectives étaient mineures.'
495 This aspect is considered in detail in chapter 3.1 on 'Voices from the East and their reception in the West.'
496 Grigori Medvedev, La Vérité sur Tchernobyl (Paris: Albin Michel, 1990).
497 Alla Yarochinskaya, Tchernobyl, vérité interdite (La Tour-d’Aigues: Éditions de l’Aube, 1993).
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accident, not only had nothing changed, the French radiation protection agencies were still not to be
trusted. A book that Michèle Rivasi published together with Hélène Crié in 1998 clearly expressed
this opinion: 'Twelve years later, in defiance of some attempts to appear more 'transparent', the
nuclear authorities have not changed how they function: disinformation and incompetence remain
the rule.'498 Thus, the only way to reveal the truth was to carry out independent studies. And this is
precisely what the CRIIRAD had been doing for years in the south-east of France and in Corsica.
However, in order to incorporate these selective studies into one comprehensive map the CRIIRAD
commissioned geologist André Paris, in 1999, to take soil samples from all over France. In 2002,
the results from CRIIRAD's various measurements and analyses were published in the book
Contaminations radioactives: atlas France et Europe.499 With this publication, the editors pursued a
clear goal: 'This atlas of reference provides unpublished maps and information, which are useful for
anybody who wants to understand the debate on the sanitary consequences of the Chernobyl
catastrophe.'500 The first part of the book was written by CRIIRAD's director, Corinne Castanier.
Castanier not only mentioned the affaire Tchernobyl of 1986 and the history of CRIIRAD but also
compared the official numbers regarding the radioactive contamination in France that had been
published by the public authorities with the results of the studies conducted by the CRIIRAD. The
subtitle to her chapter anticipated her conclusion: 'Les Preuves du Mensonge' ('the proof of the lie').
According to the CRIIRAD, the largest most serious lie that had been told consisted in the fact that
in early May 1986 the SCPRI had declared that the readings needed to be 10,000 to 100,000 times
higher before significant problems of public hygiene would begin to manifest.501 From CRIIRAD's
point of view, however, the atlas proved that the readings had indeed been high enough to call for
safety measures. Thus, by taking an uncompromising position against the adoption of any safety
measures in early May 1986, French public authorities had wilfully exposed the people to a health
threat.
AFMT
498 Michèle Rivasi and Hélène Crié, Ce nucléaire qu’on nous cache (Paris: Albin Michel, 1998), p. 113: 'Douze ans 
plus tard, en dépit de quelques tentatives pour paraître plus ‘transparent’, le fonctionnement des autorités 
nucléaires n’a pas varié: la désinformation et l’incompétence restent la règle.'
499 CRIIRAD and André Paris (eds.), Contaminations radioactives: atlas France et Europe (Barret-sur-Méouge: 
Éditions Yves Michel, 2002). For a detailed analysis of this publication, see: Kalmbach, Tschernobyl und 
Frankreich, pp. 100-103.
500 CRIIRAD/Paris, Contaminations radioactives: atlas France et Europe, back-cover of the book: 'Cet atlas de 
référence fournit des cartes et des informations inédites utiles à tous ceux qui veulent comprendre le débat sur les 
conséquences sanitaires de la catastrophe de Tchernobyl.'
501 In several points in the text, Corinne Castanier stated that a communiqué published by the SCPRI had contained the 
sentence: 'Il faudrait imaginer des élévations 10.000 à 100.000 fois plus importantes pour que commencent à se 
poser des problèmes significatifs d’hygiène publique.'
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The claim that French public authorities had wilfully exposed people to a health threat – more
specifically one that targeted the thyroid – was met with marked interest amongst those who
suffered thyroid diseases. Because the thyroid gland is very receptive to radioactive iodine,
exposure to this radionuclide can cause severe illnesses and even cancer in this organ, especially in
people exposed at a younger age. A global increase in the number of those with thyroid diseases is a
phenomenon that pre-exists Chernobyl and that has eluded all attempts on the part of physicians to
find an explanation.
In 1999, some French patients founded the Association Française des Malades de la
Thyroïde (AFMT). That same year, at the general assembly of the organization, the members were
offered a concise explanation for their illnesses: Jean-Michel Jacquemin presented them his book
'Ce fameux nuage... Tchernobyl, la France contaminée', in which he proclaimed his theory that the
increase in thyroid diseases in France was a result of the Chernobyl fallout. Details of Jean-Michel
Jacquemin, his publications, and his role in the French Chernobyl debate are discussed below (see
chapter 2.2.4). What is important in relation to the AFMT is the fact that Jean-Michel Jacquemin
was able to convince many AFMT members of the veracity of his theory: the support group partly
transformed into a group of complainants, which two years later and together with the CRIIARD
filed a suit in the French courts for 'failure to protect the French people in general and groups of
risk in particular against the radioactive fallout of the Chernobyl accident.'
AFTM activities provoked such severe criticism among French radiation physicians that, in
2005, a group of approximately 50 doctors ran an advertisement in the Libération to publicise a
manifesto.502 The manifesto was addressed to 'people with thyroid diseases who ascribe their illness
on the passage of the radioactive cloud over France in 1986'503 and emphatically communicated:
'NO, there is no Chernobyl effect in France.'504 According to this manifesto, the worst effect of this
whole debate was that many people began to challenge or call into question the expertise of their
doctors and put their health at risk by looking for absurd explanations for their illnesses. The text
concluded with the clear identification of who was responsible for what they felt were absurd
claims: 'These sick persons are the hostages of an anti-nuclear and juridical-medical lobby.'505
Although, from the mid-1990s on, the French debate on Chernobyl health effects focused
very much on the effects in France, public interest in Chernobyl health effects went hand in hand
502 For more information on the AFMT and the manifesto that was directed against its activities, see: Kalmbach, 
Tschernobyl und Frankreich, pp. 110-113.
503 Libération, “Message aux malades de la thyroïde...,” 19 November 2005, p. 10: 'malades de la thyroïde imputant 
leur pathologie au passage en France du nuage radioactif en 1986 après l'accident de Tchernobyl.'
504 Ibid.,: 'NON, il n'y a pas‚“d'effet Tchernobyl” en France.'
505 Ibid.,: 'Ces malades français sont les otages d’un lobby anti-nucléaire et juridico-medical.'
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with the increasing awareness of the situation in the most contaminated regions in Eastern Europe. 
'Caen-Group'
The living conditions of people in the most affected regions in Eastern Europe also came to be of
central interest to a group of sociologists from the University of Caen (Normandy). The term 'Caen-
Group' is not a self-coined term but one I have chosen to use in reference to the group of people
who were involved in the publication activities of Guillaume Grandazzi and Frédérick Lemarchand
and looked at Chernobyl from a social-philosophical perspective. Grandazzi and Lemarchand are
the editors of the anthology Les silences de Tchernobyl, published in 2004.506 The second edition of
the book and Grandazzi and Lemarchand's work and views were widely reflected in French media
reporting on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the accident. The central argument of Grandazzi
and Lemarchand's interpretation of Chernobyl was that they did not consider Chernobyl to be an
isolated solitary event that took place in 1986 but an ongoing event that, though it began in 1986,
will continue to unfold in the future.507 In accordance with Günther Anders and his considerations
on the atomic age, Grandazzi and Lemarchand saw in Chernobyl the manifestation of an era that is
characterized by the constant possibility and potential for total destruction. Furthermore, they
believed that time was inverted in this era, wherein the past becomes the future. And therefore, a
completely new form of commemoration, the commemoration of the future, was needed.508 Because
Chernobyl broke with all temporal and spatial reference points, the problem of creating an image of
the unimaginable arose. Another central element with regard to the issue of lack of reference points
is the missing événement fondateur ('inceptive event'). The daily life of the victims suddenly
changed without evident reason: 'Still today, millions of inhabitants of the contaminated zones find
themselves denied a reference point to the accident. […] The event is first and foremost daily life
and the fact of being brutally thrown into a world marked by new rules, of new interdictions.'509
Thus, the primary objective of Les silences de Tchernobyl was to expose daily life in the
contaminated areas, and how the suffering of the people was denied by official institutions and the
nuclear lobby. Therefore, the various articles of this anthology discussed topics ranging from the
506 Guillaume Grandazzi and Frédérick Lemarchand (eds.), Les silences de Tchernobyl. L’avenir contaminé (Paris: 
Éditions Autrement, 2004).
507 For a detailed account on the 2004 edition of Les silences de Tchernobyl and for further information on the 
background of the editors, see: Kalmbach, Tschernobyl und Frankreich, pp. 125-129.
508 Guillaume Grandazzi and Frédérick Lemarchand, “Avant-propos.” In Les silences de Tchernobyl, ed. by 
Grandazzi/Lemarchand, p. 7: 'Le problème de la mémoire est ici posé d’une manière radicale et inédite: Tchernobyl 
nous conduit à nous forger une mémoire du futur, une mémoire “à rebours”.'
509 Ibid., p. 10: 'Les millions d’habitants des zones contaminées se trouvent encore aujourd’hui privés de référence à 
l’accident. [...] L’événement, c’est d’abord la vie quotidienne et le fait d’être brutalement plongé dans un monde 
doté de nouvelles règles, de nouveaux interdits.'
145
cover-up politics of the Soviet Union in 1986 to the current working conditions of doctors in the
most affected areas, this last exemplified primarily by the case of Yuri Bandazhevsky. One of the
main problems for the people in these areas was, from the point of view of Grandazzi and
Lemarchand, that they were confronted with something heretofore completely unknown; there was
a total 'absence of reference points, of experiences, of cultural references that could be drawn on in
this entirely new situation.'510 This setting made it difficult for the people to improve their own
situation and to even express their feelings. What made the situation even worse for these people
was the concept of 'radiophobia', which was used in official reports to describe their situation,
transforming the victims into culprits and denying them their fears, suspicions and consequently
caution with regard to their environment – i.e. their only weapons against the further uptake of more
radionuclides – which were necessary for their survival in the most contaminated areas.
Of prime importance to Les silences de Tchernobyl was a book to which the editors dedicated
an entire part of the four parts of the volume: La supplication. Tchernobyl, chroniques du monde
après l’Apocalypse by Svetlana Alexievich. Alexievich's book had been translated into French in
1998 and met with tremendous success: From numerous reprints, to the adaptation as scene play, to
countless quotations in almost every text that has been written on the topic of Chernobyl in France,
La supplication was the incarnation of the counter narrative to the official narrative provided by the
French public authorities and official international expert groups. The impact of this narrative will
be discussed in chapter 3.1.3.
Britain
The official Chernobyl narratives provided by national and international nuclear authorities also
excited criticism in Britain. Compared to the variety of publications and the sheer number of critical
voices in France, however, the critical Chernobyl discourse in Britain was almost invisible between
1989 and 2005. This is even more so with regard to the aspect of self-affectedness. In general, anti-
nuclear power positions – which had never been as strong in Britain as the anti-nuclear weapons
position – steadily lost momentum. In order to understand the underlying reasons for this
invisibility, this phenomenon must be considered in direct relation to changes made to the nuclear
policies: In the 1990s, the British government decided to refrain from building any new nuclear
power plants. Indeed, the new Sizewell B reactor was completed and connected to the grid only in
1995. But rather than making this nuclear reactor the pioneer of a whole fleet of PWRs on British
510 Guillaume Grandazzi, “L’atome en héritage.” In Les silences de Tchernobyl, ed. by Grandazzi/Lemarchand, p. 129: 
'absence de repères, d’expériences, de références culturelles mobilisables face à cette situation inédite.'
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soil – as was the original intention – he government decided in May 1995 that the civil nuclear
sector would no longer receive public (financial) support. Consequently, CEGB renounced its plans
to build more new nuclear power plants. This energy policy was the extreme opposite of the official
policy in France. On the other side of the Channel, the government had decided to replace old
PWRs with a fleet of new 3rd generation PWRs, the so called European Pressurised Water Reactor
(EPR), which a joint French-German technical consortium had begun to develop in the early 1990s.
Concurrently, France actuated a profound reorganization of its nuclear sector. The government
overhauled the radiation protection authorities and founded new agencies, among which the
Autorité de sûreté nucléaire (ASN) in 2006. But, more importantly for the nuclear industry, Areva511
was instituted with the intention of making this company the world leader in reactor construction,
uranium extraction, and fuel production. This policy to give strong political and financial support to
the French nuclear power industry incited fierce criticism of anti-nuclear activists and lead to an
intensification of their protests and campaigning efforts. The Réseau sortir du nucléaire ('Network
phase-out of nuclear power'), which was created in 1997, became a key player in the coordination
of these protest and campaigning activities. So while in France anti-nuclear power protests made a
strong comeback in the late 1990s, in Britain there was barely any such activity. Since the phase-out
of existing plants had never been an objective of the majority of anti-nuclear power campaigners,
their case was basically won with the government's decision of 1995, of course with the notorious
exception of Sellafield, which continued its discharges into the Irish Sea. If anti-nuclear power plant
activism was almost non-existent in the 1990s, activism associated with other environmental issues
was thriving in Britain at the time. In the early 1990s, Greenpeace and the FoE had experienced a
rapid increase in membership. In particular, Thatcher's plans for new road construction and large
scale projects like the Eurostar had incited intense protest, which was strongest in South-East
England.512
Friends of the Earth
In the late 1980s, the FoE was still actively involved in the debate over the impact of the Chernobyl
511 Areva was instituted in 2001 and was the result of the merger and reorganization of the companies Framatome ANP, 
Cogema, and CEA-Industrie. This reorganization of the French nuclear sector was the result of a government 
initiative to render the nuclear industry more competitive. Areva is a holding company that unifies the companies 
Areva NP, Areva NC, Areva T&D and Areva TA. Areva NP (NP = Nuclear Power) is today the world leader in the 
field of reactor design development and construction and until 2006 operated under the name Framatome ANP (ANP
= Advanced Nuclear Power). Areva NC (NC = Nuclear Cycle) is a world leader in the field of fuel cycling 
(exploitation, enrichment, reprocessing) and until 2006 operated under the name Cogema. Over the last few years, 
Areva NC has been highly criticized for the working conditions in its uranium mines in Niger. 
512 For an account of British environmental activism in the 1990s, see: Rootes, Britain.
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fallout, in particular with regard to the fallout in Britain. In a 1989 report titled Fallout over
Chernobyl: A Review of the Official Radiation Monitoring Programme in the UK, FoE campaigners
Patrick Green and P. Daly criticized how the sheep farm restrictions had been and were being
managed and claimed that in some areas the restrictions had been lifted too early whilst in some
contaminated areas they had never even been introduced.513 The report did not pass unnoticed, as
may be attested by its mention in an article in The Guardian: 'A group of scientists yesterday added
their voices to those of Friends of the Earth in suggesting that the ban on the sale and slaughter of
sheep introduced in parts of Britain after Chernobyl may have been wrongly applied. The scientists
say results obtained in north-west Wales show that farmers in some affected areas may have
wrongly escaped the ban and others may have been unnecessarily restricted.'514 
In 1991, the FoE released another publication on Chernobyl, which, this time, addressed the
situation in the most affected regions in Eastern Europe. This publication was a six-page brief
written by FoE radiation campaigner Patrick Green after his visit to Belarus. Green exclusively
discussed the health effects in Belarus and was very cautious in the way in which he crafted his
statements. This is evident in his comment on the observed increase in illnesses in the most affected
regions: 'However, these statistics only provide a general indicator of a medical trend, they do not
prove whether or not the exposure to radioactivity was responsible.'515 In spite of this prudence,
Green clearly expressed his criticism of the way in which the IAEA evaluated the sanitary situation:
'It is extremely worrying that the international agency charged with investigating the health effects
of the accident seems to have made up its mind that the only health effect is radiophobia.'516 He
indicated that there was an obvious need for epidemiological surveys, but whether these studies
should be conducted by the IAEA and whether or not the right people would be included was, from
Green's point of view, to be seen.
After the early 1990s, I no longer found any further material on Chernobyl published by
either the FoE or other British environmental NGOs. 
Sheep Farmers 
With regard to British sheep farmers, no further publications seem to have been released on
513 Unfortunately, I was unable to consult this item. It is missing in the collection of the British Library. My inquiry 
request put in at the London head office of the FoE to consult the report in their archive or to put me in touch with 
one of the authors was answered with a negative response. The only information I received was that Patrick Green 
left the FoE in 1996.
514 The Guardian, “Chernobyl bans criticised,” 19 September 1989, p. 2. Another reference to the FoE report is found 
in: The Guardian, “Disaster that fell with the rain on a bleak hill,” 27 April 1990, p. 25.
515 Friends of the Earth, The Chernobyl legacy (London: Friends of the Earth, 1991), p. 5.
516 Ibid.
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Chernobyl after the 1988 memorandum by the Farmer's Union of Wales. However, given that
British newspapers on some occasions reported on the continued sheep farm restrictions and at
times wrote longer articles around the individual lives of affected farmers, some public statements
are available for this period. Undoubtedly, to use these articles as sources is to look at the sheep
farmers' statements through the lens of an intermediary, the journalists; but with no first hand
sources available, these articles nevertheless provide some information on the group of people who
was most affected by the Chernobyl fallout in Britain. 
In contrast to the point of view of the FoE that some restrictions had been lifted too early or
had not even been imposed, some sheep farmers considered the restrictions in and of themselves to
be a problem, and believed they were the victims of a government food safety PR campaign. This
perception was clearly expressed in an article printed in The Guardian in June 1990: 'Roger Ward,
regional director of the National Farmers Union in Cumbria, says his view all along was that the
restrictions weren't necessary, but the NFU went along with them to demonstrate to the consumer
that the product was definitely save.'517 In addition to the mistrust in and frustration with the public
authorities, the restrictions had proved to be a financial challenge for many farmers: though they
received compensation payments, some farmers were extremely worried that they would be unable
to find a buyer in the event they decided to sell their farm in the future. Others were concerned over
the possible health effects the fallout would have on their families and their animals. In this regard
Trebor Roberts, a sheep farmer from North Wales, told a journalist in April 1990: 'Personally I am
scared for the young people and the children. I am too old but what about seven and eight-year-
olds when it happened? Some people locally were taken for testing and were found to have very
high radiation levels indeed. I have worked this farm for 21 years and bought it just before
Chernobyl. During all that time I had maybe six deformed lambs. Last year I had more than 20. The
mothers of these lambs were born after Chernobyl. Other farmers have had similar experiences.
[…] Nobody seems to care.'518 Aside from Benbecula, Trebor Roberts' statement is one of the very
few instances in which the perception of a visible sanitary impact of the Chernobyl fallout in Britain
is openly addressed. However, the author of this article seems to have believed Roberts' statement to
be quite extreme. In fact, the article balances Roberts' worries about possible health effects in
children in this region with a statement from physicist Dr David Sanderson: 'Since the meat
contains only tiny amounts of C137 and is distributed widely by the food industry, he says, only
small amounts are actually eaten by any one individual. And the absorption of a little more of an
element that is already naturally there is not a major consideration.'519 
517 Stephen Cook, “Render unto caesium 134,” in The Guardian, 1 June 1990, p. 23.
518 The Guardian, “Disaster that fell with the rain on a bleak hill,” 27 April 1990, p. 25.
519 Ibid.
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It seems that not too many farmers in the area were willing to give interviews to journalists,
since nine years later it was once again Trebor Roberts who appeared in an article published in The
Guardian. In this 1999 interview, Roberts strongly underpinned his argument from 1990 that
'Nobody seems to care' when he spoke about the widespread ignorance regarding the contamination
in Snowdonia: 'I could even go into Dolgellau [the town closest to his farm] and people on the
street would wonder what restrictions you were talking about. They have not a clue, even seven
miles away.'520 
While some farmers might have been happy for this veil of ignorance under which the
enduring sheep farm restrictions were cloaked – after all, the BSE crisis was already threatening to
discredit British beef, and people didn't have to be reminded of the problem of radioactive sheep –
others did not think of these restrictions as just one food scandal among others but drew wider
conclusions connected to their political stance. In this regard, a farmer from Wales stated in an
interview in 1994: 'My sister was in CND and I honestly didn't understand what she was going on
about. Then this happens. A cloud of radioactive dust is created 2,000 miles away and travels 5,000
miles up over Scandinavia. It keeps going until it hits a mountain in Wales. And eight years later,
it's still here.'521
2.2.4 Individual voices 
Britain
As aforementioned, very few publications on Chernobyl appeared in Britain between 1989 and
2005, none of which were not natural science studies on the transport mechanisms in the air, water,
and soil. The objective of this mere handful of books was to present a concise history and analysis
of the accident and its impact, the most known among them were: Chernobyl, the long shadow by
Chris C. Park,522 and Fire in the Rain. The Democratic consequences of Chernobyl by Peter
Gould.523 These books appeared in 1989 and 1990 respectively and were both written by academic
geographers. Because the late 1980s have been extensively covered in this chapter, these accounts
on Chernobyl will not be discussed in detail. Furthermore, both books were one-time contributions
to the debate: the authors neither wrote again about Chernobyl nor on other nuclear issues. Of the
520 James Meikle, “Chernobyl legacy lingers down on the farm,” in The Guardian, 1 May 1999, p. 10.
521 David Ward, “Hill farmers living under cloud as effects of Chernobyl linger,” in The Guardian, 25 April 1994, p. 7.
522 Chris C. Park, Chernobyl. The long shadow (London: Routledge, 1989). At the time when he was writing the book, 
Chris C. Park was a Geography Professor at the University of Lancaster.
523 Peter Gould, Fire in the Rain. The Democratic consequences of Chernobyl (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990). In 
1990, Peter Gould was a Geography Professor at Penn State University.
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various individual British voices that came forward with an interpretation of the event in the late
1980s, only one author stuck with this topic: Richard F. Mould.524
Richard F. Mould
Similarly to the approach taken by the Watt Committee, Richard F. Mould also reviewed his
Chernobyl account published in 1988 and released, in 2000, what he referred to as 'the definitive
history of the Chernobyl catastrophe.'525 The task he set for himself in this book was nothing less
than to provide 'a balanced account of the accident and its aftermath, excluding media hype and
biased accounts of self-interest groups, and debunking some of the myths which have surrounded
Chernobyl.'526 In the foreword, Mould stated that he believed to have been successful in fulfilling
this task. To convince the reader of his qualification to do so, however, he took an entire page to
present his 'about the author' information, listing his books, his work for the WHO and IAEA and
his honorary memberships as well as the number of his grandchildren.527 Unlike his 1988
publication, pictures in this new edition were used to illustrate the text, and not the other way round.
Furthermore, the language of this book lacked much of the elitist haughtiness that had marked the
style of his previous book. In general, the text was neither dogmatic nor agitated; it cited a
multitude of reports and many other sources. For instance, to ensure a balanced representation of
the facts, a mixture of eyewitness accounts, scientific reports and newspaper articles were used to
recount the events comprising the accident. When Mould expressed his position on nuclear power
plants, he now adopted a more 'matter-of-fact' style stressing that the plants were there and therefore
we had to deal with them. He no longer openly praised the 'only viable alternative for the
foreseeable future' as he had in 1988.528 To prove his neutrality, Mould also did not refrain from
criticizing other 'authorities' of the international Chernobyl discourse, like Robert Gale.529 Mould's
evaluation of the health effects of the Chernobyl fallout, however, wholeheartedly concurred with
the interpretation contained within the International Chernobyl Project. In fact chapter 15 was
524 Rob Edwards very well may be the exception that proves the rule: Edwards, too, continued to write about 
Chernobyl, however only in some newspaper articles. The only book he published after Britain's nuclear nightmare 
dealt with the health effects of Sellafield: Rob Edwards and Susan D'Arcy, Still fighting for Gemma (Bloomsbury, 
1995). The book is available online on Edward's website: http://www.robedwards.com/2007/03/still_fighting_.html 
(last accessed: 15 November 2013). 
525 Richard Francis Mould, Chernobyl record: the definitive history of the Chernobyl catastrophe (Bristol: Institute of 
Physics Publishing, 2000).
526 Ibid., p. xiv.
527 Ibid., p. xvii.
528 This change in use of language corresponds to what Sezin Topçu has described with regard to France following the 
Chernobyl accident as a shift in the nuclear industry's discourse from the sacralization of nuclear power to 
emphasizing the 'fait accompli' of the matter, see: Topçu, L’agir contestataire à l’épreuve de l’atome, pp. 305.
529 Mould, Chernobyl record, p. 92.
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entirely dedicated to 'Psychological Illness'. The introduction to this chapter is quoted in detail for
two reasons. First, it clearly elaborates the conceptual framework of 'radiophobia'. Second, this
account demonstrates what a narration of Chernobyl within the frame of 'radiophobia' can mean for
the comparison of the accident to other 'technological disasters': 'Technological disasters in the
period 1984–86 have included not only that at Chernobyl but also the explosion at the chemical
plant in Bophal, India and the crash of the American space shuttle Challenger. In the wake of these,
people have grown more sceptical of new technologies and more fearful of familiar technologies
around them, particularly when they perceive that there is an impact on health. […] There is,
though, no doubt that Chernobyl is the greatest psychological disaster of the 20th century, having
had a worldwide impact. In 1986, just after the accident, the major cause of concern was the future
expected increase in the incidence of thyroid cancer and leukaemia, particularly in children and
adolescents. However, a decade later it became apparent that the magnitude of psychological and
social problems, of which radiation phobia is only one aspect, far outweighed that of radio-induced
cancers, and that the social and associated economic problems of psychological illness in Ukraine,
Belarus and Russia, due to the Chernobyl accident, would be enormous, both now and in the 21st
century.'530
In order to substantiate his interpretation, Mould referred to studies undertaken within the
framework of the International Chernobyl Project. Another important source to corroborate his
arguments were the proceedings of the WHO conference in 1995, which he cited extensively, for
instance: 'The national health registries of Belarus, the Ukraine and Russia recorded significant
increase in many diseases that are not related to radiation. These have included endocrine diseases,
mental disorders and diseases of the nervous system, sensory organs, and digestive and
gastrointestinal systems. Congenital abnormalities have also been observed. While present
evidence does not suggest that these diseases are radiation induced, it is possible that such
problems resulted from the considerable stress caused by the accident.'531 
The entire debate on the health impact of the Chernobyl fallout can, to put it quite bluntly, be
reduced to this statement, or perhaps more precisely to whether one believes the veracity of this
statement or not. If the choice is made to honour the statement, it is necessary to rely on the
'radiophobia' meta-narrative to explain the increase in observed illnesses. In the instance in which
this explanation is refuted, the following question must necessarily be asked: Why would the WHO
publish such an account rather than promote further research on the health effects of low-level
radiation? In an attempt to answer this question, one theory in particular has garnered progressively
530 Ibid., p. 225.
531 Ibid., p. 231.
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more support in the last few years. It refers to an agreement between the IAEA and the WHO,
dating from 1959, in which these two international agencies worked out the terms of their
relationship, namely: 'Whenever either organization proposes to initiate a program or activity on a
subject in which the other organization has or may have a substantial interest, the first party shall
consult the other with a view to adjusting the matter by mutual agreement.' This agreement, which
has played a prominent role in the French Chernobyl debate, will be examined further in the chapter
on the transnational Chernobyl debate. Therein, more information will be given on the Free WHO
movement, which calls for an annihilation of the IAEA-WHO Agreement. In this paragraph, the
existence of the debate over the independence of the WHO is used to clarify in which way accounts
such as Mould's offered fertile terrain for critical attacks on the part of anti-nuclear activists.
The degree to which Mould himself believed in the non-existence of a relation between the
increase in various illnesses and the radiation levels observed in the most affected areas became
ever more obvious in the subsequent chapter on 'Other Non-Malignant Diseases and Conditions'.
Here, Mould presented a slight reformulation of the WHO account cited above: 'Other diseases and
conditions have, of course, been reported, such as those of the cardiovascular system and of the
immune system, but no correlations have been established with radiation exposure from the
Chernobyl accident. There are so many confounding factors including stress due to the accident,
socioeconomic conditions and an inadequate diet that it is extremely unlikely even with long-term
detailed follow-up that it will be possible to prove any significant correlations.'532 Likewise, Mould
was extremely sceptical that links between different sorts of cancers and radiation could be
ascertained. According to him, only an increase in thyroid cancer could be attributed to the
Chernobyl fallout. 'In terms of other cancers in Chernobyl populations, no significant increase in
their incidence has been observed.'533 Of course, probabilistic cancer deaths as a result of Chernobyl
had been calculated, but because of the high background cancer mortality, this increase was not
observable. Mould phrased this statement in the following way, using rather technical language
which is representative of the linguistic approach of his book: 'For the cohort of 200,000
liquidators the increase in solid cancers is some 2,000 compared to the background of 41,500. This
excess would be difficult to detect epidemiologically. This is also true for the cohort of 6,800,000
residents in contaminated territories for whom the predicted excess solid cancers is some 4,600
against a background of 800,000.'534 
The Watt Committee and Richard Mould examples show clearly that the 'radiophobia'
narrative was willingly taken up by those actors who, from the beginning, had regarded the health
532 Ibid., p. 235.
533 Ibid., p. 260.
534 Ibid., p. 286.
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impact of the fallout from the Chernobyl accident to be rather limited. The concept of 'radiophobia'
offered the possibility for these actors to uphold this evaluation and, at the same time, highlight the
risks that, from this point of view, resulted from cultivating an exaggerated fear of radiation.
Consequently, the question of British self-affectedness did not play any role in these publications.
And as opposed to France, where the topic of self-affectedness was all-present, British publications
did not even have to refer to this issue. 
Christopher Busby 
While the critical individual voices that had published on Chernobyl in the direct aftermath of the
accident did not continue to play an active role in the public debate, a new actor, Christopher Busby,
rose to partly fill this gap in the 1990s. Busby's work has been dedicated to the search for visible
health effects of the nuclear industry in Britain. From the mid-1990s onwards, he has basically been
the only person to publicly speak and write on the health-related effects of Chernobyl in Britain.
Busby, an active member of the Green Party, dedicated his life to finding proof of the health effects
that exposure to low-level radiation health effects had caused in Wales. He believed that Wales, in
particular, had been exposed to discharges from the various nuclear facilities in the country and
nearby, and had received more radioactive fallout from nuclear weapons testing than any other
British region.
Busby is a highly controversial figure, and it is almost impossible to find a neutral statement
about his work, and even more so about his person. People either consider him to be a hero fighting
the mighty nuclear lobby, or hate him and campaign against him, especially those who are
associated with this lobby.535 The term 'jerk' is one of the more bland labels British and other pro-
nuclear-activists often use when referring to him. In order to refrain from further disseminating such
unpleasant linguistic choices, I will not include any further direct quotes here. But it is remarkable
that when writing about Busby, even normally eloquent individuals – like George Monbiot in his
Blog for The Guardian in November 2011 – have got carried away using language that would be
expected more of lurid tabloid articles.536 A most illuminating example of the controversies about
his person is the talk page behind the Wikipedia article on Busby: pages and pages of quarrels
between the Wikipedia editors – there have been two editors since one editor withdrew from the
535 The worst example of this Anti-Busby-Campaign is the website 'Chris Busby Exposed' which aims to strategically 
damage his reputation with personal defamation tactics, see: http://junksciencewatch.wordpress.com/ (last accessed: 
15 June 2013).
536 George Monbiot, “Christopher Busby’s wild claims hurt green movement and Green party,” in The Guardian 
Online, 22 November 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/georgemonbiot/2011/nov/22/christopher-
busby-nuclear-green-party (last accessed: 15 June 2013).
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work when a contributor to the article brought forward legal threats against him – and resolutely
pro- and anti-nuclear activists.537
Busby's first public contribution to the British Chernobyl debate came in the form of his
1995 book The wings of death: nuclear pollution and human health,538 which he published through
Green Audit, an 'environmental consultancy firm' that he founded in 1992. The aim of this book was
to make public his 'Second-Event Theory', a theory that claimed nothing less than to have
discovered the biological mechanism linking radiation from nuclear power plants and leukaemia in
children. The central argument of this theory is that 'internal radiation can have a quantitatively
greater effect than external radiation.'539 The details of this theory are not what is pertinent to this
discussion here, but rather the way in which Busby integrated the Chernobyl fallout in Britain into
his argument. 
Busby's account of the accident itself was quite short (only one page) and was inserted, along
with Windscale and Kyshtym, under the headline 'Major accidents in the Nuclear Industry'. In these
few paragraphs, Busby mainly referred to the evaluation carried out by the famous US anti-nuclear
activist John Gofman, who had calculated that 970,500 cancers would come of the Chernobyl
accident. However, Busby considered that this number 'may be still an underestimate' because he
believed that the effects of internal radiation had not been correctly taken into consideration: 'The
Hiroshima survivors data used by him [Gofman] is, itself, flawed in that it did not distinguish
internal contamination dose from external dose and made the first of a series of errors which have
been repeated ever since in studies which have attempted to evaluate the effects of ionizing
radiation on health.'540 Busby also strongly criticized the government's emergency management of
1986: 'The Chernobyl disaster provided a contemporary insight into the workings of government in
Britain. The watchword is always: “deny any risk.” So when the radioactive rain fell in Wales and
in Cumbria the population was told “No need for alarm – continue as usual.”'541 
Thus, the accident as such was not the focal point of Busby's publication. He used Chernobyl
as an example to illustrate that the existing models used by UNSCEAR and other official
institutions were erroneous. 'There are already 450 cancers in the first 10 years for the under-14
age-group alone in the areas into which the evacuees were moved. Only 100 excess thyroid cancers
were predicted for all age-groups combined in this population for the next fifty years. […] These
predictions were made on the basis of the existing risk factors, so their inaccuracy, already
537 Wikipedia, “Talk: Christopher Busby - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia,”: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Christopher_Busby#cite_note-0 (last accessed: 15 June 2013).
538 Chris Busby, The wings of death: nuclear pollution and human health (Aberystwyth: Green Audit Books, 1995).
539 Ibid., p. 188.
540 Ibid., p. 91.
541 Ibid., p. 92.
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apparent and no doubt to become more obvious over the coming years, indicated that the risk-
factor calculations for thyroid cancer, like those for leukaemia, are unreliable.'542 According to
Busby, Chernobyl was just one source of radionuclides amongst many others. But he also asserted
that the effects of these radionuclides were far more severe than what official publications had
proclaimed, and even in places as far away as Wales. Using the data of a study published in 1991 –
in which, incidentally, the author declared that Chernobyl had had no effects on infant mortality in
the regions with the highest fallout in Britain – Busby came to a different conclusion: 'There was a
peak in neonatal deaths at the time of the fallout followed by a statistically significant depression in
infant mortality over the nine months following the peak. This depression was followed by a
statistically significant excess in neonatal mortality, perinatal mortality, and still-births in the
month-long period beginning on 27 February 1987.'543 From Busby's point of view, there was an
obvious explanation for this depression in infant mortality in the 9-month gap: foetal death in utero.
But though they may have survived exposure in utero and during the first few months after their
birth did not mean that these children were well off. Many showed low birth weights and 'those
babies that survived all of these effects may still become sick later, of cancer in childhood or
perhaps some mutation-related illness in childhood or later life.'544 Yet, Busby not only saw effects
in foetus and children and an increase in thyroid cancer and leukaemia, but he also noted 'an
immediate cancer increase in 1987 across all types of cancer.'545 
Busby continued his investigations into the health effects from exposure to low-level
radiation in Wales and in Britain in general. As aforementioned, Chernobyl was but one among
other sources of low-level radiation; he also pointed to Sellafield, various British nuclear power
plants, and weapons testing fallout as sources of this radiation. The most attention was probably
paid to his publications on childhood leukaemia in children living in the vicinity of nuclear
installations – a highly contested issue that has been investigated in other countries as well. In his
studies, Busby treated the health effects of Chernobyl fallout in Britain primarily as a type of
reference point to reveal the entity of the health effects of other nuclear ventures. In this regard, in
1999, the Low Level Radiation Campaign – which Busby had initiated – published the brochure Do
we really want nine Chernobyl accidents every year for the next ten years, which argued against the
implementation of an Euroatom-directive on nuclear waste into national law.546 The brochure
542 Ibid., p. 137.
543 Ibid., pp. 297.
544 Ibid., p. 298.
545 Ibid., p. 301.
546 Low Level Radiation Campaign, Do we really want nine Chernobyl accidents every year for the next ten years?  : 
European Council Directive 96/29/Euratom the so-called “basic standards directive” on radiation protection (Low 
Level Radiation Campaign, 1999).
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presented Chernobyl as one problem among others, emphasizing that 'we all have man-made
radionuclides inside us from Sellafield, weapon tests, Chernobyl etc. etc.'547 As with the general
British anti-nuclear discourse, Sellafield figured first in Busby's list. Thus, unlike France, where
revealing the 'truth about Chernobyl' manifested in the endeavour to identify French Chernobyl
victims, revealing the 'truth about Chernobyl' for Busby meant to expose the health impact of the
British and global nuclear enterprise in general.
In 2000, together with his partner Molly Scott Cato, Busby published a paper specifically on
Chernobyl: 'Increases in Leukaemia in Infants in Wales and Scotland Following Chernobyl:
Evidence for Errors in Statutory Risk Estimates.'548 In this paper, Busby and Scott Cato claimed that
through their calculations they had discovered 'an error in the presently accepted risk factors for
radiation induced leukaemia of about 100-fold or more.'549 After comparing the numbers of
predicted cases by the NRPB to observed cases, they reached the conclusion that 'the effects of the
Chernobyl fallout in Wales and Scotland were significant.'550 
The NRPB took notice of Busby's studies, and in the early 2000s published a response in
which it dismissed all of his findings.551 Annex 2 of this document was dedicated in its entirety to
contest Busby and Scott Cato's results in their study on Chernobyl health effects in Britain. The
NRBP concluded that 'the current evidence for increased leukaemia risks associated with exposures
from the Chernobyl accident is not convincing overall, and does not support the conclusions drawn
by Busby and Scott Cato about radiation risk estimates.'552 This response only resulted in another
counter argument by Chris Busby to the NRPB in which he in turn dismissed the NRPB's arguments
against the validity of his findings.553
The objective of Busby's work was clear: to reveal the pro-nuclear bias of natural science
research, not the research of individual scientists, but of nuclear science in general. He explicitly
communicated this aim in his publication: 'When I began my investigations into the health effects of
low level radiation following the Chernobyl accident I was guided by a vague suspicion that some
of the science supporting nuclear power was unsafe. But during the course of my research I have
uncovered so much evidence of cover-ups, deceit, secrecy, and an absence of genuine scientific
547 Ibid., p. 7.
548 Christopher Busby and Molly Scott Cato, “Increases in Leukemia in Infants in Wales and Scotland Following 
Chernobyl: Evidence for Errors in Statutory Risk Estimates,” in Energy and Environment 11, 2 (2000), p. 127-139. 




551 NRPB, Response to Wind Blown Particles and Cancer Mortality, 
http://www.hpa.org.uk/webc/HPAwebFile/HPAweb_C/1194947375682 (last accessed: 15 November 2013).
552 Ibid., p. 13.
553 See: http://www.llrc.org/wobblyscience/subtopic/christopherrobinissayinghisprayers.htm (last accessed: 15 
November 2013).
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research that it has become obvious that what most nuclear scientists are about is supporting a
paradigm.'554 When such statements are taken into consideration, it becomes obvious why Busby
has become such a controversial figure and why his work and he himself have been ferociously
criticized by other scientists. This criticism and its intensity, however, only seems to have proved to
Busby not only that he was right, but that anybody who does not accept his theories must be
involved in the concerted action of the nuclear industry to cover up the truth regarding the health
effects of exposure to low-level radiation.
France
In France, many more individuals have been involved in the Chernobyl debate than in Britain. And
quite a number of people from both the pro- and anti-nuclear side have published accounts on the
accident in which they incorporate their personal stance on nuclear policies into their analysis of the
event and its impact. On the pro-nuclear side, the book by Georges Charpak,555 a prominent French
physicist who won the Nobel Prize, is a particularly interesting contribution to the French
Chernobyl debate.556 His work, in which he strongly argued in favour of stronger safety principles
and nuclear fusion technology in order to make nuclear energy the main source of electricity in the
future, was particularly interesting because his Nobel Prize and his active role as scientist very
much in the public eye lent him an extraordinary amount of credibility in the scientific community
and in the public at large. However, to address each voice in detail would render this chapter
excessively lengthy. Therefore, I will only describe in detail one of the most prominent regarding




Jean-Michel Jacquemin as aforementioned may be considered in many ways the French equivalent
to Chris Busby. Most assuredly, their publications are not comparable at the scientific level. But
since the mid-1990s, both men have dedicated their lives to revealing the true impact the Chernobyl
fallout had in their respective countries. While the physical chemist Busby has concentrated on
conducting natural science studies, former accountant Jacquemin has focused his activity on
554 Busby, The wings of death, p. 302.
555 Georges Charpak, Richard L. Garwin, Venance Journé, De Tchernobyl en tchernobyls (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2005).
556 For an analysis of this book, see: Kalmbach, Tschernobyl und Frankreich, pp. 140-144.
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bringing justice to the French victims.557 
Jacquemin's public commitment – which decidedly contributed to the situation wherein many
people in France have linked their thyroid illnesses to the Chernobyl fallout – must be regarded
from a critical perspective. One problematic issue with Jacquemin's work was the methodology
with which he derived his statements: he cited material without giving bibliographic references, and
his 'cancer index survey' consisted mainly of the random consultation of local databases. Another
problematic issue lay in his belief that he was a martyr on a holy mission.558 Jacquemin equated the
situation in France to the situation of the most affected areas of Eastern Europe, stretching the
comparison to such absurd extremes that even organizations like CRIIRAD distanced themselves
from Jacquemin's statements.559
In 1998, Jacquemin published his first book on Chernobyl: Ce fameux nuage... Tchernobyl,
la France contaminée.560 The book discussed in detail the affaire Tchernobyl and the continual
disinformation and lies of the officials and experts formed the leitmotif of the narrative. Jacquemin
had set for himself the task to reveal the true extent of the contamination of France, contamination
that he claimed, in some hot spots, had been even greater than in some areas of the restricted zone
around the Chernobyl plant.561 Jacquemin was by far not the first or the only one to have
investigated the 'true impact of Chernobyl in France': CRIIRAD had already dedicated itself to this
task for more than a decade. However, Jacquemin was the first individual to get involved and gain
visibility in the Chernobyl debate without being associated to a pro- or anti-nuclear group. His
account focused on the health effects of Chernobyl in France and claimed that the fallout was
responsible for the increase in thyroid diseases. According to him, the health effects of the fallout
were a taboo subject, which continued to be avoided even after French public authorities had
admitted that the country indeed had been hit by radioactive fallout.562 He asserted further that this
issue remained unaddressed even after, despite the fact that doctors on Corsica and cancer registers
clearly demonstrated dramatic increases in the incidence of thyroid diseases since Chernobyl.563
Jaquemin's claims did not go unheard: a second edition of his book was released the following
557 For a detailed analysis of Jacquemin's various books, see: Kalmbach, Tschernobyl und Frankreich, pp. 104-110. The
following account summarizes the content of this chapter.
558 Jacquemin concluded all his books with the acknowledgement: 'Merci à DIEU et à mon Guide, Mélahel, pour cette 
nouvelle mission, pour Votre aide et Vos protections.' ('My thanks to GOD and my Guide, Mélahel, for this mission, 
for Your aid and Your protection.')
559 See for example: Castanier, Contamination des sols français, p. 49.
560 Jean-Michel Jacquemin, Ce fameux nuage...Tchernobyl, la France contaminée (Paris: Éditions Sang de la terre, 
1998). 
561 The comparison of the radioactivity in France and in the area around the Tchernobyl plant figured prominently in the
abstract of the book's back cover.
562 Ibid., p. 163.
563 Ibid., pp. 164.
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year.564 In the extended annex to this edition, Jacquemin included a section on the AFMT, asserting
in a self-congratulatory tone that the formation of this group was directly linked to the first edition
of his book.565
In 2001, Jacquemin's next book came out: Tchernobyl: Aujourd’hui les Français malades.566
The text began with a clear statement: 'Fifteen years after the Chernobyl catastrophe, more and
more French people suffer illnesses that are imputed to the radioactive cloud. The facts, the
numbers are there. But the denial by the all powerful nuclear lobby continues and persists.'567 For
this reason he had continued to press on with his endeavour: someone needed to give a voice to the
sick people of France, whose existence had been denied and forgotten. To do so, he chose to follow
a pre-existing model: Alexievich's book La Supplication. For a total of more than 80 pages, he
presented, in 3 to 4 page-long segments, the lives of individual 'French Chernobyl victims'. The title
of this chapter in itself was a statement: 'Les témoignages des malades – La supplication des
Français.' But the adaptation of the title of this famous book in which Alexievich had presented the
life stories of Chernobyl victims in Belarus and Ukraine was not the only element Jacquemin
borrowed of the apocalyptic Chernobyl narrative of the most contaminated areas in Eastern Europe
and projected onto France. He appropriated the entire criticism that had been launched at the
international level by anti-nuclear activists against the official evaluation of the health situation in
these areas and applied it to France: In France, the same mechanisms had been employed to cover
up the real impact of the accident. In applying to France the debate on Chernobyl's health effects in
the most affected areas of Eastern Europe, Jacquemin reached the conclusion that Chernobyl had
not only caused an increase in thyroid diseases in France, but it had also led to an increase in
various other cancers, such as lymph gland cancer, breast cancer, leukaemia, and lung cancer.568
Jacquemin's mission did not end here, but continued. Already in 2002, his next book
followed: Tchernobyl, conséquences en France. J’accuse...!569 This time, in his choice of titles, he
did not limit himself to making a connection between the Chernobyl health effects in France and
Eastern Europe, but he went on to connect the French Chernobyl debate to one of the largest
political scandals that France had ever experienced, the Dreyfus Affair, and presented himself as one
564 Jean-Michel Jacquemin, Ce fameux nuage...Tchernobyl, la France contaminée (Paris: Éditions Sang de la terre,
1999).
565 Ibid., pp. 319.
566 Jean-Michel Jacquemin-Raffestin, Tchernobyl: Aujourd’hui les Français malades (Monaco: Éditions du Rocher, 
2001).
567 Ibid., p. 17: 'Quinze ans après la catastrophe de Tchernobyl, de plus en plus de Français souffrent de pathologies 
imputables au nuage radioactif. […] Les faits, les chiffres sont là. Le déni opposé par le tout-puissant lobby 
nucléaire dure et perdure.'
568 Ibid., pp. 147.
569 Jean-Michel Jacquemin-Raffestin, Tchernobyl, conséquences en France. J’accuse...! (Paris: Éditions Sang de la 
terre, 2002).
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of Émile Zola'a successors. As in his earlier books, Jacquemin presented the denial of the existence
of French Chernobyl victims to be the result of global nuclear policies and the 'sainte alliance'570
('holy alliance') between the WHO and the IAEA. 
 Jacquemin's publications were of prime importance to the French Chernobyl debate. They
not only fostered the juridical claims against the 1986 government and the radiation protection
authorities, but they also successfully discursively embedded the debate about the health effects of
Chernobyl in France within the wider international debate about the health effects the accident had
had and continued to have in Eastern Europe. In his narrative, the self-affectedness of France
became an apocalypse in and of itself.
2.2.5 Chernobyl solidarity movement groups
The term Chernobyl solidarity movement is self-coined and means the collectivity of non-
governmental initiatives that provide humanitarian aid to the regions in Eastern Europe that have
been most affected by the radioactive fallout. These groups, most frequently established on the
initiative of a single person, are mainly known to a wider public through their organization of
recreational holidays abroad for the 'children of Chernobyl' and for the collection of clothes,
medicine and presents for these children. Furthermore, many of these initiatives collect money that
is invested in the infrastructure of hospitals and orphanages. The activities of the solidarity
movement have only recently become a topic of academic research and the existing literature on
this subject is basically comprised of the works of Astrid Sahm,571 on the impact of the solidarity
movement activities in Belarus; Melanie Arndt,572 on the motivations of West German solidarity
movement groups; and Isolde Baumgärtner,573 on various forms of aid and particular projects. In
2011, the first attempt to provide a more general account of the solidarity movement was
undertaken by the German NGO Internationales Bildungs- und Begegnungswerk Dortmund (IBB).
The publication Tschernobyl und die europäische Solidaritätsbewegung574 was compiled by Isolde
Baumgärtner; it included a history of the movement from a wider perspective and contained several
570 Ibid., p. 186.
571 Astrid Sahm, “Auf dem Weg in eine transnationale Gesellschaft? Belarus und die internationale Tschernobyl-Hilfe.” 
In Tschernobyl: Vermächtnis und Verpflichtung, ed. by Sahm/Sapper/Weichsel, p. 105-116.
572 Melanie Arndt, “Verunsicherung vor und nach der Katastrophe: Von der Anti-AKW-Bewegung zum Engagement für
die ‘Tschernobyl-Kinder’,” in Zeithistorische Forschungen 7, 2 (2010): 240-258.
573 See the various chapters by Isolde Baumgärtner in: Internationales Bildungs- und Begegnungswerk Dortmund (ed.), 
Tschernobyl und die europäische Solidaritätsbewegung (Norderstedt: Books on Demand, 2011)
574 Ibid.
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chapters on the activities of various solidarity movement groups in different European countries.
Most of these country reports had been written by exponents. Linda Walker and Victor Mizzi, key
actors in the British movement, contributed the UK chapter.575 However, since none of the French
exponents contributed to this compendium, I was asked to write the article on France.576 For this
purpose Isolde Baumgärtner and the IBB provided me with precious information on French
solidarity groups. In addition to this book, the IBB organized in the same year the International
Partnership Conference in Minsk, a conference that aimed to connect the different initiatives that
have cropped up all over Europe and to provide them with a forum within which to exchange ideas
and knowledge.577 The conference took place in the Internationale Bildungs- und Begegnungsstätte
“Johannes Rau” Minsk, a branch of the IBB in Belarus directed by Astrid Sahm at the time. I was
invited to attend this conference and contributed to a workshop dedicated to the memory of
Chernobyl. 
France 
Writing the article for Tschernobyl und die europäische Solidaritätsbewegung was the first time that
I had a closer and more structural look at the activities of these groups in France. For my book
Tschernobyl und Frankreich, I had only taken into account the group Enfants de Tchernobyl
Bélarus (ETB). However, I had been more interested in the people behind this organization (Vassily
Nesterenko, Galia Ackermann, Wladimir Tchertkoff, Solange Fernex, and Michel Fernex) than in
the solidarity movement as such. The reason for which I did not initially dedicate more attention to
the Chernobyl solidarity movement in France is that the groups do not play a prominent role in the
French public debate on Chernobyl. They exist and do their work, but they do not shape the public
image of Chernobyl. Furthermore, the Chernobyl solidarity movement groups in France are not big
network-organizations with intense fundraising activities as they are in Britain. Moreover,
organizations with a particular focus on Chernobyl are not the only ones to organize recreational
stays for children from the most affected areas, there are also some local groups of the association
Familles Rurales that do so.578 Therefore, the French solidarity movement groups are less visible
575 Linda Walker, “Die Arbeit von 'Chernobyl Children's Project (UK)' und ein Überblick über weitere Tschernobyl-
Organisationen und Netzwerke in Großbritannien.” In Tschernobyl und die europäische Solidaritätsbewegung, ed. 
by IBB, p. 108-116; Victor Mizzi, “Über die Arbeit von Chernobyl Children's Life Line.” In Tschernobyl und die 
europäische Solidaritätsbewegung, ed. by IBB, p. 105-107.
576 Karena Kalmbach, “Die Wolke, die an der Grenze haltmachte. Zur Wahrnehmung der Auswirkungen von 
Tschernobyl in Frankreich.” In Tschernobyl und die europäische Solidaritätsbewegung, ed. by IBB, p. 74-88.
577 The conference took place from 17 to 20 April on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the accident. For the 
various activities the IBB organized on the occasion of this anniversary, see: http://www.ibb-
d.de/tschernobyl1.html?L=2 (last accessed: 15 November 2013).
578 I am thankful to Marie-Hélène Mandrillon for this information.
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than their British counter parts and are known mostly in their local environment. The exception that
proves the rule is ETB. However, this group is also an exception to the rule with regard to solidarity
movement groups as such. The ETB does not organize recreation stays for children in France.
Instead, it mainly collects money for Belrad, the 'Belarusian institute for radiation safety' that was
founded by Vassily Nesterenko, who also was a founding member of the ETB. Until his death in
2008, when his son Alexey took charge, Nesterenko was the director of Belrad. Vassily Nesterenko
founded Belrad in 1990 to create an independent organization to measure radioactivity levels in the
people and in foodstuffs within the areas in Belarus most affected by the fallout. Belrad has set up
numerous local radiation measuring stations in which people can have their own radioactivity doses
checked as well as the radioactivity levels of the locally grown food. Through these measuring
activities, Belrad was able to collect a large amount of data that Nesterenko used for his own
research into the health effects of radiation, particularly on children. Nesterenko became a key
player in the transnational Chernobyl debate, and therefore his publications will be discussed in
more detail in chapter 3.1. Belrad caught the attention of others outside Belarus mostly because of
its use of pectin pills to reduce radioactivity in children, a 'cure' that was invented by Nesterenko.
Belrad sells these pills under the trade-mark Vitapect in Belarus, but also internationally to host
families of 'Chernobyl children' and, after Fukushima, to people in Japan. The ETB promotes the
sale of these pectin pills. A recent flyer published by the ETB, in which the organization describes
its activities, provides the following information on pectin pills: 'It is possible to help the sick
children by financing apple pectin cures. Apple pectin is a natural adsorbent and the pills enable
the children to eliminate more rapidly the caesium 137 from their organism. The radionuclide
caesium 137 is present in their daily nutrition (the elimination reaches 50% or even 70% of the
total amount of accumulated radioactivity within 3 weeks of cure repeated every trimester).'579
These pectin pills have become a highly political issue: while the agency and possible side effects
of these pills are intensely disputed among physicians, the price of the pills have become another
topic of debate, conforming, according to its opponents, that the pills are mainly an effective way
for Belrad to make money. The advocates of the pectin pills, on the other hand, consider the
criticism to be the result of a concerted action on the part of the pro-nuclear lobby, which continues
in its attempts to block any research that might make life easier for radiation victims by denying
their status as victims as well as the existence of health risks that stem from the systematic ingestion
of low doses of radioactivity.
579 'Il est possible d'aider les enfants malades en finançant des cures de pectine de pomme, adsorbant naturel, qui leur 
permettent d'éliminer plus rapidement le Césium 137 de l'organisme, radionucléide présent dans leur nourriture 
quotidienne (élimination atteignant 50, voire 70% du taux de radioactivité accumulée, en trois semaines de cure 
répétées chaque trimestre).' In: Entfants de Tchernobyl Belarus, La plaquette réactualisée de l'association, available
online: http://enfants-tchernobyl-belarus.org/doku.php (last accessed: 15 November 2013).
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Through its involvement in the pectin pills debate, the ETB has also become an important
actor in the transnational debate on the Chernobyl health effects. At the same time, the ETB's
activities have not been limited to Chernobyl: some of the ETB's founding members have played an
important role in the general debate over the health effects of low-level radiation exposure. In this
regard, the ETB itself was a founding member of Independent WHO, i.e. the initiative that
campaigns against the IAEA-WHO Agreement. The ETB's founding father and long-time president,
Michel Fernex, is a driving force behind Independent WHO, and is also responsible for initiating the
permanent vigil at WHO headquarters in Geneva. Some years ago, Yves Lenoir, one of the most
prominent French anti-nuclear activists and co-author of Tchernobyl-sur-Seine replaced Michel
Fernex as president of the ETB and Wladimir Tchertkoff and Alexey Nesterenko are the vice-
presidents for the organization. The prominence of these actors explains why the ETB is so much
more visible than others Chernobyl solidarity groups in the French Chernobyl debate.
For the members of Entfants de Tchernobyl Belarus, their Chernobyl-related activities are
directly linked to a clear anti-nuclear statement. This is, however, not true of all French Chernobyl
solidarity movement groups. Other groups identify their work as humanitarian aid, and some even
explicitly distance themselves from debates on nuclear politics. An example of this nuclear-
unrelated self-positioning is the Fédération Échanges France-Ukraine (FEFU). The FEFU is an
umbrella organization that unites 16 associations from all over France that are dedicated to cultural
exchanges between France and Ukraine. Their humanitarian engagement consists primarily in aid
for orphanages in Ukraine but also in the organization of recreational stays in France for children
from these orphanages. The FEFU, as umbrella organization, bases its mission in the general socio-
economic situation of Ukraine, wherein the 'Chernobyl children' are only one aspect among others;
the focus is clearly placed on cultural exchanges. For some of its member associations, however,
'helping Chernobyl children' sits at the heart of their activities.580 Two other organizations that work
with 'Chernobyl children' are Accueil des Enfants de Tchernobyl and Les Enfants de Tchernobyl and
are both based in Alsace. The two associations are dedicated to improving the living conditions of
children in the most contaminated areas, especially in Ukraine. To do so, ever since their foundation
in the early 1990s, they have organized donations of medicine and clothes as well as sponsorships
of individual children and recreational stays in France. At the same time, by organizing events, they
have tried in their hometowns to raise awareness of the situation of the 'Chernobyl children'.
Another organization, also called Les Enfants de Tchernobyl but based in Paris, has concentrated its
work on providing medical aid in Ukraine. The association's founders, Dr. Marie-Laurence Simonet
580 For further information on the FEFU and its member associations, see the website: http://www.fefu.org/default.asp?
voirpage=FEFU/Portrait.htm (last accessed: 15 November 2013).
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and Dr. Alexandra Moutet, initiated collaborations between French and Ukrainian hospitals. In
addition, they fund the Centre Médical Français, based in the Kiev paediatric hospital no 6, where
more than 22,000 people have been treated since it opened in 1991.581 
With the exception of the ETB, these solidarity movement groups have not prominently
influenced the French Chernobyl debate; in fact they have been barely visible in the public debate.
Only some of the associations have a website, and none of them have ever published a book or any
other publication that has reached beyond its close circle of members. This setting, i.e. the role of
Chernobyl solidarity movement groups in the national Chernobyl debate and their public visibility,
is, however, completely different in Britain.
Britain
When the British actors of the nuclear sector and the anti-nuclear side lost interest in Chernobyl in
the early 1990s, another group of actors, the solidarity movement, picked up this topic and filled the
'discursive gap' in the years to come.
During the aforementioned IBB conference of 2011, I had the opportunity to meet Linda
Walker and speak with her about her work; we went on to discuss the activities of the British
solidarity movement. What I found most astonishing about the account she gave me on her
activities in this field in the last 20 years was the detachment of the Chernobyl topic from a more
general debate on nuclear energy. This detachment does not regard Linda Walker's personal position
– there is a close link between her commitment to the 'Chernobyl children' and her convictions on
nuclear politics – but rather one that she is faced with in her fundraising activities. I got the
impression that in Britain, a commitment to help the 'Chernobyl children', through the donation of
money or by hosting them during recreation stays, does not automatically translate into an anti-
nuclear stance. These activities may be equated with the Christian-oriented engagements to help
underprivileged and handicapped children in 'third-world' countries. This first impression was
reinforced by my many discussions with other people active in the British solidarity movement
during the IBB Chernobyl conference that was held in 2012. 
By researching publications written by people who were active in the British Chernobyl
solidarity movement and the newspaper reporting on the 10th and 20th anniversaries of the accident
in which their activities figured prominently,582 I was able to consolidate my initial hypothesis on
581 This paragraph is an adaptation from Kalmbach, Die Wolke, die an der Grenze haltmachte, p. 85-86. I am thankful 
to Isolde Baumgärtner for providing me with information on these associations. 
582 For the 10th anniversary, a search in the database Newsbank for the time span 15 to 30 April delivered numerous 
articles in local, regional, and national newspapers that dealt with 'Chernobyl children', while there were scarcely 
any articles on other Chernobyl-related topics, such as sheep farm restrictions for example. The topics of the 
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the existence of a way in which 'Chernobyl children' are perceived in Britain that is removed,
separate, and distinct from the nuclear discourse. The following pages will illustrate my argument.
Chernobyl's Children Project
Worthy of note is the strong connection the British solidarity movement has with Irish activists,
particularly Adi Roche. Roche, a peace and environmental activist and candidate for the 1997 Irish
presidential elections, is the founder of Chernobyl's Children Project (CCP). Roche established
CCP in 1991 in Cork. The organization rapidly expanded, opening branches in various countries.
Thus, it became Chernobyl's Children Project International (CCPI). Linda Walker opened the first
English branch in Manchester in 1995. Roche with her organization are special and unique for the
fact that from the very beginning she was highly successful in communicating her work to a wider
audience. When Roche travelled to Chernobyl for the second time, she brought along a whole film
crew that transformed her experiences in the orphanages, deserted cities, and the restricted zone
around the nuclear plant into a film documentary. The result – Black wind, white land – was
produced by Ali Hewson. Hewson, like Adi Roche, is an Irish peace and environmental activist and
is married to U2's lead singer Bono. Hewson has been a strong supporter and lobbyist for CCPI and
arranged for all the profits from the U2 song The sweetest thing to be donated to CCPI.583 Ali
Hewson and Bono have also supported the work of Adi Roche on other occasions. Black wind,
white land was not the only medial output of Adi Roche's work; when she travelled to the
Chernobyl region for the third time, she was accompanied by two Icelandic film crews. The
products of this visit resulted in strong Icelandic support of Roche's organization.584 Furthermore,
Roche took her experiences from her travels to the Chernobyl area and from her lobbying to bring
'Chernobyl children' to Ireland in the form of a book. Children of Chernobyl. The human cost of the
world's worst nuclear disaster585 was published in 1996 by a London-based publishing house.
Although the book helped to spread news of her work, Adi Roche and her organization were already
known in Britain. In fact, in 1994, Roche was contacted by Sarah Ferguson, the Duchess of York,
who in the years to come supported the work of the CCP by providing funds through her foundation
Children in crisis and by initiating an international publicity and fundraising campaign for the
previous group of articles included portraits of individual children, accounts on certain solidarity groups or members
of a group, and stories of host families.
583 Wikipedia, “Ali Hewson,” http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Ali_Hewson&oldid=480318803 (last accessed:
15 November 2013).
584 The work of Adi Roche and the CCPI was also at the centre of the film documentary Chernobyl Heart, which won 
the Academy Award for Best Documentary (short subject) in 2003.
585 Adi Roche, Children of Chernobyl: the human cost of the world’s worst nuclear disaster (London: Fount, 1996).
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'Children of Chernobyl.'586 
Roche's publications and the UK branch of CCP alone did not transform Roche into a central
reference point of the British Chernobyl debate. She also brought the 'Chernobyl child' Igor to the
British Chernobyl debate, and in so doing, this last had become the face – or rather the body – of
Chernobyl by the mid-1990s. To the readers of her 1996 book, Adi Roche introduced Igor as
follows: 'Igor Pavolovetts was born on 30th March 1986 and became the first acknowledged
“deformed” victim as a direct result of Chernobyl. His mother, in despair and shock at the sight of
his broken body, abandoned him at birth to the state authorities. He was four years old when we
first met him and had never seen anything beyond the four walls of the institution. Igor was special
from the first moment I met him, not only because of his physical difficulties but also because his
bright and loving personality overcame his limited circumstances. Igor, along with 60 other
children, was being kept in this “holding place” which had little medicine, food or special
facilities.'587 
Chernobyl's Children Lifeline 
In order to prevent Igor's transfer to an adult mental asylum, Roche sought help from another
Chernobyl children aid group: the English organization Chernobyl's Children Lifeline (CCLL),
which had been founded by Victor Mizzi in 1991. The CCLL is the umbrella organization for 160
local groups, which are spread throughout the UK. Since the first recreational stay for 22 children
from Belarus in 1992 was organized, the CCLL has brought more than 46,000 children to the UK.
To properly manage the 3,500 incoming children every year, the CCLL runs an office in Minsk. In
addition to the organization of these recreational stays, the CCLL collects money to support the
families and for the improvement of the infrastructure of schools and hospitals in Belarus.588 
Mizzi arranged for Igor to be brought to the UK, where he underwent a series of surgeries
and was adopted by an English family. Tiny Igor with his deformed feet, short legs and his big smile
almost became a celebrity in the UK. He starred in two TV productions: one told the story of his
'rescue to Britain' and the other, a couple of years later, recounted his new life in England. His life
story was depicted as the ultimate success story: he had escaped the dark life of a miserable
Belarusian orphanage to now enjoy the splendour of British medical care and the love of a whole
nation. This narrative found its incarnation in Jane Warren's book Igor. The courage of Chernobyl's
586 For an account of this cooperation, see: ibid., pp. 107.
587 Ibid., p. 19.
588 These numbers are taken from: Mizzi, Über die Arbeit von Chernobyl Children's Life Line.
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child,589 which was published in 1997. In this book, Jane Warren, an exponent of the CCLL,
described in detail Igor's life in England and embedded this story in a general account on
Chernobyl. Two aspects of this Chernobyl account merit closer examination: The interpretation of
the (post-)Soviet 'state of development' and the connection of this narrative to broader topics
regarding nuclear aspects. Warren framed the events of 1986 as a derivation of the political system
and therefore as a 'Soviet accident'. When describing the plant operators, she asserted that 'they
were told repeatedly during their training, a nuclear power plant cannot explode.'590 Her description
of the problems adhered to a clear east-west-divide: 'They [Soviet nuclear engineers] boasted that
their nuclear reactors were of a superior design, despite the fact that British experts had
condemned reactors like the one at Chernobyl as unsafe thirty years before the disaster.'591 The way
in which Warren spoke of the work carried out by the emergency crews and 'liquidators'
underpinned her narrative of a poor Soviet understanding of the highly sensible matter they were
dealing with: 'Everything was badly buried by men who didn't understand the need for absolute
precision.'592 Warren presented a similar 'lack of understanding' narrative with regard to the
evacuated people. Despite the fact that the evacuees also included the inhabitants of Pripyat, people
who were part of the scientific elite of the USSR, her comments on the evacuations were all
encompassing: 'These were country people. […] They hadn't studied science. They didn't
understand radiation.'593 These comments and remarks are a reflection of the implicit meta-
narrative that coloured Warren's account: i.e. the image of a simple, uneducated people that was
betrayed by their political leaders. In this regard, Chernobyl was framed more as a political accident
than a nuclear accident. Although the impact of the nuclear fallout was considered to have been
devastating and was conveyed using rather apocalyptic language – for example in relation to the
orphanages: 'Gradually the dormitories were filling up with profoundly damaged babies and
children. Many of them had defects caused by the radioactive food eaten by their mothers.'594 – the
geographical impact of the accident was, according to Warren's descriptions, quite limited. A map
indicating the 'approximate extent of radioactive contamination' only showed parts of Belarus,
Ukraine, and Russia.595 Not one word about Chernobyl fallout in Britain was uttered in the book.
Warren described Chernobyl's impact as a reality that was unfolding far from home. Britain, on the
other hand, was presented as a place that did not face any of the problems little Igor had to deal with
589 Jane Warren, Igor: the courage of Chernobyl’s child (London: Boxtree, 1997).
590 Ibid., p. 9.
591 Ibid.
592 Ibid., p. 13.
593 Ibid., p. 18.
594 Ibid., p. 32.
595 Ibid., p. 14.
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in his life in Belarus. Consequently, the chapter on his departure to Britain was titled 'The escape.'596
The CCLL promoted this 'escape' as a big event, which set the stage for Igor's career as a
British 'humanitarian aid celebrity'. Even on his flight to Britain, Igor was already accompanied by
the TV crews of stations ITV and Sky. Born with only one fully developed arm, two short legs, and
deformed feet, the first thing that awaited Igor in his new home was the correction of his body.
Warren spoke of this in her chapter 'The arm'. The medial exploitation of Igor's arrival in the UK
figured prominently in this chapter: 'By now a television crew was filming Igor's quest for his new
bionic arm. Victor Mizzi had always felt that there was a story to be told about the courage of Igor.
Through an acquaintance, he was introduced to the production company Zenith North, which was
very keen to make a documentary about Igor's early life and rescue to the West.'597 
What followed in the subsequent chapters of the book were detailed descriptions of Igor's
daily life in England, including some anecdotes of the 'odd behaviour' he had brought along from
his previous home. 'Igor had settled into British life remarkably well, but there were still occasional
signs of his early life in an institution. […] One day she [Barbara, Igor's host mother] hurriedly
stuffed some of his underwear into his drawer and the next time she looked, it had all been neatly
folded into piles and smoothed flat.'598 In his new life, Igor was often followed by TV cameras, a
fact that Warren presented in a quite positive light: 'One morning in September 1994 it was time for
Igor's first day at school. The television company, Zenith North, had arrived early to film this
momentous day in his life.'599 Igor had become a celebrity: he was the face and body that represented
the destiny of the 'Chernobyl children'. His life was narrated as a story with a happy ending.
Photographs of Igor's perfectly formed smiling face that were included in the book underpinned this
narrative. The visual representation of his smiling face stood for the British Igor of the present,
while his severely deformed body represented Igor's Soviet past. Igor's physiognomy perfectly fit
the needs of the media: His deformed body was a shocking image, but not too shocking to scare
away spectators as it was balanced by his well-formed, normally proportioned and cute face. Igor's
body offered the British media a way to broach the issue of the health effects Chernobyl had caused
without having to directly present the situation in the most affected regions in Eastern Europe to
their audience. At the same time, Igor's life could be told as a British success story without need to
broach the topics of nuclear policies or radioactive sheep. 
Applying Melanie Arndt's analytic categories – the 'externalization' and 'internalization' of
fear in the motivations of solidarity movement exponents – to the case of Igor, it is pretty clear that
596 Ibid., p. 56.
597 Ibid., pp. 68.
598 Ibid., p. 71.
599 Ibid., p. 78.
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fear was not the central category of reference in the public representation of his life story. The
category of reference was 'hope', the hope to rescue these poor 'Chernobyl children' from their awful
destiny and from the poor medical and living conditions that they had to endure in the orphanages
of Eastern Europe, i.e. the hope to remove them from institutions that could not provide what these
children needed: medical care and love. To bring them to the UK, where an entire country waited
for them with open arms, was the key to their future. These were fairy tales that were the perfect
subject for TV productions. And Igor's life story became the ultimate fairy tale, thanks to the
attention he received: 'The Duchess of York invited him and a group of visiting Belarusian children
suffering from cancer to Princess Eugenie's fifth birthday.'600 The mediatization of Igor's private life
was the proper way for the CCLL to raise funds for their work with other 'Chernobyl children'.
'Victor [Mizzi, the founder of the CCLL and who had brought Igor to the UK] continued to receive
letters and money from people who were reading articles and watching television items about Igor's
progress. Victor always replied to each letter, regardless of whether any money was enclosed inside
the envelopes. Many letters were from children who found it easy to identify with Igor's lively
manner.'601 That all of this attention and excitement directed toward his person may have been
difficult to handle for Igor – after all, he had just been moved from a place that he had never left
before to be dropped into a completely new environment the language of which he did not even
understand – does not seem to have crossed the minds of the people working for the CCLL let alone
been a source of consternation. The fact that he tried to withdraw from all of the attention was
ascribed by Warren to 'shyness': 'But Igor was growing reticent about his experience as a media
celebrity. […] Barbara picked up on his shyness, and stopped showing him the magazine and
newspaper articles that were published about him.'602
It is in no way my intention to discredit the activities of the CCLL or the activities of the
organizations of the solidarity movement in general. These people dedicate an incredible amount of
time, energy and money to help improve the living conditions of children from the most affected
areas, a commitment that deserves recognition. But I do believe the way in which the lives and
bodies of these children are exposed as part of a fundraising strategy is a topic that must be looked
at in a critical light. Similarly, advertising campaigns of (half)naked African children for fundraising
purposes have been widely criticized for a long time now. In the case of Chernobyl, the issue of
exposing the children's bodies acquires the same level of importance since the photos often focus on
highlighting physical and mental handicaps.
Warren presented a quite apocalyptic narrative of the health conditions of these children
600 Ibid., p. 91.
601 Ibid., p. 92.
602 Ibid., p. 93.
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when she wrote that: 'The health impacts of the Chernobyl disaster are difficult to measure, but the
government estimates that there are currently over one million children deformed, damaged or
diseased as a consequence.'603 'A 1993 health survey examined 500 Belarusian children and found
only one to be completely healthy.'604 She openly framed the public exhibition of Igor's life story as
a means to raise awareness in British society of the health impact the accident had in the most
affected areas in Eastern Europe: 'Unknown to him, he is bringing attention to the plight of the other
children of Chernobyl left behind on contaminated land, and has become a symbol of their
courage.'605 And indeed, the media hype over Igor was successful, not only in terms of fundraising
but also in stirring broader public interest in the 'Chernobyl children': 'The Carlton documentary
about Igor's life, Igor child of Chernobyl, was shown on Tuesday 6 June 1995. […] Barbara's and
Victor Mizzi's phones began ringing with offers of help and money.'606 'The duty officer at Carlton
also confirmed that rarely had a program provoked so many phone calls.'607 
Chernobyl as a charity activity
However, it seems that this public interest described in the quotation above was rather temporary
and was more a result of the tabloid press-like exploitation of Igor's private life, which provoked
curiosity and sensationalism, than a wider public interest in the health effects of a nuclear accident.
This detachment of Igor's life story from the discourse on nuclear energy was an inherent element of
Warren's book as well. Although she narrated the consequences of Chernobyl as an apocalypse, she
did not call into question the nuclear sector in general. She criticized the Soviet political system and
'man's carelessness'608 but not nuclear technology or the 'nuclear state' as such. Moreover, Warren
made no connection whatsoever to the British nuclear sector. In Igor's life story, Britain was the
saviour, a saviour that was worlds away from the events that had damaged Igor's body.  
This detachment of the 'Chernobyl children' from the nuclear discourse allowed the British
solidarity movement groups to address a wider audience in their fundraising activities. Chernobyl
became a purely humanitarian issue and was disconnected from any anti-nuclear connotations. To
help 'Chernobyl children' in Britain meant to help disadvantaged children, young victims of a Soviet
accident. Even a pro-nuclearist could donate money to help these children who were a symbol of
the devastating consequences when nuclear technology was put into the wrong hands and not a
603 Ibid., p. 105.
604 Ibid., p. 106.
605 Ibid., p. 107.
606 Ibid.
607 Ibid., p. 108.
608 Ibid., back of book.
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symbol that nuclear power itself was at fault. It was better to bring these children to Britain for
medical treatment, proving that Britain was far more technologically developed than these Eastern
European countries – yet another rationale that underpinned the argument that such an accident
could never happen in the UK and that therefore, there was no need to worry about the British
nuclear enterprise. Rather than addressing questions of nuclear politics, the publications by the
CCLL and the CCP focused on the joy and satisfaction they got out of their work with the
'Chernobyl children'; the care of disabled children, in particular, was described to be extremely
rewarding.609 
In order for it to be possible for the thousands of children from Eastern Europe to spend their
recreational holidays in Britain, the solidarity movement groups had to rely on the support of
thousands of host families. British newspaper articles published on the occasion of the accident's
anniversaries have presented portraits of these families and their host children. These portraits often
included calls for new host families and for donations to be made to the charities. Support did not
just come in the form of the private donations and participation of families and individuals,
companies and enterprises also took action. For instance, 21 co-workers of the Nationwide
electronic service network (NESN), on the company's 10th anniversary, went to the Belarusian
orphanage Zhitkovitchi to renovate the shower and laundry block. Their work was photographed by
Ian Beesly and a documentation entitled Orphans of the fallout was published in 2001.610 The
profits from the sale of the book were to pay for further renovation works the NESN wanted to
undertake in Zhitkovitchi in the years to come. 
The activities of the British Chernobyl solidarity movement groups and the large support
they received must be considered within the context of Britain's very strong charity culture. In
Britain, charity initiatives are undertaken to support the most diverse issues, from local playgrounds
to cancer research. Fundraising initiatives also take on myriad forms, be they sponsored runs or
sales of homemade pastry. Thus, when comparing the entity of the French solidarity movement to
its British counter-part, where British citizens are particularly receptive to supporting charity
activities, the situation in France where charity initiatives are far less common must be put into
perspective. Therefore, from a quantitative perspective a comparison between the two cannot be
609 In his 2003 book, the Irish friar Liam O'Meara expressed in a particularly obvious manner how the Christian ideal 
'to care for the poorest' can serve as the major incentive in helping 'Chernobyl children'. O'Meara's description of his
work with these children reads in some parts like the account of a therapy session. O'Meara described the happiness 
he derived from looking in the thankful eyes of the children and the pain the people in Ireland felt when they had to 
give away 'their' children at the end of their recreation holidays. His narrative, too, did not make any connection to 
nuclear questions. O'Meara wrote in detail about the 'Chernobyl children's' suffering in Eastern European 
orphanages; the nuclear accident underlying this situation was, however, barely broached in his book: Liam 
O’Meara, Fallout: the children of Belarus and the people of Ireland after Chernobyl (Dublin: Columba Press, 2003).
610 Ian Beesley, Orphans of the fallout: Zhitkovitchi Orphanage Belarus (The Darkroom Press, 2001).
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undertaken. The comparison must, instead, investigate the role the solidarity movement in each
country has played in the respective national Chernobyl debate. 
In France, the solidarity movement has played only a marginal role in the Chernobyl debate.
Although various French groups organize recreational stays for 'Chernobyl children', these groups
did not become actors in the public debate on Chernobyl, of course with the noteworthy and
prominent exception of the ETB. French media reporting on the anniversaries never focused on the
life stories of 'Chernobyl children' or host families, either. Rather it covered the affaire Tchernobyl
and the debate on the health effects of the accident in France. In Britain, however, from the mid-
1990s onwards, the public Chernobyl debate was dominated by the topic 'Chernobyl children'. For
instance, while Busby was left to self-publish Wings of death, the exponents of the solidarity
movement published their books through bigger publishing houses, and their activities were widely
covered in the media, becoming the main topic of newspaper reporting during the anniversaries of
the accident.
The work of British solidarity movement groups came to be known first and foremost
through accounts documenting personal life stories of 'Chernobyl children' that were featured in
books, newspaper articles, and TV documentaries. This attention toward personal life stories must
be contextualized within British media culture, which, particularly in the tabloids, focuses intensely
on stories about individuals. As shown above, the topic of 'Chernobyl children' was discursively
detached from questions of nuclear politics and was never related to British nuclear policies. In the
French case, the opposite may be said. The ETB is a highly political group and its founding
members amongst the most prominent actors in the national and transnational debate on the health
effects of low-level radiation exposure.
When the strong British focus on the recreational stays for 'Chernobyl children' is considered
in relation to the minor perceived self-affectedness, some interesting findings come to the force:
According to the underlying logic of the recreational stays, Chernobyl health effects were confined
to a distant location, and a holiday of only some weeks in clean British air and the ingestion of
healthy British food offered the children the possibility to detoxify their systems from the
radioactivity they had accumulated in their bodies. This logic at the same time implied that the
situation in the most affected regions in Eastern Europe was rather manageable: only a couple of
weeks every year in Britain were needed to give these children the chance at a healthy future. The
fact that members of solidarity movement groups went themselves, also for longer stays, to the most
affected areas implies that they did not perceive the living conditions there to be a direct threat to
people's life. Thus, although they have described the situation in Eastern European orphanages and
hospitals and the health conditions of children in Belarus and Ukraine using apocalyptic imagery, an
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apocalyptic Chernobyl narrative with regard to present health effects of the lasting low-level
radiation in the environment is only implied in part in their accounts. For there to be any perceived
self-affectedness in Britain, the explicit presence of such a narrative would be essential. Since self-
affectedness has played only a minor role in the British Chernobyl debate, the activities of the
charity groups fit well in the dominant public picture.
In France, however, inviting 'Chernobyl children' to the Hexagon for holidays is in some
ways a contradiction to the logic underlying the strong perception of self-affectedness: Chernobyl is
there, in France. There are, indeed, various initiatives that organize recreational stays in France, but
their activities never quite fit into the dominant public picture. The health impact of Chernobyl in
France has become the dominant focal point of the French Chernobyl debate. Therefore, if a visible
health impact does indeed exist in France, as many believe, the situation in the most affected areas
in Eastern Europe must truly be considered a real apocalypse, an apocalypse as described in the
work of Alexievich and Bandazhevsky – work that is fully present in the French Chernobyl debate
but not really present in the British one – an apocalypse that is the result of the present health
effects of the lasting low-level radiation that has permeated the environment. Such an interpretation
of Chernobyl in some ways calls into question recreation holidays as such: What long term positive
effects would there be for the children who for some weeks were brought to another country when
they would have to return to their live in the apocalypse sooner or later?
2.2.6 Conclusion
After the early 1990s, in Britain, neither the public authorities or the nuclear industry, nor the anti-
nuclear activists or other critical voices published much on Chernobyl. Chernobyl quasi-
disappeared from British public nuclear discourse. This phenomenon is very likely linked to
profound changes in the British nuclear policies that took place in that period. Within the
framework of the privatization of the British energy sector, the British government decided at the
time to refrain from building new nuclear power plants. The reactor at Sizewell B, where
construction works had already begun in 1988, was completed and connected to the grid in 1995.
But rather than being the pioneer heralding the arrival of a whole fleet of PWRs on British soil – as
was originally intended – the government decided in May 1995 that new build projects for nuclear
power plants would no longer receive public (financial) support. Consequently, CEGB renounced
its plans to build new nuclear plants. In the years to follow, the old Magnox plants were shut down
– today, only Oldbury and Wylfa are still in operation – and so the share of electricity generated in
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Britain using nuclear energy steadily decreased. The remaining nuclear power plants were
eventually sold to EDF Energy, the British branch of the EDF Group. This change in Britain's
nuclear policies may explain why British anti-nuclear activists lost interest in Chernobyl rather than
instrumentalizing the topic in the fight against the civil nuclear enterprise, as was done in France. In
the mid-1990s it looked like the British anti-energy campaigners had got what they wanted, no
nuclear expansion, and even more so, since it would only be a matter of time until nuclear power
plants would disappear from British soil.611 However, the problem of Sellafield still needed to be
resolved seeing as operations at the reprocessing plant were ongoing. Therefore, Sellafield
preserved its role as the primary target of British anti-nuclear arguments. In France, however, the
reprocessing plant in La Hague was not the only thing that troubled anti-nuclear proponents. The
trajectory nuclear policies in France followed in the 1990s and early 2000s was essentially the
opposite of what was happening on the other side of the Channel in Britain. The French government
reconfirmed its 'all-nuclear' policy and decided that the old PWRs should be replaced by a new
generation of reactors, the EPR. But the government's nuclear commitment was not limited to
France: the EDF and Areva were on track to become the world leaders in nuclear power generation
and engineering. This policy of strong political and financial support of the French nuclear power
industry instigated the severe criticism of anti-nuclear activists and led to an intensification in
protest and campaign activities, one of which was the creation of the Réseau sortir du nucléaire.
Anti-nuclear campaigns were not just directed against the new build plans but manifestly protested
the entire industry, including the effects caused by Uranium mining – in France and in Africa – or
the working conditions of contract workers in French nuclear power plants. The memory of the
affaire Tchernobyl continued to invoke strong criticism of the existing power dynamics within the
French nuclear techno-political regime, and thus the memory of the Chernobyl accident conformed
well to the general perspective of anti-nuclear protest. Therefore, French anti-nuclear campaigners
shared a strong interest in preserving the memory of Chernobyl. In Britain, however, where the anti-
nuclear discourse was dominated by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), it was not
really possible to integrate the accident into an anti-nuclear weapons argument, which progressively
focused more on the threat of proliferation. Furthermore, public attention to the concerns of the
anti-weapons movement diminished considerably once the Cold War came to an end. Thus the
number of people engaged in the British anti-nuclear energy discourse – including those interested
in keeping the memory of Chernobyl alive from an anti-nuclear perspective – shrank further. This
'commemorative gap' in Britain was, from the mid-1990s onwards, filled by the charity
611 This was, however, not the case. In 2006, the British government reversed the decisions taken in the mid-1990s and 
announced the construction of several new plants. The next chapter will deal with this development in more detail.
175
organizations of the Chernobyl solidarity movement. However, these humanitarian groups often do
not have a specific position on nuclear energy, or at least they do not openly communicate their
position in an effort to garner support from the broadest possible group of potential donors during
their fundraising campaigns. Therefore, in Britain, Chernobyl became associated solely with the
destiny of a group of suffering children living in Belarus, Ukraine and Russia. Moreover, often no
further differentiation was made between Chernobyl and the Soviet system with regard to which
was responsible for their tragic situation.
In France, the lively debate about Chernobyl health effects ensured that the accident
remained a prominent topic in public discourse as well as in media reporting. The debate of self-
affectedness in Britain, however, was marginal. People today in Britain might be rather surprised
that there even was a debate, however fleeting, about Chernobyl health effects. This is a remarkable
difference to the French case, where the fallout was increasingly considered to be a real and actual
threat to public health. From the British point of view, Chernobyl had happened far away and stayed
far away, it only came to visit the country in the form of the 'Chernobyl children'. The continued
restrictions on sheep farms were soon forgotten, not least because they barely made it into news
reporting. Thus, unlike Jean-Michel Jacquemin in France, a British activist like Christopher Busby
could not base his argument on and gain support from the existence of a common national
Chernobyl memory and awareness. 
What further strengthened the Chernobyl debate in France was the setting wherein the
perceived self-affectedness implied a certain 'shared destiny' between the French people and the
people living in the most affected areas in Eastern Europe. This might explain the substantial
French reception of the work of Eastern European Chernobyl activists, such as Alexievich, and their
public support, like in the case of Bandazhevsky. Since no perception of self-affectedness exists in
Britain, the Chernobyl narratives of Eastern European activists were not considered to be connected
in any direct or actual way to British daily life; therefore Eastern European activists did not enjoy
the same level of success and recognition as they did in France. Consequently, these strongly
apocalyptic narratives impacted the British Chernobyl debate to a much lesser degree.
A central reason as to why the debate on the health effects of the fallout in Britain remained
marginal most likely lies in the fact that trust in the official experts and scientists essentially
remained intact. Though they had been wrong in their predictions, better evaluations were
eventually made available, demonstrating to the public that science was making improvements.612
612 A statement on the failure of scientists to predict the impact of the Chernobyl fallout on British sheep farming made 
by Dr Brenda Howard of the Institute of Terrestrial Ecology illustrates this mode of thinking: 'They [the scientists] 
couldn't really predict what would happen, which is determined by grazing pressure, type of vegetation and 
innumerable ecological and environmental factors,” she says. “As is turns out, their predictions were wrong. It's as 
simple as that.”' In: Cook, “Render unto caesium 134.”
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The case of Benbecula illustrates this unbroken trust in science and public expertise: in fact, the
moment scientists dismissed the claims made by local physicians the topic completely disappeared
from the newspapers. The same may be said of Busby and his work: the fact that his arguments
were dismissed by scientists working with the public authorities proved to be no small hindrance to
their dispersion. But in France, the dynamics worked in quite the opposite direction. Here, public
authorities, too, dismissed Jacquemin's claims, but it seems that their rejection only made his claims
appear all the more valid; the rejection of his work is what turned them into proof of the nuclear
experts' continued cover-up of the truth about Chernobyl. 
In order to fully grasp why the British Chernobyl debate 'dried up' in the early 1990s, the
settings and contexts that lie outside of the immediate Chernobyl discourse must also be considered.
But because the history of the British Chernobyl debate from the mid-1990s to the early-2000s is to
a large extent a history of a 'non-debate', it is far more difficult to connect the Chernobyl debate to
wider societal issues than it is in the French case, where these connections are openly expressed in
the arguments of the various actors. Despite this somewhat speculative approach, which stems from
a lack of sources, there are some particularities of British (political) culture that supposedly have
contributed to the almost total disappearance of Chernobyl from public discourse. One such
particularity is the British media system. The British newspaper market is dominated by the yellow
press and tabloids, and thus the currency of news value has a higher value than in other markets.
This logic might explain why, for instance, newspaper reporting on Benbecula did not probe further
into the wider debate on Chernobyl-related health effects but directed its attention to this topic only
as long as it could provide a catchy headline. Furthermore, the British style of news reporting insists
on making a clear distinction between the 'facts' and 'opinion'. Thus, it is far less common in the UK
than in France for a journalist to openly take a political stance on the topic they are discussing. In
fact, for this reason the French media system made it easier for journalists like Hélène Crié, Noël
Mamère, or Galia Ackerman to take an active role in the Chernobyl debate and use their position in
order to transmit their own opinions and narratives on Chernobyl to a wider public.613 To be sure,
there is always an exception to the rule. In this argument on the different levels of engagement of
French and British journalists in the Chernobyl debate, this exception is Rob Edwards.614 Edwards,
613 This example shows how important it is to not only take into account the action of institutions and organizations but 
to link this action back to individual agency within the organizational structures and power relations. This is another 
reason why 'the media' is not considered as an actor in this study.
614 See for instance his article: Rob Edwards, “Chernobyl fall-out '40 times worse' than admitted,” in The Guardian, 28 
January 1989, p. 24. The article reported on an aerial monitoring survey commissioned by Scottish Eye, a Channel 4 
television programme, which had registered higher rates of radioactivity than were indicated on the official maps. 
Edwards stated that these 'results are bound to rekindle the argument over the effectiveness of the Government's 
response to Chernobyl and its preparedness for any future accident.' But although he pointed to the 'allegation 
repeatedly made by Labour's agriculture spokesman David Clark, MP, that 100,000 sheep from high-risk areas went
for public consumption,' Edwards did not further elaborate on the possible health effects this contaminated meat or 
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who in the 1970s and 1980s campaigned for SCRAM and the CND, has contemporaneously
managed to be an activist and a journalist. Furthermore, in a similar manner as Hélène Crié, he
wrote several books in which he openly expressed his anti-nuclear arguments. With regard to the
British setting, Edwards is a rather singular case not only because he is one of the very few
journalists who had continued to write about Chernobyl,615 he is, today, really the only prominent
British journalist who actually writes on current environmental issues from an explicitly anti-
nuclear stance.616
Another particularity of British (political) culture that may have hindered the expansion of
the Chernobyl debate is the British political party system. Like its French counter-part, the UK
Green Party was the only political party to entirely oppose nuclear power.617 What is different
between the two parties is the role each party played in their respective country's political system.
Compared to other political parties, the Greens are not a major force in France or in Britain and are
primarily successful in the European Parliament elections or those at the local level. But where the
French Greens were included in the government of the Plural Left in 1997, the 'British Greens'618
won their first seat in the national parliament only in 2010, some thirteen years later.619 Moreover,
some of the central actors in the French Chernobyl debate are successful Green politicians, for
example Noël Mamère and Michèle Rivasi; and the affaire Tchernobyl forms an essential part of
their political identity. Thus in France, the Chernobyl debate has continued to have a political
representation in the form of Les Verts. At the same time, with regard to the affaire Tchernobyl, Les
Verts stood in opposition to the rest of the French political sphere: after all, the 1986 government,
which was accused of having covered up the true impact of Chernobyl, was the Première
cohabitation with François Mitterrand as President of the French Republic and his political
the radioactivity in the environment could have incurred. In this article, Chernobyl was an occasion to criticize the 
government, but it was not a public health issue. Moreover, Edwards used the article to address the nuclear issue of 
his primary concern: Sellafield. Therefore, he took up the argument that actually Sellafield and not Chernobyl was 
responsible for the high levels of radioactivity in Cumbria. And, although the article openly called into question the 
official narrative of the Chernobyl-induced effects in Britain, the counter narrative it presented was far less radical 
than what may be found in French articles.
615 Another example of critical Chernobyl reporting is Robin McKie. In a 1991 article, McKie even addressed the issue 
of health effects in Britain: 'The milk was drunk by children, several dozen of whom are now expected to contract 
thyroid cancer over the next 30 years. This disturbing after-effect did not come to light until months after the 
disaster. Yet at the same time, Environment Secretary Kenneth Baker had claimed radiation was “nowhere near the 
levels at which there is any hazard to health.”' Robin McKie, “Britain's deadly Chernobyl legacy,” in The Observer, 
21 April 1991, p. 11.
616 In this regard, it is no surprise that also it was Edwards who, in July 2011, revealed the British government’s attempt
to influence media reports on Fukushima. 
617 For Britain, this has partly changed in recent years as some Green Party activists, within the frame of the climate 
change debate, now support nuclear power plants. This issue will be addressed in more detail in the following 
chapter.
618 This phrasing is a simplification of reality insofar as, since 1990, there no longer exists an entity such as the 'British 
Greens' anymore. In 1990, the UK Green Party split into the Green Party of England and Wales, the Green Party in 
Northern Ireland, and the Scottish Green Party.
619 However, it was already in 1999 that the Green Party won a seat in the Scottish Parliament. 
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opponent Jacques Chirac as Prime Minister. In Britain, however, the divide that came to be created
over the question of a proper emergency management in the spring of 1986 ran across party lines,
not only cutting trough the Labour Party but also in part placing the Parliament in opposition to the
Government. Although the dispute between Parliament and Government was settled with the
publication of the House of Commons Agriculture Committee report on the Government's reaction
in 1988, some Labour MPs, like David Clark, continued to broach the issue that sheep from the
affected areas had slipped through and been brought to market. Therefore, it would be an
oversimplification to say that the British political party system as such had hindered the expansion
of the Chernobyl debate. Although the weakness of the Green Party could indeed be considered a
hindering factor, the power relations between the British Parliament and the Government and the
political opposition between the Labour Party and the Conservative Party in 1986 could, in theory,
very well have provided the arena within which the debate could have expanded. 
With regard to the particularities of the British political system that might have hindered an
extension of the Chernobyl debate, many of my interview partners pointed to the general de-
politicization of the British public that was generated by Thatcherism and the neo-liberal turn of the
Labour Party. In their opinion – the people who raised this issue were mainly anti-nuclear minded –
this general de-politicization resulted in a decline of the British anti-nuclear movement and in the
transformation of questions related to nuclear power into non-issues, effectively removing them
from the sphere of public debate. This study is not equipped to verify this hypothesis. To explain the
lack of sources with a general non-interest in politics or, in particular, a non-interest in nuclear
politics, albeit tempting, does not constitute a scientific argument for the very fact that there are no
sources that could account for such an explanation. This does not necessarily mean that this
hypothesis is not valid it only means that I cannot reach or corroborate this conclusion from the
material I researched. However, to refuse to touch upon this argument would, at the same time, have
meant that an essential part of the contemporary British anti-nuclear discourse would have been
excluded from my analysis.
When a comparison is made of the ways in which the French and British each deal with and
debate Chernobyl, it is interesting to notice that questions regarding the impact of the accident have
in part become a social-philosophical issue in France – first and foremost in the work of the 'Caen
group' – whereas in Britain, the topic is addressed from a more practical 'hands-on approach'. This
holds true on the national level in relation to how the government managed the issue of
contaminated sheep as well as on the transnational level in terms of the practical help given to the
'Chernobyl children'. However, every attempt to explain this phenomenon runs the risk of heavily
drawing on national stereotypes. Although it might be tempting to refer to the French love of
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existentialism to explain why the Chernobyl as 'the end of all common reference points'
(Lemarchand/Grandazzi) narrative has been so widely received in France, such an explanation
would barely scratch the surface of the Chernobyl debate. To explain the different trajectories of the
two national debates through 'national cultural mentalities' would be to run the risk of getting
trapped in the pitfall of using highly biased and constructed stereotypes of 'Britishness' and
'Frenchness'. To focus too much on such stereotypes – despite the fact that there may be many good
examples that 'prove' their validity – would imply that less attention was paid to the power
structures at stake in the Chernobyl discourse and more precisely to the power structures that are
specific to the national nuclear discourses in which the Chernobyl discourse is embedded.620 
In order to explain the quasi-non-existence of the British Chernobyl debate, it is not enough
to only take into consideration 'abstract structures'. The comparison with the French case shows
clearly that the individual actors are just as important as the overarching political and cultural
structures. If Alexievich's narrative had not been promoted by people like Galia Ackermann,
Frédérick Lemarchand and Guillaume Grandazzi, it would never have gained such popularity in
France. The same is true for Bandazhevsky's work: Had the co-workers of CRIIRAD and especially
Michèle Rivasi not intensively disseminated information about Bandazhevsky and his theories on
the health impact of exposure to low-level radiation his work and his imprisonment would not have
received the amount of attention they did. A similar explanation can be applied to the topic of self-
affectedness: without Jean-Michel Jacquemin's publications, less people in France may have related
their thyroid diseases to the Chernobyl fallout. Perhaps Christopher Busby could have had a similar
'career' in Britain, but the impact of Chernobyl in Britain was only ever a secondary issue for him
insofar as his interest lay with the emissions of the nuclear installations in Britain and the effects of
weapons testing fallout – an area in which he received quite a bit of attention. This handful of
examples reveals the importance of individual agency in the process of the politicization of a certain
topic. Discursive power relations and wider political and cultural structures are only one side of the
issue, and the other is whether there are actors that are willing to take up the topic or if these last
prefer to focus their time and energy on other issues and topics. In Britain, an immense amount of
620 One of my British interview partners observed that the way in which the British deal with illnesses primarily takes 
place in the private sphere. For instance, a British person would not openly speak about his or her thyroid cancer in 
public. Therefore, even if there had been an increase in the number of illnesses, people would not necessarily know, 
and as long as their physician did not make the link to Chernobyl, they would not come up with this idea on their 
own. Yet, I am uncertain whether this is more an observation that underpins the 'keep calm and carry on' stereotype 
or whether it would make sense to investigate this aspect further. At any rate, I think it would be hard to generalize 
personal behaviour when speaking of a given illness at the national level. In general, it would be counter productive 
for my study to open the frame of explanations too widely: to speak of 'national debates' makes sense as long as they
can be connected back to aspects of the nation state, such as elite formation systems or national nuclear programs, 
etc. There might be a link between people's privacy regarding their illnesses and the National Health System or 
British labour rights, but since I found no indication of the existence of this link, it did not follow this trail any 
further.
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time and energy has been invested in the fight against nuclear arms; the Aldermaston Women's
Peace Camp, which has existed since 1985 might be the most prominent example of this ongoing
commitment. In this regard, it is striking that in France there is at best only a marginal debate on the
question of nuclear weapons: The French secret service's bombing of the Rainbow Warrior in 1985
had just as negligible an effect on François Mitterrand's career as Jacques Chirac's commitment in
the mid-1990s to French nuclear weapons testing in the South Pacific had on his re-election.
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2.2 ½ Excursus: Children's nonfiction books on Chernobyl
As discussed in the previous chapter there were very few publications in Britain between the early
1990s and 2006 that aimed to provide a wider public with a certain Chernobyl narrative. However,
as has also become evident in the chapter above, there is always an exception to the rule: In this
case, it is the genre of children's nonfiction books, which explain to young readers the events of the
accident and how they unfolded as well as the consequences. It is very difficult to collocate these
books and the narratives they present within the British Chernobyl debate. They were not written by
activists, and often the authors do not even have a specific connection to the topic. This can be
deduced from what are at times the very superficial and contradictory narratives they relate.
Therefore, the analysis of these books will not be included in the comparative chapters, but are dealt
with separately in this excursus. Nevertheless, these books will be subject to the same analytic
procedure used for all the other sources, the focus of which will be placed on the narrative elements
of 'radiophobia' versus apocalypse, self-affectedness, and anti-Eastern European/anti-Soviet
stereotypes. It was, at times, difficult to identify concrete statements with regard to these categories
as most of these books do not present a specific argument but rather consist of an illustrated mix
between action story, introduction to nuclear engineering, and pedagogic sensitization to the
possible risks of this technology.
Graham Rickard, 1988
Soon after the accident, Chernobyl became a topic for British publishing houses that edited
children's nonfiction books. The first of its kind appeared in 1988: Graham Rickard's 'The
Chernobyl catastrophe.'621 It was published in the 'Great disaster' series, along with other titles,
among which 'The Black Death', 'The Hindenburg Tragedy', 'The Destruction of Pompeii' and 'The
Sinking of the Titanic'. The book provided some interesting if incoherent accounts on the direct
health impact of the fallout, for instance: 'Most of the people who lived around Chernobyl luckily
escaped serious injury, because the accident happened at night. Almost all of them were safely
asleep indoors. […] Some farm workers in Poland were not so fortunate, and were the first to suffer
from the deadly fallout. […] Their skin itched, their eyes began to water, and they started to vomit.
Soon their hands swelled and their hair fell out as the radiation sickness gradually worsened. […]
Thousands of migrating birds died after coming into contact with this air-borne poison.'622 On the
621 Graham Rickard, The Chernobyl catastrophe (Hove: Wayland, 1988).
622 Ibid., p. 13.
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clean-up operations, Rickard wrote that 'remote-controlled vehicles and protected, manned vehicles
were used to clear away debris from around the plant.'623 However, he did not describe or discuss
the 'liquidators', even though pictures of them were illustrated in the book. Finally, the chapter titled
'Who was to blame' spoke of the 'bad design' of the plant and 'human error'. The belief that 'this
cannot happen here' was implicit in Rickard's statement: 'as early as 1964, the design was flatly
rejected in Britain as being too dangerous.'624 The health effects of the accident were quite
apocalyptically described: 'The widespread contamination caused by Chernobyl may damage the
health of millions of people.'625 In this regard, it was fitting that Rickard ended his story with the
words: 'The countries of the world must now decide whether the advantages of nuclear power
justify the risk of another similar, or even worse, disaster.'626
It is rather interesting that Rickard adhered on the one hand to the official narrative provided
by the public authorities with regard to the question of responsibility, but on the other he presented a
rather apocalyptic narrative with regard to the health impact of the nuclear fallout and the
geographic scale of the immediate effects that had nothing in common with the evaluations of
national and international official experts. As for British self-affectedness, Rickard included an
account on the impact of Chernobyl in the UK. He wrote that 'the cloud passed over Britain on 2nd
and 3rd May, and rain in parts of Scotland, Wales and the north of England on those days caused
quite serious contamination.'627 He also elaborated on the restrictions that had been placed on
British sheep farms.628 The narrative contained some 'catchy' stories portraying Chernobyl in a
dramatic light so that the event would fit better into this 'Great disaster' book series. Throughout,
the book alternated between telling the story of Chernobyl as a 'Soviet accident' and as an
apocalyptic event caused by nuclear power.
Judith Condon, 1998
Judith Condon, in her 1998 book Chernobyl and other nuclear accidents,629 went a step further than
Rickard and actually dismissed the narrative on the evolution of the accident released by the public
authorities. The fact that the book would offer a different narrative than that contained in the
'official story' was already suggested by the title of the series in which the book appeared: 'New
623 Ibid., p. 18.
624 Ibid., p. 22.
625 Ibid., p. 24.
626 Ibid., p. 29.
627 Ibid., p. 14.
628 Ibid., p. 24.
629 Judith Condon, Chernobyl and other nuclear accidents (Hove: Wayland, 1998).
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Perspectives'. Starting her account, Condon described a well planned and controlled test scenario:
'This was a routine procedure, enabling maintenance and repairs to be carried out.'630 Unlike in the
official narrative, here there was no insinuation whatsoever that there had been any irresponsible
action on the part of individual plant workers, and really quite the contrary: 'Several Chernobyl
engineers had also gathered in the control room, hoping to learn.'631 On the pages that followed,
illustrated information was provided on the 'liquidators', evacuations and contaminated foodstuffs.
Interestingly, the chapter on 'The Consequences' did not focus on the health effects of the radiation,
but on the collapse of the Soviet Union. But although the text did not provide numbers of victims or
a death toll, the illustrations unmistakably pointed in one specific direction. Next to a photo of the
famous 'Chernobyl child', Igor, was a copy of a painting by Swiss artist Cornelia Hesse-Honegger
of a close-up of a firebug larva that she had found in the vicinity of the Chernobyl plant in 1990: the
image revealed that a section of a feeler of this bug was missing. Hesse-Honegger had gone on to
paint a whole series of deformed insects from the contaminated zones, which, according to her,
demonstrated the genetic mutations induced by radiation exposure.632 Thus, through its pictures
Chernobyl and other nuclear accidents clearly recounted an apocalyptic narrative of deformed
humans and animals.
As the title suggested, Chernobyl was not the only nuclear accident broached in this book.
The other sections were dedicated to Windscale and Three Mile Island. In both, Condon expressed
her severe criticism of the British and US crisis management of the accidents; her attack of
Windscale is worth a closer look. In the pre-history she gives of the Windscale Fire, Condon
emphasized the existence of a culture of secrecy that surrounded the failure of the filters that were
supposed to trap the radioactive particles: 'This had been going on for two years. […] The new
Atomic Energy Authority, which in the same year took over responsibility for both bomb-making
and the nuclear power programme from the Ministry of Supply, did not make these facts public.'633
After the fire, this same culture of secrecy was perpetuated, in particular with regard to Sir William
Penney's report on the causes of the accident: 'Prime Minister Harold Macmillan insisted that it
should not be published; ministers and officials were ordered to hand in their copies, and the
printer was required to surrender the proofs.'634 
Condon's account on the impact of Chernobyl in Britain was very short. She only referred to
Britain in relation to the geographical extent of the fallout: 'Contamination appeared at a greater
630 Ibid., p. 4.
631 Ibid.
632 Hesse-Honegger's drawings were included by Grandazzi and Lemarchand in their compilation Les silences de 
Tchernobyl as well.
633 Condon, Chernobyl and other nuclear accidents, p. 32.
634 Ibid., p. 39.
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distance days later, when rain brought down radioactive particles of caesium and iodine from the
high clouds. Upland grazing areas in Wales, northern England and Scotland were among the places
affected.'635 A picture of a shepherd and his sheep illustrated this paragraph and a caption below the
picture explained: 'Scotland, April 1996. This farmer's new lambs must still be tested for signs of
radioactive poisoning.'636 Cordon did not discuss any possible health effects of the Chernobyl
fallout in Britain. In her account on Windscale, however, the health effects of the fallout were
attributed a prominent role. Here, Condon cited a letter that had been published in The Guardian in
1987. A woman who had lived close to the plant in 1957 had written the letter: 'Our daily walk was
along the cinder track towards the power station; and we all drank the milk. On the night of the fire
my father was fishing for sea-trout in the shadow of Windscale (he thought the men in the fields
with torches were poachers!). A few years later my mother had severe thyroid problems and she
was later operated on (successfully) for cancer. Next my father developed chronic, soon fatal kidney
failure. We all know many, many people in the neighbourhood who have died young of cancer. Will
this be part of the “official history”, or do we all have to tell our own? It has proven extremely
difficult for ordinary people to contact the researchers: to whom should we submit the evidence?'637
Thus, Condon's book underpins my argument that where in France, Chernobyl is discursively linked
to the question of self-affectedness from a health-perspective as well as to policies of secrecy and
disinformation on the part of public authorities, the very same questions in Britain are linked to the
Sellafield-Windscale complex but not to Chernobyl.
Paul Dowswell, 2003
It took several more years for the next children's book on Chernobyl to be published: The
Chernobyl disaster by Paul Dowswell was published in 2003.638 The book appeared in the series
'Days that shock the world' which included other titles, like 'D-Day', 'Hiroshima' or 'The Moon
Landing'. The description on the back of the book clearly expressed the focus of this series: 'This
high-drama series looks at those momentous days in the last century when great and terrible things
transpired within 24 hours, which would leave an impact on the history of the world for decades
afterwards.'639 Interestingly enough, the book was translated into French that same year. However, it
was not released in France, but in Canada.640 This fact might have something to do with the
635 Ibid., p. 20.
636 Ibid.
637 Ibid., p. 40.
638 Paul Dowswell, The Chernobyl disaster: 26th April 1986 (London: Hodder Wayland, 2003).
639 Ibid., Back of book.
640 Paul Dowswell, Tchernobyl: 26 avril 1986, Dates clés de l’histoire (Bonneuil-les-Eaux Montréal (Québec): Gamma 
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narrative Dowswell presented in his book, a narrative that did not quite conform to the French
Chernobyl debate of the early 2000s. 
Dowswell stuck with the 'Soviet accident' narrative: It had been the bad design and the Soviet
political system that had created the conditions for this accident. Unlike Judith Condon, Dowswell
did not criticize the culture of secrecy with regard to the West but referred in this regard only to the
East. Furthermore, in his chapter 'From cover up to global sensation', he negatively commented on
the sensationalistic journalism used in Western media to cover the accident.641 The degree to which
Dowswell related the accident to the Soviet system becomes particularly clear in his statement that
'Chernobyl highlighted the failure of the Soviet Union. […] Within five years of the accident, the
Soviet Union had collapsed.'642 The collapse of the Soviet political system had then made possible
the exchange of knowledge between scientists from the East and West and through this exchange
the security standards in Soviet reactors had been improved. Therefore, according to Dowswell, 'the
accident at Chernobyl has unquestionably had positive effects on the nuclear industry.'643
Although his narrative had very little in common with 'Voices from Chernobyl', Dowswell
quoted Alexievich's book twice; once in the context of the abandoned houses in the restricted
zone644 and another in relation to the work carried out by the firemen.645 But apart from this, the
scenario he described was far from apocalyptic. The estimate of the possible health effects of the
fallout that Dowswell explicitly quoted was amongst the lowest calculations: 'Because the effects of
radiation levels on the human body are difficult to predict, it is currently impossible to say how
many people in the world have been affected by the disaster. One estimate suggests that, in the
years to come, perhaps an additional 2,500 people worldwide will contract cancer as a result, but
other studies suggest that the figure will be far higher.'646 Dowswell went on to add an explanation
for these higher figures: 'These figures (particularly those in the hundreds of thousands) are
undoubtedly exaggerated – especially by Ukrainian politicians anxious to claim as much aid as
they can for their poor, newly independent country.'647 However, further down the page, he stressed
that the true figures would only be known in a few decades, if ever, and he conceded that then the
death toll would probably be adjusted upward and rest at a much higher estimate than many
believed today. This zig-zagging in Dowswell's narrative is common to many Chernobyl accounts:
on the one hand, the authors take critical distance of the high estimates, claiming that they were
École active, 2003).
641 Paul Dowswell, The Chernobyl disaster, p. 35.
642 Ibid., p. 38.
643 Ibid., p. 41.
644 Ibid., p. 37.
645 Ibid., p. 27.
646 Ibid., p. 39.
647 Ibid., p. 42.
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only finalized for purposes of political campaigning. At the same time, they acknowledge that the
real numbers are yet to be known.
Scott Ingram, 2005
The next book of this genre of children's nonfiction books on Chernobyl appeared in 2005: The
Chernobyl Nuclear disaster.648 Written by the US author Scott Ingram and published in New York, it
was distributed in the UK as well; for this reason it is mentioned here. The book was part of the
series 'Environmental disasters', which also included such titles as 'Exxon Valdez oil spill',
'Hurricane Andrew' or 'San Francisco earth quake'. It is interesting that this series did not
differentiate between industrial accidents with an environmental impact and the impact seismic and
weather phenomena had on humans. The degree to which these forms of disasters were
conceptually merged in the book became obvious in the introduction, where Ingram wrote: 'The
death toll as a result of the blast and radiation exposure was originally listed at 31 people. […] At
first glance, the toll of the Chernobyl accident might seem insignificant compared to thousands of
people killed in typhoons, for example, or the enormous areas destroyed by forest fires.'649
Ingram's narrative of Chernobyl is interesting in many regards. For instance, his statement of
the geographic scope of the impact differs from many other accounts: A map included in the preface
showed the area affected by radiation and also the areas that were marked as 'all clean' including,
among many other countries, Greece, Turkey, France, and Britain. According to Ingram, the cause
of the accident had less to do with technology than anything else: 'The mishap was years in the
making, and much of the blame for it has now been placed on Soviet scientists and government
leaders.'650 Although published in 2005, the book contained much Cold War rhetoric, contrasting
'bad' USSR nuclear policies to 'good' US nuclear policies. But Ingram did not criticize only USSR
nuclear policies: 'Although the loss of life of nuclear plant workers has been much less than that of
coal miners and oil field workers, past nuclear accidents have not been well publicized in the media
at large. In most instances, no matter where the accident took place, government authorities went to
great length to assure the public that there was no great danger.'651 However, there was one
important exception to this rule: 'U.S. government leaders reacted with speed and were honest with
the public regarding the 1979 nuclear accident at T.M.I.'652 Ingram also painted another actor of the
nuclear sector in a very positive light: the IAEA. 'The IAEA established safe operation procedures
648 Scott Ingram, The Chernobyl nuclear disaster (New York/London: Facts On File, 2005).
649 Ibid., p. ix.
650 Ibid., p. 3.
651 Ibid., p. 14.
652 Ibid., p. 21.
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and developed a system for reporting any safety violations.'653 In conformity with this narrative, the
International Chernobyl Project – the highly criticized expert committee on Chernobyl – was
described as a 'charitable organization formed to support the development of medical community
and humanitarian aid programs that serve the (Chernobyl) region.'654
Ingram's statement on the health effects of the fallout could hardly have been more vague:
'Although 31 deaths are attributed to the actual event, studies in subsequent years have led to the
conclusion that deaths and damage from the accident were long-term and far-reaching.'655 Although
the chapter 'The Human Toll' quoted Edmund Lengfelder656 a number of times, it shifted to the
'radiophobia' explanatory pattern and wrapped up the narrative with an account on 'The Chernobyl
Syndrome': 'This psychological condition of extreme stress among people in Belarus, Russia and
Ukraine is characterized by people's overwhelming uncertainty about the effects of the disaster on
the health of themselves and their children. This feeling of helplessness has led to increased
alcoholism and clinical depression in millions.'657
Victoria Parker, 2006
The last example of this genre of literature that has been published thus far in Britain is the book by
Victoria Parker: Chernobyl 1986. It appeared in 2006 in the series 'When disaster struck',658
alongside titles such as 'The Asian Tsunami', 'The Black Death', 'The Challenger', 'The Exxon
Valdez', 'The Hindenburg', 'Pompeii' and 'The Titanic'. Although its acknowledgements to the
Children of Chernobyl US Alliance, the Nuclear Information Resource Service and the Union of
Concerned Scientists hinted that an anti-nuclear account was to follow, the narrative presented by
Parker was, like with Ingram, more anti-Soviet than it was anti-nuclear. In the chapter on 'Why was
Chernobyl built', Parker stated that the USSR did not have enough coal or oil and not enough
money to buy these resources from abroad, almost as though nuclear power was a valid option in
electricity generation for poor countries. Furthermore, she argued that 'the Soviet Union wanted to
develop nuclear weapons, to keep up with the United States and the United Kingdom […]. This is
another reason why the Soviet government wanted to produce nuclear energy.'659 Parker's narrative
653 Ibid., p. 4.
654 Ibid., p. 28.
655 Ibid.
656 Edmund Lengfelder is a German radiation biologist and doctor who, together with Sebastian Pflugbeil and Inge 
Schmitz-Feuerhake, is an active member of the Gesellschaft für Strahlenschutz. He is the founder of the Otto-Hug-
Strahleninstitut and has stressed in his work the severity of the health effects caused from exposure to low-level 
radiation.
657 Ingram, The Chernobyl nuclear disaster, p. 79.
658 Victoria Parker, Chernobyl 1986: an explosion at a nuclear power station (Oxford: Raintree, 2006).
659 Ibid., p. 8.
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also implied that the USSR could never keep up with Western nuclear powers, given that, as with
the case of Chernobyl, 'many of the workers were poorly trained.'660 
As for the 'Health Costs' of the accident, Parker started her account with the statement: 'Thirty-one
people died due to the explosion. This is a matter of controversy, but it seems that thousands more
have died or become ill because of the effects of the disaster. Many have suffered terrible stress.'661
What followed were quotations of figures from reports published by the international organizations
and a short account on aid projects run by NGOs. The double page on aid projects was illustrated
with photos of children and teenagers in hospitals. In order to link the case of Chernobyl to larger
questions, Parker dedicated the last pages of her book to a general statement on nuclear politics,
concluding: 'Most countries do all they can to make sure nuclear power is produced safely. But
accidents can happen. We all need to reduce the amount of energy we use. We also need to invest
money in developing and using safer renewable energy sources.'662 
Conclusion
The books discussed above are all very different one from the other, not only with regard to the
narratives of the accident they present but also with regard to the range of Chernobyl-related topics
they deal with, their length, and the illustrative techniques applied; some use photographs, others
use drawings and illustrations. But what they all have in common is a specific target group: children
and teenagers. It is very interesting that every single of these books was published in a book series
that transformed the topic of Chernobyl for its readers into just one historical event among others.
While they differed very much on the kind of 'facts' they presented, the authors all aimed to provide
a 'balanced' account that was informed by different sources. This is why, as shown above, many
accounts were quite contradictory. 
In France, there is also a big market for children's nonfiction books. However, I do not know
of the existence of any book published in France that may be comparable to these. A possible
explanation as to why Chernobyl became a topic for this book genre in Britain but not in France
might be found in the intensity of the ongoing French debate. Publishing in France on Chernobyl
implies that one has taken a clear stance with regard to the debate on self-affectedness. It seems that
instead of getting involved in this debate, French youth literature publishing houses have preferred
not to publish on this subject. In Britain, however, Chernobyl has never really been considered a
'British' topic. It was quickly considered an event of the past that had happened at a great distance
660 Ibid., p. 10.
661 Ibid., p. 42.
662 Ibid., p. 49.
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from the country. This interpretation rendered it possible to provide children and teenagers with a
narrative of this accident without running the risk of being blamed for publishing politically slanted
statements and narratives. 
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2.3 2006: The Chernobyl 'renaissance' within the 'nuclear renaissance'
The debate about the health effects of Chernobyl gained major prominence on the occasion of the
accident's 20th anniversary. It was particularly at the transnational level that the Chernobyl debate
took place during this specific moment in time. The transnational level will be discussed in depth in
the following chapter. This chapter, however, will look at the degree to which the national debates
of France and Britain differed one from the other in 2006. Much like the previous chapter, this
chapter opens with a brief observation of the way in which the media approached the topic of
Chernobyl in this period. 
British newspaper editors and journalists did not consider the 20th anniversary of Chernobyl a
major news event.663 Although, compared with the media output of 1996, there seems to have been a
significant increase in the number of articles published,664 this coverage is quite modest compared to
that in France. In France, the media dedicated an enormous amount of space to Chernobyl
throughout the second half of April 2006; the anniversary was presented as kind of an event in
itself, and radio and TV665 stations dedicated substantial broadcasting time to Chernobyl. The
national newspapers started their reporting on Chernobyl already in mid-April. Around 26 April,
most of the French newspapers published several pages long dossiers, which addressed various
aspects of the Chernobyl accident, primarily the reasons for why the accident happened, the current
situation in the highly affected areas in Eastern Europe, and the debate about the health effects of
the fallout in France. These dossiers allocated extensive space to critical voices, which called into
question the 'official narrative' with regard to the affected areas in Eastern Europe as well as the
consequences of the accident in France.666 Special attention was paid to the interpretations of the
'Caen Group' (Guillaume Grandazzi, Frédérick Lemarchand, Galia Ackerman, Jean-Pierre Dupuy)
and Wladimir Tchertkoff; their publications were often recommended to the readers should they
wish to inform themselves further on this topic.667 In this manner, the French media coverage of
Chernobyl's 20th anniversary was strongly marked by an 'apocalyptic' Chernobyl narrative, and at
the same time it prominently addressed the question of self-affectedness by recalling the affaire
663 This statement is a result of my consultation of the newspaper database Newsbank and my hermeneutic analysis of 
the results for the search key 'Chernobyl' for the period between 15 and 30 April 2006.
664 As described in the footnote above regarding newspaper reporting around the 20th anniversary, I conducted a similar 
search in the newspaper database Newsbank for the 10th anniversary, wherein I analysed the results for the search 
key 'Chernobyl' for the period between 15 and 30 April 1996. However, the entries in Newsbank for this time span 
do not reflect the real number of articles on Chernobyl, given that many newspaper articles of 1996 have not yet 
been included in the Newsbank database.
665 For the coverage of Chernobyl by TF1, see: http://www.tf1.fr/recherche/?query=tchernobyl&x=0&y=0&n=1 (last 
accessed: 15 June 2013).
666 For a detailed analysis of French newspaper coverage of the 20th anniversary, see: Kalmbach, Tschernobyl und 
Frankreich, pp. 168-171. 
667 Further information on these publications is provided in chapter 2.3.3.
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Tchernobyl. 
Whereas in France self-affectedness had dominated the Chernobyl debate since the mid-
1990s, in Britain this issue was in some ways re-discovered only on the occasion of the 20th
anniversary of the accident. After having almost completely disappeared from newspaper reporting,
the continued restrictions on sheep farms once again resurfaced in 2006. In this regard, on 13 April,
The Guardian published an article titled 'Sheep farms under curbs see no end to Chernobyl
fallout.'668 This article provided the latest news on the farms that were still subject to the restrictions
and reported that 'now there are 359 in Wales, nine in the Lake District and 10 in Scotland,
involving 200,600 sheep.'669 'No one knows when the restrictions will end. ' What is particularly
interesting about this article is the fact that it presented the persistence of the restrictions as though
it were a new development: 'Hundreds of British sheep farms still blighted by the effects of
radioactive fall-out after the world's worst nuclear accident, two decades ago at Chernobyl, will
have to follow strict safety measures for years to come, it emerged yesterday.' Moreover, the article
basically implied that it had not been the journalists' non-interest in the topic that had led to this
lacuna in coverage and its eventual disappearance from the public arena, but rather because 'few
farmers wish to talk about their experiences, being worried about scaring consumers.'670 However,
the article made it clear that there was nothing to worry about since 'the [food standards] agency
says the controls have effectively protected public food safety.' Not only was there nothing to worry
about in terms of self-affectedness, the article also went on to present the health effects of
Chernobyl in general in quite an 'un-apocalyptic' manner, ending with the sentence: 'Officially,
fewer than 50 people have so far perished as a result of Chernobyl, according to a study last year
by the IAEA, the UN and the WHO.' Aside from this interesting interpretation of the Chernobyl
death toll – which entirely excluded probabilistic cancer deaths – a closer look at this article sheds
light on the deterioration of the state of general public knowledge on the British nuclear fleet as was
expressed in the kind of information the author felt was necessary to include. When quoting a sheep
farmer from Wales that the lasting restrictions 'make you think twice about living in the shadow of a
nuclear power station, if they ever opened another one here,' the author added: 'when Chernobyl
happened there was a nuclear plant operating just a few miles south of the farm at Trawsfynydd' –
an explanation that had not been necessary in the articles on sheep farm restrictions in Wales in the
1990s, since the location of Trawsfynydd was considered common knowledge at the time.
668 James Meikle, “Sheep farms under curbs see no end to Chernobyl fallout,” in The Guardian, 13 April 2006.
669 In the following years, this number decreased further. According to a newspaper article in The Guardian, in 2009, 
'there were still 355 farms in Wales (in and around Snowdonia), 9 in England and 7 in Scotland. All the farms in 
Northern Ireland were "derestricted" in 2000.' See: Leo Hickman, “What is safe to eat?,” in The Guardian, 29 
December 2009.
670 Meikle, “Sheep farms under curbs see no end to Chernobyl fallout.”
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A more general look at British newspaper reporting on the occasion of Chernobyl's 20th
anniversary reveals that there are some more interesting findings. Although British newspapers
dedicated much less space and attention to Chernobyl than French newspapers in 2006, similarity in
the reporting on another level becomes evident. Similarly to the French reporting, British regional
as well as national newspapers addressed a wide range of issues connected to the accident: from life
stories of people in the most affected regions in Eastern Europe,671 to the 'liquidators',672 and the
state of the wildlife in the restricted area around the plant.673 Yet, there is a very important difference
in the priorities that are identified: whereas in France, the affaire Tchernobyl – often paraphrased as
'the cloud that stopped at the border' – and the debate on the health effects of the fallout in France
itself formed a central part of the reporting, self-affectedness continued to be given only a marginal
place in British coverage. Like in 1996 and especially in the regional newspapers, the activities of
local Chernobyl solidarity movement groups were the primary interest. The focus was placed on the
life stories of people who were actively involved in these groups as well as on the many children
who had been hosted by these people in Britain over the years.674 These stories were often
connected to fundraising drives in support of the Chernobyl aid groups, and primarily the biggest
associations CCLL and CCP.675 
Although self-affectedness still did not play a major role in British news reporting, the topic
was broached in some articles. And most interestingly, at least one journalist began to speak of the
health effects caused by the radioactive fallout as a scientific finding and no longer as rumours or
speculations – as had occurred with the Benbecula cancer story in 1996. On 23 April 2006, the
national quality newspaper The Independent on Sunday published an article entitled 'Chernobyl
“still causing cancer in British children”' which started with the statement: 'More than a third of
Britain is still contaminated by radioactivity from the Chernobyl disaster two decades ago, and
children are getting cancer as a result.'676 Here in this article, British self-affectedness had drawn up
alongside French self-affectedness: the Chernobyl fallout had caused thyroid cancer in the country's
children. What is even more remarkable is that this article also mirrored the positions taken during
the French affaire Tchernobyl in the way that it addressed the question of a deliberate cover-up by
the government, albeit in a more subtle way compared to the intensity of the accusations that were
brought against French officials: 'Scientists have found rates of thyroid cancer in children in
671 See for example: Juliette Jowit, “Dispatch: Chernobyl’s generations of suffering,” in The Observer, 23 April 2006.
672 See for example: Jeremy Page, “Chernobyl hero remembers the men who saved Europe – Factbox,” in The Times, 
22 April 2006.
673 See for example: Western Daily Press, “Nature’s cure for nuclear fallout: Wildlife heaven,” 21 April 2006.
674 See for example: The Sun, “A Life Line to radiation kids,” 25 April 2006; Hull Daily Mail, “We won't forget 
Chernobyl victims,” 25 April 2006.
675 See for example: Yvonne Bolouri, “Nuclear family of love,” in The Sun, 25 April 2006.
676 The Independent on Sunday, “Chernobyl 'still causing cancer in British children,'” 23 April 2006.
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Cumbria, the worst-affected part of England, rose 12-fold after the catastrophe – and blame fallout
from the radioactive cloud that spread from the stricken reactor. This confounds government
assurances at the time that the radiation in Britain was “nowhere near the levels at which there is
any hazard to health.”' This article, however, lies on the far extreme of what was said in British
newspapers in terms of Chernobyl health effects in Britain on the occasion of the 20th anniversary.
Therefore, it is in no way representative of British media coverage in 2006. 
Yet, the regional Liverpool-based newspaper The Daily Post, also picked up the topic of
Chernobyl related illnesses in Britain and on 26 April 2006 it printed the article 'Wales: Did
Chernobyl disaster cause my cancer?'677 Here, the attention was not directed toward increases of
cancer in children, but – like in the case of Benbecula – on an increase in cancers among
farmworkers. As with Benbecula, this self-affectedness was presented as a speculation: 'People in
rural north-west Wales are worried cancer levels are higher than the national average. But they are
also keen to avoid scare-mongering in case it damages tourism and farming.' Thus, there is a
parallel between France in Britain insofar as in both countries it was discussed whether an
evaluation of the true health effects of the fallout was suppressed for fear of negative economic
repercussions. However, whereas in France this was an argument brought forward by 'Chernobyl
victims' who accused the government setoff having placed their health at risk in order to avoid
negative effects for the French economy, in Britain, it was people in the affected regions who did
not want to have the issue of health effects of the fallout publicised for fear of the impact on their
local economy. If this argument, expressed in the article cited above, is taken at face value, then
British self-affectedness in terms of health effects from the fallout was perceived as an
individualized threat, and an eventual disclosure was seen as a risk that there would be a change for
the worse. On the contrary, in France, the 'Chernobyl victims' poured all their energy into obtaining
this disclosure not least because it promised monetary compensation and therefore was perceived as
a change for the better.
Putting this far extreme of reported self-affectedness in relation to the general British
newspaper coverage of Chernobyl's 20th anniversary, it is important to understand that the typical
way in which Chernobyl was discussed in British newspapers consisted primarily of relatively
neutral remarks on the fallout of 1986 and the sheep farm restrictions, but did not generally make
any mention of health effects caused by the fallout. Most often, the articles presented Chernobyl as
an event that had 'just happened'. The rainfalls and the geographic constitution of the country were
blamed for the problems that were caused by the fallout in Britain and not the civil use of nuclear
energy. An article in The Times of 26 April 2006 can be considered an ideal-type of this common
677 Andrew Forgrave, “Wales: Did Chernobyl disaster cause my cancer?,” in Daily Post, 26 April 2006.
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narrative: 'High-altitude winds spread the cloud of radiation over northern Europe, and on May 2,
1986, the fallout passed over Britain. [...] The toxic cloud would have caused no harm had the
weather stayed dry, but local rainstorms washed down the contamination over a swath of Cumbria,
Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Radioactive caesium-137 contaminated the ground, and
would have been bound up relatively safely in most soils. But the peat in upland areas kept the
substance in solution and it became absorbed by grasses that were grazed by sheep. More than a
million sheep were contaminated and emergency orders were imposed to prevent their sale. The
legacy of that disaster still lingers in Britain. Although radiation levels have fallen over the years,
some hills are still so contaminated that 375 farms and more than 200,000 sheep remain
embargoed. No sheep can be moved out of affected areas without a special licence, the flocks are
scanned regularly for radioactivity, and contaminated animals banned from markets.'678 The fact
that the account stops with the observation that the radionuclides had been taken up by the sheep
may be considered a statement all on its own. There is no mention of the possible effects were the
radionuclides to travel up the food-chain. People are not even mentioned in this article. The account
somehow gives the impression that the only creatures that take up radionuclides are sheep. In this
regard, it is very interesting to look again at the above-cited article of 26 April 2006 in The Daily
Post. This article, too, broached the issue of sheep farm restrictions, but with an added detail that
was quite unique for British media reporting on the 20th anniversary: 'Sheep were found to be
contaminated and each year around 103,000 lambs are still tested for radioactivity before
slaughter. A further 210,000 ewes and lambs are paint marked and licensed before being moved to
grazing outside restricted areas. Because of the high level of monitoring, Welsh farmers say their
lambs are the safest in the world. But they also claim animals have received more attention than
humans.'679
Other than the health effects of the fallout in Britain, another aspect of perceived self-
affectedness is the way in which risks linked to Chernobyl are placed in relation to the national
nuclear fleet or even other hazards. In this regard as well, the article in The Daily Post offers up an
interesting perspective. The author of the article quoted a farmworker saying '“We've lived through
BSE and foot-and-and-mouth and we don't want any more health scares”' to which the journalist
added: 'his farm is also down-wind of the decommissioned nuclear power station at Trawsfynydd.'680
This tendency to relate Chernobyl to 'British-made' hazards, especially to the threat national nuclear
plants represented, has been an inherent element of the British Chernobyl debate from the very
beginning and has also showed up in the newspaper reporting of 2006 as well. Another example in
678 Paul Simons, “Ill winds carried Chernobyl poison,” in The Times, 26 April 2006.
679 Forgrave, “Wales: Did Chernobyl disaster cause my cancer?”
680 Ibid.
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this regard is an article that was printed in the regional newspaper Wales on Sunday on 23 April
2006. It quoted Dr Keith Baverstock saying 'that enough radioactive material to fill Albert Hall five
times was being stored in “very much less than ideal conditions” at British power stations,
including Wylfa on Anglesey.'681 The London-based national newspaper The Daily Telegraph made
the connection between the British nuclear enterprise and the Chernobyl accident in a more
'traditional'682 way: on 25 April 2006 it dedicated an entire article to the topic 'Windscale fallout




In France, the 20th anniversary of Chernobyl was not just widely covered by the media, the public
authorities also published intensively on the accident. The CEA used the anniversary as an
opportunity to communicate its assessment of the accident to a broader audience.684 It launched a
comprehensive website with information on Chernobyl.685 This website included a list of hyperlinks
to (international) organizations that had been involved in the evaluation of the situation in the most
affected areas, such as IAEA, IRSN, World Bank etc, as well as a text providing a general overview
of the topic. This text spoke of the causes of the accident – faulty reactor design and human failure
on the part of the plant workers – and it included a statement on the passage of the Chernobyl
'cloud' over Europe and France, which had resulted in a multitude of studies that looked into the
impact of the fallout. This general account, however, did not further elaborate on the results of these
studies. Instead, the website posted a position paper by Bernard Bigot.686 Bigot, at this time the
681 Wales on Sunday, “Remembering Chernobyl,” 23 April 2006.
682 A possible connection to Sellafield/Windscale had been broached even in the debate regarding the increase in cancer
rates on Benbecula. The article in The Herald Scotland of 1 April 1996 that was discussed in the chapter above had 
referred to a study that was conducted in the early 1990s on the Western Isle North Uist, which had revealed that 
'some islanders had five times more radioactivity than people elsewhere in Scotland. At the time, the excess levels of 
caesium found in the islanders was attributed to discharges from the Sellafield nuclear processing plant entering the
food chain in the Western Isles.' However, other 'possible links with the firing of rockets, possibly tipped with 
radioactive material, from the military range at Benbecula and the presence of a powerful early warning radar 
system' were discussed also. See: Buie, “Cancer island inquiry.”
683 Roger Highfield, “Windscale fallout from 1957 reactor fire still affecting Cumbria,” in The Daily Telegraph, 25 
April 2006.
684 This paragraph is a summary of the corresponding chapter in: Kalmbach, Tschernobyl und Frankreich, pp. 134-137.
685 CEA, Accident de Tchernobyl: quelques repères sur le sujet: http://www.cea.fr/energie/accident-de-tchernobyl-
reperes/reperes. (The website is still available but the information presented has changed since 2006, last accessed: 
15 June 2013).
686 Bernard Bigot, Point sur les conséquences sanitaires de l’accident de Tchernobyl (CEA, 2005). Available online: 
http://www.cea.fr/energie/accident-de-tchernobyl-reperes/pour-en-savoir-plus. (last accessed: 15 June 2013).
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Haut-Commissaire à l'Énergie Atomique (High Commissioner for Nuclear Energy) had already
drafted this paper in 2005, the objective of which was to provide a precise statement on the health-
related consequences in France that people, and especially French politicians, could refer to in the
upcoming debate for the 20th anniversary.687 Bigot's account of Chernobyl opened with a description
of the causes of the accident but very soon switched to its principal topic, the affaire Tchernobyl. He
stressed that a wide range of data had been available in May 1986. These data had been compiled
from the substantial number of measurements taken by the French public authorities and had been
made available to the public.688 Bigot then went on to address the various maps that had been drawn
up to show the radioactive deposits in France. He explained that the reasons for why there were
differences amongst the maps lay in the fact that different models had been used to create them. As
for the health effects of this radiation, he stated that the only possible effect could be that of thyroid
cancer; however, none of the cancer registers (including the PACA-Corse Region) had shown any
increase. Even were additional cases of thyroid cancer to occur, this number would be so low that it
would not be possible to detect these incidences.689 Thus, he stated, 'concerning the risk that
resulted from Chernobyl, we are confronted today with a finding that is purely statistical.'690 Aside
from the debate on Chernobyl health effects in France, Bigot's paper focused on the criticism that
had been directed at the French crisis management. From his point of view, there was no reason to
call into question the public authorities given that their action had been absolutely proportional to
the situation at hand.691 Even were additional cases of thyroid cancer in France to have been verified
using today's calculations, any countermeasures the government could have taken would have been
disproportional to the increase in the fear and the negative economic consequences these
countermeasures would have provoked.692 Bigot did not limit his discussion of Chernobyl's impact
687 Ibid., p. 3: 'L’objet de cette note est de faire un point précis sur ses conséquences sanitaires en France, permettant 
aux responsables gouvernementaux qui ne manqueront pas d’être légitimement interrogés à cette occasion, d’avoir 
une vision précise de la réalité des faits, telle qu’elle peut être déterminée avec toute la rigueur souhaitable après 
les derniers travaux de recherche conduits, et de pouvoir ainsi s’exprimer sur ces bases, s’ils le souhaitent.'
688 Ibid., p. 6.
689 Ibid., 14: 'En contre point de ces incertitudes larges, il est important de savoir que, jusqu’en 1999, dernière date 
complète disponible à ce jour, aucun des registres de cancers, y compris celui de PACA-Corse, n’a montré 
d’augmentation particulière de l’incidence des cancers thyroïdiens. Cependant, compte tenu des faibles doses 
concernant la France, il est possible que le temps de latence atteigne quelques dizaines d’années. En somme, si un 
excès est théoriquement possible, et sous réserve que la poursuite du bilan des registres continue à montrer des 
valeurs homogènes avec ce qui a été observé jusqu’ici à l’échelle nationale et internationale, cet éventuel excès 
n’est pas discernable de l’incertitude statistique associée au nombre de cancers de la thyroïde dits spontanés.'
690 Ibid.: 'Concernant le risque résultant de Tchernobyl, on se trouve aujourd’hui face à un constat purement 
statistique.'
691 Ibid., pp. 18.
692 Ibid., p. 18: 'Les moyens d’éviter certaines doses étaient-ils faciles à mettre en œuvre ? En théorie oui, puisqu’il 
aurait fallu, sur une période limitée, recommander de ne pas consommer de lait frais (déviation du lait contaminé 
vers des formes consommables après décroissance radioactive, par exemple fromages et lait stérilisé ou en poudre),
de bien laver les légumes et fruits frais, d’éviter les activités intenses de plein-air et de limiter le pâturage du bétail.
Si ces moyens n’ont pas été utilisés, c’est sans doute parce que le bénéfice dosimétrique et donc sanitaire avait été 
jugé trop faible devant le risque d’amplification des craintes et la possibilité de conséquences économiques 
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to the case of France. He also provided an evaluation of Chernobyl health effects in Eastern Europe
stating that the only effect that could actually be observed was an increase in thyroid cancer in
children. With regard to other cancers, leukaemia and the general mortality rate, no effects were as
of yet discernable.693 The fundamental stance Bigot took in this paper was to emphasize the
continuity of the excellent work of French nuclear institutions and experts. In his opinion, there was
no reason to criticize any of the decisions or evaluations that had been taken, in 1986 and in 2006
alike. Hence, Bigot appealed to the French government to finally put an end to the misleading
debate on Chernobyl health effects in France.694 
IRSN 
Like the CEA, the IRSN published on its website an extensive dossier on Chernobyl on the
occasion of the 20th anniversary.695 This dossier696 assembled not only PDF-versions of the general
reports that the IPSN and later its successor IRSN had published every year since 1996 but it also
contained information and maps on the radioactive fallout in France. In addition, the website
included a detailed bibliography, which also listed publications by a number of critical voices that
either attributed more or less importance to the Chernobyl impact than the IRSN had. In its account
on the Chernobyl death toll, the IRSN noted the factors that rendered it so difficult to provide a
concrete number: the lack of knowledge with regard to the health effects of low-level radiation, the
difficulties in conducting representative studies, etc. Taking these difficulties into account, the IRSN
concluded that 'generally speaking, the prediction of the number of deaths caused by the received
doses is tarnished by severe incertitude.'697 In order to show the range of this uncertainty, the IRSN
quoted its analogous British institution, the NRPB, which had calculated the death toll to be
difficilement cernables. On peut considérer que cette décision fut globalement raisonnable compte tenu du fait qu’il 
n’y a pas à ce jour d’anomalie imputable avec certitude à l’accident de Tchernobyl dans les incidences de cancer 
thyroïdien comptabilisées en France.'
693 Ibid., p.13: 'Pour ce qui concerne les autres cancers, les leucémies et la mortalité en général, rien de particulier n’a
pour le moment été mis en évidence.'
694 Ibid., pp. 23: 'Afin d’éviter l’écueil des débats fondés sur des suspicions et des hypothèses nécessairement 
réductrices, et donc toujours ouvertes à la contestation, en ayant en outre présent à l’esprit les procédures 
judiciaires en cours, je recommande vivement une communication gouvernementale sur l’éventuel impact sanitaire 
de Tchernobyl en France uniquement fondée sur les faits avérés.'
695 The following short account is an adaptation of the corresponding chapter in: Kalmbach, Tschernobyl und 
Frankreich, pp. 138-140. 
696 In 2009, the website 'Les leçons de Tchernobyl' was available at the following web address: 
http://www.irsn.org/index.phpposition=lecons_tchernobyl_accueil. There is now a new dossier on Chernobyl 
available which was published on the occasion of the 25th anniversary, see: 
http://www.irsn.fr/FR/connaissances/Installations_nucleaires/Les-accidents-nucleaires/accident-tchernobyl-
1986/Pages/Tchernobyl.aspx (last accessed: 15 Mai 2014).
697 IRSN, Les leçons de Tchernobyl – Évaluer les conséquences et protéger les personnes: http://www 
.irsn.org/index.php?position=lecons_tchernobyl_ la_mortalite_due_a_l_accident: 'De façon générale, la prédiction 
du nombre de décès imputables aux doses reçues est entachée de grandes incertitudes.' (last accessed: June 2009)
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anywhere between 4,200 and 80,000. With regard to the health effects in France, the IRSN pointed
to the study the IPSN had conducted together with the InVS in 2000698 and repeated that, according
to the models applied, the number of additional incidences of thyroid cancer in children continued
to fall within the natural range of incidences and therefore any cancers caused by the accident
would not have been detectable.699 To a large degree, the IRSN's Chernobyl dossier was dedicated to
the topic of nuclear safety and to examining how this field had been challenged by the accident. The
IRSN stressed that the studies conducted in the most affected regions in Eastern Europe were of
paramount importance to gain knowledge about living conditions in contaminated areas.700 Thus,
the IRSN was quite concerned about the health situation in Eastern European and believed that the
consequences of the accident had not yet been fully evaluated. However, the IRSN saw no reason
for why there should be a debate about French self-affectedness as, from the IRSN's perspective,
even if a health impact were to exist in France, it would be far too small to be detectable. 
In direct relation to the 20th anniversary, albeit with a slight delay, Philippe Renaud, Didier
Champion, and Jean Brenot published Les retombées radioactives de l’accident de Tchernobyl sur
le territoire français.701 The book came out in 2007 and was an updated version of the 1999 book
written by Philippe Renaud et al., Les retombées en France de l'accident de Tchernobyl. As was
stated in the preface, this new book was part of the efforts of the IRSN to reach a balance regarding
the Chernobyl health effects on the occasion of this important anniversary.702 In the chapter
'Estimation des risques sanitaires en France,' the authors stated that the calculated doses of
radioactivity justified an evaluation of health effects in France, in particular with regard to possible
thyroid diseases.703 However, the results of the evaluation they presented several pages later asserted
there was no reason to be worried about the Chernobyl health effects in France: 'The results show
698 This study is discussed in chapter 2.2.1.
699 IRSN, Les leçons de Tchernobyl – Exposition des personnes en France: http://www.irsn.org/index.php?
position=lecons_tchernobyl_exposition_des_ personnes_en_france (last accessed: June 2009).
700 IRSN, Les leçons de Tchernobyl – Mieux agir en territoire contaminé: http://www.irsn.org/index.php?
position=mieux_agir_en_territoire_contamine (last accessed: June 2009).
701 Philippe Renaud, Didier Champion, Jean Brenot, Les retombées radioactives de l’accident de Tchernobyl sur le 
territoire français. Conséquences environnementales et expositions des personnes (Paris: Éditions Tec & Doc, 
2007).
702 Ibid., p. ix: 'Après la première édition par l'IPSN, en 1999, d'un ouvrage intitulé Les retombées en France de 
l'accident de Tchernobyl, ce nouveau livre dresse une synthèse actualisée des connaissances acquises sur la 
contamination radioactive du territoire français, plus de vingt ans après la catastrophe nucléaire. Depuis la 
première édition, de nombreux travaux ont été poursuivis principalement par l'IPSN, pas l'OPRI, puis par l'IRSN né
de la fusion de ces deux organismes, ainsi que par lINVS. L'année 2006 a été pour l'IRSN l'occasion de dresser le 
bilan de l'ensemble de ces travaux et d'en tirer des enseignements pour l'avenir, en s'appuyant sur une analyse de 
son conseil scientifique. Le présent livre constitue l'une des pièces finales de ce bilan, qui complète les éléments 
déjà rendus publics par l'Institut, notamment sur son site Internet.'
703 Ibid., p. 146: 'Compte tenu de l'ordre de grandeur des doses calculées, les conséquences pour la population 
française pourraient être des pathologies cancéreuses (tumeurs solides et leucémies) et notamment des cancers de 
la thyroïde. Les niveaux calculés des doses équivalentes à la thyroïde en France, en particulier pour les expositions 
maximales, justifient une évaluation du risque du cancer de la thyroïde.'
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that, according to the model, the excesses of the estimated cases are inferior or comparable to the
uncertainties regarding the estimations on the number of “spontaneous” cancers: thus, these
excesses would be hard to detect from an epidemiological point of view. Considering the limits of
the indicated method and the uncertainties regarding the risks associated with low doses, the real
excess of thyroid cancer, on the level of considered doses, might actually be zero.'704 With regard to
'les enseignements tirés en France sur la gestion des crises nucléaires' ('the lessons learned in
France on the management of nuclear crises'), the authors stated clearly that their evaluation was
not intended to call into question the appropriateness of the actions taken by the French public
authorities in 1986. On the contrary, rather than looking back and asking what should and could
have been done in the case of Chernobyl, it was more important to ask what should and could be
done in the event another important nuclear accident were to happen.705
InVS 
The InVS also used the 20th anniversary of Chernobyl as an opportunity to communicate its
evaluation of the Chernobyl health effects in France to a broader public.706 For this purpose, it
published the pamphlet Surveillance sanitaire en France en lien avec l'accident de Tchernobyl –
Bilan actualisé sur les cancers thyroïdiens et études épidémiologiques en cours en 2006.707 Since
2000, the InVS had investigated the possible increase of thyroid cancers in France by compiling a
broad range of cancer registers and local and regional epidemiological studies. In its 2006
publication, the InVS presented its results, but it left out the results of the investigations in Corsica
insofar as this study had not yet been completed at the time of writing.708 In this report, the InVS
704 Ibid., p. 149: 'Ces résultats montrent qui, selon le modèle, les excès de cas estimés sont inférieurs ou comparables 
aux incertitudes sur les estimations du nombre de cancers «spontanés»: ces excès devraient lors être difficilement 
détectables d'un point de vue épidémiologique. Compte tenu des limites de la méthode indiquées ci-dessus et des 
incertitudes sur le risque associé aux faibles doses, l'excès réel de cancers de la thyroïdiens, aux niveaux de dose 
considérés ici, peut même être nul.'
705 Ibid., p. 153: 'Il ne s'agit pas ici de porter un jugement sur ce qui aurait dû être fait en 1986 car, en 20 ans, les 
conceptions et les pratiques en matière d'évaluation et de gestion des risques pour la santé et pour l'environnement 
ont significativement évolué. La question se pose davantage dans une vision prospective, face à l'éventualité d'un 
nouvel accident nucléaire important.'
706 This paragraph is an adaptation of the corresponding chapter in: Kalmbach, Tschernobyl und Frankreich, pp. 140-
141. 
707 InVS (Laurence Chérié-Challine et al.), Surveillance sanitaire en France en lien avec l'accident de Tchernobyl – 
Bilan actualisé sur les cancers thyroïdiens et études épidémiologiques en cours en 2006 (Saint-Maurice: InVS, 
2006).
708 The results of the study on Corsica were published in 2012: InVS (L. Pascal, J.L. Lasalle), Estimation de l’incidence
du cancer de la thyroïde en Corse. 1998 – 2006 (Saint-Maurice: InVS, 2012). The study is available online. The 
English summary on IRSN's website provides the following information: 'In France, Corsica appears to be one of 
the most exposed regions to the fallout from the Chernobyl accident. Taking into account the scientific knowledge at 
that time, it was decided to focus studies on thyroid cancers. A study was carried out in order to estimate thyroid 
cancer incidence in Corsica for the periods 1998-2001 and 2002-2006. The study identified incident thyroid cancer 
cases between 1998 and 2006 among residents in Corsica. Data were collected using information from the hospitals
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concluded that its further investigations confirmed the preliminary results of its work, which had
been published in 2001 and 2003, namely that 'the observed increase in incidences of thyroid
cancers is longstanding, important, and continued in time, having started before the Chernobyl
accident. […] The lowest rates were observed in the counties of Alsace, which had been the most
exposed to the accident's fallout.'709 The studies revealed a slight tendency toward an increase in
already very rare incidences of thyroid cancer in children. But this observed increase, just as with
the general increase in thyroid cancers, was according to the InVS not linked to Chernobyl but
rather to an improvement in the registration of these cases over time.710 However, considering that
the causes of thyroid cancer were so little known or understood, the InVS announced it would be
investigating this topic further, particularly what possible role ionizing radiation had in the
development of these cancers in children.711 In this regard, the aspect of French self-affectedness
figured prominently in the InVS report; though it primarily argued against an increase in thyroid
cancers in France because of Chernobyl. 
The InVS pamphlet was not limited to providing an evaluation of the health impact in
France, it also spoke of the health impact of Chernobyl in the most affected areas of Eastern
Europe. It stated that since 1990, there was a veritable epidemic of thyroid cancers in children, but
apart from this specific kind of cancer, there was no evidence of significant increases in other
cancers in the three most contaminated countries.712 Thus, the InVS's account of Chernobyl was far
from apocalyptic. The way in which the InVS evaluated Chernobyl in this pamphlet can be directly
linked back to its position regarding the health impact of low-level radiation. This stance was also
clearly forwardly expressed in this report: 'There isn't any epidemiological study that has been able
to show that incidences of cancer are linked to low-level exposure.'713
(PMSI) and the local health insurance funds (ALD). Cases were validated through medical records before inclusion 
in the study. Over the period of study, 342 cases of thyroid cancer, rather women and relatively young patients, were
identified in Corsica. Incidence rate of the thyroid cancer was high, but stable among men, and with a slight 
increase among women, particularly between 2002 and 2006. However, incidence rate and clinical characteristics 
of thyroid cancer in Corsica are not exceptional and are similar to those in other French districts.' On: 
http://www.invs.sante.fr/Publications-et-outils/Rapports-et-syntheses/Maladies-chroniques-et-
traumatismes/2012/Estimation-de-l-incidence-du-cancer-de-la-thyroide-en-Corse (last accessed: 15 June 2013).
709 InVS, Surveillance sanitaire en France en lien avec l'accident de Tchernobyl, p. 65: 'L’augmentation observée de 
l’incidence des cancers de la thyroïde est ancienne, importante et continue, ayant commencé avant l’accident de 
Tchernobyl. [...] Les taux les moins élevés étant observés dans les départements d’Alsace qui ont été les plus 
exposés aux retombées de l’accident.'
710 Ibid.
711 Ibid., p. 66.
712 Ibid., p. 4: 'En dehors des cancers de la thyroïde, aucune augmentation significative des taux des autres cancers n’a
été mise en évidence depuis l’accident dans les trois pays les plus contaminés.'





In 2005, the NRPB became the Radiation Protection Division of the Health Protection Agency
(HPA). Thus, in 2006, the task of communicating on Chernobyl fell to the HPA. However, there are
n o publications in Britain that are comparable to those released by the IRSN and the InVS in
France.714 The only publication by HPA released on the occasion of the 20th anniversary is a two-
page press release for 25 April entitled The consequences of the Chernobyl nuclear accident.715 The
numbers that were presented in this press release were taken from the articles written by Elisabeth
Cardis et al. in 1996 and 2006.716 In order to give a better overview of these numbers, the HPA
reproduced the summary table that was used in one of the articles to show the 'Mean cumulative
whole body dose,' the 'Predicted excess number of cancer deaths,' and the 'Predicted % of cancer
deaths due to radiation in the population.' Aside from the two articles by Cardis et al., the HPA
included only two more references: the UNSCEAR report of 2000 and the WHO/Chernobyl Forum
report of 2006 (of which Cardis' findings were actually an essential part). Because the text of the
press release only consisted of three paragraphs, and given this is one of the very few Chernobyl
statements released by the British public authorities after the mid-1990s, it is quoted here in its
entirety:
'The 20th anniversary of the Chernobyl accident on 26th April has produced a number of
714 I do not know if, in 2006, the HPA included information on Chernobyl on its website. Today, the account on 
Chernobyl provided on the HPA's website is quite short and 'Chernobyl' is not even included as a key word in the 
topic list, a list which consists of several hundred entries. However, in the brief account on Chernobyl, one quarter 
of the text is dedicated to 'The impact in the UK' and provides the following information: 'Chernobyl fallout was 
first detected in northern Poland on Monday, 28 April, 1986 and soon afterwards across the Baltic Sea in Sweden. 
The plume then travelled southwards over Germany and up through France to the UK, arriving in southeast 
England on the morning of Friday, 2 May. The plume had travelled over 1000 miles before reaching the UK and so 
was considerably dispersed. It was nevertheless very detectable with suitable instruments and there was some 
widespread 'dry' deposition (i.e., not caused by rainfall). Rainfall in North Wales, NW England and Scotland 
deposited more fission products on the ground via 'wet' deposition. Iodine-131 was measured in air at about 1or 2 
becquerels per cubic metre and could be detected in milk products in these and other regions, but not at levels that 
would have triggered a ban on consumption. Caesium-137 could also be detected in soil samples and this still has 
an impact in parts of the UK. In most areas the caesium-137 was washed into the ground where it binds strongly 
with clay and other soils and is therefore removed from the food chain. However in certain parts of the UK the soil 
and grasses combine to recycle the caesium-137 and it can then enter the food chain. This occurs in some hill farm 
areas and has required restrictions on produce from sheep farms in these areas. Measurements were carried out to 
see how much radiation people had absorbed during, and after, the passage of the plume. In southern UK, people 
had levels of about 300 becquerels of caesium-137 in their bodies in 1986 which dropped to 50 becquerels in 1989 
and then were back to pre-incident levels in 1990. For comparison, adults have about 4,000 becquerels of naturally 
occurring potassium-40 in their bodies. Potassium is essential for life and potassium-40 emits electrons and a 
gamma ray with a very similar energy to the gamma ray from caesium-137.' See: 
http://www.hpa.org.uk/Topics/Radiation/UnderstandingRadiation/UnderstandingRadiationTopics/RadiationIncidents
/Chernobyl/ (last accessed: 15 June 2013).
715 Health Protection Agency, The consequences of the Chernobyl nuclear accident, in: HPA press releases archive for 
2006: http://www.hpa.org.uk/webc/HPAwebFile/HPAweb_C/1253205582795 (last accessed: 15 June 2013).
716 The studies by Elisabeth Cardis et al. on the health effects of the Chernobyl fallout have formed a central element of 
the reports of the Chernobyl Forum. Until 2008, Cardis was Head of the Radiation Group at the International 
Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), the cancer agency of the WHO. 
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papers, articles and claims about the health effects of the accident both here in the UK and in
Eastern Europe. The estimates of the number of health effects caused by radiation exposure from
the accident vary widely, from a few thousand to hundreds of thousands of deaths. 
Three people died immediately as a result of the accident and a further twenty eight died within a
few weeks as a direct result of acute radiation doses(1). They were staff working at the Chernobyl
nuclear power station at the time and staff from the emergency services, particularly the fire
service. Nineteen more of these emergency workers died during the period 1987 to 2004 from
various causes. There is also an increase in the incidence of thyroid cancer in people who were
children in 1986, including those in utero at the time of the accident. At present over 4000 cases of
thyroid cancer have arisen in Belarus, the Ukraine and parts of Russia, most of which can be
attributed to exposure of the thyroid gland by radioactive iodine isotopes from Chernobyl(2). This
condition is fatal in only about 1% of cases but it is nevertheless a serious health effect; people
affected need to take medication for the rest of their lives. 
Predictions of increases in the incidence of cancer in general, and of other illnesses that might have
resulted from exposures to radionuclides from Chernobyl, are subject to large uncertainties and can
therefore be contentious. These uncertainties are at their greatest when attempting to estimate the
number of excess cancer cases attributable to very low radiation doses received by very large
numbers of people. A wide range of estimates have been reported in recent weeks using various risk
factors and differing methods of calculation. The most reliable recent evidence comes from
Elisabeth Cardis and colleagues published in the International Journal of Cancer(3). We reproduce
a summary table of their predictions below and the uncertainties inherent in making such
predictions are discussed in detail in the paper and in a recent review(4).' 
The figure that was presented for the 'Predicted excess numbers of cancer deaths' for the
whole of Europe was 16,000. In relation to other calculations, which were brought forward on the
occasion of Chernobyl's 20th anniversary, this number is one among the lower estimates. But what is
even more interesting about this press release is the fact that the HPA did not even include a
subordinate clause on the topic of Chernobyl fallout in Britain. Thus, self-affectedness was
absolutely a non-issue for the British radiation protection authority. With regard to the third
narrative element used in this analysis, anti-Eastern European/anti-Soviet stereotypes, nothing can
be derived from these few lines. However, another source, the official memoir of the NRPB
published by the HPA one year after the 20th anniversary, proves interesting to this end.717 In this
717 Mike O’Riordan, Radiation protection: a memoir of the National Radiological Protection Board (Didcot: Health 
Protection Agency, 2007).
203
institutional history of more than 300 pages, the author dedicated only 3 pages to Chernobyl,
praising the 'excellent manner in which the scientific, administrative and public relation aspects of
the event had been handled.'718 The problems resulting from the fallout in Britain itself did not
figure in the account either. However, the author framed the Chernobyl impact in what was unusual
and for 2007 quite impressive Cold War rhetoric: 'Although the accident caused thirty deaths
among the workers at the site and increased incidents of thyroid cancer among children,
considerable disruption of the economy, and much distress in the affected areas, the people of the
region were inured to suffering. They, or their parents, had experienced the horrors of
collectivisation, famine, purges, invasion and the Gulag system. If there was a positive outcome of
the accident, it was at the political level in the USSR.'719  
2.3.2 Nuclear power industry
Britain
The British nuclear industry did not take the opportunity offered by the 20th anniversary to
communicate on Chernobyl either. There was not one single publication or even a press release by
any of the actors in this cluster for this event. Like in France, the British nuclear industry withdrew
from the Chernobyl debate after the early 1990s. However, there is one very important difference
between these two cases. Whereas in France, in the years leading up to the 20th Chernobyl
anniversary, the nuclear industry, in particular Areva, had received substantial political support, the
British nuclear power industry had basically been dismantled with the privatization of the British
energy sector – a privatization that resulted in the sale of the British nuclear power plants to the
British branch of the EDF, EDF Energy. Thus, in 2006, the actors of the British nuclear power
industry were very much linked to France.
France
EDF 
It seems that after its publications on Chernobyl in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the EDF felt it
had said everything there was to say on the topic. Similarly to the actors in the British nuclear
industry, the EDF's immediate communication revolved around the central statement that an
718 Ibid., p. 119.
719 Ibid., p. 120.
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accident like Chernobyl could not happen in its own power plants. Any possible links between the
activities of the company and the events of Chernobyl were rejected. Therefore, I hypothesize that
the EDF did not further communicate on Chernobyl because the company simply did not consider
itself part of the Chernobyl debate. The possibility that people could have linked the accident to the
EDF's activities in the event it continued to release statements on the accident and participate in the
Chernobyl debate was most likely an important factor in the company's decision to refrain from
making further statements. This policy to avoid making any potential link between Chernobyl and
French nuclear power plants even impacted the festivities of the 20th anniversary of the Paluel site.
Although the Paluel site opened in April 1986, the EDF celebrated its anniversary at the end of
2006 instead of during April 2006 in order to prevent the festivities from becoming a target for anti-
nuclear protest on the occasion of the 20th Chernobyl anniversary.720 The EDF's public relations
communication is another instance in which the company has actively distanced its affairs from the
accident. The company history on the EDF website does not mention Chernobyl at all. The way in
which EDF chose to deal with Chernobyl by refraining from discussing it can be considered the
logical consequence of how the events of 1986 were classified, namely as a 'Soviet accident'. The
EDF has considered itself to be completely separate from the world in which Chernobyl happened;
this world was the past of nuclear energy, and the EDF lay in the future. The company is proud of
its technology and openly advertises the source of its generated electricity; it has done so even more
openly since the 'greening of the atom' within the frame of the climate change debate – and strongly
lobbied for by France721 – discursively transformed nuclear reactors into mechanisms of nature
conservation, if not of world salvation.
Areva
It is very likely that similar reasoning underpins the silence of Areva on the topic of Chernobyl.
Neither Areva nor its precursors Framatome and Cogema published any statements on the accident.
However, the way in which Chernobyl was interpreted in the internal context of Areva can be
deduced from another source: a book written by Areva's long-term CEO Anne Lauvergeon and her
co-worker Michel-Hubert Jamard. Published in 2008, La troisième révolution énergétique722 lies
outside the temporal bounds of this study. However, because the account on Chernobyl in this book
is quite interesting, and because it is the only Areva-linked statement on Chernobyl that I came
720 I am thankful to Yves Bouvier for providing me with this information.
721 See: Emmanuelle Mühlenhöver, L’environnement en politique étrangère: raisons et illusions. Une analyse de 
l’argument environnemental dans les diplomaties électronucléaires françaises et américaines (Paris: L’Harmattan, 
2002).
722 Anne Lauvergeon and Michel-Hubert Jamard, La troisième révolution énergétique (Paris: Plon, 2008).
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across in my research, I have decided to include it here. The space dedicated to Chernobyl in La
troisième révolution énergétique is minimal; in fact, the authors dedicated only 4 of 200 pages to
the accident. The title of this account, 'A soviet catastrophe', already provided a clear indication of
the direction the argument would take: according to the authors, the accident was caused by the
action of the operators and the reactor design. But Lauvergeon and Jamard provided more than just
their view on the events of 1986. They also gave an evaluation of Chernobyl's health effects. Here,
they primarily referred to the report published by the Chernobyl Forum, stating that it was 'the most
profound study that has been conducted so far.'723 They went on to state that there would be 4,000
additional deaths because of the accident, asserting that the 'relatively low level of doses received by
the inhabitants of the affected areas' did not substantiate the presence of any links between the
radioactive fallout and the increase in still-births, malformations, or the weak health of children in
this region.724 Instead, the reason for this problematic health-related situation was to be found in the
people's mental health problems, which were caused by a lack of information and the conviction
they had reduced life expectancy – a setting that had been further exacerbated by anti-nuclear
campaigners.725 As well as the narrative elements of anti-Soviet stereotypes and radiophobia, the
authors also included an account on French self-affectedness: Epidemiological studies had shown
that no correlation could be found between thyroid cancer and Chernobyl in a country like
France.726 Lauvergeon's and Jamard's Chernobyl narrative is well summed up in the metaphor they
included in their account: 'In consideration of these facts, it becomes clear that the attempts to make
Chernobyl the incarnation of the dangers implied in nuclear energy, is the result of ignorance... or
of maliciousness. A little bit like if one were to condemn cars because of a deadly accident that had
been provoked by a Trabant the breaks of which were sabotaged and that had been driven at full
speed on a mountain road by a driver who was determined to ignore all traffic rules.'727
723 Ibid., p. 132: 'L'étude reconnue comme la plus approfondie à ce jour sur les conséquences de Tchernobyl fur menée 
sou l'égide des Nations unies vingt ans après l'explosion.'
724 Ibid.: 'La relative faiblesse des doses reçues par les habitants des zones touchées n'a pas permis d'établir de 
corrélation avec le nombre d'enfants mort-nés, de grossesses non menées à terme, de complications à 
l'accouchement ou avec l'état de santé général des enfants. Le rapport relève aussi l'impossibilité d'établir un lien 
entre les malformations congénitales signalées dans les zones contaminées et l'exposition aux rayonnements.'
725 Ibid. pp. 132: 'En revanche, les experts ont mis en lumière un problème aigu de santé mentale dû au manque 
d’information donné par les autorités, ce silence ayant amené les populations exposées à se convaincre de la 
diminution de leur espérance de vie et à s’enfermer dans une attitude passive et ce ne sont pas les propos 
apocalyptiques des antinucléaires qui peuvent les aider à vivre.'
726 Ibid., p. 133: 'De même, des enquêtes épidémiologiques ont démontré l’absence de corrélation entre l’augmentation 
des cancers de la thyroïde constatée dans un pays comme la France et l’accident de Tchernobyl.'
727 Ibid., p. 131: 'A la lumière de ces faits, on comprend que vouloir faire de l’accident de Tchernobyl l’illustration 
définitive de la dangerosité de l’énergie nucléaire, c’est faire preuve de beaucoup d’ignorance... ou de mauvaise foi.
Un peu comme si l’on condamnait l’automobile à la suite d’un carambolage meurtrier provoqué par une Trabant 
dont on aurait saboté les freins avant de la lancer à pleine vitesse sur un chemin de montagne entre les mains d’un 
conducteur résolu à ignorer le code de la route.'
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2.3.3 Anti-nuclear groups and other critical voices
France
Greenpeace / Réseau: sortir du nucléaire
Contrary to the strategy of the EDF to distance its company activities from Chernobyl, French anti-
nuclear activists were very keen to make that connection between the accident and the French
nuclear enterprise. The campaign protesting the construction of the first EPR in France – at the
Flamanville site in Normandy – emphasized this connection. This project was to be the first of an
entire fleet of new nuclear reactors to be built in France; Flamanville 3 was also intended to be a
show piece to market this new reactor particularly after problems in the construction of the first
EPR ever to be built had been compromised in Finland and threatened to ruin the reputation of this
new reactor design, which was supposed to become the new cash cow of French export. In 2005,
the public authorities gave the EPR project in Flamanville, where two reactors already existed, the
go-ahead. In April 2006 – the same month of Chernobyl's 20th anniversary – thousands of people
gathered to protest the EPR in Cherbourg.
In the years leading up to, including and following 2006, Greenpeace France focused its anti-
nuclear campaigns on the EPR. At the same time, this NGO was one of the main promoters of a
public commemoration of Chernobyl's 20th anniversary. For the occasion, Greenpeace published a
pamphlet728 and a CD729 with songs that had been written by various French artists on Chernobyl.
Together with Fnac, Greenpeace also organized a photo exposition in the Parisian shopping mall
Forum des Halles, performances of the theatre play Une autre voix solitaire (a play based on La
supplication), and round table discussions.730
Réseau: sortir du nucléaire was the other key player to campaign against the EPR project in
Flamanville. Contemporaneously to its mobilization for the anti-EPR demonstration in Cherbourg
in mid-April, the network prominently raised the issue of Chernobyl. On its website, it published an
extensive dossier on Chernobyl, which focused on the accident's impact in France and the affaire
Tchernobyl.731 In addition, at the beginning of 2006, the network's spokesperson Stéphane Lhomme
728 Greenpeace France, 20 ans Tchernobyl (Paris: Greenpeace France, 2006).
729 Until 2011, information on this CD as well as a streaming function for all titles was available on Greenpeace's 
website: http://www.greenpeace.org/france/news/CD-20ans-tchernobyl. See for general information on the CD: 
http://musique.fnac.com/a1840356/Variete-francaise-20-ans-Tchernobyl-CD-album#ficheDt (last accessed: 15 June 
2013).
730 A website with a list of all Chernobyl-related events which Greenpeace had organized in Paris was available until 
2011 on: http://www.greenpeace.org/france/news/expo-tchernobyl.
731 Until 2011, the website was available at: http://www.sortirdunucleaire.org/index.php?
menu=sinformer&sousmenu=themas&souss ousmenu=tcherno3&page=index.
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published his book L'insécurité nucléaire. Bientôt un Tchernobyl en France.732 But the Chernobyl
anniversary was really just the opportune occasion on which to publish the book and the accident
was more of a metaphor than it was the topic of the book.733 Lhomme was primarily concerned with
the risk that a similar accident could happen in France. In his opinion, Chernobyl was everything
but a 'Soviet accident': Western nuclear experts had been familiar with the RBMK reactor design,
however, they had done everything to dismiss their complicity. Lhomme also pointed out that
human failure of plant operators could happen anywhere in the world. His description of the
situation in the most affected regions in Eastern Europe heavily drew on the information provided
in La Supplication. But Lhomme's aim was not to present a detailed account of the health situation
of people living in these regions, but to reveal the overarching politics governing the management
of these people's daily life. From Lhomme's point of view, these people were being treated like
laboratory animals in an immense experiment, the clear aim of which was 'to show that after all, the
consequences of Chernobyl, and by deduction any other eventual nuclear accident, were just not
that serious.'734 In particular, the ETHOS and CORE projects were intended to serve as
demonstrations on 'how to live happily in an contaminated area.'735 Lhomme in his book identified a
clear promoter of this policy: the French nucléocratie. According to Lhomme, the French
nucléocratie was using the contaminated areas around Chernobyl as a training ground to learn and
prepare for such eventualities as an accident in a French nuclear power plant. At the international
level, this way of managing and at the same time profiting from the situation in the most affected
areas in Eastern Europe was made possible by the WHO-IAEA-agreement and the concept of
'radiophobia'.736 In this regard, French nuclear policies and Chernobyl were tightly entwined in
Lhomme's narrative: According to this narrative, the affaire Tchernobyl clearly demonstrated the
lies and cover-ups the nucléocratie propagated regarding the dangers of the nuclear enterprise.737 At
the same time, he pointed out how the nucléocratie had held a dominant role in the evaluation and
management of the situation in the most affected areas of Eastern Europe. 
Thus, for French anti-nuclear activists, the promotion of a public commemoration of
Chernobyl on the occasion of the 20th anniversary served two purposes. On the one hand, Chernobyl
was presented as a proof that a serious accident could indeed happen and would have devastating
732 Stéphane Lhomme, L'insécurité nucléaire.
733 For a detailed analysis of Lhomme's book, see: Kalmbach, Tschernobyl und Frankreich, pp. 151-155. 
734 Lhomme, L'insécurité nucléaire, p. 183: '[...] visant à ‚démontrer’ par tous les moyens que les conséquences de 
Tchernobyl, et par déduction de toute nouvelle catastrophe nucléaire, ne sont en fin de compte pas si graves que 
cela.'
735 Ibid, pp. 185: 'L’après Tchernobyl – ou 'Comment vivre heureux en zone contaminée.'
736 Ibid., pp. 196.
737 Ibid., p. 205: 'Tout le monde sait bien que l’État français a menti lors du passage du nuage de Tchernobyl sur 
l’Hexagone.'
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consequences. On the other hand, by connecting the management of the post-accident situation in
France and in Eastern Europe to the power structures in the French nuclear techno-political regime,
the activists used Chernobyl as the demonstration of the inherent inhumanity of French nuclear
policies. Activists felt that there was an urgent need to unveil the real implications these policies
had for the future of France, if not the rest of the world. After all, the French nuclear industry was
about to reap the benefits of its international lobbying efforts of 'greening the atom' and was
preparing to sell the new EPR to the rest of the world. Therefore, within the context of the launch of
the new build project of the EPR in Flamanville, the 20th anniversary of Chernobyl proved to be the
ideal means with which the activists could catch and draw the attention of the wider public to their
cause. To this purpose, the image of the clean and green energy of the future – which was the
embodiment of the EPR marketing campaign – was placed in contrast with the apocalyptic scenery
of the situation in the most affected regions of Eastern Europe. The aim of bringing this divers
imagery together was to show that nuclear power was anything but a benign technology. The
activists wanted people to think twice about whether they truly found it acceptable to be surrounded
by 58 nuclear plants in their country and whether they really supported a policy that pushed for
worldwide nuclear expansion.
CRIIRAD
The CRIIRAD also instrumentalized the 20th anniversary of the accident to call attention to its
cause, i.e. calling to account the people who had covered up the true impact of the Chernobyl fallout
in France.738 In early April, the CRIIRAD released Tchernobyl – 20 ans après, les services officiels
français persistent dans la censure et la désinformation739 and made this communiqué available on
its website. The central argument of the publication was its criticism of the IRSN: the successor of
the SCPRI still would not admit that the data published in 1986 had been falsified. What was even
worse was that the same people who had lied to the French public 20 years ago were still in charge
and that the same mind-set that had made these lies possible still persisted. 'In the event of a new
accident should occur, one thing is certain: there won't be a single discordant voice inside the
official expert institution, everybody will speak with one voice... and this voice will have the same
intonations as in 1986!'740 The extent to which the affaire Tchernobyl, even 20 years later, was still
738 This paragraph is an adaption of: Kalmbach, Tschernobyl und Frankreich, p. 150.
739 CRIIRAD, Tchernobyl – 20 ans après, les services officiels français persistent dans la censure et la désinformation 
(Valence: CRIIRAD, 2006).
740 Ibid., p. 2: 'En cas de nouvel accident, une chose est sûre, il n’y aura pas une seule voix discordante au sein de 
l’institut officiel d’expertise, tout le monde parlera d’une seule voix... et elle aura les mêmes intonations qu’en 
1986!'
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considered an ongoing struggle between the very same actors that were present in 1986 is well
illustrated by a round table discussion that the CRIIRAD had attempted to plan for 25 April 2006:
Bella and Roger Belbéoch, as well as Roland Desbordes and Corinne Castanier of the CRIIRAD
were supposed to confront Philippe Renaud, Georges Charpak, André Aurengo and André-Claude
Lacoste.741 To be sure, the commitment that the CRIIRAD had to Chernobyl was not limited to
resolving the issue inherent to the affaire Tchernobyl and ensuring that compensations for health
effects of the fallout in France were allocated. The organization also actively supported Eastern
European Chernobyl activists, in particular Yuri Bandazhevsky (chapter 3.1.2).
'Caen-Group'
Chernobyl's 20th anniversary was not only used as a tool in explicit anti-nuclear campaigns or to
further the claims of pro- and anti-nuclear proponents in the struggle connected to the affaire
Tchernobyl. Advocates who challenged the official evaluations of the situation in the most affected
areas in Eastern Europe also used the anniversary to increase awareness for their cause.742 To this
end, Frédérick Lemarchand and Guillaume Grandazzi published a revised and expanded edition of
Les silences de Tchernobyl.743 This time around, Galia Ackerman – who had translated La
Supplication to French and lobbied for a French edition of the book – joined the team of editors. In
addition to this joint publication, the editors also pursued individual projects in 2006. Galia
Ackerman published her own book Tchernobyl, retour sur un désastre744 and wrote a foreword to
the French edition of Igor Kostin's photography book on Chernobyl.745 Guillaume Grandazzi, in
turn, wrote an article for Osteuropa,746 and Frédérick Lemarchand, together with others, edited a
topic issue for the journal Écologie & Politique.747 Among this group of editors was Jean-Pierre
Dupuy – philosopher of science and author of the book Pour un catastrophisme éclairé748 who had
come in closer contact with the topic of Chernobyl through his visit to the most affected areas
where he had joined Grandazzi and Lemarchand. Dupuy published a book on Chernobyl on the
741 This debate was announced on CRIIRAD's website, however, as far as I know, never materialized.
742 All the books mentioned subsequently are discussed in more detail in: Kalmbach, Tschernobyl und Frankreich, p. 
144-148.
743 Galia Ackerman, Guillaume Grandazzi, Frédérick Lemarchand (eds.), Les silences de Tchernobyl. L’avenir 
contaminé (Paris: Éditions Autrement, 2006).
744 Galia Ackerman, Tchernobyl, retour sur un désastre (Paris: Buchet/Chastel, 2006).
745 Igor Kostine (avec la collaboration de Thomas Johnson), Tchernobyl: confessions d'un reporter (Paris: Éditions des 
Arènes, 2006).
746 Guillaume Grandazzi, “Die Zukunft erinnern – Gedenken an Tschernobyl,” in Tschernobyl: Vermächtnis und 
Verpflichtung, ed. by Sahm/Sapper/Weichsel, p. 7-18.
747 Frédérick Lemarchand, et al. (eds.), Destination Tchernobyl (Paris: Éditions Syllepse, 2006; Écologie & Politique
32/2006).
748 Dupuy, Pour un catastrophisme éclairé.
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occasion of the 20th anniversary as well: Retour de Tchernobyl: journal d’un homme en colère.749
The commonality of all of these publications lay in their emphasis on the devastating
consequences the accident had had and would continue to have for the people living in the most
contaminated areas in Eastern Europe. At the same time, the authors vehemently criticized
international attempts to cut any connection between the health situation and the radio-hygienic
situation of the area and to dump the individuals of the contaminated areas with the responsibility of
dealing with the consequences of the disaster themselves. Already the sheer number of publications
that originated from the sphere of the 'Caen-Group' ensured that their narrative of Chernobyl would
profoundly shape the media reporting on the 20th anniversary. Interviews with the authors were
printed and broadcasted, their books were reviewed and figured prominently in the reading
recommendations, and Galia Ackerman – translator and journalist as aforementioned – ensured the
broad and very critical coverage of Chernobyl on Radio France Inter.
Britain
Undoubtedly, there were also people in Britain who, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary, raised
criticism of the evaluation and management of the impact of Chernobyl. Their criticism was
particularly directed towards the official reports published by the IAEA and WHO in late 2005
regarding the environmental effects and healths impact of the accident. In response to these reports,
MEP Rebecca Harms had commissioned a study to look into the scientific basis of their evaluations,
which was published in 2006 and became widely known as the TORCH-report (The Other Report
on Chernobyl).750 Although the authors, Ian Fairlie and David Summer, are both British scientists,
the report has never truly been perceived as a British publication, least of all in the UK. This is very
likely due to the fact that a wider British debate on Chernobyl during the 20th anniversary never
materialized. The few British activists who took part in the transnational Chernobyl debate did not
work together to create a 'concerted effort' at a national level, as did the French Chernobyl activists.
The French activists received far more public attention due to the strong perception of self-
affectedness, which had become a pressing political issue within the context of the EPR new build
project. This public interest in turn generated enough interest on the part of publishing houses, the
editorial offices of journals and newspapers, and broadcast television for them to cover this topic as
well. In Britain, however, the issue of nuclear energy policies had almost totally disappeared from
the public discourse for years: for instance, the government's 2003 Energy White Paper had not
749 Jean-Pierre Dupuy, Retour de Tchernobyl: journal d’un homme en colère (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2006).
750 Ian Fairlie and David Summer, The Other Report on Chernobyl (TORCH) (Berlin/Brussels/Kiev: Greens and EFA in
the European Parliament, 2006).
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even included nuclear energy in its considerations. Yet, 2006 was the year that brought nuclear
energy back on the agenda: Tony Blair's Energy Review, which was launched in January 2006,
embraced the many voices that had lobbied to revive the British nuclear enterprise. Many of these
voices had argued that nuclear power would be the perfect solution to reduce CO2-emissions and to
reach the ambitious aims that the British government had set for itself in this regard in the fight on
climate change. This turnabout of the Labour government with regard to its nuclear policies was
consolidated in the years to come: in 2007, the EDF publicly expressed its willingness to be the
operator of the eventual new build reactors,751 and – after intensive debates on the costs of the new
build project and the legitimacy guaranteeing the EDF a fixed price per kW/h752 – the government
gave its approval in March 2013 for Hinkley Point C. Interestingly, in the criticisms that
Greenpeace UK raised against this decision, the economic argument was present first and foremost:
'Hinkley C fails every test – economic, consumer, and environmental. It will lock a generation of
consumers into higher energy bills, via a strike price that’s understood to be nearly double the
current price of electricity, and it will distort energy policy by displacing newer, cleaner,
technologies that are dropping dramatically in price.'753
But in 2006, this was all still very much perceived as the government's dreams for the future.
As many of my interview partners stated, at this point in time nobody believed that the government
would be successful in pursuing this goal. Thus, in 2006, from the British anti-nuclear power
perspective – which comprised only a very few people to begin with – there was no reason why the
debate on the 'true' impact of Chernobyl ought to be transformed into a proxy war in the fight
against national nuclear policies as had occurred in France. By 2006, Chernobyl had been entirely
discursively distanced and separated from British nuclear policies. However, the fact that on the
occasion of the 20th anniversary some newspapers included the question of self-affectedness in their
reporting might be directly linked to this change in nuclear policies since it brought the newsworthy
question of the risks connected with nuclear power plants back on the agenda. Yet, in order to obtain
statements on British self-affectedness, journalists basically had to turn to one individual
campaigner: Chris Busby. 
751 See for this declaration the EDF's press release of 23 May 2007: http://medias.edf.com/communiques-de-
presse/tous-les-communiques-de-presse/communiques-2007/edf-apporte-son-experience-et-ses-competences-
nucleaires-aux-britanniques-40311.html&return=54%2526page%253D2%2526searchMonth%253DMai
%2526searchYear%253D2007%2526search%253D1 (last accessed: 15 June 2013).
752 The Sussex Energy Group is one of the most fierce critics of the government's plans. See in this regard: Sussex 
Energy Group, Response to Government’s “The Future of Nuclear Power” consultation (Sussex, 2007): 
https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=seg-spru-nuclear-response.pdf&site=264 (last accessed: 
15 June 2013).
753 Greenpeace UK, Hinkley strike price briefing: http://www.greenpeace.org.uk/hinkley-strike-price-briefing (last 





Although Chris Busby's contribution to the Chernobyl debate on the occasion of the 20th
anniversary was a cooperative project, it will be discussed all the same as an 'individual voice'. The
reason for such a decision lies in the fact that although from a transnational perspective is was very
much a cooperative project, from the British perspective it was very much an individual project
insofar as Busby's partners were completely external to the British nuclear discourse. In 2006,
Busby together with his colleague Alexey Yablokov edited the book Chernobyl 20 years on.754 This
compendium of articles was published, on behalf of the European Committee on Radiation Risk
(ECRR),755 by Busby's own environmental consultancy firm Green Audit. The book consisted of a
collection of articles that investigated various aspects of the Chernobyl health effects. The articles
were mostly written by Eastern European scientists. According to the editors, the studies included in
this book had been deliberately ignored by Western radiation experts because they openly
contradicted the 'official narrative' of Chernobyl's health impact, a narrative which was endorsed by
the UNSCEAR and the WHO. But the objective of this book was not just to provide a forum to a
Chernobyl counter narrative. The aim was to present evidence that the models for risk evaluation of
radiation exposure – that had been developed by the International Commission on Radiological
Protection (ICRP) and were based mainly on studies on Hiroshima and Nagasaki survivors – were
erroneous. This claim employed a rational that went far beyond the case of Chernobyl, and nuclear
accidents. It called into question the risk assessment of nuclear power plants in general – again, not
because of the fear of what could happen in the event of an accident, but because of the radioactive
emissions that were a result of the normal operations of nuclear power plants. Hence, although this
publication addressed the Chernobyl accident, its primary topic was to call attention to the need for
a fundamental review of the risks associated with nuclear power in general. The editors clearly
explained the role Chernobyl held in their argument: 'The Chernobyl accident and its appalling
754 Chris Busby and Alexey Yablokov (eds.), Chernobyl 20 years on: health effects of the Chernobyl accident 
(Aberystwyth: Published on behalf of the ECRR by Green Audit, 2006).
755 The ECRR is a working group that was initiated 1997 by the Green Group of the European Parliament in the context
of the adaption of a Council Directive on radioactive waste management. Chris Busby, a driving force of this 
initiative, served as the Scientific Secretary to this group. In 2003, Inge Schmitz-Feuerhake became the Chair of the 
Scientific Committee of the ECRR. Schmitz-Feuerhake, a retired Professor of experimental physics of the 
University of Bremen, is a founding member of the Gesellschaft für Strahlenschutz and became known in Germany 
because of her leukaemia cluster study in the Elbmarschen region. This study was intended to ascertain whether the 
nuclear power plant Krümmel had caused cancer in children in the area surrounding the plant.
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outcomes have given the human race the empirical evidence to test this theory [the ICRP model].'756
And they also openly addressed the wider political implications of their assessment: 'This book
represents a landmark on the road to understanding the effects of low-dose chronic irradiation. The
committee believes that these lessons should be borne in mind by policy makers who are, even now,
discussing new investments in nuclear energy and ways in which historic and future radionuclide
waste can be disposed of into the environment. The committee recommends this book to scientists
and policymakers and concerned members of the public in the hope that the huge amount of work
carried out by scientists publishing their results in Russian language journals and others studying
the effects of the Chernobyl accident will influence their decisions in this important area of public
health.'757 This quote is especially interesting because of its clear reference to the historical context
in which this book was published: 'policy makers who are, even now, discussing new investments in
nuclear energy', or rather Tony Blair's government, amongst others. Thus, Busby, very much like
anti-nuclear activists in France, used Chernobyl as an instrument to counter national nuclear
policies and to influence public opinion with his evaluation of the accident. 
The articles included in the compendium intended to leave no doubt in the reader's mind that
Chernobyl had generated an apocalypse. The radioactivity released by the accident had caused
changes in the genomes of 'all species, plants and animals and humans.'758 The effects of these
changes were the topic of the various articles compiled in this book. For example, Krysanov wrote
about the higher radiosensitivity of mice that had been living in the high irradiation zone for
generations; Yablokov contributed an article on the health status (or rather sickness status) of the
'liquidators'; and the Nesterenkos elaborated on the various illnesses found in children and adults in
the most affected areas of Belarus that they had been studying for years. But the apocalyptic
narrative of this collection of reports most obviously surfaced in Rosalie Bertell's article on 'The
death toll of the Chernobyl accident'. Bertell, one of North America's most prominent anti-nuclear
campaigners, proclaimed that a conservative estimation hovered between '899,600 to 1,787,000 in
total.'759 
The fact that this book – published by a British anti-nuclear campaigner in close cooperation
with a Russian colleague – included papers by the Nesterenkos, Inge Schmitz-Feuerhake, and
Rosalie Bertell and directly addressed the health effects of Chernobyl from a global perspective,
reveals the degree to which the Chernobyl debate had become transnationally entangled by 2006.
This well connected transnational counter expertise on Chernobyl was now taken by Busby to
756 Busby/Yablokov, Chernobyl 20 years on, p. 3.
757 Ibid.
758 Ibid., p. 2.
759 Ibid., p. 247.
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underpin his claim that a re-evaluation of low-dose radiation effects was necessary. This was
supposed to be the starting point for what he hoped would become a more generalized campaign
against the nuclear turn the British government had just taken. 
The way in which these two debates were connected becomes most visible in Busby's own
contribution to this group of articles in which British self-affectedness formed an integral part of his
argument. In his article on 'Infant leukaemia in Europe after Chernobyl and its significance for
radioprotection: a meta-analysis of three countries including new data from the UK', Busby argued
that 'infant leukaemia rates had been increased following exposure in utero to radiation from the
Chernobyl accident fallout in the UK.'760 But the point he wished to make with his finding was less
about Chernobyl's impact in Britain as such. For Busby, British health effects from Chernobyl were
just one steppingstone among many in a general argument built around the health impact of nuclear
power plants during their normal, accident-free operation. His line of argument intended to prove
that the low-level radiation people had been exposed to because of the Chernobyl fallout had led to
serious health effects, and this, at the same time, implied that nuclear plants in general caused
cancer in the people living near them. According to Busby, these health effects had already been
proven by the child leukaemia cluster that was verified around Sellafield.761 Therefore, for him,
there was only one possible conclusion: 'In the case of the Chernobyl infant leukemias there is no
alternative explanation apart from internal radiation exposure to largely the same isotopes as the
nuclear site leukaemias. The significance of this result for radio protection is overwhelming.'762 In
this regard, Busby used the research on the impact Chernobyl had in Britain as a means to a very
specific end: the end of electricity generation through nuclear power. And, in this regard – like in
his earlier publications – the health effects of Chernobyl in Britain served as an illustration of the
impact of the global nuclear enterprise.
This is an interesting difference when compared to the focus on which the French Chernobyl
debate was based. In France, the Chernobyl fallout has been perceived as something dangerous as
such and has not necessarily been put into relation with the national nuclear enterprise. This
constellation was a result of the prominent role attributed to French self-affectedness in the debate
on Chernobyl's impact. In Britain, however, the Chernobyl fallout was used by activists like Busby
as a means to expose the dangers of British nuclear installations. In this regard, investigations into
760 Busby and Yablokov, Chernobyl 20 years on, p. 136.
761 These kinds of cluster studies, which investigate the health situation of children living near nuclear installations, 
have been conducted in various countries. Normally, they are initiated by anti-nuclear groups and also, normally, 
find an 'abnormal level' of specific illnesses in the children; all of these studies and their applied methodologies are 
highly contested and, especially pro-nuclear scientists, consider the connection between these illnesses and the 
nuclear plants, which these studies claim to prove, to be untenable.
762 Busby and Yablokov, Chernobyl 20 years on, p. 142.
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the health effects of Chernobyl fallout in Britain aimed to underpin arguments brought against the
British and global nuclear industry and did not focus on individual compensation. Thus, it is
possible to detect a distinct difference in the way in which the argument 'Chernobyl' is used in the
two national contexts: in France, the notion 'Chernobyl' is attached to the criticism of the secrecy
policies of the French nucléocratie, whereas in Britain it is associated with the health impacts of the
British nuclear installations and the global nuclear enterprise.
France
In Britain, the 20th anniversary of Chernobyl was basically a non-issue. But in France, the numerous
monographs on Chernobyl that were published in 2006 mirror the high level of attention that was
dedicated to the accident from the diverse perspectives – among which the various publishing
houses that made these publications possible. Public authorities, anti-nuclear groups, and people
concerned with the health situation in the most affected areas of Eastern Europe were not the only
ones to use the anniversary to disseminate their interpretations and narratives of the accident,
various individual voices did so as well.763 Among them was one actor whose work and activities
have been already discussed in the previous chapter: Jean-Michel Jacquemin. In 2006, he released
his new book Tchernobyl: Aujourd’hui les Français malades.764 This 400-page book was basically a
synthesis of his earlier publications. It placed the emphasis on the devastating health effects of
Chernobyl in France and the continued official cover-up of the true impact. In addition to his
monograph, Jacquemin also contributed an article to the new edition of Les silences de
Tchernobyl.765 But Jacquemin was not the only individual voice that used the occasion of the 20th
anniversary of Chernobyl to come up with a narrative of the accident's impact; other new individual
actors sprung up as well. For instance, Chantal Montellier wrote and illustrated a graphic novel on
Chernobyl that not only addressed the question of the health effects in Eastern Europe, but also
broached the topic of the affaire Tchernobyl.766 Raymond Micoulaut used the 20th anniversary to
publish a book on the secrecy policies that surrounded the crisis management of the Chernobyl
accident, in France as well as in the Soviet Union.767 Moreover, for the Chernobyl activists from
763 Because the analysis of the French publications released for the 20th anniversary forms a central part of my book 
Tschernobyl und Frankreich, I keep this account here rather short.
764 Jean-Michel Jacquemin-Raffestin, Tchernobyl 20 ans après. Cachez ce nuage que je ne saurais voir (Paris: Guy 
Trédaniel Éditeur, 2006).
765 For a more detailed analysis of Jacquemin's 2006 publications, see: Kalmbach, Tschernobyl und Frankreich, 156-
158.
766 Chantal Montellier, Tchernobyl mon amour (Arles: Actes Sud BD, 2006). For an analysis of the graphic novel, see: 
Kalmbach, Tschernobyl und Frankreich, 165-166.
767 Raymond Micoulaut, Tchernobyl. L’histoire d’une désinformation (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2006). For an analysis of the
book, see: Kalmbach, Tschernobyl und Frankreich, 162-163.
216
Eastern Europe, like Igor Kostin768 and Juri Bandazhevky,769 the anniversary served as an occasion
to publish their accounts on the accident and its impact in French. The anniversary was also a
convenient occasion on which to publish books on the nuclear enterprise in general. Thus, it is no
coincidence that Jean-Philippe Desbordes' book Atomic Park. À la recherche des victimes du
nucléaire770 and the French translation of Günther Anders' classic Die atomare Bedrohung771
appeared in 2006. This variety and quantity of nuclear-related publications that appeared in 2006
clearly shows Chernobyl's central role in the French nuclear discourse.
2.3.5 Chernobyl solidarity movement groups
France
In France, the solidarity movement groups that organize recreational stays for children from the
most affected areas in Eastern Europe were almost invisible in 2006. They did not publish anything
on their work, nor did the media dedicate much space in their reports on their activities. However,
the Chernobyl interpretations of two founding members of the ETB, Galia Ackerman and Wladimir
Tchertkoff, figured prominently in news reports. In conformity to the work and stance of the ETB,
the publications did not discuss the recreational stays of Eastern European children in France.
Instead, Ackerman and Tchertkoff used the opportunity provided by the 20th anniversary to increase
awareness of the health and living conditions of the people in the most affected areas of Eastern
Europe. In addition, Tchertkoff's book Le crime de Tchernobyl. Le goulag nucléaire772 included a
detailed account on the wider nuclear politics that were at stake in the cover-up of the 'true' health
impact of Chernobyl. From Tchertkoff's point of view, the CORE and ETHOS programmes
essentially barred the formation of any criticisms of the evaluation policies and in particular
hindered any challenges to the concept of 'radiophobia' from forming. The author asserted that it
was, therefore, important to support people like Nesterenko and Bandazhevsky who opposed these
policies. In this regard, Ackerman's and Tchertkoff's publications conformed to the goals of the
ETB. This stance was located wholly within the political sphere, a setting that differed quite
768 Igor Kostine (avec la collaboration de Thomas Johnson), Tchernobyl confessions d’un reporter Tchernobyl (Paris: 
Editions des Arènes, 2006). For an analysis of the book, see: Kalmbach, Tschernobyl und Frankreich, 159-161.
769 Youri I. Bandazhevsky, La philosophie de ma vie: journal de prison (Paris: Jean-Claude Gawsewitch Éditeur, 2006).
Bandazhevsky's work is discussed in more detail in chapter 3.1.2.
770 Jean-Philippe Desbordes, Atomic Park. À la recherche des victimes du nucléaire (Arles: Actes Sud, 2006). For a 
short analysis of the book, see: Kalmbach, Tschernobyl und Frankreich, p. 161.
771 Günther Anders (traduit de l’allemand par Christophe David), La menace nucléaire: considérations radicales sur 
l’âge atomique (Monaco: Le Serpent à plumes, 2006). 
772 Wladimir Tchertkoff, Le crime de Tchernobyl. Le goulag nucléaire (Arles: Actes Sud, 2006).
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drastically from the one in which British solidarity movement exponents communicated in 2006
about their work. 
Britain
As aforementioned, very few British publications on Chernobyl were released on the occasion of
the 20th anniversary of the accident. This setting reflects the minor role that Chernobyl has played in
the British nuclear discourse. However, the few publications that came out in 2006 represent well
the main actors of the British Chernobyl debate since the mid-1990s. Alongside Chris Busby, a
central figure of the British solidarity movement also published work on Chernobyl: Linda Walker,
the head of the UK branch of Adi Roche's CCP. Her book Living with Chernobyl. The after effects
of a nuclear disaster. Ira's story773 appeared in the book series 'Real life stories' besides other titles
like 'Refugee camps', 'Street children' and 'Aids orphans'. The book presented the life story of Ira, a
'Chernobyl child' living in a Belarusian orphanage. This narrative hardly provided any direct
criticism of the nuclear enterprise. In terms of statements on wider implications of Chernobyl, the
book – on the very last page – quoted scientists from the Ukrainian Ministry of Health that 'The
Chernobyl radiation accident is undoubtedly the greatest environmental catastrophe in the history
of mankind.'774 In the following sentence – the last sentence of the book – Linda Walker added: 'The
world must never forget the children of Chernobyl, the generation yet to come and the terrible
events of Saturday, 26 April, 1986.'775 But apart from its concluding statement, the book spoke
almost exclusively of the life story of Ira and her daily life and friends in the orphanage. The
accident as such was barely even mentioned and even less so the (nuclear) political questions
connected to its impact. In this regard, for instance, the author did not question the fact that the
accident had rarely been discussed with the children in the orphanage, instead she presented this
setting as a given: 'Millions of people from Belarus, the Ukraine and parts of Russia, live with the
consequences of the Chernobyl disaster every day of their lives. At places such as Zhuravichi and
Rechitsa [names of orphanages] however, the accident and its effects are rarely discussed. The staff
feel that the children have enough to worry about coping with their disabilities and coming to terms
with what difficult future is ahead of them'.776 Regarding statements on the health impact of
Chernobyl, Walker's account was very reserved and did not provide any numbers at all, not even
estimated ranges. Instead, she said: 'The number of casualties therefore remains controversial, but
773 Linda Walker, Living with Chernobyl  : Ira’s story (Tunbridge Wells: Ticktock Media, 2005).
774 Ibid., p. 45.
775 Ibid.
776 Ibid., p. 30.
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experts now agree that the Chernobyl disaster caused many cancers and, in particular, thyroid
cancer. The full medical impact of Chernobyl will not be known until at least 2012.'777
It is not possible to say whether such careful formulations regarding the health impact of
Chernobyl or the absence of open allusions to nuclear politics – specifically regarding the
contestation of the official evaluations on the health situation in the most affected areas – were a
condition dictated by the publishing house or whether they originated from the author herself. In
any case, the exclusion of these topics from the narrative has resulted in an almost exclusive focus
on the individual. As a result, the daily life of Ira was presented as something that was detached
from Chernobyl. Of course, at one point there had been a connection, but this connection was an
event of the past. In this regard, the short description on the back of the book, where the content was
summed up, is of interest: 'Ira was born with severe disabilities two years after the Chernobyl
disaster. She was given away to a home for abandoned babies and spent the next 11 years lying in a
cot with nothing to do. But Ira has a huge strength of character – all she needed was to be given a
chance.'778 This statement was a declaration of the perspective the narrative would take; it was
turned toward Ira's future and this future was detached from her past. In so doing, the narrative
effectively severed any connections her story had with nuclear questions. By placing the emphasis
on the personal character of the children – this also occurred with Igor, who was discussed in the
previous chapter – it was possible to insinuate that the real scandal in their life was their living
conditions in the Eastern European orphanages, which did not allow their capabilities and talents to
develop. When this type of narrative is placed alongside the one presented, for instance, in
Tchertkoff's Le crime de Tchernobyl. Le goulag nucléaire, it becomes even more obvious how
apolitical (with regard to nuclear politics) the publications of British solidarity movement exponents
are in comparison to those of their French counterparts.
In this regard, the book on Ira underpins my argument that the focus that British solidarity
movement groups placed on the personal stories of the 'Chernobyl children' actually separated the
topic of 'Chernobyl' from the nuclear discourse. This detachment clearly facilitated these groups
with their fundraising activities and could explain why the solidarity movement grew as strong as it
did in the UK, first and foremost with regard to the number of children that were hosted for
recreation holidays. At the same time, this detachment from nuclear questions promoted a
denuclearization779 of the topic of Chernobyl in the British discourse. Additionally, this detachment
actively worked against the perception of self-affectedness; this is especially true in the case in
777 Ibid., p. 44.
778 Ibid., back of the book.
779 The denuclearization of Chernobyl's consequences is an essential part of Chernobyl politics in Eastern Europe. See 
in this regard: Bauer/Kalmbach/Kasperski, From Pripyat to Paris. The term denuclearization refers to Gabrielle 
Hecht's considerations in: Hecht, Nuclear Ontologies.
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which the details of the horrible living conditions in the Eastern European orphanages were
juxtaposed with descriptions of the fluffy toys and the overloaded aid convoys that left from the
UK.
2.3.6 Conclusion and outlook on the post-2006 period
In France, the various actors of the lively French Chernobyl debate used the opportunity offered by
the 20th anniversary to communicate their statements on the impact of the accident to a broad public.
This date was a particularly convenient opportunity for anti-nuclear activists to foster a debate on
the use of nuclear energy in general. From their standpoint, this had become especially necessary
due to French national and international attempts to expand and advance the nuclear enterprise. Pro-
nuclear French public authorities, on the other side, used the occasion to lobby in favour of their
evaluation of the accident's impact, which did not call into question the nuclear enterprise as such.
The French efforts to 'green the atom' – i.e. to present it as a sustainable environmentally friendly
form of energy – and the plans to build the new EPR in Flamanville must be considered the decisive
elements of the historical context within which the selective French Chernobyl debate was
contained in 2006. In Britain, the Chernobyl debate never reached any where near the same level of
importance that it had in France. From the mid-1990s onwards, Chernobyl had basically
disappeared from the British nuclear discourse and only lived on in relation to charity activities.
However, when the British government decided in 2006 to pave the way for a return to nuclear via
nuclear new build, the topic of the health effects from the fallout slightly re-surfaced in several
newspaper articles and in the work of anti-nuclear activist Chris Busby, who used the occasion of
the anniversary to challenge national nuclear policies as had anti-nuclear activists in France. Yet, in
the case of France, a broad coalition of actors challenged the official narratives of Chernobyl,
whereas in Britain, only a handful of people in 2006 publicly engaged in the Chernobyl debate. At
the same time, the activities of the solidarity movement groups dominated the British media
reporting. In contrast, the activities of French solidarity movement groups were hardly reported on
at all by the French media, which focused on the health effects of Chernobyl: in Eastern Europe as
well as in France. 
The different objects upon which the emphasis was placed in the two national contexts in
2006 reflect well the general ways in which Chernobyl has been debated differenly in France and in
Britain. In France, Chernobyl has become an anti-nuclear and anti-nucléocratie argument. In
conformity with this tendency, the 20th anniversary generated a lot of attention and on the part of
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anti-nuclear activists Chernobyl was turned into a case against the government's EPR policies. At
the same time, the occasion of the anniversary was used to challenge the official international
assessments regarding the accident's impact – to which the public authorities responded by arguing
in favour of this official assessment. In Britain, however, Chernobyl did not embody a specific
meaning with regard to national nuclear politics; this is also why British public authorities saw no
need to communicate anything on Chernobyl in 2006. From the mid-1990s onwards, Chernobyl has
been perceived as an event that only impacted people – and mostly children – in Eastern Europe.
Because of this perception, Chernobyl could not be mobilized as an argument against British
nuclear new build in 2006. The fact that the argument just simply did not work in the British context
is well reflected in the feedback Busby received: by insisting that there had been discernable
Chernobyl health effects in Britain only succeeded in further excluding him from the British nuclear
debate because his positions were widely considered to be absurd.  
Given this setting, it is interesting to have a look at the British debate on nuclear new build in
the years following 2006: the 'anti-nuclear' argument that has dominated the debate has not regarded
the question of possible health effects but it has revolved around the question of money. People
have wondered whether this investment of tax money to subsidize a guaranteed price per kW/h for
the operators will pay off in the end. Thus, whereas in France, the nuclear question has over the
years been 'taken back to the streets' and has been debated through such various popular instruments
as manifestations, rallies, blocking castor transports, and the occupation of nuclear power plants, in
Britain the arguments against nuclear new build have been brought forward mainly by economists
and political scientists in editorial articles and academic papers – that is, with the noteworthy
exception of Scotland. In recent years, the Scottish nuclear discourse must be considered as a
separate entity to the British nuclear discourse. Since its election to power in 2007, the current
Scottish government has opposed Westminster's new build plans and has categorically refused to
allow any new build projects to be implemented on Scottish soil. The Scottish government was
backed in its position by the Scottish parliament, which re-formed following a referendum in
1997.780 Thus, when discussing the 'British' position in the following paragraphs, it is to be
understood that I refer to a 'Britain' that predominantly represents the stance of the government in
London. 
In France, Chernobyl can be well integrated into the country's current anti-nuclear discourse
seeing as its memory inherently implies criticism of the French nucléocratie, and – due to the
strongly perceived self-affectedness – there is a large audience for health-related nuclear arguments.




In Britain, however, the argument on health effects of low-level radiation exposure and that of an
oppressive Atomstaat ('atom state', in reference to Robert Jungk's homonymous book) – both
mounted in relation to the civil nuclear enterprise – are the arguments of a very small group of
people and thus Chernobyl as an anti-nuclear argument, is quite an 'outsider argument'. In addition,
the already very small group of anti-nuclear power plant activists in Britain has shrunk even more in
recent years. As climate change came on the agenda and became the new buzz word, George
Monbiot (among others) – claiming that this challenge necessitated a reconsideration of questions
related to anti-nuclear positions – left the British anti-nuclear movement to become one of Britain's
most prominent advocates of nuclear new build. A strong believer in the narrative of the 'green
atom', Monbiot now considers the anti-nuclear movement to be an enemy. This shift on the part of
environmentalists from the anti- to the pro-nuclear side has also been verified in other countries
than Britain. But it seems that in Britain the 'pro-nuclear environmentalists' dominate the nuclear-
discourse at the moment. This might explain why, regardless of the internationally supported re-
emergence of the Chernobyl debate, the 20th anniversary was unable to spark a broader debate on
British Chernobyl self-affectedness or mobilize a larger group of people to campaign against the
renaissance of the British nuclear enterprise. Britain seems to lack a driving force capable of turning
events such as the attempt by the British government to manipulate media reporting on Fukushima
– as Rob Edwards revealed in The Guardian in July 2011 – into a more widely backed argument
against national nuclear policies. In other countries, this driving force consists, inter alia, of
environmental groups. In Britain, however, this important actor seems to have in some ways
refrained from joining the nuclear discourse, and, as it has been shown above, it has never tried to
have a prominent role in the British Chernobyl debate. 
This is not so say that an anti-nuclear discourse has not existed in Britain in recent years, but
in comparison to many other Western European countries such as France, Germany, or Italy it has
remained a marginal topic within the political discourse. Moreover, Chernobyl never became a
central argument to the British anti-nuclear discourse, and the primary focus has ever remained the
Sellafield-Windscale complex. Interestingly, this continuity has also shaped the way in which
meaning is assigned to Chernobyl. When Chernobyl was discursively connected to British nuclear
plants, it primarily adhered to the argumentative scheme: 'Sellafield is x-times more dangerous than
the Chernobyl fallout.'781 This argumentative scheme may also be found in France; mainly it is
applied to the scenario of a plane crashing into the site of La Hague 'which would cause x-times the
damage of Chernobyl.' But most frequently – and this is a very interesting difference between the
781 The comparison to Sellafield is very prominent in the Irish Chernobyl debate as well. The Irish and the British 
Chernobyl debates are tightly interwoven, not at least via such individuals as Adi Roche and the common circulation
of publications on Chernobyl across the Irish Sea.
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British and the French nuclear discourses – the comparison is made the other way around and it is
argued that: 'Chernobyl poses x-times a bigger risk than incident y.' This reversed line of reasoning
is illustrated by the findings of an opinion poll that was conducted in 2006 by the French radiation
protection agency, IRSN. This study on risk perception revealed that 50% of the interviewees – who
formed a representative sample of the French population – perceived the nuclear fallout caused by
Chernobyl to be a 'risque élevé' ('elevated risk'). This meant, at the same time, that this fallout was
perceived to be more risky than household accidents, genetically modified foodstuffs , or nuclear
power plants in general.782 Thus, in France, Chernobyl and its health effects in France have become
a topic in and of itself, which – particularly through the compensation trials – has grown out of and
separated from the nuclear discourse in which it was embedded initially. In Britain, however, the
Chernobyl debate has very much remained within the confines of the nuclear discourse. At the same
time, this discourse has further declined in recent years as the climate change context has led to a
denuclearization of the British nuclear discourse insofar as many central issues in the debate about
nuclear new build are not framed as 'nuclear issues' but rather are connected to the spheres of
economics and global warming. 
782 IRSN, Baromètre IRSN 2006. La perception des situations à risques par les Français (Fontenay-aux-Roses: IRSN, 
2006).
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2.4 Conclusions drawn from the comparison of French and British Chernobyl debates
The comparison between the French and British Chernobyl debates shows clearly that 'the degree to
which a country is affected by the hazard'783 is, with regard to Chernobyl, not proportional to the
radioactive fallout that the country received. 'Risk exposure' cannot be understood in the terms of
the absolute number of radionuclides that was deposited on a certain region or taken up by an
individual. Although this approach has been proved to be useful in explaining the short-term
changes in public opinion polls after Chernobyl784 (given that it was taken for granted that the
intensity of the fallout was communicated correctly), this approach cannot explain why in one
country, France, an intense debate on the health impact of Chernobyl is sparked in 1996, whereas in
Britain, a country with a comparable deposition of radionuclides (as far as may be discerned from
the published figures), such a debate never rose to importance in public discourse. Therefore, the
question is not: How much fallout deposited on a certain country or region? The question is: How
has this fallout been perceived, and in what context? Thus, the interpretation of Chernobyl has been
less the result of a direct physical impact and more a 'crystallization' of existing sets of values and
beliefs. These values and beliefs determine the way in which the accident has been perceived and
narrated, or not been considered at all.
By analysing the narratives that were presented by the various actors of the national
Chernobyl debates, I was able to shed light on the ways in which Chernobyl has been perceived,
interpreted and narrated in France and Britain. In this analysis, I focused on the narrative categories
or elements of 'radiophobia' and apocalypse, self-affectedness, and anti-Eastern European/anti-
Soviet stereotypes. The aspect of anti-Eastern European/anti-Soviet stereotypes played a more
important role in the comparison between different narratives within a single national context than
in the comparison between the two national case studies. Therefore, this conclusion will focus on
the results of my analysis of the two aspects 'radiophobia' versus apocalypse and self-affectedness.
What kind of 'imagined world' regarding the dangers of radiation and its health impact
affected the perceptions of and communications on Chernobyl? The narratives that developed
around the Chernobyl accident can be situated on a spectrum between two extremes. At one extreme
lies the explanation pattern of 'radiophobia' and at the other extreme is situated an apocalyptic
narrative that describes Chernobyl as a type of allegory for the end of the world.785 In their
783 This phrasing is a quotation from Lynn Frewer et al., Media reporting.
784 Hohenemser and Renn, Shifting Public Perceptions of Nuclear Risk.
785 In this regard, English literature has often made a connection between Chernobyl and Revelations 8:10, 11, insofar 
as some have translated the term 'Chernobyl' to wormwood (as in the plant). This revelation says: 'And the third 
angel sounded, and there fell a great star from heaven, burning as it were a lamp, and it fell upon a third of the 
rivers, and upon the springs of water; and the name of the star is called Wormwood: and a third of the waters 
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statements, the protagonists of the Chernobyl debate normally took a clear stance on health effects
caused by the fallout and situated their statements closer to one of the two extremes of
interpretation. Therefore, the first question applied when looking at the various sources regarding
this category of comparison was the question 'Who said what?'. What interpretations were proffered
by national public authorities and actors of the national nuclear industries? Did a specific counter
narrative emerge in response to the official experts' evaluations, and if so, who paid attention to it;
who believed it? 
Secondly, investigating the narrative element of 'self-affectedness' enabled me to understand
why Chernobyl became such an important topic and reference point in the French nuclear debate,
while in Britain it almost sank into total oblivion before it partly resurfaced again in 2006. In fact,
the detailed analysis of British Chernobyl literature that I carried out for this study should not leave
the reader with the impression that Chernobyl was a prominent topic in British public discourse.786
A purely quantitative comparison between the French and the British debate would only lead to the
conclusion that there is barely grounds for a reasonable comparison between the two, especially
with regard to the 20th anniversary. But a quantitative observation reveals very little about the
debates themselves, and nothing at all about the reasons for this drastic difference. However, by
conducting a qualitative comparison and looking more closely at the structure of the Chernobyl
narratives present in the two national contexts, some very interesting findings come to the force. To
accomplish this type of comparison, it was necessary to analyse in detail the accounts of the various
actors present in the French and British Chernobyl debates. The British material is presented for the
very first time, whereas most of the French material has already been examined in my book
Tschernobyl and France and therefore is given less physical space in this study. In order to present
the research clearly and concisely, the development of the debates is divided into three distinct time-
slots: the accident and its direct aftermath, the trajectory of the debate from 1988 to 2005, and the
debate that took place on the accident's 20th anniversary. The major markers of these three stages are
as follows: For both countries, the debate in the direct aftermath of the accident was in many
regards very similar. However, in the following stage the two trajectories split off. The British
debate falls off sharply in the mid-1990s, while the French begins to expand and evolve. The mid-
1990s were for both countries an important turning point: from this time forth, the aspect of self-
affectedness in Britain almost entirely disappeared from the Chernobyl debate, whereas in France
self-affectedness experienced a lively awakening from the mid-1990s onwards. In both countries,
became bitter; and many people had died of the waters, because they were made bitter.'
786 Undoubtedly, the fact that there is no prominent public debate on Chernobyl in Britain does not mean that there is no
debate at all. It may be that such debates are held in the private or non-publicly visible sphere. But this sphere was 
not included in the ambit of this study. The methods of sociology and anthropology and an entirely different set of 
sources would be needed to answer the question of whether such debates exist.
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this changing perception of self-affectedness must be considered within the context of their
respectively evolving nuclear policies. Finally, in the third stage, a closer look at the specific debate
that was carried out on the 20th anniversary of the accident particularly clarified the degree to which
national nuclear politics and policies and the perception of self-affectedness are interrelated in the
Chernobyl debates. 
But national nuclear politics and policies were not impervious to external influences, and so
while these politics and policies shaped the respective Chernobyl debates, they too were in turn
shaped and influenced by this debate. In addition, many more aspects influenced the different
trajectories of the British and French debate. For this reason, I systematically located these debates
within their historical context and referred to the national specificities that influenced their
development and tenor. The aspects that I paid the most attention to were: the formation, role and
status of 'experts' and 'counter experts'; national nuclear policies; the shape, political role and protest
culture of the environmental and anti-nuclear movement; (the problematic issues of) the national
nuclear fleet; and the importance of charities. In the following paragraphs, I wish to summarize the
results of this contextualization. The conclusions that can be drawn from the comparison of the
French and the British case are manifold. First, it becomes obvious that there is no single factor that
can explain why the debate on the impact of Chernobyl developed differently in one country than in
the other. Rather, a broad range of factors comes into play – factors that reciprocally influenced
each other.
At first, it might seem that the debates on Chernobyl and its ramifications would have
proceeded similarly in France and Britain. Each country was affected by a comparable degree of
fallout in late April and early May 1986, and each had a highly developed nuclear sector. Both
countries had an active anti-nuclear movement and had previously experienced accidents in their
own national nuclear plants. Members of each government proclaimed that fallout from Chernobyl
would have no relevant impact on their national territory – in both countries they were proven
wrong. The French and British governments, radiation protection agencies, and various actors of the
nuclear industry argued that an accident such as the one that had occurred in Chernobyl could not
happen in their own country. Later, in both countries, the local doctors – in the French case on
Corsica and in the British case on Benbecula – suggested a possible connection between increases
in the cancer rates that they observed in their daily work and a possible health impact from the
fallout. Finally, in both countries, single actors – Jean-Michel Jacquemin in France, Chris Busby in
Britain – picked up this topic and dedicated a great deal of time in the search for national Chernobyl
victims. 
Despite these many similarities, the relative impact of the Chernobyl debates in France and
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Britain could not have been more different. In France, Chernobyl became a national reference point
for criticizing the central government and the country's political and scientific elite system.
Conversely, in Britain, the Chernobyl solidarity movement is worried about maintaining support for
its work as public memory of the accident has faded. In France, Chernobyl became a contemporary
representation of threats to everyday life, while in Britain, it was relegated to the past; it was
considered an accident that happened far away a long time ago. Few people remember the extensive
restrictions that were placed on British sheep farms in the aftermath of Chernobyl because the
animals were too radioactive to be sent to market.
To explain this process – i.e. the formation of a national environmental lieu de mémoire that
is connected to the political scandal of the affaire Tchernobyl in France and the non-existence of this
common point of reference in Britain – various aspects must be taken into consideration. The first
and most important aspect seems to be the way in which national official experts and their
evaluation of the fallout's impact were perceived by the public. As Brian Wynne argued, the
interaction between experts and lay-publics is highly context-bound: 'Though they pervade all
processes of “understanding”, trust and credibility are contingent variables which depend upon
evolving relationships and identities. [...] The fundamental interaction between scientific expertise
and lay-publics is cultural, in that scientific knowledge embodies social and cultural prescriptions
in its very structure. The problems of public uptake of science therefore lie in the institutional forms
of science and of its incorporation into policy and administration.'787 In France, a rather large public
took a critical stance towards the government and its nuclear experts, who had proclaimed that the
French people had not been exposed to any risk. The distrust of the French public was fuelled by a
more general criticism of the French elite system, specifically the exclusive positions graduates of
the Grandes Écoles hold in the upper echelons of the state administration and their detachment from
the rest of the society. Long before Chernobyl, the French nucléocratie had been blamed for being a
closed circle of fortunate and privileged individuals who cared about their own career above all
else. This general calling into question of key structures of the French nuclear sector, from the
beginning was drawn into the debate on the health effects of Chernobyl. The fact that the state
experts actively engaged in the debate on French self-affectedness increased the level of attention
paid to this topic by a broader audience, and at the same time continuously instigated counter
statements from critics. Confronted with a French government that promoted nuclear power at the
global level as green solution to the climate change problem, the French anti-nuclear side
transformed the debate on the health impact of Chernobyl into a proxy war in the fight about the
legitimation of the nuclear enterprise. 
787 Wynne, Misunderstood Misunderstandings, p. 20.
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Although the reactions of the British government and its nuclear experts in 1986 were in
many regards similar to those adopted in France, there are several important differences in the
contextual setting that account for the different development of the Chernobyl debate in Britain.
One decisive aspect is how nuclear experts and their role in British society were perceived. With
Oxford and Cambridge, the UK also has a longstanding tradition of a clearly distinctive scientific
and political elite. However, the experts of the civil nuclear industry – be they the engineers or
physicists – were never assigned the label of a group that was illegitimately detached from 'the
average people'. They filled a significant role in society and, because of their education, were
considered to be an authority in scientific evaluations. This fact was, however, never perceived to be
as much of a problem as it had been in France. Therefore, the criticism brought forward by actors
who challenged the official evaluations did not find in Chernobyl the fertile terrain upon which to
disseminate their argument to a greater and more receptive audience. As I was able to demonstrate,
critical voices that called into question the narratives presented by state experts did exist in Britain.
But they were isolated phenomena. When the government passed the decision in the mid-1990s to
no longer finance and go ahead with new nuclear new build projects, these voices lost even more
terrain. At this point, unlike their French counterparts, British anti-nuclear power activists did not
have to turn the debate on Chernobyl health effects into a proxy war in the fight over the
legitimation of the nuclear enterprise, because their (national) fight seemed to have won itself. A
'discursive gap' formed that would come to be filled by the solidarity movement, and thus
Chernobyl as an environmental lieu de mémoire lost its anti-nuclear connotations in Britain. As a
result, Chernobyl became an accident that happened far away and long ago, an exciting event that
could entertain British children and teenagers in youth science literature without, however, causing
them to fear their own environment. The slow re-emergence of Chernobyl as a topic of public
debate, which came about within the context of the re-emergence of government support for nuclear
power in 2006, reveals how closely national debates on the impact of Chernobyl cleave to national
nuclear policies.
Based on the analysis of these elements thus far, expert culture of the civil nuclear industry
could be identified as the main factor to have shaped the national Chernobyl debates in France and
Britain. However, as the further comparison of these two cases reveals, there are many other factors
that had an important influence on the trajectories of these debates. In this regard, the role of
individual agency should not be underestimated. In France, particularly in terms of the propagation
of self-affectedness, actors like Michèle Rivasi and her CRIIRAD-colleagues, Jean-Michel
Jacquemin, and local doctors on Corsica were most important. Without their involvement, it is
unlikely that the debate on the health effects caused by Chernobyl in France would ever have gained
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such importance. The propagation of the 'apocalyptic' narrative regarding the situation in the most
affected areas of Eastern Europe – particularly by spreading the word about the work of Alexievich
a n d Bandazhevsky – was also brought forward by individuals: without the activism and
publications by individuals of the 'Caen group' and the CRIIRAD, these voices from Eastern Europe
would have remained unknown in France. No such activism, or no comparable level of activism,
exists in the British Chernobyl debate. Individual agency can also be found in the British case, for
instance Chris Busby or the solidarity movement groups. But these groups (with the exception of
Busby) neither lobbied for British self-affectedness nor in favour of an apocalyptic narrative – and
Busby was mainly an isolated campaigner. In France, the number and variety of Chernobyl activists
is considerable. Moreover, these activists were able to publish their Chernobyl accounts in large
publishing houses, since – thanks to strongly perceived self-affectedness – there was a bigger
market for Chernobyl-literature in France than in Britain.
 The analysis of the French and British Chernobyl debates reveals another interesting finding
with regard to individual agency. The existence of individual Chernobyl activists is not connected to
or a result of the particular strength or certain degree of political institutionalization of the
environmental movement. In both countries, the Green Party has played a marginal role in national
politics. Close links between prominent individual Chernobyl activists and their respective national
Green Party are also verifiable for both countries: Busby was a spokesperson for the Green Party
and Michèle Rivasi has been an MEP since 2009. But in France, there are numerous political
Chernobyl activists that are not necessarily connected to the Green Party, and in Britain, Chernobyl
activism is rather a-political.
However, it seems that the shape of the national environmental movement has played a
decisive role in the respective national Chernobyl debates in a different regard. It is not so much the
strength or the degree of institutionalization that has influenced the respective national Chernobyl
debates, but rather the way in which the environmental movement has addressed the topic of
climate change. Without generalizing the position adopted by George Monbiot for the British
environmental movement as such, Monbiot's determined fight against 'climate change deniers' hints
at an aspect of the British case that might differ from other countries. A 2009 opinion poll taken in
Britain revealed that only 'some 41 per cent of those taking part in today's poll agreed that it has
been established that climate change is largely due to human activity.'788 This context might partly
explain Monbiot's strong insistence to make the fight against climate change and to sensitize the
788 Telegraph online, “Only two in five believe climate change caused by human activity,” 14 November 2009, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/earthnews/6565955/Only-two-in-five-believe-climate-change-caused-by-human-
activity.html (last accessed: 15 June 2013). Franz-Josef Brüggemeier's drew my attention to the British climate 
change debate, Franz-Josef Brüggemeier, Geschichte Großbritanniens im 20. Jahrhundert (München: Beck, 2010).
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public on this topic a priority for environmental campaigners. At the same time, Monbiot has used
climate change as an argument with which to attack anti-nuclear campaigners because, according to
him, their activities have hindered international efforts to work against global warming. And, as the
publicized switching of sides of some other former anti-nuclear campaigners over to the pro-nuclear
camp clearly shows, Monbiot is not alone in his view.
But despite this diminution of the anti-nuclear power movement due to the successful
marketing of nuclear reactors as 'climate saviours', British anti-nuclear power protest has never been
strong. The focus of British anti-nuclear campaigners has always been directed at the military
applications of nuclear technology. And even before people like Monbiot changed sides, the small
group of anti-nuclear power campaigners had already lost much of its influence after the
moratorium on British new build in the mid-1990s. The rare instances of public anti-nuclear power
criticism that were voiced after the mid-1990s have been directed at Sellafield and not Chernobyl.
The Sellafield-Windscale complex has always been Britain's primary reference point with regard to
self-affectedness and government cover-ups; and it has maintained this position also after 1986. For
this reason many accounts on Chernobyl used Sellafield as the analytic framework or unit of
comparison. The fact that one of the British regions most affected by the Chernobyl fallout, the
Lake District, is also the region that houses the Sellafield site has reinforced the discursive
connection between these two nuclear threats. Furthermore, the restrictions placed on sheep farms
in this region after Chernobyl caused the Windscale Fire to resurface in public memory. First,
research in the Chernobyl fallout always included a reference to the Sellafield-Windscale complex,
since the 'background radiation' in this region was already higher because of the contamination from
1957. Second, this setting resulted in the local perception that the counter measures taken against
the Chernobyl fallout were actually the delayed effects of the Windscale Fire: because the region
had already had a higher level of background radiation prior to the Chernobyl accident, dose limits
were exceeded only because of the sum of the two fallouts. 
British self-affectedness, therefore, was not so much the perceived victimization brought
about by the events of 1986, but rather a self-affectedness connected to the (re-)discovery of the
permanent threat posed by the nuclear installations in the country itself, in particular Sellafield. This
interpretative pattern may be found in very early critical accounts on Chernobyl as well as in the
later publications written by Chris Busby. In this regard, for instance, attached to the account on
'The Chernobyl fallout' in Mackay's and Thompson's 1988 compilation Something in the wind was a
map showing the 'danger zones around nuclear reactors in Britain' instead of the Chernobyl fallout
intensities in the UK.789 Furthermore, Busby used the impact of Chernobyl in Britain mainly as an
789 Mackay/Thompson, Something in the wind, p. 48.
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argument to underpin his statements on the devastating health effects of British nuclear power
plants. In France, however, Chernobyl was treated mainly as a distinct and independent event.
Although the Chernobyl debate – through the correlated criticism of the nucléocratie – was
discursively closely connected to the French nuclear enterprise, the debate on the fallout's health
impact did not lead, for instance, to a re-discovery of the 1969 accident in Saint-Laurent. Moreover,
as revealed by the 2006 IRSN opinion poll, the Chernobyl fallout in France was perceived to be a
bigger threat than national nuclear installations.790 Thus, we are confronted with a situation that
demonstrates rather the opposite traits of what was encountered in Britain. Indeed, on the 20th
anniversary of the accident the Chernobyl debate, within the context of the protests of the EPR
project in Flamanville, made reference to the threats represented by the French civil nuclear
enterprise. But still, also in 2006, public discourse treated the health effects of Chernobyl in France
as a separate topic that was independent from any possible health effects that might have been
caused by the national nuclear fleet. This discrepancy points to a profound difference in the
respective national attributions of nuclear risk. A simplified list ranking the risk attributions (from
highest to lowest) in Britain would look something like this: 1. nuclear weapons, 2. re-processing
plants, 3. nuclear power plants, 4. Chernobyl fallout. In France, however, this ranking would be
reversed, with Chernobyl fallout in the first position and nuclear weapons in the last.
In this regard, the argument on the 'externalization of fears' that Melanie Arndt used to
explain the reasons underlying West German Chernobyl solidarity activities can be applied to the
British case as well: Inviting 'Chernobyl children' for recreational stays to the UK has helped the
host families to externalize their worries about the nuclear installations close by on the national
territory. In France, however, the 'foreign radiation' and its impact on the country have formed the
focal point of the public Chernobyl debate and many people have perceived the health risks of the
fallout to be more dangerous than the presence of nuclear power plants just a few kilometres away.
It may be that this risk attribution is a long-term effect of the profound pride in the national nuclear
technical capability, which Gabrielle Hecht described with regard to the French post-war period.
The fact that the employment of foreign contract workers in French nuclear plants – the 'nuclear
nomads' who do the most radioactive-dirty work – has for a long time been a central point of
criticism against French nuclear policies791 might further underpin this hypothesis. Undoubtedly, the
790 I am thankful to Heinz-Gerhard Haupt who pointed out to me that in France, there is a long history of identifying 
problems outside of France and mobilizing against their impact on the country. Mobilization has been particularly 
successful in cases that do not address problems generated nationally. In this regard, the perception that the foreign 
Chernobyl fallout was more dangerous than emissions from, for instance, La Hague, could be considered an 
interesting topic of study in an investigation into French political culture, which goes far beyond the case of nuclear 
politics.
791 In relation to the 'nuclear nomads', there are two aspects that emerge in the criticism of this employment practice:  
First, it is considered problematic that French employers may pay less attention to the received radioactive doses of 
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British post-war era experienced similar levels of pride in the national nuclear technical capability,
which was iconified by Queen Elizabeth II's inauguration of Calder Hall. But this came to an end
with the privatization of the British nuclear industry and the sale of the British nuclear power plants
to a French company, the EDF. In France, however, the government's and EDF's lasting
commitment to the strategy of 'tout nucléaire', the successful creation of Areva, the development of
the EPR, and the proclaimed 'nuclear renaissance' which discursively – within the context of the
climate change debate – transformed nuclear plants from the grey monolithic projections of the
planning fantasies and the strong belief in technology-driven steady progress of the 1960s into
environmentally benign steam generators of the future. This setting created the ideal conditions
within which the pride in the national nuclear technical capability could live on and, at the same
time, within which nuclear risk could be attributed to foreign entities, like the Chernobyl fallout. To
connect this attribution of nuclear risk back to the almost total lack of space dedicated to the
recreational stays for 'Chernobyl children' in France in the public Chernobyl debate, I would like to
present the following hypothesis: one of the reasons why recreational stays for 'Chernobyl children'
in France are not more diffuse may have to do with a sense of unease or the worry that the presence
of these children could result in an increase in the perception of risks associated with the French
nuclear installations. Thus, in France, the recreational stays of 'Chernobyl children' have a latent
tendency toward politicization, whereas in Britain they rather contribute to the allocation of
radiation health effects to the private sphere. 
Finally, when the wider contextual settings of the two countries' political systems and
political cultures are taken into consideration, several interesting similarities and differences that
helped to shape the respective Chernobyl debates come to the force. In both countries, with the
exception of the Greens, the emergency management of the 1986 crisis on the part of the public
authorities did not become a political argument amongst opposing parties. In France, this can be
explained by the fact the Première Cohabitation and, therewith, a broad coalition of the French
political spectrum was responsible for the official reactions to the 1986 crisis. In Britain, however,
where one might have expected Labour to have turned the quarrel over the sheep farm restrictions
into a political argument against the Thatcher government, it seems that Labour's internal disaccord
on nuclear policies is what prevented Chernobyl from becoming a political argument at the level of
national party politics. Despite this similarity between the French and British Chernobyl debate,
there were other contextual settings and characteristics of each country's political system and
political culture, however, that contributed to the very different development of these two national
this group of workers than to the doses their French unionized colleagues are subject to. Second, there is an 
underlying fear that these contract workers –who often come from Eastern Europe – might somehow undermine 
French security standards.
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Chernobyl debates. The centralized political system in France facilitated the transferral of what had
begun as a local and regional issue to a national topic of debate: the issue of Chernobyl fallout and
its possible health effects did not remain confined to Corsica, Alsace or the Mercantour, but quickly
reached national proportions. Because most of the key actors in the French Chernobyl debate are
present on a national scale – be it the government, the radiation protection agencies (SCPRI, IPSN,
IRSN), the plant operator (EDF), or the main anti-nuclear activists (Greenpeace France, Réseau:
sortir du nucléaire) – their arguments never remained in the local or regional context, but were
immediately brought to the national level. In Britain, however, the local and regional debates – in
particular those regarding the sheep farm restrictions in the Lake District and in Snowdonia –
remained very much on these levels. This is, for instance, illustrated by the fact that it was mainly
regional and not national newspapers that reported on this issue, and that they were 'regional'
landowner's and farmer's unions that expressed their stance on Chernobyl. Undeniably, to apply the
term 'regional' to the countries of England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland is a major offence.
Moreover, such word choice negates today's constitutional reality and the fact that after the
referendum in September 2014 Scotland may no longer be part of the UK. But this is precisely the
point I wish to make: The fact that there is a Scottish Parliament that has the power to make the
decision to ban and prevent nuclear new build in Scotland has very much diversified the current
nuclear debate in the UK. The result is that there is no longer a unitary British nuclear policy today.
In France, however, no 'intermediate' power exists that can cross and call into question decisions
that have already been taken by the national government. Here, all debate on nuclear issues must be
made at the national level. In Britain, the multi-level setting allows for a more scattered or
diversified debate. Moreover, the various instruments (inquiries, hearings, and committees) that
form an important part of the British political decision-making process and procedures, have
contributed to the creation of a British nuclear discourse that is far less confrontational than the one
that has developed in France. This is not to imply that the instrument of inquiries is not problematic;
indeed, it has been severely criticized and accused of being a mere ritual that provides the results
the government wants. However, the fact that these inquiries do exist is a guarantee of far more
public involvement; it at least gives the public a voice in, for instance, siting decisions. The
instrument of committees has also enabled and forced opposing sides within the British nuclear
debate to sit together at a table and discuss their positions. For instance, the Committee Examining
Radiation Risks from Internal Emitters (CERRIE) has brought together Chris Busby and other anti-
nuclear activists from Greenpeace and LLRC with representatives of the NRPB and BNFL.792 In
792 For further information on CERRIE and its members, see the committee's website: http://www.cerrie.org/about.php 
(last accessed: 15 November 2013).
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France, however, such constellations are far less evident, as the example of Flamanville 3 clearly
shows. Although an enquête publique ('public enquiry') was organized, opponents of the new build
project saw in the measure mainly a dishonest attempt to get the public to give its blessing to a
project in which it did not have a real voice.793 Therefore, many anti-nuclear groups refrained from
participating in the hearing. Despite the broad mobilization against the new build project, a decree
by Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin authorized the EDF in April 2007 to move ahead with the
construction of the first EPR in France.794 Such events only reflect and reinforce the public
perception that the French nuclear techno-political regime is far more closed than its British
analogue.
The examples of the French and British Chernobyl debates also clearly demonstrate how a
disaster is not debated in a discursive vacuum but instead is always related and compared to the
effects of other disasters. The references to the affaire du sang contaminé ('contaminated blood
scandal') that are found in the French Chernobyl debate and the close connection between
Chernobyl and the Sellafield-Windscale complex, which figures so prominently in the British
Chernobyl debate, are telling examples. At the same time, the Chernobyl debates have deeply
influenced the way in which both countries – and in particular the actors of the respective
Chernobyl debates – reacted towards Fukushima. Their reactions exemplify how much the
perception and memory of disaster are framed by contemporary settings and previous experiences. 
In summary of my findings from the comparison between the French and British Chernobyl
debates, the following general picture emerges: Different perceptions of the power dynamics within
the two national nuclear techno-political regimes lay at the source of the different trajectories that
the Chernobyl debates in France and Britain took. In France, from the outset, Chernobyl was framed
as a French debate, and it was placed into the context of the nucléocratie. In Britain, such an
interpretative framework did not exist for the civil nuclear programme, since the predominant
criticism against the nuclear enterprise had always been directed against the military complex and
was more focused on aspects of international relations than on the national nuclear energy complex.
In Britain, Chernobyl was considered from a global perspective, whereas in France the focus was
placed on the accident's impact at home. However, with the end of the Cold War and the British
government’s decision in the mid-1990s to no longer finance new nuclear power plants, anti-nuclear
positions as such lost their impetus. Thus, few people in Britain were interested in transforming the
793 For this criticism, see for example: Jean-Stéphane Devisse et al., “Débat public sur l’EPR: une crédibilité à 
construire,” in Les Echos, 10 January 2005; Michel de Pracontal, “EPR: premier débat, cahin-caha,” in Le Nouvel 
Observateur, 10 November 2005. 
794 The decree is available online: http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?
cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000276348&dateTexte=&categorieLien=id (last accessed: 15 November 2013).
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debate on the health impact of Chernobyl into a proxy war in the fight over the legitimacy of the
civil nuclear enterprise as was happening in France. Leaving this discursive and commemorative
gap to be filled by the solidarity movement, in Britain, Chernobyl did not become an anti-nuclear
lieu de mémoire as it did in France, and it instead became associated primarily with charity
activities for the disabled or unprivileged children of Eastern Europe which effectively
'depoliticized' Chernobyl and separated it from the nuclear debate.
In addition to interesting insights into French and British nuclear discourses and various aspects of
the countries' political, social and cultural history in the timespan between 1986 and 2006, an
analysis of the two Chernobyl debates provides telling examples that underpin sociological theories.
For instance, the emergence of French counter expertise like the CRIIRAD or Busby's studies on
the health effects of British nuclear plants shows that in both countries the anti-nuclear arguments
had to be based on natural science studies and research in order to be considered valid in public
discourse. The disclosure of the 'truth' about Chernobyl had to be based on scientific 'fact'.795 This
phenomenon adheres to the widely recognized 'Verwissenschaftlichung' ('scientification') of various
societal issues in the modern world. In relation to modernization theory, there is another prominent
issue that is implicit in the Chernobyl debates: the issue of uncertainty. The enormous variety in the
estimations of the Chernobyl death toll – which is directly related to the general debate on the
possible health effects from low-level radiation – represents the degree of uncertainty that is
involved in the evaluation of Chernobyl's impact. The issue of uncertainty in these debates goes far
beyond the specific case of Chernobyl: amongst others, it calls into question the integrity of
international organizations, the models that were internationally applied to decipher the relation
between radiation doses and health effects, global energy policies, and the way in which the
(nuclear) scientific community operates in general. The various actors of the Chernobyl debate
chose different strategies to manage this uncertainty. Wolfgang Bonß identified three basic options
to handle the uncertainties in the modernized modernity: the calculation and acceptance of
(residual)risks; the prevention and avoidance of damage; the communication and politicization of
the risk discourse.796 All three of these basic options were used by the actors of the Chernobyl
795 As Wolfang Rüdig was able show, scientification was an essential part of the formation of a German environmental 
'counter expertise' as well. See: Rüdig, Mobilising Environmental Expertise.
796 Bonß, Vom Risiko, Kapitel III: Zum Umgang mit Ungewissheit in der modernisierten Modern, Unterkapitel 1: Drei 
Grundoptionen: Kalkulation und Inkaufnahme von (Rest-)Risiken, Prävention und Schadensvermeidung, 
Kommunikation und Politisierung des Risikodiskurses. Ibid, p. 240: 'Aber ungeachtet aller Differenzen im Detail 
verweisen die jeweiligen Argumentationen immer wieder auf drei Grundoptionen für den Umgang mit den 
Unsicherheiten der modernisierten Moderne. Einerseits kann man versuchen, die veränderte Situation mit den alten
Mitteln weitgehend unkorrigiert zu bewältigen. Andererseits gibt es die Variante, die Strategien der 
kalkulatorischen Risikobewältigung durch Formen der Prävention und Schadensvermeidung zu ergänzen, und 
jenseits dessen kann man schließlich auch für eine kommunikative Verflüssigung und Politisierung des 
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debate: the public authorities and the nuclear industry mainly applied options one or two, whereas
the critics of the official evaluations made use of option three. In this regard, the Chernobyl debate
is not a unique phenomenon. On the contrary, it shows many similarities to other (post)modern
debates, such as the debate on genetically modified organisms (GMOs). There will never be a
definite and universally accepted answer to the question of the number of Chernobyl victims. This
is because the question itself and the definition of victim have both become politicized and each and
every attempt to produce an answer only raises new questions. Bonß has expressed this dynamic
quite concisely: 'The price we must pay for this growing power over reality lies in the increasing
potential of uncertainties, which are produced scientifically but which cannot be completely
dominated. From the perspective of the theory of society, the contemporaneity of increasing
potentials of configurations and of increasing potentials of uncertainties means that the attempt –
that characterizes modernity – to exercise an unambiguous control over nature has only limited
success, and in some respect even results in the opposite. Under the conditions of a “reflexive
modernity” (Beck, 1993) that which becomes apparent are, in effect, “an end of unambiguousness”
(Baumann, 1992) and “uncertainty as a diagnosis of time” (Kaufmann 1973).'797
Risikodiskurses votieren.'
797 Ibid, p. 84: 'Denn der Preis für die wachsende Verfügungsgewalt über Wirklichkeit liegt in parallel zunehmenden 
Unsicherheitspotentialen, die wissenschaftlich produziert, aber nicht vollständig beherrscht werden können. Unter 
gesellschaftstheoretischen Gesichtspunkten bedeutet die Gleichzeitigkeit von wachsenden Gestaltungs- und 
Unsicherheitspotentialen, daß der die Moderne kennzeichnende Versuch, eine eindeutige Naturbeherrschung zu 
realisieren, offensichtlich nur begrenzt gelingt und in mancher Hinsicht das Gegenteil zur Folge hat. Denn was sich 
unter den Bedingungen der „reflexiven Moderne“ (vgl. Beck 1993, 72 ff.) abzeichnet, sind ein „Ende der 
Eindeutigkeit“ (Baumann 1992) und „Unsicherheit als Zeitdiagnose“ (Kaufmann 1973, 14).'
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Unanswered questions 
I have reiterated many times throughout the text that the British anti-nuclear power movement was
always rather weak, I never provided any further explanation for this fact, however. This is not
because I was implicitly referring to some 'common knowledge' explanation that most nuclear
historians are familiar with. On the contrary, there is no such explanation and I myself am still
looking for a satisfying answer. Many times over the last few years, I have posed the question 'Why
isn't the anti-nuclear plant movement in the UK stronger?' to various individuals who have a
connection to British nuclear history. From the historians researching the UK environmental history
to anti-nuclear activists, one common answer was given across the board: 'People just don't care!'
When asked my follow-up question: 'But why do they not care?', I was given a plethora of
explanations. Unfortunately, I was not successful in synthesizing this multitude of aspects of 'British
culture' into one coherent hypothesis on 'British nuclear plant neutrality'. Perhaps, it was because I
was asking the wrong question: Having grown up in Germany and having carried out in-depth
research on the French nuclear debates, I am just more surprised to have encountered the absence of
an anti-nuclear power movement than I would have been had I run into its existence. Perhaps, this is
simply not the way I ought to be looking at the case of Britain. And perhaps, more in general, it also
makes more sense to inquire into the reasons why something exists than to ask why something does
not. But still, I think it makes sense to ask this question, if even for the simple reason that nobody
yet has been able to give me a satisfying answer. Of course, it is easier to present a coherent
argument that is based on the existence of sources than on their absence. This is the same problem I
faced for my case study on Chernobyl: It was far easier to come up with hypotheses for the French
case, where there was even more material available than I could analyse than it was to understand
the almost complete absence of a Chernobyl debate in Britain. I hope that with this work, I can at
least provide some answers to the question 'Why has the Chernobyl debate been of minor relevance
in Britain?'. The question as to why the British anti-nuclear power debate is so minor, however,
must remain unanswered. At any rate, I hope that through this case study on Chernobyl I was able to
highlight some important aspects of the British nuclear discourse that might contribute to the
history of Britain’s civil nuclear programme, which has yet to be written. 
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III THE TRANSNATIONAL CHERNOBYL DEBATE
It would be limited to look at publications by only authors from the UK and France when
researching the narratives of the respective Chernobyl debates of these countries. Specifically with
regard to Britain, the fact that very few publications by British authors were released between the
early 1990s and 2006 in an attempt to reach a wider audience with a specific interpretation of the
accident must be looked at from a broader perspective. This broader perspective is crucial for
gaining an understanding of the discursive context of the 'renaissance' of the Chernobyl debate on
the occasion of the 20th anniversary in 2006. Therefore, this chapter examines the transnational
sphere of the Chernobyl debate. It pays special attention to the way in which Chernobyl narratives
from outside Britain and France were received and perceived in these two countries. In addition, it
provides some additional references to the German Chernobyl debate. This account gives more
space to 'apocalyptic' narratives, insofar as academic research has thus far paid less attention to
apocalyptic narratives than to 'radiophobic' narratives. It closely investigates through what kinds of
paths, mediators and networks these narratives were distributed. In addition, this chapter assesses
whether intertextuality exists between certain publications, and which authors and works have been
received across linguistic borders. Although, in the following analysis, a similar amount of space is
dedicated to each of the various actors, this does not necessarily mean that they are to be considered
on a similar level in terms of their potential to influence policies. There are clear power hierarchies
that separate these actors. Their impact on political decision-making very much depends on how
decision-makers judge their relevance, and this setting can differ quite substantially from one
national context to another. Despite these national differences, reports by international organizations
and in particular UN organization are mostly considered to be highly credible on the part of the
national governments and the public.
3.1 Voices from the East and their reception in the West
From the early 1990s onwards – and in particular on the occasion of the 5th anniversary of
Chernobyl in 1991 – the various national Chernobyl debates in Western Europe received important
input from external sources. In the late 1980s, the literature on Chernobyl that was available
internationally and had been received across national boarders primarily consisted in the reports
released by the IAEA and the international798 Chernobyl expert groups. As discussed in the previous
798 With regard to the actors, I use the term international in reference to international governmental organizations 
(IGOs) and the term transnational in reference to the activities of non-governmental organizations (NGO) and the 
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chapters, Western public authorities and actors of the national nuclear industries adopted the
narratives presented in these reports and incorporated them into their communications on
Chernobyl. At the same time, these narratives were profoundly criticized by anti-nuclear activists
and specialists on Eastern Europe who had, thanks to their language skills, access to critical voices
that had been raised in the USSR very shortly after the accident. Thanks to the perestroika and
glasnost as well as to the growing strength of national independence movements within the USSR,
these critical voices progressively grew in strength in the following years and became available to a
wider audience.799 Public criticism of how Moscow had managed the Chernobyl crisis and of the
Soviet government's information policies became a linchpin for the call for national independence,
particularly in Belarus and Ukraine. Tatiana Kaspersky described these dynamics very clearly:
'Between 1989 and 1991, dozens of rallies burst forth in Minsk, Kiev, Moscow and in some of the
localities of the most contaminated regions; the first maps of the radioactive contamination were
published; and multitudinous critical articles on the handling of the disaster by the Soviet
authorities appeared. A number of the representatives of Chernobyl victims were elected to the
Soviet Supreme Soviet and the Supreme Soviets of the Belarus and Ukraine. The Belarusian and
Ukrainian nationalists’ movements, represented, respectively, by Belarusian Popular Front (BPF)
and Popular Movement (Rukh), became, in 1989-1991, leading actors of the Chernobyl protest
movement. Together with the nationalists’ movements in other republics they also contributed to the
collapse of the USSR. These movements were strongly connected to such developing green and
antinuclear protests’ actors as the organization “Zelenyi Svit” in Ukraine and “Nabat” in Belarus.
They also collaborated with dissident scientists in the republican academies of sciences who
protested against norms of radiological protection imposed by Moscow official experts. Finally,
they sought to involve the inhabitants of the most contaminated regions, liquidators, and relocated
people in their protests. This pre-eminence of nationalist movements in the Chernobyl protests led
to the “nationalization” of public memory of the Chernobyl disaster. The accident appeared in
public discourse first of all as a crime of colonial communist authorities against Belarusian and
Ukrainian nations, or even as a “radioactive genocide” of its people.'800
initiatives from within civil society that reach across national borders.
799 These dissident voices have not yet been subject to a broader scientific research project. As a first important move in
this direction, Thomas Bohn provides interesting background information on the most important authors in his 
forthcoming article: Thomas Bohn, “From Recording the Catastrophe to Tackling the Trauma: Chernobyl in (Post-) 
Soviet Documentary Literature.” In The Impact of Disaster, ed. by Bohn et al., forthcoming.
800 Bauer/Kalmbach/Kasperski, From Pripyat to Paris.
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3.1.1 Zhores Medvedev, Grigori Medvedev, Alla Yaroshinskaya, Vladimir Chernousenko
Zhores Medvedev
Zhores Medvedev was amongst the earliest critics with a background in Eastern Europe whose
voice was heard in Britain. Already in 1987, he published an article in The Environmentalist in
which he criticized the information policy of the USSR officers towards the evacuees and people
living in the most affected areas. This article served as the basis for Mackay and Thompson's
account on the accident in their 1988 book Something in the wind. This 1988 publication also
included an article by Medvedev on the Soviet nuclear energy programme. In the English-speaking
world, Medvedev had already established his role as an 'investigative insider' ten years earlier with
his book on the Kyshtym accident;801 it was thanks to his book that this accident at the military
nuclear facility Mayak in the Urals came to be know by a broader public in the West.802
The fact that Medvedev had been exiled from the USSR in 1973 and had ever since been
working as a research scientist for the National Institute for Medical Research in London further
strengthened his public credibility as an independent scientist. Thus, when in 1990 he published his
book The Legacy of Chernobyl,803 it automatically became one of the most important references
works in Britain. In this book, Medvedev described in detail the possible impacts the Chernobyl
fallout would have on people, plants and animals. To write this book, Medvedev had not undertaken
research in Chernobyl himself, but had carefully studied the various papers and reports that had
been published on the topic both in the East and in the West. The result was a concise account of the
state of the art in Chernobyl research, which also included his harsh criticism, for instance of the
unnecessarily high levels of radioactivity the emergency workers had been exposed to. Regarding
the death toll, Medvedev refrained from taking a clear stance on numbers because: 'There is
insufficient relevant information to enable an accurate assessment of the health consequences.'804
Instead, he discussed the different reports that had been published thus far. For the highest estimate,
he presented a study by R. E. Webb that was published in The Ecologists in 1986, which predicted
280,000 extra cancer deaths worldwide.805 However, with regard to this study, Medvedev criticized
the fact that the author had 'consider[ed] radiation-related cancer deaths' only. From Medvedev's
perspective – which was the point of view of a specialist in ageing research – 'the general reduction
801 Zhores A. Medvedev, Nuclear disaster in the Urals (New York: Norton, 1979).
802 A French translation of his book appeared quite some time later, in 1988: Jaurès Medvedev, Désastre nucléaire en 
Oural (trad. de l'anglais par Anne-Rose Fontanet, Roger et Bella Belbéoch) (Cherbourg: Isoète, 1988).
803 Zhores A. Medvedev, The legacy of Chernobyl (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990).
804 Ibid., p. 165.
805 Ibid., p. 166.
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in life expectancy as a result of radiation exposure'806 is what should have been researched instead.
Furthermore, Medvedev pointed out 'odd' discrepancies of the debate on the Chernobyl health
effects, for instance: 'it should be stressed that the initial Soviet and IAEA reports on the level of
radiation exposure of the population and the projected health risks made in 1986 were much higher
than the figures given later. The origin of the confusion has never been explained.'807 And last but
not least, Medvedev tied his discussion of the various Chernobyl reports and accounts in with
statements on the wider discourse on energy policies: 'the heated debate about possible future
health effects of Chernobyl is understandable. […] If the lowest estimates are right, the safety
record of nuclear energy remains better than that of coal, oil and hydroelectric power. But if the
highest estimates prove accurate, the outlook is vastly different.'808
Medvedev's Chernobyl narrative to a large degree was a critical account of the official
evaluations. But his criticism was not limited to Chernobyl. Medvedev did not consider Chernobyl
to be a single isolated event. Instead, he considered the accident to reside within the larger
framework of Soviet energy policies and, at the same time, called into question many 'facts' that the
international nuclear community had agreed upon thus far in its evaluation. However, Medvedev
did not present a concrete counter narrative to this official evaluation. His aim was to highlight
those areas in which scientific knowledge was still lacking and to point to issues on which the
existing knowledge might be biased. In so doing, The legacy of Chernobyl opened the Chernobyl
debate to new findings: A respected scientist without any connection to the nuclear sector had made
a clear, comprehensible statement on the problems that were implicit in the official reports; it was a
clear invitation to other 'counter experts' to join the debate.  
As important as Zhores Medvedev's book was for the British Chernobyl debate, it was, very
surprisingly, never translated into French. Not even the English version is available in the French
National Library (BNF). This is even more surprising given that Medvedev's book on Kyshtym was
translated in 1988; an edition for which Roger and Bella Belbéoch had been the translators. Thus,
The legacy of Chernobyl is a particularly striking example of the degree to which Western European
national Chernobyl debates were separated by linguistic boarders. The book written by Robert Peter
Gale is another example. Gale, an American doctor, had carried out several bone marrow transplants
on the Chernobyl firefighters in Moscow in the weeks following the accident. This work was
financed by American millionaire Armand Hammer. In 1988, Gale published his book Chernobyl –
The final warning809, which was a combination of his diary from his time in Moscow and general
806 Ibid., p. 130.
807 Ibid.
808 Ibid., p. 166.
809 Robert Peter Gale, Chernobyl: the final warning (London: Hamilton, 1988).
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thoughts regarding the probabilities nuclear accidents could occur and the problems inherent to
large-scale evacuations. Because the book included far more details on Gale's daily life in Moscow
than it did statements on the impact of Chernobyl, it is not discussed. Regardless, or perhaps rather
because, of this act of self-marketing, Gale's surgery work in Moscow is mentioned in almost all
accounts on Chernobyl written in English. In the French context, however, Gale's work never had a
role in the Chernobyl narratives: he is not mentioned in descriptions of the accident, nor does
anybody refer to his opinion on the lessons that should be learned from Chernobyl. Like Zhores
Medvedev's publication, no copy of Gale's book is preserved in the collection of the BNF.
Grigori Medvedev
Another Medvedev deeply influenced the French Chernobyl debate: Grigori Medvedev. His book,
The truth about Chernobyl was first translated from the Russian original into French in 1990,810
before the English edition was published in 1991.811 Grigori Medvedev had been a high-ranking
Soviet nuclear engineer, who had worked at the Chernobyl construction site in the 1970s and was,
in 1986, involved in the investigation into the causes of the accident. In his book, Medvedev
presented a detailed account of how the accident unfolded; this was a narrative that in the years to
come would become the main reference for descriptions of the accident. But Medvedev did not stop
with a detailed account of the chain of events leading up to and including the accident; he enriched
his story with sharp criticism of the Soviet nuclear programme. According to him, the staff at the
plant was clearly responsible for the events of the night from 25 to 26 April: 'Toptunov and Akimov,
who came on duty that night, as well as the operators and all the preceding shifts on 25 April 1986,
failed to show the proper sense of responsibility and blithely proceeded to commit serious breaches
of the nuclear safety regulations.'812 However, the blame could not be placed on the staff alone; the
deeper problem lay in the general logic of how the nuclear system functioned. In this regard, it is
opportune to quote the first sentences of Medvedev's final chapter – titled 'A new culture for the
nuclear age' – in which he openly addressed his larger agenda: 'But so much still remains to be
done! What further lessons still need to be learned! What battle must be fought in order to make
our earth truly clean and safe for life and happiness! Meanwhile, the nuclear bureaucrats are not
asleep. Though somewhat bruised by the Chernobyl explosion, they are once again rearing their
heads, praising the completely “safe” power of the peaceful atom, while not forgetting to cover up
the truth. For it is not possible to sing the praises of the peaceful atom unless the truth is covered
810 Grigorij Medvedev, La Vérité sur Tchernobyl, (Paris: A. Michel, 1990).
811 Grigori Medvedev, The truth about Chernobyl (London: Tauris, 1991).
812 Ibid., p. 57.
243
up.'813
Medvedev's account focused on the chain of events leading up to and including the accident,
and therefore the impact of Chernobyl's fallout was not addressed in the book, especially not from a
broader geographical perspective. In this regard, The truth about Chernobyl was not a counter
narrative to any official report on health effects. It was rather a counter narrative to the early official
reports that had, also in Britain, described the emergency actions as having been well planned and
coordinated. As opposed to the official reports, which were filled with scientific data, Medvedev
provided the personal story of the event: his was a minute-by-minute or even second-by-second
account of the plant workers' and firefighters' struggle for life, large portions of which were written
like a play with dialogues. Medvedev's description was completed by transcriptions of eyewitness
accounts. 
The material Medvedev had collected for The truth about Chernobyl and the reactions
following its publication – including the attacks that were directed against Medvedev – were
enough for a second book: No breathing room. The aftermath of Chernobyl' was published just two
years later.814 In No breathing room, Medvedev told the story behind his first book: how he had
become an anti-nuclearist, his work on the book, the difficult search for an editor, etc. Medvedev
underlined that the criticism he had expressed in The truth about Chernobyl was not directed
against the Soviet nuclear system alone. In this regard, the fall of the Soviet Union was for him a
crucial moment: 'Perhaps the most telling question of all: is the Western capitalist society really a
suitable model for the former Soviet regime to follow – that is, can it be stated honestly that many
of the problems that led to the Chernobyl catastrophe are not also present in the West?'815 Thus,
Medvedev's reasoning openly contradicted the narrative provided by Western public authorities that
'such an accident can not happen here'.
The introduction to Grigori Medvedev's second English Chernobyl book was written by
David R. Marples. Marples, Professor at the University of Alberta and specialist in Ukrainian,
Belarusian and Russian history, was one of the first scientists in the humanities who conducted
research on Chernobyl. Already in 1987, Marples' first book on Chernobyl had been published:
Chernobyl and Nuclear Power in the USSR.816 Only one year later, his next followed: The Social
Impact of the Chernobyl disaster.817 Through his work on the impact of Chernobyl, Marples became
increasingly more interested in Belarus, an interest which led to the publication of his third book on
813 Ibid., p. 265.
814 Grigori Medvedev, No breathing room: the aftermath of Chernobyl (New York: Basic Books, 1993).
815 Ibid., pp. 28.
816 Marples, Chernobyl and nuclear power in the USSR.
817 Marples, The social impact of the Chernobyl disaster.
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Chernobyl: Belarus: From Soviet Rule to Nuclear Catastrophe.818 Through his work, Marples
clearly established himself as an international expert on Chernobyl, but primarily with regard to the
political impact of the accident and not on its health impact. For this reason, an account of his work
will not be included in this study. 
Alla Yaroshinskaya
Another author who attempted to lift the veil of the The forbidden truth about Chernobyl was Alla
Yaroshinskaya.819 Interestingly, the 1995 English edition of her book was not a translation from the
Russian original, but from the French version, which had been released in 1993.820 In her book, the
journalist Yaroshinskaya described the way in which information on Chernobyl had been
systematically held back by the Soviet state. The following quote from the book may be regarded as
a kind of summary of her arguments: 'The most dangerous isotope to escape from the mouth of the
reactor did not appear on the periodic table. It was not “Cs-137”. It was “Lie-86”. A lie as global
as the disaster itself.'821 In the US edition, which was published in the following year by the
University of Nebraska Press, it was again Marples who provided an introduction. Furthermore, a
foreword by John Gofman – former professor at UC Berkeley and one of the most prominent voices
in the debate on the health effects of low-level radiation exposure – was added. In 1992, together
with Yaroshinskaya, Gofman was awarded the Right Livelihood Award – also referred to as the
Alternative Nobel Price – for his work on the health effects of ionizing radiation. In conformity
with the claims he had made in his own research, Gofman in his introduction of Yaroshinskaya's
text called for independent research to be carried out on the health effects of radiation. He
considered the current research policies – which were governed by 'a market eager for medical-
unknowledge in the field of health consequences from nuclear (and other) pollutants,'822 – to be
characterized by the same dynamics that Yaroshinskaya had uncovered with regard to the Chernobyl
accident: 'In lavish sponsorship of scientists, engineers and physicians in innumerable institutions
worldwide (including many halls of academe), the governments have a wish-list for the outcome of
radiation research (into Chernobyl for instance). […] Best of all would be the finding that a little
818 David Marples, Belarus: from Soviet rule to nuclear catastrophe (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996).
819 Alla Yaroshinskaya, Chernobyl: the forbidden truth (Oxford: Jon Carpenter, 1994).
820 Yarochinskaya, Tchernobyl, vérité interdite. In 2004, the editors of Les silences de Tchernobyl included an article by 
Yaroshinskaya in their compilation. In Germany, her statements became known to a wider audience in particular 
through the special edition of the journal Osteuropa, which appeared on the occasion of the accident's 20th 
anniversary and which included an article by Yaroshinskaya: Alla Jarošinskaja, “Lüge-86. Die geheimen Tschernobyl-
Dokumente.” In Tschernobyl: Vermächtnis und Verpflichtung, ed. by Sahm/Sapper/Weichsel, p. 39-56.
821 Yaroshinskaya, Chernobyl, p. 123.
822 Ibid., p. 2.
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extra radiation improves human health.'823 
Vladimir Chernousenko
A somewhat similar argument that the true health effects of Chernobyl had been systematically
covered up in order to protect the international nuclear industry was brought forward by Vladimir
Chernousenko. Chernousenko had been to Chernobyl several times after 1986 in relation to his
scientific work for the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. In his book Chernobyl – Insight from the
inside, which was published in 1991 by Springer, Chernousenko aimed to debunk 21 'myths of
Chernobyl.'824 These myths included, for instance, the following statements: 'The design of the
RBMK-1000 reactor is impeccable. It was the operating staff that caused the explosion'; 'Only 31
people died as a result of the accident and the clean-up operations'; or 'The doses which people
have received while living in contaminated areas will not have genetic effects.'825 All in all, the
entire list of the myths could be equated with the statements produced in the early IAEA reports. By
working with a broad selection of what were at the time mostly unpublished material and interviews
with eyewitnesses and people living in the most affected areas, Chernousenko aimed to deconstruct
these myths. In his account, he especially focused on the health effects in the most affected areas,
which he described to be devastating: 'There are practically no healthy children in any of the towns
or settlements there. The appearance of ambulances on school grounds is a common sight. Children
faint from weakness right in the classroom.'826 To underpin this argument, he quoted the Union of
Chernobyl Liquidators: according to them there were between 650,000 to 1,000,000 'liquidators'
whose radiation related illnesses were being denied and negated. From his point of view, people had
very good reason to be afraid: 'Is it any wonder that these “radiophobic” people think a crime was
committed by those who made the negligent decision to suppress important, truthful information.'827
What is particularly interesting about Chernousenko's account is the fact that he did not limit the
Chernobyl health effects to cancer. In the chapter 'Doctor, will I live?', he presented an entire list of
illnesses observed in children including diseases of the liver, nose, and throat as well as birth
defects. The health conditions of adults were not described as being any better: They suffered
gastritis, colitis, various swellings, problems with the cardiovascular system, etc.828 Chernousenko
did not explicitly argue that these various illnesses were induced directly by radiation. But from his
823 Ibid., pp. 3.
824 Vladimir Mikhailovich Chernousenko, Chernobyl: insight from the inside (Berlin/London: Springer, 1991).
825 Ibid., pp. ix.
826 Ibid., p. 39.
827 Ibid., p. 171.
828 Ibid., p. 217.
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narrative, only one, minute step was needed to establish this link; as had been done by Belarusian
doctors, Nesterenko and Bandazhevsky.
3.1.2 Yuri Bandazhevsky and Vassily Nesterenko
Yuri Bandazhevsky
Yuri Bandazhevsky is a Belarusian doctor who worked in one of the country's most heavily
contaminated regions and, on his own initiative, carried out research on the relationship between the
constant exposure of the children to radionuclides in their food and their many illnesses, in
particular respiratory and cardiovascular diseases. In 1999, Bandazhevsky was arrested on charges
of corruption. Global protests against his arrest ensued, both by human rights organizations such as
Amnesty International and anti-nuclear organizations. In 2005, Bandazhevsky was finally released
on parole. He went to France, where he planned to continue his research in cooperation with the
CRIIRAD829 and with the financial aid of a stipend provided by the Conseil régional d’Auvergne. It
was the campaign carried out by the CRIIRAD that made Bandazhevsky known in France and led
to his official support, which was given in the form of the conferral of honorary citizenship on
Bandazhevsky by several French cities. For example, Noël Mamère – a well-known French TV
presenter and journalist, who stepped away from his media career to pursue a political career with
Les Verts – in his function as major of Bègles, conferred on Bandazhevsky the position of honorary
citizen of Bègles in 2009. Mamère had been involved in a longstanding legal fight with Pierre
Pellerin and therefore was very personally close to the Chernobyl debate.830
Bandazhevsky's work was already widely known in France before his connection to this
country was further strengthened by his move to the country upon his release from prison.
Bandazhevsky's study results and imprisonment were prominent arguments used in the narratives
put forth by the anti-nuclear side of the French Chernobyl debate, and particularly in those released
by the CRIIRAD. Other actors of the French Chernobyl debate also took action to spread
information about his work and what had happened to him. For instance, in 2004, Frédérick
Lemarchand and Guillaume Grandazzi dedicated two articles of their book Les silences de
Tchernobyl to Bandazhevsky and his work, one of which was written by Bandazhevsky's wife
Galina.831 References to Bandazhevsky's work underpinned Lemarchand's and Grandazzi's argument
829 For CRIIRAD's commitment to support Bandazhevsky after his release from prison, see for instance: CRIIRAD, 
Trait d’Union. Bulletin d’information des adhérents de la CRIIRAD, No 32/33 (2005).
830 For these trials, see: Kalmbach, Tschernobyl und Frankreich, pp. 114.
831 Galina Bandajevskaya, “Comment on a réduit au silence le professor Youri Bandajevski.” In Les silences de 
Tchernobyl, 2004, ed. by Grandazzi and Lemarchand, p. 101-105; Maryvonne David-Jougneau, “Semmelweis, 
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that in the most affected areas the health effects of the radioactive fallout were much stronger than
had been proclaimed by international expert groups. 
In the same respect, Bandazhevsky and his work – insofar as they were counter example to
the official evaluations and proof of the 'apocalyptic' effects of the accident – figured in almost
every publication that was written by critical voices of the French Chernobyl debate on the occasion
of the 20th anniversary: For instance, Wladimir Tchertkoff elaborated on Bandazhevsky's (and
Nesterenko's) work in the context of his account on the 'global campaign for the denial of the
Chernobyl victims,'832 and Stéphane Lhomme referred to Bandazhevsky in his contemplations on the
role that the French nuclear sector had played in keeping Belarusian physicians from publishing
their work on the 'true impact' of Chernobyl: 'without surprise, this unjustified imprisonment does
not keep the French from collaborating with the Belarusian powers.'833 To show his support,
Stéphane Lhomme was also present when Noël Mamère made Bandazhevsky honorary citizen of
Bègles. In addition to Wladimir Tchertkoff and Stéphane Lhomme, there were also many other
French authors who referred to Bandazhevsky in their 2006-publications: In his book Atomic Park.
À la recherche des victimes du nucléaire Jean-Phillipe Desbordes presented the trial against
Bandazhevsky as an archetype of the denial of the victims of the nuclear age.834 In her graphic novel
Tchernobyl mon amour, Chantal Montellier also included a reference to Bandazhevsky: At one
point, the main character of the graphic novel – the young journalist Chris – mediates on the people
who fought to reveal the truth about Chernobyl's health effects. Chris' speech balloon says: 'It was
not only the 4th reactor that was choked, they also wanted to choke the truth. Those who spoke
about the consequences of the catastrophe, such as the doctor and scientist Yuri Bandazhevsky or
the writer Svetlana Alexievitch with her extraordinary book 'La Supplication' were condemned to
prison, to relegation and exile.'835 On the same page, Montellier inserted drawn portraits of
Alexievich and Bandazhevsky. Alexievich's speech balloon consists of a quote from La
Supplication, and Bandazhevsky's speech balloon says: 'They arrested me for a ridiculous story of a
bribe. But in reality it is my research that disturbs them.'836 And even the historian Nicolas Werth, in
his article on Chernobyl that was published in the popular science magazine L’Histoire, referred to
Bandazhevsky stating that, in addition to thyroid cancers, various radiation-induced illnesses had
Bandajevsky: des savants victimes de la répression scientifique.” In: ibid., p. 106-118.
832 Tchertkoff, Le crime de Tchernobyl, pp. 349.
833 Lhomme, L'insécurité nucléaire, p. 194: 'Sans surprise, cet injustifiable emprisonnement n’empêche pas les 
Français à collaborer avec le pouvoir biélorusse.'
834 Desbordes, Atomic Park, pp. 279.
835 Montellier, Tchernobyl mon amour, p. 29: 'On n’a pas seulement essayé d’étouffer le quatrième réacteur, on a aussi 
voulu étouffer la vérité. Ceux qui ont parlé des conséquences de la catastrophe, comme le savant Youri Bandajevsky
où l’écrivain Svetlana Alexiévitch, avec son extraordinaire livre ‘La supplication’ ont été condamnés à la prison, la 
relégation et l’exil.'
836 Ibid.: 'Ils m’ont arrêté pour une ridicule histoire de pots-de-vin. En réalité, mes recherches dérangent.'
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been verified in children.837
But Bandazhevsky's role in the French Chernobyl debate in 2006 was not just a passive one
in terms of others referencing his work. He himself contributed actively to this debate. On the
occasion of the 20th anniversary, his boo k La philosophie de ma vie: journal de prison was
published in France.838 This book was not a scholarly piece but a personal log from his time in
prison that was accompanied by several scientific papers and an autobiography. The cover design of
the book consisted in a red bar running across the cover on which a white inscription read:
'Tchernobyl: 20 ans après'. The book included a preface written by Bandazhevsky's wife, Galina. In
her preface, Galina Bandajevskaya made clear that their fight did not concern only the health effects
of Chernobyl but was also directed against the threats posed by the nuclear industry as such: 'I hope
that this book sparks the interest of a large group of readers sensitive to the problems of Chernobyl.
That it will help them to understand the people who fight against the nuclear menace that weights
on our planet.'839 The summary of the book printed on the back cover declared Bandazhevsky's
work to be 'the scientific proof of the radioactive contamination of Chernobyl.'840 Amongst the
people in France who had already long held a critical stance towards the official evaluations of
Chernobyl, Bandazhevsky's book was received as precisely this: the 'scientific proof' corroborating
their criticisms. In addition to this circle of people, Bandazhevsky's book was extensively covered
in media reporting on Chernobyl on the occasion of the 20th anniversary: many newspapers
published reviews of the book or listed it as a reading suggestion, and Radio France Culture
broadcasted an interview with Bandazhevsky. But La philosophie de ma vie was not the only book
written by Bandazhevsky that appeared in France; Tchernobyl 25 ans après,841 Les Conséquences de
Tchernobyl sur la natalité,842 and Les Conséquences de Tchernobyl sur la santé843 soon followed.
On the other side of the Channel, however, neither Yuri Bandazhevsky's work nor his
imprisonment played a role in the British Chernobyl debate. The only account on Bandazhevsky's
work that I could find in all of the material I looked through on the British case was a single
newspaper article published in 2006. Furthermore, his books have not been translated into English.
837 Nicolas Werth, “Tchernobyl: enquête sur une catastrophe annoncée,” in L’Histoire, 308 (4:2006), p. 75.
838 Youri I. Bandazhevsky, La philosophie de ma vie: journal de prison (traduit du russe par Manuela Büx) (Paris: Jean-
Claude Gawsewitch Éditeur, 2006).
839 Ibid., p. 15: 'J’espère que ce livre suscitera l’intérêt d’un vaste cercle de lecteurs sensibles aux problèmes de 
Tchernobyl. Qu’il puisse aider à comprendre ces gens qui se battent contre la menace nucléaire qui pèse sur la 
planète.'
840 Ibid., back of book: 'la preuve scientifique de la contamination radioactive de Tchernobyl.'
841 Youri I. Bandazhevsky et al., Tchernobyl 25 an après. Situation démographique et problèmes de santé dans les 
territoires contaminés (Gap: Éditions Yves Michel, 2011).
842 Youri I. Bandazhevsky and N. F. Dubovaya, Les conséquences de Tchernobyl sur la natalité. Césium radioactif et 
processus de reproduction (Gap: Éditions Yves Michel, 2012).
843 Youri I. Bandazhevsky and Galina S. Bandajevskaya, Les Conséquences de Tchernobyl sur la santé. Le système 
cardiovasculaire et l’incorporation de radionucléides Cs-137 (Gap: Éditions Yves Michel, 2012).
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The very different reception of his work in these two national contexts is very apparent in another
regard: The French Wikipedia article of 2013 was roughly three times as long as the English one.
Vassily Nesterenko
Alongside Yuri Bandazhevsky, there is another Belarusian doctor who profoundly influenced the
debate on the health effects of Chernobyl: Vassily Nesterenko. Vassily Nesterenko, who died in
2008, was the founder of the private Belarusian radiation protection institute Belrad. Belrad has,
among other things, provided citizens in the most affected areas with facilities to measure the
radioactivity present in their food and trainings to learn on how to reduce their exposure. It also
developed the highly contested pectin pills, which are used to reduce the radioactivity levels in
children. In France, it was mainly the group Entfants de Tchernobyl Bélarus (ETB) that promoted
Belrad's and Nesterenko's work.844 In this regard, it is not surprising that Wladimir Tchertkoff's Le
crime de Tchernobyl included an account on Nesterenko, given that Tchertkoff was a founding
member of the ETB. Beyond the immediate circle of people linked to the ETB, however,
Nesterenko has been far less present in the French Chernobyl debate than Bandazhevsky.
Nonetheless, one of Nesterenko's articles was included in the compendium Les silences de
Tchernobyl edited by Frédérick Lemarchand and Guillaume Grandazzi. The central premise of the
article stressed that the Chernobyl accident had been close to causing a nuclear reaction similar to
that of an atomic bomb and thus could have rendered all of Europe uninhabitable.845 Aside from this
article, however, no further articles by Nesterenko have been published in French.846 
Throughout the English-speaking world, however, Vassily Nesterenko and his son Alexey
Nesterenko's publications are widely known. In particular, a book published in 2009 through the
New York Academy of Science has become an important reference in the transnational Chernobyl
debate – for the anti-nuclear as well as the pro-nuclear side.847 For the anti-nuclear side, Chernobyl:
844 The ETB has also supported the work of the Bandazhevskys, for instance lately by collecting money among ETB-
members for Galina and her daughters, see: ETB, Compte rendu de l’Assemblée Générale Ordinaire du 17 
novembre 2012. More information on ETB is in chapter 2.2.5.
845 Vassilli Nesterenko, “L’Europe aurait pu devenir inhabitable.” In Les silences de Tchernobyl, 2004, ed. by Grandazzi
and Lemarchand, p. 14-27.
846 In the case of Germany, an article by Vassily Nesterenko was included in the 2006 special edition of Osteuropa: 
Vasilij Nesterenko, “Mauern der Ignoranz. Protokoll einer Katastrophe.” In Tschernobyl: Vermächtnis und 
Verpflichtung, ed. by Sahm/Sapper/Weichsel, p. 27-38. An article by Guillaume Grandazzi was included in this 
special edition as well. It is very interesting to see how the French and German Chernobyl debates were connected 
in this special edition and how, at the same time, this publication reflects the transnationality of the Chernobyl 
debate. In this regard, this volume also included an article by David Marples.
847 Alexey Yablokov, Vassily B. Nesterenko, Alexey V. Nesterenko, Chernobyl: consequences of the catastrophe for 
people and the environment (Boston: Blackwell Publisher on behalf of the New York Academy of Sciences, 2009). 
In Germany, the book has been made available through the website 'Strahlentelex': 
http://www.strahlentelex.de/Yablokov_Chernobyl_book.pdf (last accessed: 15 November 2013).
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consequences of the catastrophe for people and the environment – to which I refer in the following
paragraphs as the Yablokov-Nesterenko Report – is the long overdue scientific proof that the official
reports on Chernobyl's impact and their explanatory pattern of 'radiophobia' are erroneous and that
the various and severe health effects of the radioactive fallout are indeed observable. The pro-
nuclear side, however, believes that this publication just proves that there is no valid scientific
argument that is capable of underpinning the apocalyptic Chernobyl narratives. In this controversy
over the book, the very fact that it was included in the Annals of the New York Academy of Science
became a political issue in and of itself. While the anti-nuclear side referred to this fact as
confirmation of the scientific value of this book, the pro-nuclear side ferociously attacked the
Academy for undermining scientific standards. Chernobyl: consequences of the catastrophe for
people and the environment caused such heated debate that the New York Academy of Science felt
obliged to distance itself from this publication. On its website on the page it lists its publications,
the Academy included the disclaimer: 'In no sense did Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences
or the New York Academy of Sciences commission this work; nor by its publication does the
Academy validate the claims made in the original Slavic language publications cited in the
translated papers. Importantly, the translated volume has not been formally peer-reviewed by the
New York Academy of Sciences or by anyone else. Under the editorial practices of Annals at the
time, some projects, such as the Chernobyl translation, were developed and accepted solely to fulfill
the Academy’s broad mandate of providing an open forum for discussion of scientific questions,
rather than to present original scientific studies or Academy positions. The content of these
projects, conceived as one-off book projects, were not vetted by standard peer review.'848
As Susanne Bauer emphasized in her work, 'the debates raised in this controversy were
symptomatic of the different modes of health research and conflicts over “design issues” in
epidemiological research.'849 These conflicts over 'design issues' derived from the fact that 'Soviet,
post-Soviet and western ways of doing research and documentation differed in their standards and
protocols. In Soviet radiation epidemiology, mostly ecological (area comparisons) were used, while
international protocols insisted on certain study designs, statistical tests for significance, specific
baseline data and dose-response-relationship as criteria for proof of radiation effects.'850 These
different ways of 'doing' science surfaced and clashed in the controversy over the Yablokov-
Nesterenko Report since the papers in this publication had obtained their results mainly from
ecological studies into the numbers of cases observed of specific illnesses as well as area
848 New York Academy of Science: http://www.nyas.org/publications/annals/Detail.aspx?cid=f3f3bd16-51ba-4d7b-
a086-753f44b3bfc1 (last accessed: 15 November 2013).
849 Bauer/Kalmbach/Kasperski, From Pripyat to Paris.
850 Ibid.
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comparisons. This method differed from what the critics of the Yablokov-Nesterenko Report have
considered to be valid scientific method: 'In environmental epidemiology, which is based on
observational rather than experimental approaches, methodological superiority is attributed to
“quasi-experimental designs”, i.e. cohort studies, followed by case-control studies. […] In this
system, the study designs mostly used by Soviet researchers (ecological or area comparisons) count
only as descriptive and hypothesis-generating.'851
In addition to being an archetypal example of the scientific disputes that are characteristic of
the Chernobyl debate, the Yablokov-Nesterenko Report is also an archetypal example of the
scientific foundation of the apocalyptic Chernobyl narrative. The objective of the report was to
prove that the apocalyptic situation that Chernobyl activists like Alexievich had outlined through
personal life stories is not a truth that applies to only some individuals but is in fact the reality for
all of the people living in the most affected areas. The book's foreword clearly stated that the impact
of the radioactive fallout is in no way limited to these areas alone: 'More than 22 years have passed
since the Chernobyl catastrophe burst upon and changed our world. In just a few days, the air,
natural waters, flowers, trees, woods, rivers, and seas turned to potential sources of danger to
people, as radioactive substances emitted by the destroyed reactor fell upon all life. Throughout the
Northern Hemisphere radioactivity covered most living spaces and became a source of potential
harm for all living things.'852 The introduction, also, opened with a similar apocalyptic narrative of
the accident: 'For millions of people on this planet, the explosion of the fourth reactor of the
Chernobyl nuclear power plant on April 26, 1986 divided life into two parts: before and after. […]
Chernobyl has become synonymous with human suffering and has brought new words into our lives
– Chernobyl liquidators, children of Chernobyl, Chernobyl AIDs, Chernobyl contamination,
Chernobyl heart, Chernobyl dust, and Chernobyl collar (thyroid disease), etc. For the past 23 years
it has been clear that there is a danger greater than nuclear weapons concealed within nuclear
power. Emissions from this one reactor exceeded a hundredfold the radioactive contamination of
the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. No citizen of any country can be assured that he or
she can be protected from radioactive contamination. One nuclear reactor can pollute half the
globe. Chernobyl fallout covered the entire Northern Hemisphere.'853 
The results of the studies that Yablokov and the Nesterenkos presented in this volume had
mostly been published already in Slavic languages. From the editors' point of view, non-English
publications had not been considered enough in the official evaluations of the international experts.
In particular, the evaluation provided by the Chernobyl Forum lacked this perspective entirely. As
851 Ibid.
852 Yablokov/Nesterenko/Nesterenko, Chernobyl, p. vii.
853 Ibid., p. 1.
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the editors stated themselves, 'the principal idea behind this volume is to present, in a brief and
systematic form, the results from researchers who observed and documented the consequences of
the Chernobyl catastrophe. In our view, the need for such an analysis became especially important
after September 2005 when the IAEA and the WHO presented and widely advertised “The
Chernobyl Forum” report because it lacked sufficiently detailed facts concerning the consequences
of the disaster.'854 
Although the report was mostly concerned with Chernobyl health effects in Eastern Europe,
it addressed other regions as well. Interestingly, on several occasions, Britain was used as the
example of an affected region in Western Europe – thus, the authors chose a country where debate
on self-affectedness almost did not exist. This appears to be less surprising when the fact that, in
2006, Yablokov and Chris Busby had jointly edited the book Chernobyl 20 years on is taken into
consideration.855 A likely consequence of this cooperation was that the Yablokov-Nesterenko Report
gave quite a bit of space to Busby's studies. For instance, the report stated that 'in Wales, one of the
regions most heavily contaminated by Chernobyl fallout, abnormally low birth weights (less than
1,500 g) were noted in 1986–87.'856 In addition – in reference to a study by Busby and Scott Cato –
the Yablokov-Nesterenko Report stated that there had been an increase in leukaemia in infants in
Wales and Scotland, and it quoted Busby on his declaration that 'a significant increase in perinatal
mortality occurred in March 1987, some 10 months after the catastrophe in the three most
contaminated counties of England and Wales: Cumbria, Clwyd and Gwynedd.'857 Alongside Busby's
work, the report also included another study on the health effects of Chernobyl in Britain in order to
provide perspective on the vast geographical impact of the fallout: 'Thyroid cancer in children and
young adults in the North of England. Is increasing incidence related to the Chernobyl accident?',
which was published in 2001 by Cotterill, Pearce and Parker in the European Journal of Cancer.858
In the abstract to this article, the authors had summarized their findings as follows: 'Regression
models showed a significant increase in the incidence of thyroid cancer after the Chernobyl
accident (P=0.002). In Cumbria, the area receiving the heaviest fallout in the UK, the increase in
incidence was much greater (rate ratio 12.19, 95% CI 1.5–101.2). These temporal and spatial
changes in incidence are consistent with a causal association with the Chernobyl accident although
a greater effect in the younger rather than the older age group would have been anticipated.
However, factors including improvements in ascertainment and earlier detection of tumours may
854 Ibid., p. x.
855 Busby and Yablokov, Chernobyl 20 years on.
856 Yablokov/Nesterenko/Nesterenko, Chernobyl, p. 50.
857 Ibid., p.195.
858 S. J. Cotterill, M. S. Pearce, L. Parker, “Thyroid cancer in children and young adults in the North of England. Is 
increasing incidence related to the Chernobyl accident?” in European Journal of Cancer 37 (8, 2001): 1020-1026.
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also have contributed to the increasing incidence.'859 It is an interesting finding that this study seems
to have played a more important role in the transnational Chernobyl debate than in the British one.
Although with regard to the British debate, I did not come across any reference to this study in
either newspaper reports or in British Chernobyl literature – not even in Busby and Yablokov's 2006
book – I did encounter one such reference in a German Chernobyl publication. The 2001 report
Health effects of Chernobyl, published by the German branch of IPPNW together with Sebastian
Pflugbeil's Gesellschaft für Strahlenschutz, made reference to this study in its chapter on 'Thyroid
cancer and other thyroid diseases'.860 
In terms of the national and transnational reception of these studies, there is another
interesting finding: Although Britain figured prominently in the Yablokov-Nesterenko Report, the
report itself was barely received in British public discourse, as was the Nesterenkos' work as such.
However, this changed slightly after the events at the Fukushima plant. In this regard, it is worth
having a closer look at two articles that George Monbiot published in April and November 2011 on
his blog. In his article of November 2011,861 Monbiot harshly attacked Chris Busby and his work.
Monbiot's outburst was triggered when Busby earlier that month proclaimed in a video blog that the
Japanese government was spreading radioactivity around the country in order to cover up the health
effects of the Fukushima accident. Busby had stated that by contaminating all of Japan, the
government would be able to ensure that no increases in illnesses in the Fukushima region could be
ever found to be statistically significant. Furthermore, he proclaimed that by increasing intake of
calcium and magnesium, the human body could block the impact of radionuclides. In addition to
these statements, a US-based website began to sell highly overpriced calcium and magnesium pills
under the name of Christopher Busby. Busby, in a statement that he posted on his website the day
after Monbiot's blog entry, confirmed that the US-based website had been set up with his consent,
but he refuted receiving any financial benefits for himself from the proceeds of the sale of these
items.862 It is not my intention to discuss here the possible agency of these pills or the ethic
implications implied in carrying out such business. What I am interested in are the reactions that
859 Ibid., p. 1020.
860 German Affiliate of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) / Gesellschaft für 
Strahlenschutz, Health effects of Chernobyl. 25 years after the reactor catastrophe (Berlin: IPPNW / Gesellschaft 
für Strahlenschutz, April 2011), p. 51. An online version is at: 
http://www.ratical.org/radiation/Chernobyl/HEofC25yrsAC.html (last accessed: 15 November 2013).
861 George Monbiot, “How the Greens were misled,” 22 November 2011: http://www.monbiot.com/2011/11/22/how-
the-greens-were-misled/ (last accessed: 15 November 2013).
862 Chris Busby, “A personal statement by Chris Busby. Fukushima, Calcium Supplements, the Christopher Busby 
Foundation for the Children of Fukushima, George Monbiot et al: The Real Target; the Real Strategy,” 23 November
2011: http://llrc.org/epidemiology/subtopic/monbiot21nov2011.htm. On the webpage of this statement, Busby 
included a link to a youtube video in which he performs his song 'News Paper Man'. Although he does not mention 
Monbiot's name, the song is clearly dedicated to him: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hKBusvfq0eM (last 
accessed: 15 November 2013).
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these activities elicited, activities that George Monbiot had 'disclosed' to the public. It was no
coincidence that George Monbiot is the individual who got interested in this story and prominently
promoted it on his blog. Monbiot is a British journalist who has worked for years for the BBC and
who became known not just because of his investigative documentaries on health and
environmental issues but also through his books, mainly on climate change. In the last few years,
the topic of climate change has become his most important field of activism – and in this regard, he
has become a declared campaigner for and supporter of nuclear power; he is known throughout the
English-speaking world, and fights in favour of the 'green atom' in order to save the world.863 To
foster his claims, Monbiot strongly attacked the anti-nuclear movement, proclaiming that these
activists were consciously promulgating incorrect information in order to incite fear of radioactivity
in the people. In his article of April 2011, Monbiot clearly explained his viewpoint: 'Over the past
fortnight I’ve made a deeply troubling discovery. The anti-nuclear movement to which I once
belonged has misled the world about the impacts of radiation on human health. The claims we have
made are ungrounded in science, unsupportable when challenged and wildly wrong. We have done
other people, and ourselves, a terrible disservice.'864 He based his argument mainly on the debate
over the health impact of Chernobyl and stated that: 'For the past 25 years, anti-nuclear
campaigners have been racking up the figures for deaths and diseases caused by the Chernobyl
disaster, and parading deformed babies like a mediaeval circus. They now claim that 985,000
people have been killed by Chernobyl, and that it will continue to slaughter people for generations
to come. These claims are false.'865 As the most obvious example of the degree to which the claims
by anti-nuclear campaigners were scientifically unfounded, Monbiot made reference to the book
discussed above: Chernobyl: Consequences of the Catastrophe for People and the Environment, i.e.
the book in which Busby's studies had figured prominently. In his statement, which was released  on
the occasion of the 25th Chernobyl anniversary, Monbiot drew a parallel between these authors and a
group of people he had made out to be today's worst criminals: the 'climate change deniers'. This
parallel was described as follows: 'Failing to provide sources, refuting data with anecdote, cherry-
picking studies, scorning the scientific consensus, invoking a cover-up to explain it: all this is
horribly familiar. These are the habits of climate change deniers, against which the green
movement has struggled valiantly, calling science to its aid. It is distressing to discover that when
863 See in this regard the open letter that Monbiot wrote together with Stephen Tindale, Fred Pearce, Michael Hanlon 
and Mark Lynas to Prime Minster David Cameron in March 2012: http://www.monbiot.com/2012/03/15/a-letter-to-
david-cameron/ (last accessed: 15 November 2013).
864 George Monbiot, “Evidence Meltdown,” 4 April 2011: http://www.monbiot.com/2011/04/04/evidence-meltdown/ 
(last accessed: 15 November 2013).
865 Ibid.
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the facts don’t suit them, members of this movement resort to the follies they have denounced.'866 
Thus, the fact that Monbiot disclosed the story about Busby's pill-selling activities is by no
means a coincidence. Instead, these blog posts in November 2011 reflect the personal power
struggle between two persons, each of whom believes the other to be the incarnation of evil. Both
men are equally convinced that the 'scientific facts' they believe in are the absolute 'truth', and
therefore neither has left any room to consider the potential validity of the other's opinion. Both
have elevated their convictions to the level of a theory by which they categorically explain and
divide the world into good and bad.
Undoubtedly, it could be argued that one does not need Monbiot's convictions to be stunned
about Busby's promotion of pharmaceuticals. But, again, it is very useful to take a step back and
apply a comparative look. In France, the Chernobyl solidarity movement group the ETB has been
collecting money for years so that children in Belarus may be provided with pectin pills. It is highly
debated whether pectin really 'absorbs' the radionuclides in children's bodies, as is proclaimed by
the founder of the private radiation protection institute Belrad, Vassily Nesterenko and his son
Alexey, who is the current director of this institute. The fact that Belrad produces these pills through
a French pharmaceutical factory, sells them directly, and also urges people who are active in the
solidarity movement to buy these pills and give them to the 'Chernobyl children' during their stays
abroad, has been widely criticized. Nevertheless, this fact has never attracted any further public
attention in France or led to wider critical reporting in newspapers. Comparing this situation to the
British 'Busby scandal' becomes even more interesting if we take into consideration that the
founding members of the ETB are – alongside the prominent Swiss anti-nuclear activist Michel
Fernex – Vassily Nesterenko, Galia Ackerman and Wladimir Tchertkoff, i.e. the founder of Belrad
and two central figures of the French Chernobyl debate.
As is made clear by this account on Bandazhevsky and the Nesterenkos, the scientific basis
of the 'radiophobic' narrative is not the only one that spread through global networks. The scientific
basis of the apocalyptic narrative is also transmitted through global networks; it actually travels
through the same networks that call into question the scientific basis upon which the 'radiophobic'
narrative is built. These networks will be discussed further in the sub-chapter on the debate on the
WHO-IAEA Agreement (3.3.3) given that this agreement is considered by a growing number of
activists to be the reason why the 'radiophobic' narrative continues to be the dominant narrative
within scientific circles despite the efforts of individuals like Bandazhevsky and the Nesterenkos to
bring the 'apocalyptic' dimension of the accident to light. The International Chernobyl Project and
t h e Chernobyl Forum may be described as 'lighthouses' that disseminated the 'radiophobic'
866 Ibid.
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narrative; such 'lighthouses' also exist with regard to the apocalyptic narrative. Among them are
Greenpeace International, IPPNW, and the European Committee on Radiation Risk (ECRR), this
last of which connects in particular the British, German, and Eastern European Chernobyl debates
through individuals like Chris Busby, Inge Schmitz-Feuerhake, and Alexey Yablokov. This is not an
attempt to place these two competing networks on the same level with regard to their (discursive)
power. On the one side, i.e. that of the promoters of the 'radiophobic' narrative, the members of
scientific and political elites, because of their status, have access to financial funds and have strong
(discursive) power with regard to shaping official evaluations and influencing political decision-
making. On the other side, i.e. that of the promoters of an apocalyptic narrative, many of the
individuals involved are not members of scientific and political elites and therefore their access to
financial funds is more difficult. At the same time, their (discursive) power with regard to shaping
official evaluations and influencing political decision-making is rather limited; this is a result of
their self-identification as opponents to the established elites. When these power hierarchies are
compared, it is possible to see that, despite its comparatively limited power, the network that
promotes the apocalyptic narrative has succeeded in deeply influencing public debate and how
Chernobyl is represented. Depending on the different national context, the level of success of the
proponents of this 'alternative' or apocalyptic narrative can vary drastically: in Germany and France
these actors were successful in shaping public debate and how Chernobyl was represented, but in
Britain they did not have much success at all. In order to understand the transnational sphere of the
Chernobyl debate, it is crucial to have a clear understanding of this network of actors. This
knowledge and understanding prove to be extremely important when trying to comprehend
reactions toward the Fukushima accident as well, given that in the debate on Fukushima health
effects the same issues are at stake and therefore the same actors are involved as in the Chernobyl
debate.
3.1.3  Svetlana Alexievich
But science-based counter narratives provided by (former) Soviet Union citizens are not the only
elements to have deeply influenced Chernobyl debates in many countries. In addition, there is one
book that was attributed particular importance from a transnational perspective: Svetlana
Alexievich's Voices from Chernobyl.867 Originally published in Russian in 1997 under the title
867 This paragraph is an extract of my article: Kalmbach, Chernobyl as a National and Transnational Site of Memory, 
pp. 142.
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Chernobyl’skaia molitva, it was translated into Swedish and German directly in that same year.
Translations into Japanese, English, Chinese, and Spanish, among other languages, soon followed.
The book continues to be reprinted today. In Voices from Chernobyl, Alexievich gave a voice to the
'victims of Chernobyl' from the contaminated regions in Eastern Europe – people who were
evacuated in 1986, family members of deceased 'liquidators', sick patients and their families, and
people who have returned to their evacuated villages, as well as those who moved to these regions
because they considered them safer than their homelands. Their stories were expressed in the form
of monologues – sometimes nine to ten pages long, sometimes only half a page – without editorial
commentary. The book is anything but easy reading: The monologues describe the suffering of the
Chernobyl victims in great detail, enabling readers to visualize, for instance, the skin peeling off of
the irradiated body of a firefighter when his wife talks about his time in hospital. Although
Alexievich claimed to have simply recorded eyewitness reports, she in fact heavily edited the
interviews and combined them into a coherent narrative of incredible intensity. The book's
worldwide success is to a large degree due to the artistic quality of the narrative. It has been a
source of inspiration for a number of artists: theatre groups in particular have found the texts
suitable for stage adaptation.868 However, Voices from Chernobyl is generally read as a
documentation of the situation around Chernobyl rather than a literary creation. As a result,
quotations from the book have frequently been used as captions or explanatory texts in other books
and exhibits.869 Voices from Chernobyl has come to be the prime example of narrations that portray
Chernobyl as an apocalypse – the French translation even incorporates the word 'apocalypse' into its
title: La supplication. Tchernobyl, chroniques du monde après l’Apocalypse. Thus the book has
become a model and reference point for narratives on the 'true' effects of the accident, narratives
that aim to bring visibility to the suffering that has been disguised and even negated by the
'radiophobia' concept of the official reports. 
With regard to differences in the reception of 'foreign' Chernobyl narratives in the various
national contexts, the difference in the way Alexievich's book was received in France and Britain is
a particularly striking example. In France, La supplication. Tchernobyl, chroniques du monde après
l’Apocalypse had a tremendous amount of success and its impact was significant.870 Published in
France in 1998, this release coincided with the growing interest in Chernobyl health effects in
France itself that had seen as strong increase not only in intensity but also in its diffusion after 1996.
868 For adaptations in France, see: Virginie Symaniec, “Mettre en scène La Supplication: du déni de la réalité au rejet de
la représentation.” In Les silences de Tchernobyl, 2004, ed. by Grandazzi and Lemarchand, pp. 178.
869 See for example the children’s book by Paul Dowswell, The Chernobyl Disaster: 26th April 1986 (London: Hodder 
Wayland, 2003), p. 27 and 37; or the traveling exhibition of the Internationales Bildungs- und Begegnungswerk, '25 
Jahre nach Tschernobyl'.
870 This paragraph is an adaption of the respective account in: Kalmbach, Tschernobyl und Frankreich, pp. 123.
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Thus, just weeks after the initial publication was released by the publishing house JC Lattès,871 the
book was re-printed and promoted through the French book clubs France Loisir872 and Le Club.873
The latter even incorporated it into its series Le Grand Livre Du Mois. Already by the next year, the
first paper-back edition had been edited and released by the publishing house J’ai lu.874 Alexievich's
book was translated into French by Galia Ackerman, who had dedicated a great deal of time and
energy to finding a publishing house for the French edition and, after its publication, had
accompanied Alexievich on the promotion tour through France. In an interview in 2007, Galia
Ackerman admitted to me that it had been very difficult to find a publisher. However, after the
initial publication, La Supplication very quickly gained momentum and came to hold a prominent
place in the French Chernobyl debate. From its numerous reprints to the adaptation of the text as a
play to countless quotations in almost every text that French critical voices have written on
Chernobyl, La supplication has become the incarnation of the counter narrative to the ‘official
story’ that was provided by French public authorities, with regard to the health effects of the
accident in Eastern Europe and in France alike. Jean-Michel Jacquemin probably expressed this
connection most obviously: the main chapter of his 2001 book consisted of 3 to 4 page-long life
stories of individual 'French Chernobyl victims' and carried the title 'Les témoignages des malades
– La supplication des Français.'875 
In France, the success of Alexievich’s book not only paved the way for the publication of
numerous other books and film documentaries on the situation in the contaminated areas around
Chernobyl, it also created the basis upon which developed a strong sense of French solidarity for
the detained Belarusian doctor Yuri Bandazhevsky, who after his release from prison moved to
France where CRIIRAD provided him with space in their laboratory. The success of Alexievich’s
book and the solidarity with Bandazhevsky was not unique to France but also occurred in other
countries. But in France the echo was particularly resonant. This extremely positive receptive
response might be explained by the fact that many people in France perceived that they shared a
'common destiny' with the people in the most affected areas in Eastern Europe. This perception was
based on the assumption that in both cases the public authorities were lying to the people about the
true extent of the health risks and effects and were denying the existence of their illnesses, of which
the children suffered the most, and those who attempted to speak the truth were actively discredited
871 Svetlana Alexievitch, La supplication. Tchernobyl, chroniques du monde après l’Apocalypse (traduit du russe par 
Galia Ackerman et Pierre Lorrain) (Paris: JC Lattès, 1998). 
872 Svetlana Alexievitch, La supplication. Tchernobyl, chroniques du monde après l’Apocalypse (Paris: France Loisir, 
1998).
873 Svetlana Alexievitch, La supplication. Tchernobyl, chroniques du monde après l’Apocalypse (Paris: Le Club, 1999). 
874 Svetlana Alexievitch, La supplication. Tchernobyl, chroniques du monde après l’Apocalypse (Paris: Éditions J’ai lu, 
1999). 
875 Jacquemin-Raffestin, Tchernobyl: Aujourd’hui les Français malades.
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by the authorities who accused them of being unreliable and unknowledgeable. 
The central role La supplication obtained in the French Chernobyl debate becomes obvious
first and foremost in the way in which the book has served as a major reference in various
subsequent publications on Chernobyl – in particular in those of which the authors had a (loose)
connection to the 'Caen Group' – as well as in media reporting. In Britain, however, Alexievich's
work was received in a completely different manner. Her book was published in the UK in 1999
under the title Voices from Chernobyl.876 But unlike in France, it was neither promoted by book
clubs, nor repeatedly reprinted. And while in the French case La supplication influenced various
playwrights, photographers and researchers, in Britain this narrative never gained an important
influence. The only case I could find in which an artist directly referred to Alexievich as the source
of his or her inspiration was the poet Mario Petrucci. His two 2004 publications Half life – Poems
for Chernobyl877 and Heavy Water – a Poem for Chernobyl878 both made mention of his reading of
Voices from Chernobyl in 2002, and Half life was even dedicated to Alexievich. But compared to
the prominence and popularity of La Supplication in France, Voices form Chernobyl went almost
entirely unnoticed in Britain and hardly made a ripple in the British Chernobyl debate. 
In researching the circulation of Chernobyl narratives of (former) Soviet Union citizens in Western
Europe, the high degree of transnationality in the Chernobyl debates emerged. At the same time, the
degree to which the reception of these narratives varied from one national context to the other
became evident. Yuri Bandazhevsky is a very salient example in this regard: while he even became
an actor of the French Chernobyl debate after 2006, his work has not been given any space in the
British Chernobyl debate. Through an analysis of the intertextuality between Eastern and Western
European Chernobyl publications, it is possible to not only make out networks of actors but also to
trace the origin of specific arguments and narrative elements. In France, the narrative of La
Supplication has been particularly popular and has thus become an essential part of many French
Chernobyl narratives. 
3.2 Chernobyl as a topic of literature and photography
3.2.1 Literature
876 Svetlana Alexievich, Voices from Chernobyl: chronicle of the future (London: Aurum, 1999).
877 Mario Petrucci, Half life: poems for Chernobyl (Coventry: The Heaventree Press, 2004).
878 Mario Petrucci, Heavy water: a poem for Chernobyl (London: Enitharmon, 2004).
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Alexievich's work is by far the most prominent example of Chernobyl literature. However, there is a
wide range of writers who have incorporated the accident into their work: either as an inspiration, a
topic, or a metaphor. In the British context, the most famous book that uses Chernobyl as a
metaphor is probably Vesna Goldsworthy's Chernobyl strawberries, a personal memoir of a life
marked by the author's emigration from Yugoslavia to England.879 A novel that takes Chernobyl as
its topic, Piers Paul Read's Ablaze – which narrates the accident in the form of an action thriller – is
another widespread piece.880 Both books are actually telling examples of just how un-political
Chernobyl is in the British public discourse and to what extent the events of 1986 have been
conceptually detached from the UK. In its literary reflection of the affaire Tchernobyl the French
book Tchernobyl-sur-Seine881 similarly represented the decisive elements of the country's Chernobyl
debate. Published in 1987, the book was authored by Hélène Crié and Yves Lenoir. Crié had been
involved in the French Chernobyl debate from day one. In May 1986 she published various articles
i n Libération in which she criticized French official reactions towards the accident and later, in
1998 together with the founder of the CRIIRAD Michèle Rivasi, she published the book Ce
nucléaire qu'on nous cache. Yves Lenoir has not been any less involved in the French Chernobyl
debate: an anti-nuclear activist, first with Amis de la Terre and later with Greenpeace, he is
currently the president of the ETB. In Tchernobyl-sur-Seine, the authors presented an accident
scenario of the nuclear facility at Nogent-sur-Seine. The choice of nuclear power plant for this
scenario was no coincidence: in 1987 this nuclear reactor was in its final stages of construction, and
even before the Chernobyl accident occurred, it had already been subject to criticism on the part of
anti-nuclear activists because of its proximity to Paris – the plant is located approximately 120 km
southeast of the city.882 The objective of the novel was primarily to shed light on the shortcomings
inherent to the French nuclear sector, which, according to the authors, the official responses to
Chernobyl had made abundantly clear: namely the secrecy of the 'nucleocratic system' and its policy
of disinformation. More than 50,000 copies of the book were sold.883 
Yet, the success of Ablaze and Tchernoybl-sur-Seine was limited, and these books were
barely noted beyond their strictly national and linguistic context. Therefore, they cannot be
considered to be part of the transnational Chernobyl debate. However, there is a book that, like
879 Vesna Goldsworthy, Chernobyl strawberries: a memoir (London: Atlantic, 2005). 
880 Piers Paul Read, Ablaze: the story of Chernobyl (London: Mandarin, 1995).
881 Hélène Crié and Yves Lenoir, Tchernobyl-sur-Seine. (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1987).
882 The novel was not the first time in which the idea of a 'Tchernobyl-sur-Seine' was expressed. In the Libération on 22
May 1986, an article titled 'Nogent, 7 décembre 1990, 20h 11: Catastrophe-fiction' described the chain of events of a
fictional accident in comic strip form.
883 Philippe Testard-Vaillant, “Yves Lenoir, en vert et contre tous,” in La Recherche. L'actualité des Sciences 356 
(2002), p. 19. Available online: http://www.larecherche.fr/actualite/aussi/yves-lenoir-vert-contre-tous-01-09-2002-
86243 (last accessed: 15 November 2013).
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Tchernobyl-sur-Seine, was also published in 1987; it, too, was written from an explicitly anti-
nuclear perspective and transferred the Chernobyl scenario to the national context: Gudrun
Pausewang's Die Wolke ('The Cloud').884 The difference being this last had tremendous success
across linguistic and national borders. This children’s novel The Cloud focuses on the experiences
of a girl named Janna-Berta. Janna-Berta lives near the German nuclear power plant
Grafenrheinfeld. After an accident at the plant, she and her brother Ulli try to flee the radioactive
'cloud' that was released. The chaos that erupts as people attempt to flee the fast approaching
radioactive 'cloud', visible on the horizon as a storm front, is described as a situation of mass panic
in which everyone fends for themselves without consideration for others. Ulli dies during their
flight, and Janna-Berta collapses when the radioactive rainstorm outpaces and engulfs her. She
wakes up in an emergency hospital, suffering from acute radiation sickness. Around her children are
dying one after another, but Janna-Berta survives. However, since her parents also died in the
accident, she is sent to live with her aunt in Hamburg, where she fights to keep the memory of the
event alive. The comparison with Chernobyl is explicit and not just because the novel includes as its
foreword an announcement that was published in the newspaper Die Zeit on 23 May 1986 about
how the government had handled Chernobyl. In the story, the characters use their memories of
Chernobyl to help them interpret what is happening around them.885 
In Germany, The Cloud has played a key role in the interpretation and remembrance of
Chernobyl. The fact that the scenes of mass panic and mass deaths from radiation poisoning, though
fictional, have often been considered to be realistic scenarios is of central importance in the history
of the reception of the book. For example, a teachers' manual with classroom materials mentioned
that the background of the book was real.886 In spite of the criticism of this decision on the part of
conservative circles, the book received the Deutscher Jugendliteraturpreis (German Children’s
Literature Prize) in 1988, and by 2011 almost 1.5 million copies had been sold. The book has been
translated to various languages, it is available as an audio book and graphic novel, and a film
adaptation was released in 2006 on the 20th anniversary of Chernobyl. In Germany, The Cloud is a
standard school text that has shaped the imagery of nuclear accidents of a whole generation of
children, for whom nuclear accidents are associated with an apocalyptic outcome. Outside of
Germany, as well, The Cloud has found many readers. 
The comparison of Tchernobyl-sur-Seine and The Cloud clearly shows the different reactions
and debates that Chernobyl has spurred in Germany and France. In Germany, the fear that there
884 This paragraph is an extract of my article: Kalmbach, Chernobyl as a National and Transnational Site of Memory, 
pp. 138.
885 Gudrun Pausewang, Die Wolke (Gütersloh/Rheda-Wiedenbrück, 2003), p. 16 and 23.
886 Brigitta Reddig-Korn (ed), Materialien zur Unterrichtspraxis – Gudrun Pausewang, Die Wolke (Ravensburg: 
Ravensburger Buchverlag, 2009), p. 3.
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would be immediate health effects from radioactive exposure was predominant, while in France, the
people’s concerns focused on the internal structures of the nuclear industry and, in association with
this, a policy of deliberate disinformation by the government and the institutions in charge of
radiation protection. 
3.2.2 Photography 
One of the most important ways to underpin an apocalyptic narrative of Chernobyl has been to
make the misery the accident provoked visible, and this can be done foremost through photography.
Thereby, images of the accident and its after-effects have been just as transnational and universal as
the reception of Alexievich’s book. The ghost town Pripyat with its motionless Ferris wheel and
hastily abandoned classrooms, the plaintive faces of prematurely aged 'liquidators', the scars on
children’s necks from thyroid operations: these motifs have been universally used to portray
Chernobyl as apocalypse.887 Because it has become less and less difficult in recent years to enter the
restricted zone – bus tours to Chernobyl can easily be booked in Kiev and have thus transformed the
spot into a highly requested tourist destination – more and more photos of Pripyat and the power
plant have been published or posted on the Internet. Unlike with literature, the circulation of
Chernobyl photography is far less impeded by linguistic boundaries. However, differences in the
national reception of a photographer's work do exists, and some photography books have
experienced a greater degree of transnational circulation than others.
In Britain, the first photography book to be entirely dedicated to Chernobyl was published in
2001: John Darwell's Legacy.888 The book presented pictures that were taken in the restricted zone
and thereby focused on the scary scenery of deserted houses and dust-covered interiors. The picture
on the cover reflected the mood that was to follow inside the book: It showed a mud-covered puppet
doll that brought to mind the doll Chucky from the horror movie Child's Play. The book included a
one-page introduction by Darwell, which presented a lively description of the view he was
confronted with while he was taking photos of the spot: 'The sun is shining, the weather is hot.
Imagine that you are driving along endless roads surrounded by rich forests. You pass affluent
looking farms, villages – even cities. Now imagine that they are all empty, no livestock in the fields,
no children playing. Everyone has gone – removed by government decree – to escape an invisible,
887 For a philosophical and art-historical analysis of Chernobyl photography, see for example: Daniel Bürkner, “Eine 
vollkommen neue Realität: Transgression des Wahrnehmbaren in den Bildern Tschernobyls.” In Masslose Bilder: 
Visuelle Ästhetik der Transgression, ed. by I. Reichle, S. Siegel, A. Spelten (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2009): 189-206.
888 John Darwell, Legacy: photographs inside the Chernobyl exclusion zone (Stockport: Dewi Lewis, 2001).
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deadly presence. […] The Power Plant has become a laboratory for scientists from around the
world, as they look at the ongoing effects of the disaster and bring much needed currency to an
economy bankrupted by catastrophe. Pripyat, the world's most radioactive city, stands alongside
the plant […] – this city that was too radioactive to even demolish. Around the plant the soil was
removed […], yet it is still unsafe to stay in the areas at any length of time.'889 His vision of the
place was clearly portrayed in the pictures that followed this introduction. In 2006, on the occasion
of the accident's 20th anniversary of the accident, some of Darwell's pictures were published in an
article in the International Journal of Epidemiology of Oxford University Press.890 
In Germany, the respective work of Robert Polidori and Rüdiger Lubricht has gained
particular level of distinction. Polidori's famous photography book Zones of Exclusion: Pripyat and
Chernobyl was published in 2004 by the German publishing house Steidl.891 And Rüdiger Lubricht's
photographs have been given a prominent place in exhibitions, in particular in the Chernobyl
exhibition in the Willy-Brandt-Haus in 2006 and in the travelling exhibition of the IBB 25 Jahre
nach Tschernobyl. Menschen – Orte – Solidarität892 in 2011.
Despite the fact that numerous photographers have published on Chernobyl in recent years,
one photographer is associated with the accident and its aftermath in particular: Igor Kostin.
Kostin’s photographs have enjoyed a particularly extensive circulation; his 'popularity' was often
reinforced by the claim that he was the first photographer to take pictures of the accident as it was
still unfolding.893 Kostin was there with his camera to document the firefighters dying from
radiation sickness in the No. 6 clinic in Moscow, as well as on the roof of the destroyed reactor
while 'liquidators' cleared the rubble from it in order to start building the sarcophagus. In
subsequent years, Kostin has not only returned repeatedly to Chernobyl, but he has also continued
to visit hospitals in Belarus and Ukraine and the 'liquidators' in their own homes. Many of his
pictures have been used in the media coverage of Chernobyl and on numerous book covers and
have also been displayed in many exhibitions. For example, one of Kostin’s photographs is the
cover image for the 2006 Chernobyl special issue of the journal Osteuropa.894 This same year, in
spring, the Willy-Brandt-Haus in Berlin put on a large exhibition of Chernobyl photography in
889 Ibid.
890 John Darwell, “Legacy: inside the Chernobyl exclusion zone,” in International Journal of Epidemiology 35 (2006): 
827-831.
891 Robert Polidori, Zones of Exclusion: Pripyat and Chernobyl (Göttingen: Steidl, 2004).
892 A photo book by Lubricht was published by the IBB in connection to this exhibition: Rüdiger Lubricht, Verlorene 
Orte / Gebrochene Biografien. Fotografien zu Tschernobyl (Dortmund: IBB, 2011).
893 Anna Veronika Wendland revealed in her work that this story is not true and that the official photographer of the 
plant was the first to take photos of the destroyed reactor building. 
894 This special issue of Osteuropa included an article on Igor Kostin, as well: Christine Daum, “Der Kriegsreporter und
der Architekturfotograf. Die Tschernobyl-Fotos von Igor’ Kostin und Robert Polidori.” In Tschernobyl: Vermächtnis
und Verpflichtung, ed. by Sahm/Sapper/Weichsel, p. 63-70.
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which the work of Kostin figured prominently.895 But Kostin's work was not just an important
reference for the German Chernobyl debate in 2006. Familiarity with his work goes far beyond this
single national context, and his imagery has played a central role in the transnational Chernobyl
debate. The most important example in this regard is his photography book Confessions of a
reporter, which was published on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of Chernobyl.896 The same
version of the book appeared in the same year in English, French,897 German,898 Spanish,899 and
Italian.900 The English edition, however, was not published by a British publishing house but by the
American Umbrage Editions. The original version was French. The book was the result of a
collaborative project between Igor Kostin, film producer and director Thomas Johnson, and Galia
Ackerman. Ackerman wrote the afterword to the French edition and Johnson, in addition to making
possible the publication of the book, produced a film whose story line was built around Igor Kostin
and his work: La bataille de Tchernobyl.901 Both the book and the film were widely received in
France on the occasion of the 20th anniversary.902 Kostin’s interpretation of the effects of the
accident is essentially the visual analogue to Alexievich’s narratives: his images show the results of
an event that has brought unimaginable suffering to humanity, the full extent of which is not yet
known, insofar as the mutagenic effects of radiation will only fully manifest in future generations. 
In 2011, for the 25th anniversary of Chernobyl, the British newspaper The Guardian
published on its the website the dossier 'Chernobyl nuclear disaster – in pictures', which consisted
of a 'selection of Kostin's finest photographs.'903 The few lines that were written to introduce his
work to the reader included an interesting note that reflected the focus on 'Chernobyl children' that
by this point dominated the British Chernobyl debate: 'His images of a deformed boy even led to
adoption of the 'Chernobyl Child' in UK.'904 In fact, this boy was Igor. Thus, Kostin's photographs
have profoundly influenced the British imagery of Chernobyl. However, the apocalyptic meaning of
his pictures was somewhat lost when these children were removed from their Eastern European
context.
While Kostin's work is the model of a transnational visual Chernobyl narrative that has been
895 For more on this exhibition see: Daniel Haas, “Tschernobyl-Ausstellung – Nahaufnahmen des Leids,” Spiegel-
Online, 3 April 2006: http://www.spiegel.de/panorama/zeitgeschichte/0,1518,druck-409586,00.html (last accessed: 
15 November 2013). Hung alongside Kostin's work, were many photos by Paul Fusco and Rüdiger Lubricht.
896 Igor Kostin, Chernobyl: confessions of a reporter (New York: Umbrage Editions, 2006).
897 Igor Kostin, Tchernobyl: confessions d'un reporter (Paris: Editions des Arènes, 2006).
898 Igor Kostin, Tschernobyl. Nahaufnahme (Munich: Kunstmann, 2006).
899 Igor Kostin, Chernobil: Confesiones de un reportero (El Papiol: Efados, 2006).
900 Igor Kostin, Chernobyl: Confissioni di un reporter (Torino: Edizioni Gruppo Abele, 2006).
901 Thomas Johnson, La bataille de Tchernobyl (Paris: Play Film, 2006). 
902 For a detailed analysis of Kostin's and Johnson's work, see: Kalmbach, Tschernobyl und Frankreich, pp. 159.
903 The Guardian, Chernobyl nuclear disaster – in pictures: 




received in various national contexts, there is another photography book that, the other way around,
incorporated the various elements of the transnational Chernobyl debate: Pierpaolo Mittica's
Chernobyl, the hidden legacy.905 In 2007, the book was published in English by a British publishing
house.906 In 2011, after Fukushima, a Japanese edition of the book followed.907 The book's inherent
transnationality becomes particularly clear when looking at its contributors: The story told by the
photographs of the Italian photographer Mittica was completed by articles written by, amongst
others, Naomi Rosenblum, Rosalie Bertell and Wladimir Tchertkoff. In the textual portions of the
chapters, statements by Bella Belbéoch and Michel Fernex were placed next to accounts of
Nesterenko's work, a fact that is less surprising when considering that the texts were mainly written
by Wladimir Tchertkoff – a person who, so to say, incarnates the transnationality of the Chernobyl
debate. The bibliography also reveals the transnational approach and character of this book. By this
point, many of the references will probably sound familiar to the reader of this study: the CRIIRAD,
Medvedev, Busby, Yablakov, Alexievich, Yaroshinskaya, Read, Petryna, Gale, Mould, Ingram,
Fusco, Sherbak, Grandazzi, Lemarchand, Chernousenko, etc.
Most certainly, the visual representation of Chernobyl as an apocalypse is in no way limited
to photography. Documentaries have played an important role in this context, as well. Of particular
relevance from a transnational perspective are La bataille de Tchernobyl by Thomas Johnson and
Le sacrifice by Emanuela Andreoli and Wladimir Tchertkoff. In addition to the visual representation
of Chernobyl through photography and film, the accident has also served as topic for graphic
designers, illustrators and graphic novelists. With regard to graphic novels, we find for instance in
the British case Doc Chaos, in the French case Chernobyl mon amour, and in Germany the graphic
novel adaption of The Cloud. In the case of Italy, one issue of the popular comic series Dylan Dog
was set in the scenery of Chernobyl.908 However, these fictional graphic novels mainly remained
within their national contexts. At the transnational level, the most important fictional visualization
of Chernobyl is not a graphic novel but a computer game: S.T.A.L.K.E.R.: Shadow of Chernobyl.
S.T.A.L.K.E.R. is a popular ego-shooter and is set in the restricted zone after the occurrence of a
second severe accident at the Chernobyl power plant. The player must find valuable artefacts that
were created by physics that were altered by the high levels of radiation and fight mutants. In
addition to the phenomena of altered physics and animal and human mutants, the radiation also
905 Pierpaolo Mittica, Chernobyl: the hidden legacy; with additional text by Naomi Rosenblum, Rosalie Bertell, 
Wladimir Tchertkoff (London: Trolley, 2007).
906 In 2006, a Spanish publishing house released a smaller version of the book that did not yet include the text by 
Wladimir Tchertkoff: Pierpaolo Mittica, Chernobyl La Herencia Oculta (Pontevedra: Ellago Ediciones, 2006).
907 For information on the release of the Japanese edition, see: http://trolleybooks.com/blog/2011/11/japanese-edition-
of-chernobyl-the-hidden-legacy-by-pierpaolo-mittica/ (last accessed: 15 November 2013).
908 In 'La furia dell'Upyr' Dylan Dog must fight a vampire that lives in the Chernobyl reactor.
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poses a threat to the virtual player. However, the radiation poisoning can be treated with vodka. The
video game was created by a team of Ukrainian game developers and released in 2007. It has
enjoyed widespread success not only in Eastern Europe but also in Western Europe and the US. As
a result, in 2010, a sequel was released: S.T.A.L.K.E.R.: Call of Pripyat.909 Daniel Bürkner in his
work demonstrated how apocalyptic literature and Chernobyl photography were melded together in
this game:910 The plot of S.T.A.L.K.E.R. heavily draws on the pre-Chernobyl science-fiction story
Roadside Picnic by Arkady and Boris Strugatsky and the film Stalker by Andrei Tarkovsky, which
was based on this book. The plot unravels in the midst of the scenery of the restricted zone, which
includes not only the plant and Pripyat but also the vast expanse of surrounding nature. The imagery
of this zone is based on photographs that were taken by people who had visited the restricted area as
tourists. Thus, popular photo motifs of the ghost town Pripyat like the motionless Ferris wheel
figure prominently in the game's imagery. And like in Kostin's famous photographs taken in the
immediate aftermath of the accident from a helicopter and on the rooftop of the reactor, the invisible
radiation becomes visible in the game as a type of visual interference. In this regard, S.T.A.L.K.E.R.
is the absolute embodiment of Chernobyl as an apocalypse, an imaginary world right in line with
Hieronymus Bosch's and Albrecht Dürer's monsters and mutants. And in conformity with this
concept, it is not the world of the present that is depicted in the game but the period of the Last
Judgement that is yet to come. Whether or not the imagery of S.T.A.L.K.E.R. is shaping the imagery
of nuclear accidents of a whole generation of teenagers who are playing this game, similarly to the
way in which the reading of the The Cloud did in the late 1980s and early 1990s, is an open
question.
3.3 Transnational networks of actors
3.3.1 Remembering Chernobyl
The commemoration of Chernobyl on its anniversaries has played an essential role in keeping alive
the memory of the accident and refreshing the knowledge about its ongoing impact. As I have
909 There is a very well informed and detailed Wikipedia article on S.T.A.L.K.E.R., which includes various links to 
reviews of the game: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S.T.A.L.K.E.R.:_Shadow_of_Chernobyl (last accessed: 15 
November 2013). According to this article, S.T.A.L.K.E.R. won the GameSpot's Prize for Best Atmosphere, and by 
the end of 2008 more than 2 million copies had been sold worldwide. For detailed information on the plot and the 
various elements of the zone world, see the game's official website: http://cs.stalker-game.com/en/?page=home (last 
accessed: 15 November 2013).
910 Bürkner, Eine vollkommen neue Realität, pp. 204.
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shown in my comparison of the French and British Chernobyl debate, this commemoration has been
very much shaped by the national contexts. Compared to France, the commemoration of Chernobyl
has played a minor role in Britain and the accident's anniversaries have attracted far less public
attention. Not only has it been given less space in media reporting, but fewer publications on
Chernobyl – be they in book form or are CDs or films – have been released in general. Events
organized to commemorate the accident and its victims, have been arranged mostly by solidarity
movement groups and not, as in France, by anti-nuclear groups like Greenpeace France or the
Réseau: Sortir du nucléaire. Comparing the memory work carried out in these two Western
European countries to the memory work undertaken in Belarus or Ukraine reveals that the political
instrumentalization of Chernobyl is quite varied, and it has not always focused on questions of
nuclear energy use. The different implications that are attributed to Chernobyl as a national site of
memory mirror the divergent processes of coming to terms with the event and its consequences.911 
In addition to these national Chernobyl commemorations, the transnational sphere of
memory work has become increasingly more important in recent years. On the occasion of the
anniversaries, in particular, some actors have made considerable efforts to influence the Chernobyl
commemoration beyond their national context, to organize events across linguistic and national
borders, and to connect activists from the East and the West. The 20th anniversary of Chernobyl in
2006 was the first time this transnational cooperation visibly gained momentum. Two crucial
contextual elements fostered this concerted action: the proclaimed 'nuclear renaissance' which
manifested in Europe in the new build projects in France and Finland, and the Chernobyl reports
published in 2005 by international expert groups. These official reports had horrified anti-nuclear
campaigners because the authors of the reports considered the direct health impact of the radiation
to be much lower than what critical assessments were suggesting. Thus, anti-nuclear campaigners
used the 20th anniversary of the accident to challenge official evaluations of Chernobyl's impact and
to call into question pro-nuclear policies. 
Greenpeace International was a key player in cultivating the transnational connection and
fostering Chernobyl commemoration in 2006. In response to the reports released by the
international expert groups, the NGO initiated a structured collection of scientific studies that
provided an evaluation of Chernobyl that suggested much stronger health effects than the official
reports. In order to ensure these studies and their results would reach the widest audience possible,
Greenpeace International commissioned a report that has since been posted on its website for free
download: The Chernobyl Catastrophe – Consequences on Human Health.912 To compile this
911 For a detailed discussion of this issue, see: Kalmbach, Chernobyl as a National and Transnational Site of Memory.
912 Alexey Yablokov, Iryna Labunska, Ivan Blokov (eds.), The Chernobyl Catastrophe - Consequences on Human 
Health (Amsterdam: Greenpeace, 2006): 
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report, Alexey Yablokov took on the role as main general editor. Most of the contributors to this
report were from Eastern Europe. Similar to the TORCH report, Greenpeace's report has become a
pivotal reference for arguments that counter the validity of the Chernobyl evaluations made by the
IGO's international experts groups.
In addition to providing the transnational Chernobyl debate with a scientific foundation upon
which to base its queries into the statements of the public authorities, there have been other actors
who focused on performative action to raise public awareness on the lasting consequences of
Chernobyl. The foundational idea of two such initiative in particular was inherently transnational:
the International Chernobyl Day and the European Chernobyl Network.913
International Chernobyl Day
The International Chernobyl Day in 2011 adopted the slogan '25th anniversary – 25 days of action.'
The concept of the International Chernobyl Day is less a unified event coordinated by a central
organization than it is a loose network of initiatives that organize public remembrances of the
accident every year. This network serves as a platform the exchange of ideas and to bring together a
wide variety of individual actors, so as to increase their visibility. The French anti-nuclear network
Réseau: Sortir du nucléaire provides a sort of central coordination by listing individual events on
the website www.chernobyl-day.org, where partner organizations from around the world can
announce their calls to action. The site also provides Chernobyl Day materials such as posters.
Partner organizations include, for instance, regional branches of Greenpeace and various local anti-
nuclear groups.914 The events organized in 2011 – the network listed 532 events in 27 countries –
included commemorative rallies, marches, benefit concerts and candlelight vigils, to give just a few
examples. In 2011 as well as in 2012, the Fukushima victims were incorporated into the events
commemorating the Chernobyl victims in April.915 In 2013, the Réseau: Sortir du nucléaire divided
its memory work in two separate events. It organized a human chain in early March to
commemorate Fukushima916 and then its activities in late April 2013. The motto of the activities
around 26 April 2013 was, however, not limited to Chernobyl but claimed: 'From uranium mine to
nuclear waste, we are all concerned by nuclear power!'
http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/publications/reports/chernobylhealthreport/ (last accessed: 15 November
2013).
913 The following part of the paragraphs on the 25th anniversary are an extract of my article: Kalmbach, Chernobyl as a
National and Transnational Site of Memory, pp. 155.
914 A detailed list of events and the organizations involved for each year may be found at: http://www.chernobyl-
day.org/ (last accessed: 15 November 2013).
915 In 2012, the umbrella title for the events was 'Tchernobyl, Fukushima: plus jamais ça!'
916 For information on this initiative, see: http://chainehumaine.org/ (last accessed: 15 November 2013).
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The International Chernobyl Day is thus an attempt to connect at the transnational level the
Chernobyl commemoration with a direct contestation of the use of nuclear energy. This initiative,
which has its roots in France but has already spread through the transnational network of anti-
nuclear groups of Europe, is an effort to unify the different national sites of memory of Chernobyl –
all of which have differing national connotations – into one transnational site of memory, a site of
memory in which Chernobyl is infused with an explicit anti-nuclear meaning. 
European Chernobyl Network
An initiative that takes a similar direction as the International Chernobyl Day is the European
Chernobyl Network. However, it is very important to note that these two initiatives spring from two
very different actor clusters. Where the International Chernobyl Day has grown out of the anti-
nuclear movement, the origins of the European Chernobyl Network lead to the Chernobyl solidarity
movement. For the associations and individuals who are actively involved in the Chernobyl
solidarity movement, the accident's anniversary has always been a time to remind people of the
problematic situation of the residents – particularly the children – in the most affected regions in
Eastern Europe and to call for donations and support. 
For the 25th anniversary of the accident, a campaign by the Internationales Bildungs- und
Begegnungswerk (Association for International Education and Exchange, IBB) gained particular
prominence. It pursued the goal of bringing together the various aid initiatives at an International
Partnership Conference in Minsk, the ultimate purpose of which was to take an active role in
shaping the commemoration of Chernobyl on its 25th anniversary and after.917 With this in mind, by
November 2010 representatives of various associations had already met and established the
European Chernobyl Network, which devised ideas for joint initiatives that would be carried out on
26 April, including a candlelight event.918 During the conference in April 2011, the cornerstone for a
Zukunftswerkstatt ('workshop for the future') – that would take the form of an information centre on
renewable energy – was laid on the grounds of the IBB in Minsk. This Zukunftswerkstatt thus
connects the transnational commemoration of the victims of Chernobyl with the demand for an
energy transition; a connection that must also be seen in relation to the Belarusian government’s
decision in March 2011 to build their own nuclear power plant. 
917 For the programmatic background, see: Astrid Sahm, “Die Katastrophe von Tschernobyl im Kontext einer 
europäischen Erinnerungskultur.” In Tschernobyl und die europäische Solidaritätsbewegung, ed. by IBB, pp. 16–32.
918 The website of the European Chernobyl Network has more information about its members and the candlelight event:
http://www.ecnchernobyl.eu/ (last accessed: 15 November 2013).
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3.3.2 Forgetting Chernobyl
Next to these actions promoted by the anti-nuclear movement and the Chernobyl solidarity
movement that aim to preserve and keep alive the memory of Chernobyl, there are other actors of
the Chernobyl debate who would rather see the accident forgotten than actively remembered every
year. From their perspective, to remember Chernobyl in an 'apocalyptic' manner is rather
counterproductive as it only contributes to an increase in 'radiophobia' and thus prevents the people
most affected by the accident from overcoming the accident and reaching a post-accident
normalization.
The concept of 'radiophobia' 
My classification of a narrative as 'radiophobic' does not necessarily mean that the author entirely
subscribes to this concept or uses this term directly – the same may be said of my classification of a
narrative as 'apocalyptic', which does not mean automatically that the author includes mutated
monsters in his or her Chernobyl account. In this study, I use the classifications 'apocalyptic' and
'radiophobic' as an Idealtypus ('ideal type'); in conformity with Max Weber's considerations that an
Idealtypus is not identical to a particular observed phenomenon but rather a conglomerate and
synthesis of elements that are common to similar cases. Thus, the classification of a narrative as
'radiophobic' does not imply that the author advocates that 'radiophobia' as a medical condition
exists. This classification rather means that the author allocates health problems observed in the
population of the most impacted areas to other causes than ionizing radiation – and therefore
considers attempts to connect these health problems to the ionizing radiation to be the result of an
exaggerated risk assessment of this radiation. 
The term 'radiophobia' has been widely used in accounts on Chernobyl. Mostly, it does not
refer to a diagnosable phobia or psychosis in an individual, but rather paraphrases what is
considered an exaggerated fear of a group of people; this is a similar mechanism with regard to the
fact that a real 'panic' is rarely diagnosed in an individual, while accounts of 'panicking individuals'
are common to various situations. The term 'radiophobia' has not only figured in early official
evaluations of the accident's impact but has also appeared in many rather pro-nuclear accounts of
Chernobyl. As Tatiana Kasperski demonstrated in her research, the term 'radiophobia' in relation to
Chernobyl was used for the first time in a report by the president of the national radiation protection
committee of the USSR, Ilin, and his colleague Pavlovskiï. This report was published in the 4th
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IAEA Bulletin of 1987 under the title 'Radiological Consequences of the Chernobyl Accident in the
Soviet Union and Measures Taken to Mitigate Their Impact: Analysis of Data Confirms the
Effectiveness of Large-Scale Actions to Limit the Accident’s Effects.'919 In Belarus, the term
'radiophobia' was profoundly discredited in the 1990s because 'the protest movements which
emerged in the late 80s and early 90s and for which the Chernobyl catastrophe served as catalyst
often referred to this term in order to demonstrate the Soviet authorities' cynicism vis-à-vis the
dangers the inhabitants and the liquidators had encountered. The term 'radiophobia' thus became
widely discredited because it evoked the attempts of the communist leaders to dissimulate the harm
caused by the accident by misinforming the population and the international community.'920
Therefore, after this development, the term 'radiophobia' was no longer used in official reports on
Chernobyl. However, the assumption has continued to perpetuate that it is not the radiation but the
fear of the radiation that causes the psychological and physical sufferings in people from the most
affected areas, who incorrectly attributed their illnesses to radiation in the first place which in turn
exacerbates their fear of the radiation. This concept was integrated into the wider notion of 'socio-
economic stress' in which an exaggerated fear of radiation was inserted onto a list of other stress
factors like evacuation, distrust in medical and political authorities, worries about the health and
future of their children, etc.
At the international level, the reports produced by the International Chernobyl Project and its
successor the Chernobyl Forum widely diffused the concept of 'stress induced illnesses' as the
common narrative of the health impact of Chernobyl. In their reports on the health effects of the
accident, these international expert groups placed particular emphasis on the psychological
problems associated with the accident. In this regard, the 1991 report by the International Chernobyl
Project stated that 'there were many important psychological problems of anxiety and stress related
to the Chernobyl accident and in the areas studied under the Project these were wholly
disproportionate to the biological significance of the radioactive contamination.'921 The physical
condition of the people living in this area was, however, considered to be less problematic as this
quote reveals: 'General Health: The children who were examined were found to be generally
healthy. […] No statistically significant evidence was found of an increase in incidence of foetal
919 Kasperski, La politique de la mémoire, p. 393.
920 Ibid., p. 394: 'Les mouvements contestataires nés à la fin des années 1980 et au début des années 1990 auxquels la 
catastrophe de Tchernobyl a servi de catalyseur ont par la suite fait souvent référence à ce terme en démontrant 
ainsi le cynisme des autorités soviétiques vis- à-vis des dangers encourus par les habitants et les liquidateurs. Le 
terme de radiophobie a ainsi été largement discrédité puisqu’il évoquait les tentatives des dirigeants communistes 
de dissimuler les dommages causés par la catastrophe en désinformant les populations et la communauté 
internationale.'
921 The International Chernobyl Project, An Overview. Assessement of Radiological Consequences and Evaluation of 
Protective Measures. Report by an International Advisory Committee. (Vienna: IAEA, 1991), p. 32.
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anomalies as a result of radiation exposure.'922 According to the International Chernobyl Project,
the health-related problems in this region did not stem from the radiation levels, but 'action should
be taken on adult hypertension and dental hygiene as major health issues.'923 Fifteen years later, in
the Chernobyl Forum's report on the health effects of the accident, the fundamental considerations
remained very much the same: 'Anxiety over the effects of radiation on health shows no sign of
diminishing. Indeed, it may even be spreading beyond the affected areas into a wide section of the
population. Parents may be transferring their anxiety to their children through example and
excessively protective care. Yet while attributing a wide variety of medical complaints to Chernobyl,
many residents of the affected areas neglect the role of personal behaviour in maintaining health.
This applies not only to radiation risks such as the consumption of mushrooms and berries from
contaminated forests, but also to areas where individual behaviour is decisive, such as misuse of
alcohol and tobacco.'924 In this regard, the Chernobyl Forum reasoned that 'the most pressing health
concerns for the affected areas thus lie in poor diet and lifestyle factors such as alcohol and
tobacco use, as well as poverty and limited access to health care.'925 The reports by the WHO on
Chernobyl health effects – which lay at the basis of the Chernobyl Forum report – stressed the
physical effects of the accident, as well. In a 2006 publication, the WHO stated that 'the mental
health impact of Chernobyl is the largest public health problem caused by the accident to date.'926 
Yet, from the Chernobyl Forum's point of view, it is not just the psychological setting that
causes severe problems in the population of the most affected areas, but also the government's
actions in addressing these problems: 'Added to exaggerated or misplaced health fears, a sense of
victimization and dependency created by government social protection policies is widespread in the
affected areas. The extensive system of Chernobyl-related benefits has created expectations of long-
term direct financial support and entitlement to privileges, and has undermined the capacity of the
922 Ibid., pp. 33. 
923 Ibid., p. 35.
924 The Chernobyl Forum, Chernobyl’s Legacy: Health, Environmental and Socio- Economic Impacts and 
Recommendations to the Governments of Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine (Vienna: IAEA, 2006) 
second revised version, pp. 36.
925 Ibid., p. 37.
926 WHO, Health Effects of the Chernobyl Accident and Special Health Care Programmes, Report of the UN Chernobyl
Forum Expert Group 'Health' (Geneva: WHO, 2006), p. 95. In the conclusion of this report, the members of this 
expert group summed up their understanding of the nature of the health problems: ibid, p. 96: 'The accident has had 
a serious impact on mental health and well-being in the general population. Importantly, however, it appears that 
this impact is demonstrable mainly at a sub-clinical level. Although the empirical studies do not support the view 
that the public anxiety bears a resemblance to clinical psychiatric disorders, such as phobia or psychosis, the 
disaster did have a psychological effect that is not limited to mental health outcomes. It also has ramifications for 
other areas of subjective health and health-related behaviour, especially reproductive health and medical service 
utilization, and the level of trust in authorities. Further, it may influence people's willingness to adopt safety 
guidelines issued by the authorities.' For current WHO research on Chernobyl health effects, see the website of the 
IARC's programme 'Agenda for Research on Chernobyl Health' (ARCH): http://arch.iarc.fr/who/expert.php (last 
accessed: 15 November 2013).
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individuals and communities concerned to tackle their own economic and social problems. The
dependency culture that has developed over the past two decades is a major barrier to the region’s
recovery.'927 If we take this reasoning a step further, it actually means that to remember and actively
commemorate Chernobyl as an apocalyptic catastrophe is the worst thing that can be done to the
people living in the most affected areas. But this does not apply just to the people living in the most
affected areas, but also to the 'several hundreds of thousands of individuals whose lives have been
directly and significantly affected by the consequences of the accident […] including resettlers […]
and many of the former clean-up workers', who need to move on in their lives and must defeat their
stigmatism of a Chernobyl-past. 'The priority here should be to help these people to normalize their
lives as quickly and as far as is possible. They need to be reintegrated into society as a whole, so
that their needs are increasingly addressed through mainstream provision and according to the
same criteria as those that apply to other sections of society.'928 The same is true for the most
affected regions as such; they too should overcome their stigma of Chernobyl. In this regard, the
Chernobyl Forum recommended to 'urgently revisit the classification of Chernobyl-affected zones,
as current legislation is too restrictive, given the low radiation levels that now prevail in most
territories.'929 It also recommended that the land should be partly used again, for settlement,
agriculture and other businesses.
This kind of thinking is not unique to the international experts' groups that evaluate the
consequences of Chernobyl and give advice and recommendation on how to overcome the existing
problems. This way to describe, attribute and interpret the health-related effects of Chernobyl is
widespread among radiobiologists. But the reports by the International Chernobyl Project and the
Chernobyl Forum in particular have disseminated this narrative to a wider audience. Due to the
high-ranking members of these international experts' groups, these reports emanate a strong sense
of authority, and for this reason became a central reference for people looking for independent and
credible expert information on Chernobyl. Thus, the explanatory concept of 'radiophobia',
paraphrased as 'exaggerated or misplaced health fears', has become a 'meta narrative' present in
many accounts on the impact of the accident. Many individuals as well as public authorities have
accepted these reports as the 'state of the art' of Chernobyl research.
In addition to the question of radiation-related health effects, the topic of monetary
compensation has been the source of a number of polemics. The chapter 'Demographic situation in
territories of Russia affected by the Chernobyl accident' in the 1996 special edition of Radiation
927 The Chernobyl Forum, Chernobyl’s Legacy, p. 37.
928 Ibid., p. 43.
929 Ibid., p. 50.
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Protection Dosimetry is a telling example in this regard. In relation to the topic of alcohol
consumption, the authors stated that 'as to the affected population, although data are not available,
it is reasonable to think that the situation is even worse, as people there have extra money as a
compensation from the government for being irradiated. […] In some respects the most
contaminated areas were in a better situation than unaffected ones.'930
World Nuclear Association 
The pro-nuclear lobby was rapid to take up the concept of 'radiophobia' to prove that Chernobyl-
related problems are in fact not linked to the physical fallout of the accident. A key actor in the
transnational nuclear lobby is the London-based World Nuclear Association (WNA), which until
2001 was the Uranium Institute.931 On its website, www.world-nuclear.org, the WNA showcases
itself as an information service on nuclear energy and offers 'Nuclear Basics: Key information and
surprising facts on nuclear energy and our world' as well as an 'Information Library […] which
includes over 150 information papers containing detailed information on all aspect of nuclear
energy.'932 In accordance with this claim, the website includes a detailed dossier on the 'Chernobyl
Accident 1986'. At the beginning of the dossier, the WNA summarizes the most important
information on Chernobyl in five bullet points: '1.) The Chernobyl accident in 1986 was the result
of a flawed reactor design that was operated with inadequately trained personnel. 2.) The resulting
steam explosion and fires released at least 5% of the radioactive reactor core into the atmosphere
and downwind – some 5200 PBq (I-131 eq). 3.) Two Chernobyl plant workers died on the night of
the accident, and a further 28 people died within a few weeks as a result of acute radiation
poisoning. 4.) UNSCEAR says that apart from increased thyroid cancers, "there is no evidence of a
major public health impact attributable to radiation exposure 20 years after the accident." 5.)
Resettlement of areas from which people were relocated is ongoing.'933 The list of references
attached to the end of the dossier illustrates that WNA's narrative is well in line with official
evaluations of the highest international authorities: The first reference listed is the report by the
Chernobyl's Forum Expert Group 'Health', which was published in 2006 by the WHO, and the third
930 G. N. Kelly and V. M. Shershakov (eds.), Environmental contamination, radiation doses and health consequences 
after the Chernobyl accident (Ashford: Nuclear Technology Publishing, 1996), p. 118.
931 In 1986, the Uranium Institute briefly entered the Chernobyl debate when it published the booklet Understanding 
Chernobyl (London: Uranium Institute, 1986). This booklet consisted of seven papers that were presented to 
members of the Uranium Institute by French and British radiation safety experts, like Pierre Tanguy (IPSN) or John 
Gittus (AEA). The Uranium Institute decided to publish these papers 'so that a wider audience can benefit from the 
explanations of safety policy.' (Ibid., p. v).
932 World Nuclear Association: http://www.world-nuclear.org/ (last accessed: 15 November 2013).
933 World Nuclear Association, Chernobyl Accident 1986: http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Safety-and-
Security/Safety-of-Plants/Chernobyl-Accident/ (last accessed: 15 November 2013).
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reference listed is the 1991 report released by the International Chernobyl Project. 
The Internet dossier is not WNA's only account of Chernobyl health effects. In 2012, in
response to the events in Fukushima, the WNA commissioned the documentary Fukushima and
Chernobyl: Myth versus Reality.934 In this film, the WNA explained why Chernobyl just did not
have as many terrible health effects as so many anti-nuclear activists claimed. It is very interesting
to examine this film in more detail and see who the WNA mobilized to underpin its arguments. The
film starts with pictures from Fukushima and an account on the emergency management. Shortly
thereafter the tone of the narrator changes: 'But these actions only seemed to add to the mood of
public anxiety and confusion fed by a global media frenzy.'935 Freeze frames of the cover pages of
various international newspapers illustrate this statement while the narrator continues: 'The common
assumption was that many Japanese people would suffer long-term cancers from the radiation. As
for the workers still in the plant, they were seen as dead men walking. But with the eyes of the
world on Fukushima, an important anniversary was taking place, one which offered lessons on the
public health impacts of nuclear events. It was the 25th anniversary of Chernobyl, the world's worst
nuclear accident.' After this introduction trailer, the film switches to Vienna and pans to the UN
headquarters while introducing UNSCEAR. This serves as the introduction to the next take, an
interview with Dr. Malcolm Crick, Principal Officer of UNSCEAR. Crick is the first of three
scientists to present an evaluation on Chernobyl's health effects: 'After Chernobyl, the only public
health impact we have seen has been more than 6,000 thyroid cancers amongst those people who
were children at the time of the accident, drinking contaminated milk. Of those 6,000 or more cases
perhaps 15 have died, its not a very fatal disease. […] Then when we think about other effects,
actually there is no really good persuasive evidence of any public health impact due to radiation
from the accident, other than the thyroid cancers. Most people find that kind of hard to believe but
in fact that's the case.' Professor Gerry Thomas of Imperial College London is the next to present
her evaluation. She is introduced by the narrator as the Director of the Chernobyl Tissue Bank,
where she has carried out 'work that has led Dr. Thomas to re-assess her views on nuclear energy.'
Unlike Crick, Thomas does not give her statement in a face to face interview with the camera but in
a university class where she tells her students: 'The health consequences of a nuclear power
accident may not be as bad as we first thought. I was anti-nuclear until I started working on
Chernobyl. Now, no problem at all. The results of the studies that we carried out post-Chernobyl,
which were big international studies, have not been what we might have expected from the outset.
934 World Nuclear Association, Fukushima and Chernobyl: Myth versus Reality (London: WNA, 2012). The film is 
available on WNA's website (http://www.world-nuclear.org/Features/Fukushima/Fukushima-and-Chernobyl---Myth-
versus-Reality/) as well as on youtube (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2Ncm8KwxWNg). Interestingly, the 
usual commentary function for the youtube video is deactivated (last accessed: 15 November 2013).
935 Transcription from the film available on youtube by the author.
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Those studies have shown that there is only one thing that we can pin down to being due to
radiation, and that's the sharp increase of thyroid cancer in those who were very young at exposure
to the Chernobyl accident.' From Crick, there is a direct switch over to the third scientist who
speaks in the WNA's film: Professor Abel Gonzales of the International Commission on
Radiological Protection. Like Thomas, Gonzales is filmed while he is speaking in a classroom,
elaborating on the effects of iodine in children. Summing up the statements of Crick, Thomas and
Gonzales, the narrator concludes: 'So the voice of leading scientific bodies is clear: The only
observable public health impact due to radiation after Chernobyl has been no more than 6,000
thyroid cancers of which only around 15 are proven fatal. As for the emergency workers who
received the highest doses, fewer than 50 have died. These numbers, while significant, represent a
fraction of the hundreds of thousands if not millions of victims predicted after the accident.' This
summary is followed by another statement by Thomas. Although the narrator announces the
statement to be an evaluation of the 'doses received by residents living around the Chernobyl plant',
Thomas actually presents the figure for a much wider population group: 'The whole body doses to
six million residents is about 9 mSv, so each person had about 9 mSv. […] Now, 9 mSv is about
what any of us will get when we are going to have a CT scan. Do we sit there and panic about
having a CT scan? No, we don't! […] We expose ourselves to radiation voluntarily, we can't avoid
it, we live in a radioactive world.' This statement provides the basis of an account of different
sources and levels of background radiation by the narrator. From here, the narrator passes to the
actual key question of the film: 'So what of Fukushima-Daiichi?' Thomas is the first to answer the
narrator's question: 'In real terms, I doubt that there will be any radiological consequences in the
whole population at all.' In the following clip, all three scientists elaborate on the differences
between Chernobyl and Fukushima: in Japan, there were no children who drank contaminated milk,
and the emergency workers are much better protected. Again, the narrator sums up these statements
in a conclusion: 'So thanks to measures taken by the Japanese authorities, expert opinion is that we
can expect no health impact on the population around Fukushima due to radiation. As for the
workers on the site, they, too, can expect to avoid any effects from the exposure they received. So, if
the health consequences are not what they are commonly believed to be, what are the consequences
of a serious nuclear accident like Chernobyl?' It was Crick to give the first answer: 'When we think
then about the non-radiation impact, clearly, this has been a tremendous trauma for the people in
terms of the stress, and anxiety, and concern that the radiation [..., incomprehensible] has caused
them. And the counter measures that have been made disrupted their lives.' After the statements by
the other two, the narrator presents, once again, his conclusion followed by another important
question: 'In the confusion and disruption that follows a nuclear accident, the social and economic
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consequences become far greater than those relating to public health. So what can be done?'
Crick's answer follows promptly: 'Well, I think the scientific community has to do a much better job
in communicating to the public or to the lay-person. Decisions are being made all the time on fairly
important issues that relate to the understanding of science. And I think the understanding is
hindered by the quality of communication that we, the scientific community, have given in the past.'
Thomas then argues in the same direction, and her statement forms the conclusion of the film: 'I
don't think we should blame the media completely for what happens, scientists have responsibility
as well. It is important to be able to get a public understanding of the science of a situation like
what happened in Fukushima, out there, so that the public can make a judgement for itself. And if
nobody is willing to talk to the media on the science side or a government representative for
example being put up [..., incomprehensible] and stands the science and cannot answer the
questions so that feeds people's fear. Communication is actually extremely important in a disaster
like that, and if communication had been better post-Chernobyl, if communication had been better
post-Fukushima, maybe we wouldn't have done the psychological damage that we have [...,
incomprehensible] done to these populations.' The following end titles are of paramount
importance for they openly address the primary objective of the film: i.e., to ensure that the events
in Fukushima do not hinder the 'global renaissance' of nuclear power. 'Scientists, industry and
governments must work harder to dispel widespread myths about the radiation effects of nuclear
accidents. For the people of Fukushima, the question of when they can return home should be
determined by rational science-based judgements. Nuclear power holds great potential to meet
growing worldwide energy needs in the 21st century. Fulfilment of this potential will depend on
better public understanding of radiation. WNA aims to serve as a comprehensive source of reliable
information on nuclear technology.'
The film Fukushima and Chernobyl: Myth versus Reality is a telling example of how
Fukushima provoked renewed interest in the debate about the health effects of Chernobyl. It
illustrates the way in which, through the events in Japan, the debate on low-level radiation health
effects has gained tremendous importance for the pro-nuclear side: the promotion of 'radiophobic'
narratives on Chernobyl was used as a type of armour to deflect anti-nuclear voices who, alarmed
by the events in Fukushima, called for a reassessment of the global nuclear enterprise. At the same
time, it was important for the anti-nuclear side to promote 'apocalyptic' narratives on Chernobyl.
This underpinned the argument that, like Chernobyl, Fukushima, too, will have considerable
negative health effects for people in Japan. The pro-nuclear side, on the other hand, referred to their
'radiophobic' narrative of Chernobyl in order to emphasize and reiterate that the worst thing that
could possibly happen in Japan was for fear driven overreactions to manifest. 
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The question of Chernobyl health effects did not just gain central importance in the debate
about the global nuclear enterprise from its association with the events in Fukushima. Within the
framework of the advocated 'nuclear renaissance', the pro-nuclear side has considered it very
important to stress that Chernobyl has just not had as devastating an impact as many people seem to
believe. To argue against and debunk the apocalyptic narrative of Chernobyl meant to remove a
central obstacle wherein the public could then perceive nuclear energy as a benign technology. The
contributions to the 42nd Annual Meeting of the American National Council on Radiation
Protection and Measurements, which titled Chernobyl at Twenty, is quite revealing in this regard.936
Among representatives of various national and international nuclear-related public authorities, Abel
Gonzales – one of the three scientists that was interviewed in the WNA film – harshly criticized the
'Chernobyl saga.'937 The target of these arguments was summarized in the closing sentence to the
conference's summary and discussion panel by Ralph L. Andersen of the Nuclear Energy Institute,
Washington: 'Major reviews of the effects of the Chernobyl accident reported in the Chernobyl
Forum and discussed at an international conference in Vienna in September 2005 have led to
general consensus that the health and environmental consequences of the accident, although large
and unprecedented, should not be viewed as an impediment to future increase in the use of nuclear
power.'938
The fact that so many international nuclear-related public authorities subscribed to the
'radiophobic' narrative of Chernobyl induced anti-nuclear activists to investigate into the possible
reasons as to why these public authorities and the scientists linked to these institutions were not
more nuclear-critical in their assessments but instead offered evaluations that perfectly fit the needs
of the pro-nuclear lobby. In this context, one particular document attracted the attention of many
anti-nuclear activists: the IAEA-WHO Agreement.
3.3.3 Making Chernobyl a case for public health
In recent years and in direct connection to the debate on the health effects of low-level radiation,
anti-nuclear activists have directed their criticism more and more toward an agreement that the
IAEA and the WHO signed in 1959. Many activists see this agreement to be the reason why such a
low estimate of Chernobyl victims is presented in the official evaluations and also the reason that
these evaluations have placed the emphasis on the psychological impact of the radiation rather than
936 The contributions are published in: Health Physics – The radiation safety journal, 93 (5:2007).
937 Abel J. Gonzales, “Chernobyl Vis-à-Vis the Nuclear Future: An International Perspective” in: ibid., pp. 590.
938 Ralph Andersen, “Summary and Discussion of Major Findings From Chernobyl” in: ibid., p. 595.
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the physical impact. In addition, anti-nuclear activists maintain that this agreement created the
condition whereby the lack of knowledge on the health effects was not only deliberately encouraged
and upheld at the international level, there was political pressure to refrain from conducting studies
to scientifically investigate these effects further. From their perspective, the underlying aim of such
a strategy was to obfuscate the real risk factors in order to skew the cost-benefit analysis in favour
of the civil use of nuclear power. In this regard, it is not a surprise that the activists identified the
IAEA as the prime actor behind this 'open conspiracy', insofar as the aim of the international agency
i s to 'encourage and assist research on, and development and practical application of, atomic
energy for peaceful uses throughout the world.'939 In order to understand the background of the
debate over the IAEA-WHO Agreement, it is therefore necessary to first examine the part the IAEA
played in the evaluation of Chernobyl.
IAEA's role in the evaluation of Chernobyl 
From the very beginning, the IAEA has played a central role in the assessment and evaluation of the
Chernobyl accident. What will be examined here is the public perception of its engagement, in
particular from anti-nuclear perspectives.940 
In carrying out the media reporting on Chernobyl, journalists from day one looked for
experts who could comment on the events. In order to find answers to their questions, they first
turned to the national radiation protection authorities. These national experts, on the other hand, had
received their information mainly from the IAEA. In May 1986, Hans Blix and Morris Rosen of the
IAEA were the first Westerners to visit the site of the accident. Some months later, in August 1986,
the IAEA organized the Post-Accident Review Meeting on the Chernobyl Accident, a meeting in
which Eastern and Western nuclear experts were called together to evaluate the cause and to
determine the chain of events of the accident. This meeting returned Chernobyl to the front pages of
Western newspapers. Journalists were eager to hear and write about the reports the USSR delegation
had submitted. They also wanted to hear what conclusions the IAEA as an institution would reach
of the recent events. During this conference, Morris Rosen, the Director of nuclear safety, gave an
interview to Le Monde. One specific phrase from this interview is still regularly quoted in anti-
939 Statute of the IAEA, Article III, Paragraph A1: http://www.iaea.org/About/statute_text.html (last accessed: 15 
November 2013).
940 I am unable to present here an institutional history of the IAEA's engagement in the Chernobyl debate. I did not 
undertake research in the IAEA archives, and therefore I can not provide an answer to the question: What role did 
the IAEA actively play in the debate on the health effects of Chernobyl? Nor can I provide a concise history of the 
IAEA's publication or funding activities on the topic of Chernobyl. This aspect of IAEA's history has not yet been 
researched.
280
nuclear narratives on Chernobyl: 'Even if an accident of this type should happen once a year [...] I
would still consider nuclear power an interesting energy source.'941 For anti-nuclear activists, this
comment epitomizes the arrogance and conscious refusal of the IAEA to look at or acknowledge the
implicit risks of nuclear technology. From the anti-nuclear perspective, Rosen's statement is proof
that this organization is willing to continue to promote nuclear power regardless of the price the
victims of this technology must pay. Rebecca Harm's foreword to the TORCH report is a cogent
example of the way in which the 1986 conference and Rosen's comment have become landmarks in
the debate on the Chernobyl health effects. Harms opened her account with the following statement:
'In August 1986, four months after the Chernobyl disaster, Morris Rosen, head of the Division of
Nuclear Safety of the Vienna based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), declared: “Even if
there was a Chernobyl type accident every year, I would still consider nuclear power an interesting
type of energy production”. (Le Monde, 28 August 1986) After a gigantic explosion and a ten day
blazing fire had spread two hundred times the amount of radioactivity of the combined releases of
the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs all over the planet, after the evacuation of over one hundred
thousand people, the IAEA’s chief nuclear safety officer considered an annual repetition of such a
catastrophe an acceptable hypothesis. This man was the most powerful person in the IAEA on the
issue of nuclear safety between 1981 and 1996, when he retired from his position then as Assistant
Director General for Nuclear Safety. Breathtaking. Rosen’s post-Chernobyl declaration sheds a
particular light on the mission statement of the IAEA, which stipulates that the Agency “develops
nuclear safety standards and, based on these standards, promotes the achievement and
maintenance of high levels of safety in applications of nuclear energy, as well as the protection of
human health and the environment against ionizing radiation”. Frightening.'942
In addition to the 1986 conference, it was the IAEA's involvement in the International
Chernobyl Project and the Chernobyl Forum that decisively shaped the perception anti-nuclear
activists had regarding the role the IAEA filled in the evaluation of Chernobyl. Activists all over the
world were shocked by the statements contained in the Chernobyl Forum's final report of 2006.
Because this report was published by the IAEA Division of Public Information, the report was
considered to be a direct representation of IAEA policies. The Chernobyl Forum was founded in
2003 upon the initiative of the IAEA. It consisted of a group of experts from the IAEA, WHO,
UNDP, UNEP, UNSCEAR, UN-OCHA, FAO, as well as from the World Bank and the governments
of Belarus, Ukraine and the Russian Federation. The final report released by the Forum in 2006
941 Le Monde, La catastrophe de Tchernobyl pourrait être à l’origine de 24 000 décès par cancers, 28 August 1986, p. 
20: 'Même s’il y avait un accident de ce type tous les ans, – ce qui est loin d’être le cas – je considérerais le 
nucléaire comme une source d’énergie intéressante.' In translations, this quote is often shortened or paraphrased 
942 Fairlie and Summer, The Other Report on Chernobyl, p. 4.
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included these principal positions on the health effects of Chernobyl (paraphrased as follows): The
victims of the Chernobyl radiation are a small number of firefighters who died of acute radiation
syndrome, the children who died from thyroid cancer, and the possible some 4,000 fatal cancer
cases among the 'liquidators', evacuees, and the population of the highly contaminated area. The
health effects on the five million residents of the other 'contaminated' areas (the report always put
the word 'contaminated' in quotation marks) are even more speculative as radiation-related deaths
are expected to be less than one per cent of the normal cancer-induced mortality rate.943 The report
rejected outright the possibility that radioactive exposure from Chernobyl could cause DNA
mutations that would affect future generations – in fact from the perspective of this group, birth
defects caused by Chernobyl do not exist. Instead, the Chernobyl Forum considered the increasing
number of congenital malformations observed in Belarus most likely to be the result of the more
active and improved screening for such cases.944 Neither the Chernobyl Forum nor its precursor, the
International Chernobyl Project, ever denied that the frequency of many illnesses has increased in
these regions; however, they imputed these increases wholly to increases in screening and detection
and improved recording methods of these diseases and to mental health problems. The exaggerated
fear of radiation945 among the population along with the stress induced by the evacuations and
resettlements, the breakup of the Soviet Union, and the social and economic upheaval that
accompanied it, and not radioactive exposure, were given as the real causes of the health 'legacy'
attributed to Chernobyl. Accordingly, the 2006 report by the Chernobyl Forum advocated re-settling
the regions that had been evacuated in the late 1980s and phasing out any 'Chernobyl-related
benefits and privileges'. The Chernobyl Forum considered the negative health effects of low-level
radiation to be negligible and therefore argued that 'the majority of the “contaminated” territories
are now safe for settlement and economic activity.'946 One of the main reasons why the radioactive
fallout could not be said to have been responsible for the increase in illnesses lay in the simple fact
943 The Chernobyl Forum, Chernobyl’s Legacy, pp. 14. 
944 Compare: Ibid., pp. 19: 'These doses are also unlikely to have any major effect on the number of stillbirths, adverse 
pregnancy outcomes or delivery complications or the overall health of children. Birth rates may be lower in 
‘contaminated’ areas because of concern about having children (this issue is obscured by the very high rate of 
medical abortions) and the fact that many younger people have moved away. No discernible increase in hereditary 
effects caused by radiation is expected based on the low risk coefficients estimated by UNSCEAR (2001) or in 
previous reports on Chernobyl health effects.'
945 Compare: Ibid., p. 36: 'As noted in the Chernobyl Forum report on Health,“the mental health impact of Chernobyl 
is the largest public health problem unleashed by the accident to date.” Psychological distress arising from the 
accident and its aftermath has had a profound impact on individual and community behaviour. Populations in the 
affected areas exhibit strongly negative attitudes in self-assessments of health and wellbeing and a strong sense of 
lack of control over their own lives. Associated with these perceptions is an exaggerated sense of the dangers to 
health of exposure to radiation. The affected populations exhibit a widespread belief that exposed people are in 
some way condemned to a shorter life expectancy. Such fatalism is also linked to a loss of initiative to solve the 
problems of sustaining an income and to dependency on assistance from the state.'
946 Ibid, p. 8.
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that 'the average doses received by residents of the territories “contaminated” by the Chernobyl
fallout are generally lower than those received by people who live in some areas of high natural
background radiation in India, Iran, Brazil and China.'947 
This report was presented to the public as the state-of-the-art of scientific research on
Chernobyl, a kind of summary of what the international nuclear-scientific community had to say on
the topic. The 'authority' of its member institutions948 put the Forum in the position to automatically
dismiss anything and everything that differed from the stance these experts had taken as the result
of unqualified and untenable science or mere guesswork. The fact that the number of Chernobyl
victims presented in this report ranks amongst the lowest estimates that can be found in the
Chernobyl debate led to the protest and profound criticisms on the part of anti-nuclear and human
rights activists. From their perspective, this report was the manifestation of the nuclear lobby's
attempt to downplay the health effects of Chernobyl and of low-level radiation in general. The
activists argued that the scientific excellence underpinning the report was spurious since many of
the studies undertaken by researchers that did not strictly conform to this 'IAEA-authorized'
narrative were simply ignored. According to many activists, one international institution was
charged with the responsibility of listening to this independent research: the WHO. But the WHO, a
participating member of the Chernobyl Forum, did not seriously take into consideration the results
of this independent research and instead emphasized the psychological and not the physical impact
of the radiation. In their search for an explanation as to why the WHO so assiduously focused on
the psychological instead of physical effects, several anti-nuclear activists came across a document
that offered space for reflections on the underlying reasons for this behaviour, reasons that had
nothing to do with scientific evidence: this document was the IAEA-WHO Agreement of 1959. 
The IAEA-WHO Agreement
The agreement between the IAEA and the WHO of 1959 became a major reference point in the
transnational Chernobyl debate in recent years. It is considered by many anti-nuclear activists to be
the reason why the WHO has always so determinedly focused on the psychological instead of
947 Ibid, p. 13.
948 Regarding the Chernobyl Forum's member institutions, the most important studies in relation to Chernobyl are the 
UNSCEAR report of 2000 (which the Chernobyl Forum report quotes very often), the UNDP / UNICEF report of 
2002, and the WH report of 2006. See: UNSCEAR, Sources and Effects on Ionizing Radiation, UNSCEAR 2000 
Report to the General Assembly with Scientific Annexes. Annex J: Exposures and effects of the Chernobyl accident 
(New York: United Nations, 2000); UNDP and UNICEF, The human consequences of the Chernobyl Nuclear 
Accident – A Strategy for Recovery (New York: UNDP, 2002); WHO, Health Effects of the Chernobyl Accident and 
Special Health Care Programmes, Report of the UN Chernobyl Forum Expert Group ‘Health’ (Geneva: WHO, 
2006).
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physical effects in its evaluation of Chernobyl health effects. The 'discovery' of this agreement led
to the birth of a movement that calls for a 'free and independent WHO', i.e. a WHO that is
independent from the nuclear lobby and as such capable of revealing to the world the 'truth' about
Chernobyl which, in the opinion of these activists, the IAEA has thus far succeeded in covering up. 
Regarding the role that the anti-nuclear activists have allocated to the IAEA-WHO
Agreement in their arguments, it is interesting to return once more to the foreword written by
Rebecca Harms for the TORCH-report. In this foreword, she wrote the following statement: 'When
the IAEA in September 2005 released two reports on the environmental effects (coordinated by the
IAEA) and health impacts (coordinated by the WHO) of the Chernobyl accident, numerous people
and NGOs were suspicious about intentions and content. The IAEA is not neutral. Its primary role,
as defined on its website, is “to promote safe, secure and peaceful nuclear technologies”. The IAEA
led interagency cooperation with the WHO is not a coincidence. An 1959 agreement between both
organisations stipulates: “Whenever either organization proposes to initiate a program or activity
on a subject in which the other organization has or may have a substantial interest, the first party
shall consult the other with a view to adjusting the matter by mutual agreement.” The term is well
chosen: “adjusting the matter”.'949 
Before considering more carefully the line of arguments that has been constructed around
this agreement, it is important to provide some information on the content of this agreement, as it is
in its written form: On 28 May 1959, the World Health Assembly approved an agreement negotiated
between the WHO and the IAEA that was intended to regulate the interaction of the two agencies.
As the General Conference of the IAEA had already ratified the agreement on 1 October 1958, this
agreement entered into force the very next day, on 29 May 1959.950 Alongside such practical aspects
as the co-operation in technical or administrative fields (Article VI), reciprocal representation
(Article II) or the collection and exchange of statistical data (Article VII), this agreement also
regularized the modalities of co-operation and consultation between the two agencies with regard to
their topics in general. This was located in Article I of the agreement, which is quoted in its entirety
below: 
'ARTICLE I: Co-operation and Consultation 
1. The International Atomic Energy Agency and the World Health Organization agree that with
a view to facilitating the effective attainment of the objectives set forth in their respective
949 Fairlie and Summer, The Other Report on Chernobyl, p. 4.
950 Protocol of the IAEA-WHO Agreement: 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/inf20.shtml#note_c (last accessed: 15 November 
2013).
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constitutional instruments, within the general framework established by the Charter of the
United Nations, they will act in close co-operation with each other and will consult each
other regularly in regard to matters of common interest. 
2. In particular, and in accordance with the Constitution of the World Health Organization and
the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and its agreement with the United
Nations together with the exchange of letters related thereto, and taking into account the
respective co-ordinating responsibilities of both organizations, it is recognized by the World
Health Organization that the International Atomic Energy Agency has the primary
responsibility for encouraging, assisting and co-ordinating research and development and
practical application of atomic energy for peaceful uses throughout the world without
prejudice to the right of the World Health Organization to concern itself with promoting,
developing, assisting and co-ordinating international health work, including research, in all
its aspects. 
3. Whenever either organization proposes to initiate a program or activity on a subject in
which the other organization has or may have a substantial interest, the first party shall
consult the other with a view to adjusting the matter by mutual agreement.'951
The fact that such an agreement exists is not in itself exceptional. The IAEA as well as the WHO
have concluded a range of agreements with other international organizations, as is normal in the
field of international relations.952 This, incidentally, was the explanation the WHO Information
Office gave to concerned journalists in 2001, when these last had begun to investigate in this
agreement: 'The Agreement between WHO and IAEA follows the model of agreements concluded
between WHO and the United Nations or other international organizations […] Such commitment
does not in any way imply a submission of one organization to the authority of the other so as to
affect their independence and responsibilities under their respective constitutional mandates.'953 But
many activists do not believe that this official classification as 'normal working agreement' applies.
For example, in an open letter to the Director of Public Health and Environment of the WHO, the
NGO Women in Europe for a Common Future (WECF) argued that 'the wordings of the WHO-IAEA
Agreement of 1959 are not the same as the wordings in agreements concluded by the WHO with
other organizations, e.g. FAO, UNESCO or UNIDO. The WHO/FAO Agreement of 1948 requests
951 Article I of the IAEA-WHO Agreement: Ibid.
952 For the IAEA Relationship Agreements with Specialized Agencies, see: 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/inf20.shtml# (last accessed: 15 November 2013).
953 WHO Information Office, Statement WHO/06: 'Interpretation of the World Health Organization's agreement with 
the International Atomic Energy Agency, 23 February 2001: http://www.who.int/inf-pr-2001/en/state2001-05.html  
(last accessed: 15 November 2013).
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the two organizations to “consult each other regularly in regard to matters of common interest”,
which undoubtedly does not go so far as the WHO/IAEA Agreement of 1959 does by requiring
consultations “with a view to adjusting the matter by mutual agreement”.'954 
In order to assess the importance of the different wording in the every-day-work of these
organizations, it is necessary to conduct research that goes far beyond the scope of this study.
Moreover, no statement can be given here as to whether the WHO-IAEA Agreement actually
prevents the WHO from researching and publishing on the physical health effects of radiation. Any
answer to such a question would necessitate a detailed understanding of the work process and
cooperation between these two organizations. However, the question in this study is how this
agreement has been used over the last few years in the debate over the Chernobyl health effects:
The WHO-IAEA Agreement has become one of the most important arguments used by the anti-
nuclear side to call into question the official number of Chernobyl victims that was provided by
expert groups like the International Chernobyl Project or the Chernobyl Forum. All of these
evaluations were based on research conducted by WHO experts and have been systematically
promoted as independent expertise, compiled by people without any links to the nuclear industry.
However, if the WHO-IAEA Agreement is interpreted as a 'gag contract', an entirely different
interpretation of the claims made by these 'independent expert groups' comes to the force. At the
same time, it offers a convenient explanation as to why the WHO never took a strong stance in the
nuclear debate nor specifically supported research on health effects of low-level radiation. 
This interpretation has been fostered predominantly by activists of the group Independent
WHO. Ever since the April 2007 Chernobyl anniversary, this group has organized a permanent vigil
at the WHO headquarters in Geneva to raise awareness for this issue amongst people working for
and visiting the WHO.955 A central reason for why the campaign against the WHO-IAEA Agreement
is so closely linked to the Chernobyl debate lies in the fact that the founding members of
Independent WHO are contemporaneously the most prominent critical voices in the French as well
as in the transnational debate on Chernobyl health effects: Enfants de Tchernobyl Bélarus (an
association founded by some of the most important transnational Chernobyl activists: Solange and
Michel Fernex, Vassily Nesterenko, Galia Ackerman, and Wladimir Tchertkoff), the CRIIRAD, and
the Réseau: Sortir du nucléaire. The fact that the Swiss section of the IPPNW is a founding member
o f Independent WHO has to do with Michel Fernex's central role in this campaign. Fernex, an
Emeritus Professor at the Faculty of Medicine in Basel and a member of the IPPNW, is not only a
954 Women in Europe for a Common Future, Re: WHO/IAEA Agreement of 1959: 
www.wecf.eu/download/2010/04/letterIAEA-WHO.pdf (last accessed: 15 November 2013).
955 For further information on this campaign, see: http://independentwho.org/en/the-collective-independentwho/ (last 
accessed: 15 November 2013).
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prominent and well connected anti-nuclear campaigner, he is also the driving force behind
Independent WHO and at the same time the medical expert most often quoted with regard to the
IAEA-WHO Agreement, including Rebecca Harms in her foreword to the TORCH-report.956 
Due to the important role that many French anti-nuclear activists have played in the work of
Independent WHO, the IAEA-WHO Agreement has gained much visibility in the French Chernobyl
debate. For instance, the prominent French anti-nuclear activist and long-term spokesperson of
Réseau: Sortir du nucléaire, Stéphane Lhomme, openly integrated the agreement into his argument
in his 2006 publication: L’insécurité nucléaire: bientôt un Tchernobyl en France.957 Beyond the
circles of French anti-nuclear activists, a broader public learned of this agreement through a detailed
article written by Alison Katz, which was published in 2008 in the widely-read magazine Le Monde
Diplomatique.958 The debate over the IAEA-WHO Agreement has gained such popularity in France
that even pro-nuclear activists feel obliged to refer to it in their Chernobyl accounts – albeit, mainly
to dismiss the manner in which anti-nuclear activists have framed this agreement, classifying the
claims of these last as un unfounded conspiracy theory. Anne Lauvergeon's comment in her book
La troisième révolution énergétique is an illustrative example of this: 'The rejection of these
findings [the non-existence of a causal link between Chernobyl fallout and an increase in thyroid
cancer in a country like France] by anti-nuclear activists could lead to the belief that these findings
are the results of a complot orchestrated by international and national authorities, like the WHO,
UNDP and IAEA. Maybe, but I ask a simple and stupid question, what would be the aim of such a
conspiracy? [...] Since the drama of Chernobyl, the cumulated running time of all nuclear reactors
in the world represents 9,000 years without accident. Which other industrial sector can assert such
a balance?'959
Criticism of the IAEA-WHO Agreement has also begun to spread to the transnational debate
on Chernobyl health effects, especially through networks like the IPPNW. For instance, there is a
Spanish Wikipedia article on the IAEA-WHO Agreement.960 Although the Wikipedia article on the
956 Fairlie and Summer, The Other Report on Chernobyl, p. 4.
957 Lhomme, L'insécurié nucléaire, pp. 196.
958 Alison Katz, “Les dossiers enterrés de Tchernobyl,” in Le Monde diplomatique, March 2008: 
http://mondediplo.com/2008/04/14who (last accessed: 15 November 2013).
959 Lauvergeon and Jamard, La troisième révolution énergétique, pp. 133: 'La réfutation de ces données par les 
antinucléaires pourrait laisser croire qu'elles sont le fruit d'un complot orchestré par les organismes nationaux et 
internationaux comme l'OMS, le PNUD, l'AIEA. Soit, mais je pose une question toute bête, dans quel but se 
livreraient-ils à une telle conspiration? Les autorités et l'industrie mondiales ont tiré les leçons de la catastrophe. 
[…] Les réacteurs de la troisième génération proposées aujourd'hui au marché comportent les innovations majeures
en matière de sûreté. C'est particulièrement vrai du modèle EPR d'AREVA. […] Quant aux centrales de deuxième 
génération existantes, les résultats sont là. Depuis le drame de Tchernobyl, le temps de fonctionnement cumulé de 
l'ensemble des réacteurs nucléaires en service dans le monde représente plus de 9 000 années sans accident. Quel 
autre secteur industriel peut se prévaloir d'un tel bilan?'   
960 Wikipedia, Acuerdo WHA12-40 entre la OIEA y la OMS de 1959: http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Acuerdo_WHA12-
40_entre_la_OIEA_y_la_OMS_de_1959 (last accessed: 15 November 2013).
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Independent WHO only exists in French, it still illustrates that the campaign is supported by various
international critical Chernobyl voices: one picture, for instance, shows Chris Busby participating in
the permanent vigil at the WHO headquarters.961 Thus, with regard to the actors involved and the
issues at stake, the debate over the IAEA-WHO Agreement can be considered to be the incarnation
of the transnational Chernobyl debate: anti-nuclear activists from Eastern and Western Europe
campaign together against the international public authorities and call into question not only the
very basic premise of the global nuclear enterprise – i.e. that there are no effects of low-level
radiation exposure, as posited in the risk assessments carried out by the mainstream scientific
community – but also the way in which the international experts 'did (and do) science'.
961 Wikipedia, Independent WHO: http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independent_WHO (last accessed: 15 November 2013).
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3.4 Conclusions drawn from the analysis of the transnational Chernobyl debate
In 2006, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary, anti-nuclear campaigners around the globe engaged
in the debate on the Chernobyl health effects within the framework of the 'nuclear renaissance' –
which was advocated by the nuclear sector as well as by various national and international political
and scientific elites – and the contested official evaluations of the accident's impact published by
international organizations. Any statement on the health impact of Chernobyl is the direct result of a
particular way to assess and evaluate the risk of low-level radiation exposure. The question of
health effects from low-level radiation had been the subject of debate between pro- and anti-nuclear
activists long before Chernobyl. But the question of the health effects from Chernobyl provided this
controversy with a prominent public arena, and as the accident became less immediate and receded
with time, the question of the radiation's long-term health effects progressively became more of a
topic of scientific research. In 2011, the events in Fukushima in concomitance with the 25th
anniversary of Chernobyl fostered a further intensification of the debate on the health effects of
exposure to low-level radiation. At the same time, the debates on the health effects of Chernobyl
and the debates on the health effects of Fukushima became tightly interwoven as the evaluation of
the health effects and dose limits that had been applied in Japan elicited calls for comparisons with
Chernobyl. As the film by the WNA shows clearly, the comparison between Chernobyl and
Fukushima became a central argument in transnational pro-nuclear post-Fukushima campaigning,
as well. And also in various national contexts, pro-nuclear campaigners and the critical voices of the
Chernobyl debate have played a prominent role in the public Fukushima debates and the evaluations
of the accident. 
Through its role in the official evaluation of the Chernobyl health effects and the debate
about the IAEA-WHO Agreement, the IAEA increasingly came to be more of a focal point of
transnational anti-nuclear criticism. But the argument about the IAEA-WHO Agreement is not the
only aspect that spread transnationally through the actors of the Chernobyl debate. Other anti-
nuclear arguments, like the cover-up of the accident at Mayak, have made their way into various
national nuclear debates also through the transnational reception of critical voices of the Chernobyl
debate. 
As the debate on the Yablokov-Nesterenko Report makes particularly clear, the transnational
Chernobyl debate is not just concerned with a controversy on certain types of scientific reasoning
and scientific findings. What is disputed here is actually the very way science is being conducted.
Critical voices in the Chernobyl debate have argued against the language used in the official experts'
assessments, their focus on anonymous cohorts instead of individual victims, and the various
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comparisons applied to the death toll such as the smoking-topos and the 'natural' background
radiation argument. Moreover, what many of the critical voices of the transnational Chernobyl
debate have challenged is the way in which the official findings are produced with regard to
possible political restraints placed on certain studies, and importantly, to the very way in which the
scientific studies are carried out. In this regard, the question of whether or not the focus should be
placed on the individual or on an anonymous cohort has grown in importance. At the same time,
this question indicates that there is a clash between two competing ways to analyse the health
impact of Chernobyl: a toxicological approach that focuses on the impacts of a toxic agent on an
individual body, and a model-based epidemiological approach that focuses on the probabilistic
effects in an exposed group of people and comparisons between this last and a control group. As
Kate Brown has shown in her work on Mayak, these two contrasting ways to evaluate the health
effects of a radioactive contamination existed long before Chernobyl ever occurred. In the case of
Mayak, the initial toxicology-based approach taken by local Soviet doctors led them to frame their
findings with the concept of 'chronic radiation syndrome'. But their work was dismissed by Western,
mostly American, epidemiologists.962 Yet, the concept of 'chronic radiation syndrome' has once
more been taken up, this time in the Chernobyl debate by Eastern European physicians like Vassily
Nesterenko and Yuri Bandazhevsky, who have diagnosed this illness in children living in the most
affected regions. 
The uncertainties regarding the health effects of systematic exposure to low-level radiation
have resulted in various scientific endeavours into this highly politicized field. The leukaemia
cluster studies around nuclear power and reprocessing plants are a prominent example, but are, at
the same time, a highly contested one, not least because of the openly political background and the
political aim of these studies. In the evaluation of the long-term health effects of Chernobyl, the
same questions of causal links and accountability are asked. These will remain the same even in the
case of Fukushima as the debates on its effects unfolds in the years to come. The results obtained
through research on the effects of the radiation on the Hiroshima and Nagasaki survivors were the
basis upon which the models and parameters that are the basis of today's radiation safety policies
were established. This however has been criticized and challenged by the transnational nuclear
activists of the Chernobyl debate insofar as, according to them, the results of these models cannot
and do not apply to the Chernobyl context. Chris Busby's and Alexey Yablokov's work, which aims
to call into question these existing ICPR models are probably the most prominent examples of this
wider frame of reference within which the debate on Chernobyl health effects is embedded. In this
regard, the transnational Chernobyl debate has become a proxy war over the validity of
962 I am thankful to Kate Brown for discussing this topic with me.
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international standards and models of radiation protection. Whether the international efforts to fill
the knowledge gap on the health effects of low-level radiation which are currently being carried out,
for instance within the framework of the Multidisciplinary European Low Dose Initiative
(MELODI),963 will change the arguments of the actors of the transnational Chernobyl debate has yet
to be seen. 
For the time being, keeping the Chernobyl debate alive will continue to be a task of the
utmost importance for anti-nuclear campaigners and the Chernobyl solidarity movement.964 Efforts
to network and transnationalize the commemoration of Chernobyl, such as Chernobyl Day and the
European Chernobyl Network, stem from the fear that Chernobyl is being forgotten, and with it its
victims and the dangers of nuclear power that they have come to symbolize. If the plans to resettle
the evacuated zones are pushed forward, as well as the additional plans to transform the forbidden
zone into a nature discovery park,965 Chernobyl will essentially disappear as a geographic reference
point. Without this physical symbol, all of the Chernobyl campaigning by the anti-nuclear networks
and the solidarity movement would have to be reconceptualized. Key elements of the imagery used
to render the consequences of the radioactive fallout visible – i.e., the abandoned villages, the ghost
town of Pripyat – would no longer exist. It seems unlikely that the transnational anti-nuclear
movement would continue to be able to effectively point to Chernobyl as a means to strengthen
their position. And if the memory work conducted by these groups should cease to be carried out,
Chernobyl would also soon cease to be 'alive' as a site of memory and would disappear from the
collective memory. In a national context, the memory might continue to be accessible, but as has
been shown, these national memories have very different implications, and this would make it
extremely difficult for the anti-nuclear movement and the Chernobyl solidarity movement to find
universal guiding principles in these disparate forms of recollection. As a tourist attraction, interest
in the power plant and the city of Pripyat might continue to grow in appeal. However, it is unclear
whether these locations would then offer more to visitors than merely the experience of visiting
industrial ruins and a ghost town. 
963 For further information on the platform MELODI, which was funded in 2010 and unites 15 European radiation 
safety agencies and research institutes, see: http://melodi-online.eu/index.html (last accessed: 15 November 2013). 
The first concrete project that was conducted in this framework is the Open Project for European Radiation 
Research Area (OPERRA), financed through Euratom by the European Commission and coordinated by the French 
IRSN and the German BfS. For a project presentation, see: http://melodi-online.eu/doc/OPERRA_
%20Call_Launch_Meeting_Brussels_20012014%20%5BSchreibgesch%C3%BCtzt%5D.pdf (last accessed: 15 
November 2013).
964 The following paragraphs are an adaption of the conclusion of my article: Kalmbach, Chernobyl as a National and 
Transnational Site of Memory, pp. 157.
965 The final report of the Chernobyl Forum presented a proposal 'to explore the possibilities for promoting specialized 
ecological tourism' (Chernobyl Forum, Chernobyl’s Legacy, p. 57). The proposal is inspired by the fact that 
endangered animal species such as wild horses and wolves have flourished due to the lack of human activity in the 
restricted zone for many years.
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Chernobyl might very well cease to be a guiding reference for reasons other than the
disappearance of the geographical reference point that serves today as a concrete physical reminder
of the event, as reactions to Fukushima in spring 2011 demonstrated. The question of whether
Fukushima will replace Chernobyl coloured the debates surrounding the 25th anniversary of
Chernobyl. This speculation was inspired by the fact that in certain countries reactions to
Fukushima had similar political effects, and similar goals to those that were pursued in 1986.966 Yet
it is already clear that the status of Chernobyl is being re-evaluated as a result of Fukushima: the
narrative of a 'Soviet accident', that had been attached to the discourse surrounding Chernobyl from
the beginning, is slowly being displaced by the narrative of a 'universal residual risk', since the issue
of losing control over the technology, the difficulties of organizing mass evacuations, and the
credibility of the operators and the public authorities as well as the information they report can no
longer be explained away using Cold War rhetoric. It remains to be seen whether the narrative of
the 'universal residual risk' will be accepted as a satisfactory explanation or whether it will
eventually lead instead to a situation in which the entire nuclear industry is called into question.
966 Interestingly, the imagery that has been created around the Fukushima accident adheres to the example of 
Chernobyl, as for example in the photographs of empty playgrounds. See in this regard: De Tijd, Welcome to 
Fukushima, 12 March 2014, p. 14.
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IV AFTERWORD
Over the last few years, the question people have asked me the most with regard to my research
topic was: 'What do YOU think? How many people died because of Chernobyl?' Probably one of
the hardest things I had to learn while I carried out my research was to learn to answer this question
with conviction: 'I have no idea!' To many people it seemed strange that I had worked for years on a
topic without finding 'the truth', and even without attempting to find 'the truth'; or rather 'a black and
white truth' comprised of concrete numbers and a clear division separating the truth from the false. I
have to admit, it also often seemed strange even to me. These were the moments when I most
doubted my research project. In these moments I received much well intentioned advice. Basically,
this took the form of one or the other of two opposing strategies: One the one hand, I was given the
advice that I should take a clear stance in the debate; and on the other hand, I was to take more
distance from my topic. But neither of these strategies proved to be a solution. After six years of
reading hundreds of accounts on the impact of Chernobyl and learning the various arguments in this
debate and the different reasons why these arguments arose, I can only underline that there is no
such a thing as a 'neutral' point of view; and it would not have been helpful for my research to
pretend that I found this neutral point of view or to take a clear position in favour of a particular
actor or stance of the debate. At the same time, to view Chernobyl only as an abstract research topic
did not work either. I am emotionally involved in the debate regarding its impact, but my emotions
run high for multiple reasons: I cannot claim that I am not touched when I read the stories of Voices
from Chernobyl; and I do not think that it should be the aim of a researcher to loose all sense of
empathy. But I am also emotionally affected by the arrogance with which many actors in the
Chernobyl debate have brought forward their arguments, actors from both sides of the spectrum of
the debate. I speak of the arrogance and absolute certainty that comes with the belief that there is
only one possible point of view and that leaves no space for other arguments than one's own.
Another issue I found personally very hard to deal with is the exploitation and instrumentalization
of the 'Chernobyl victims' in this debate – again, by actors on both sides of the spectrum. These
people have to all effects been turned into laboratory animals in the scientific debate about the
health effects of low-level radiation. Whatever the health impact from Chernobyl radiation exposure
has been, is or will be, it will most probably never be agreed upon. But I believe there are other,
perhaps even more serious questions than identifying the exact number of the Chernobyl death toll
that merit our attention when we use 'Chernobyl' as an argument in the nuclear debate, regardless of
the position taken. And this central issue is the Chernobyl debate itself. It is a debate that clearly
illustrates the uncertainties implicit in the applications of science and technology, uncertainties we
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all must face in our daily lives, uncertainties that cannot be overcome with narrow, single faceted
answers. 
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V DEFINITIONS OF METHODOLOGICAL TERMS
Chernobyl debate:
The way in which accounts on Chernobyl differ and contrast one another is what I refer to as the
'Chernobyl debate'. Thus, this term stands for the variety of and relation between statements,
interpretations, and narratives on Chernobyl that have circulated in public discourse over time.
Chernobyl discourse:
I consider the Chernobyl debate to be a discursive field. Elements from other debates have been
imported to this discursive field, which have made it possible to assign meaning to Chernobyl. This
discursive field can be considered to be the wider frame of reference within which Chernobyl has
been interpreted. The most prominent of these related issues are: the national nuclear
polities/politics/policies, the general debates on the health effects of low-level radiation, and the
Cold War setting or context.
Chernobyl narrative:
A 'Chernobyl narrative' is a statement on Chernobyl made by an actor. A narrative consists of many
different elements, of which the following are central to this analysis: self-affectedness,
'radiophobia' versus 'apocalypse', and anti-Soviet/anti-Eastern European stereotypes. These
narrative elements reflect a certain position within the debates on national nuclear
polities/politics/policies, the general debates about health effects of low-level radiation, and the
Cold War setting or context.
Context:
The primary contextual elements within which I locate the national Chernobyl debates are: the
formation, role and status of nuclear 'experts' and 'counter experts'; the changes to the national
nuclear politics, policies and polities as well as to their pro-nuclear versus anti-nuclear orientation
during the researched time span; the shape, political role and protest culture of the anti-nuclear
movement; (the problematic issues of) the national fleet of nuclear power plants; and the
importance of charities.
Actor clusters:
The following four clusters constitute the basic structural reasons underpinning an actor's
involvement in the Chernobyl debate: public authorities (government, radiation protection
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agencies); nuclear industry (companies, associations); anti-nuclear groups; Chernobyl solidarity
movement groups.
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VI LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AEA – Atomic Energy Agency (short for: UKAEA)
AERO – 'Alternative' Environmental Research Organisations
ACRO – Association pour le contrôle de la radioactivité dans l’Ouest 
AFMT – Association française des malades de la thyroïde 
AFP – Agence France-Presse 
AGR – Advanced gas-cooled reactor
AIEA – Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique (= IAEA) 
ANT – Actor-Network Theory 
ASN – Autorité de sûreté nucléaire 
BL –  British Library
BNF – Bibliothèque nationale de France 
BNFL – British Nuclear Fuels Limited
CEA – Commissariat à l’énergie atomique 
CIRC – Centre international de recherche sur le cancer (= IARC) 
CEGB – Central Electricity Generating Board
CERRIE – Committee Examining Radiation Risks from Internal Emitters
CNRS – Centre national de la recherche scientifique 
COGEMA – Compagnie générale des matières nucléaires 
CORE – Cooperation for Rehabilitation
CORE – Cumbrians Opposed to a Radioactive Environment 
CRIIRAD – Commission de recherche et d'information indépendantes sur la radioactivité 
DGEMP – Direction génerale de l’Eénergie et des matières premières
DGSNR – Direction générale de la sûreté nucléaire et de la radioprotection
DGS – Direction générale de la santé
DoE – Department of the Environment
DSIN – Direction de la sûreté des installations nucléaires
ECRR – European Committee on Radiation Risk
EDF – Électricité de France 
EPR – European Pressurized Water Reactor
ETB – Enfants de Tchernobyl Bélarus
EU – European Union
FAO – Food and Agriculture Organisation 
FEFU – Fédération Échanges France-Ukraine
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FoE – Friends of the Earth
FRAMATOME – Société franco-américaine de constructions atomiques 
GSIEN – Groupement des scientifiques pour l’information sur l’énergie nucléaire 
HPA – Health Protection Agency
HSMO – Her Majesty's Stationery Office
IARC – International Agency for Research on Cancer (= CIRC) 
IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency (= AIEA) 
ICRP – International Commission on Radiological Protection
IGO – International Governmental Organisation 
INA – Institut national de l'audiovisuel
InVS – Institut de veille sanitaire 
INES – International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale
IPPNW – International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War
IPSN – Institut de protection et de sûreté nucléaire 
IRSN – Institut de radioprotection et de sûreté nucléaire 
MAFF – Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food
NAIIC – Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission
NGO – Non-governmental Organisation
NII – Nuclear Installations Inspectorate
NRPB – National Radiological Protection Board 
OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPRI – Office de protection contre les rayonnements ionisants 
OMS – Organisation mondiale de la Santé (= WHO) 
PACA – Région Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur 
PNUD – Programme des Nations Unies pour le développement (=UNDP)
PS – Parti socialiste
PWR – Pressurized Water Reactor (= REP) 
RBMK – Reaktor Bolshoy Moshchnosti Kanalniy 
REP – Réacteur à eau pressurisée (= PWR)
RIMNET – Radioactive Incident Monitoring Network
SCPRI – Service central de protection contre les rayonnements ionisants
SCRAM – Scottish Campaign to Resist the Atomic Menace 
STS –  Science, Technology, and Society Studies
TASS – Tyelyegrafnoye agyentstvo Sovyetskogo Soyuza
TORCH – The Other Report on Chernobyl 
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UKAEA – United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority 
UNDP – United Nations Development Programme
UNEP – United Nations Environment Programme
UN-OCHA – United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affaires
UNSCEAR – United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation
WHO – World Health Organisation (= OMS)
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